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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is about how Jonathan Dickinson (1663-1722), a second-generation 
Anglo-Jamaican planter and early-Philadelphian merchant, made sense of the mercurial 
and uncertain Atlantic world around the turn of the eighteenth century.  The following 
chapters examine Dickinson’s interactions with an extremely diverse group of European, 
Native American, and African peoples who collectively comprised a formative 
generation of colonial society in North America and the West Indies.  The main purpose 
of this dissertation is to provide a counterpoint to the many tautologous, whiggish, and 
nationalistic interpretations of Anglo-Atlantic history that tend to deemphasise the 
obvious disconnections, disruptions, discord, and diversity apparent during the late-
seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.  This dissertation further contends that 
individuals, driven by self-preservation and influenced by local circumstances, dictated 
the direction and the pace of many inter-colonial, inter-imperial, and trans-Atlantic 
developments familiar to the late-eighteenth century Anglo-Atlantic world.  In short, new 
exigencies outweighed custom, and self-preservation, rather than directives from 
metropolitan governments, guided Atlantic peoples’ actions.  By extension of individual 
actions, the nascent British Atlantic Empire began to take shape. 
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CHAPTER 1: SAME OLD ATLANTIC? 
 
This dissertation is about how Jonathan Dickinson (1663-1722), a second-generation 
Anglo-Jamaican planter and early-Philadelphian merchant, made sense of the mercurial 
and uncertain Atlantic world around the turn of the eighteenth century.  The following 
chapters examine Dickinson’s interactions with an extremely diverse group of European, 
Native American, and African peoples who collectively comprised a formative 
generation of colonial society in North America and the West Indies.  By analysing 
Dickinson’s social and commercial maneuvers through the uncertainties of this period, 
this work argues that contingency for unforeseen events was a fundamental organising 
principle of many early-Atlantic peoples.   
In very specific ways, local circumstances in three important Atlantic colonies—
Jamaica, Florida, and Pennsylvania—were manifest in interesting and instructive ways in 
the trove of documents Dickinson generated during his lifetime.  The plight of 
historically maraginalised peoples also receives considerable, albeit inadvertent, attention 
in Dickinson’s vast body of personal and professional correspondence.  Accordingly, the 
main purpose of this dissertation is to provide a counterpoint to the many tautologous, 
whiggish, and nationalistic interpretations of Anglo-Atlantic history that tend to de-
emphasise the obvious disconnections, disruptions, discord, and diversity that were 
apparent during the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries in the Anglo-Atlantic 
world.  By utilising Dickinson’s life trajectory as a lens to examine three broad 
historiographical themes—time, space, and structure—this dissertation further contends 
that individuals, driven by self-preservation and influenced by local circumstances, 
dictated the direction and the pace of many inter-colonial and trans-Atlantic 
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developments familiar to the late-eighteenth-century Anglo-Atlantic world.  In short, new 
exigencies outweighed custom, and self-preservation, rather than directives from 
metropolitan governments, guided Atlantic peoples’ actions.  Only by extension of 
individual actions, could the nascent British Atlantic Empire take shape. 
Periodisation underpins this dissertation.  Dickinson’s life spanned a 
fundamentally understudied period of early-American and Atlantic-world history, the 
period between 1655 and 1725, and in particular the 1690s through the 1710s.  The years 
on either side of 1700 are easily the least studied decades of all American history.  Ned 
Landsman has characterised the period as a ‘death valley’ of historical scholarship.1  
Despite the possibilities for interesting and un-replicated work many historians simply 
touch on these years in their studies while very few dedicate their attention solely to this 
transformative period.2  Therefore, this study focuses specifically on evaluating this 
historiographical disregard and the opportunities provided by analysing both the 
contemporary problems and the scholastic difficulties of this period. 
This subject and this period also provide an opportunity for scholars to step 
beyond the typical national boundaries of Atlantic history.  During this period, trans-
Atlantic relationships between mother countries and colonies were often ill defined and 
fluid.  As a result, colonists, either more willing or better suited to maneuver across 
                                                           
1 Ned Landsman, From Colonials to Provincials. American Thought and Culture, 
1680-1760 (Ithaca, 1997), p. xi. 
2 Notable exceptions include: Wesley Frank Craven, The American Colonies in 
Transition, 1660-1713 (New York, 1963); Ian Steele, The English Atlantic. An 
Exploration of Communication and Community, 1675-1740 (Oxford, 1986); Alan Gallay, 
The Indian Slave Trade. The Rise of the English Atlantic Empire in the American South, 
1670-1717 (New Haven, 2002); Richard Dunn, Sugar and Slaves. The Rise of the Planter 
Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1717 (Chapel Hill, 1972). Many other 
monographs take a slightly longer chronological period in order to study the social 
history of individual colonies during the eighteenth century.  
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imperial lines, developed relationships with a myriad of peoples who did not necessarily 
identify themselves as English.  The diversity of Atlantic world peoples is reflected in the 
diversity of their interactions.  During the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
the home government left the Anglo-Atlantic colonies largely unsupervised and 
unregulated.  Salutary neglect, the long-lasting British policy of avoiding strict 
enforcement of parliamentary laws to keep colonies obedient, is well studied.3  My work 
explicitly examines the period when England did not have a coherent imperial policy, or 
the ability to enforce one, revealing how relative isolation from England allowed for 
unique, yet complementary, inter-colonial and trans-imperial socio-economic trends to 
develop throughout the Atlantic world.4 
The contentious conditions of local milieus, I will argue, heavily influenced the 
trends that guided the development of disparate colonies around the Anglo-Atlantic.  
Furthermore, as a result of various political and economic struggles, colonists developed 
localised colonial identities that did not necessarily coincide with directions from the 
mother country.  Moreover, this quasi-independence helped create a generation of 
ambitious Atlantic-world peoples, like Jonathan Dickinson, who were forced to negotiate 
the exigencies of their lives in the colonies by reacting and creating avenues for 
contingency for the seemingly endless problems, turned opportunities, they faced as a 
result of this imperial neglect.  
                                                           
3 James Henretta, Salutary Neglect. Colonial Administration under the Duke of 
Newcastle (Princeton, 1972). 
4 Salutary neglect occurred in three time periods. From 1607 to 1696, England 
had no coherent imperial policy. From 1696 to 1763, England (and after 1707 the 
Kingdom of Great Britain) tried to form a coherent policy through the Navigation Act but 
did not enforce it. Finally, from 1763 to 1775, British policy-makers developed a 
coherent policy designed to rein in the unwieldy colonies and generate tax revenue after 
the Seven Years War. See Henretta, Salutary Neglect; Craven, The Colonies in 
Transition.  
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This dissertation is largely about the Anglo-Atlantic world because our main 
character is Anglophone.  The following chapters, however, also incorporate a number of 
different Atlantic colonies and their peoples.  Therefore, the following chapters examine 
Dickinson’s interactions from three European Atlantic colonies: Jamaica, Florida, and 
Pennsylvania.  I selected these three colonies for two reasons.  First, this dissertation 
utilises Dickinson’s life trajectory as an organising principle; therefore, his interests in 
these three colonies provide a logical methodological approach.  Second, and more 
importantly, these three colonies, Jamaica, Florida, and Pennsylvania, represented critical 
crossroads of international exchange.  Therefore, they provide several instructive 
examples that illustrate the exigencies of and contingencies for the issues various Atlantic 
world peoples faced during the turn of the eighteenth century.  For example, in the early 
1700s Dickinson turned his run-in with French privateers in the Bahamas and subsequent 
captivity in Saint Domingue into opportunity by developing trade with the under-supplied 
island.  While in Florida, Dickinson observed how Native Americans actively 
incorporated Europeans and their trade goods into their local world.  He further observed 
how captivity among Native Americans acted as a social leveler when several of his 
enslaved Africans openly criticised their white counterparts to gain material benefits from 
their Native American captors.  In Pennsylvania, Dickinson and some of his West Indian 
counterparts deliberately imported enslaved African despite an emerging anti-slavery 
sentiment expressed by fellow Quakers.         
The remaining sections of this introduction provide a framework for the 
proceeding analysis by exploring four questions.  First, who was Jonathan Dickinson and 
why study his life? Second, why study this period, 1655 to 1725? Third, why study these 
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three distinct places, Jamaica, Florida, and Pennsylvania?  Finally, why use the Atlantic 
world paradigm to explore, this man, this time period, and these places? 
Who was Jonathan Dickinson? 
 
Jonathan Dickinson was a West-Indian planter, a trans-Atlantic merchantman, an 
Atlantic-world traveler, a Quaker, a ship-owner, a slave-owner, a slave-trader, a 
smuggler, a bureaucrat, a judge, a Philadelphian mayor, a provincial representative, a 
father, a husband, a brother, a son, a real-estate speculator, a captive of Native 
Americans, a captive of French privateers, an author of a famous captivity narrative, and 
near the end of his life, an ambassador to the Five Nations of the Iroquois.5  Dickinson 
traveled to and maintained connections in many corners of the Atlantic world.  These 
                                                           
5 A vast body of primary sources including Dickinson’s many letter-books held at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania and the Library Company of Philadelphia supports the 
following biographical sketch.  Only three secondary sources offer sustained commentary 
on Dickinson’s life.  In 1945, Charles Andrews briefly sketched Dickinson’s biography in 
his notes as he prepared Dickinson’s journal for publication.  Unfortunately, Andrews 
died before he could annotate his biographical sketch; therefore his wife, Evangeline 
Walker Andrews, published his notes without citations to trace.  Evangeline Andrews and 
Charles Andrews (eds), Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal or God’s Protecting Providence. 
Being the Narrative of a Journey from Port Royal in Jamaica to Philadelphia between 
August 23, 1696 and April 1, 1697 (New Haven, 1945), pp. 124-32. Andrews also 
published a short article about Dickinson.  Most the material covered in the article is also 
covered in his notes for the journal.  Andrews, ‘God’s Protecting Providence: A Journal 
by Jonathan Dickinson’, Florida Historical Quarterly, 21:2 (1942), pp. 107-126.  In 
1997, a third work on Dickinson appeared in a much larger project that collected 
biographical information regarding Pennsylvanian legislators during the colonial period.  
Craig Horle’s biography of Dickinson has proved to be foundational in my research. 
From this essay I have traced many of Dickinson’s trans-Atlantic connections.  
Considering that Dickinson only appears in the footnotes of other scholarly work and 
considering the vast body of primary resources regarding Dickinson, this work is a 
masterpiece in its simplicity.  Horle explores many under-utilized sources and provides 
us with beautifully distilled version of Dickinson’s life in Philadelphia.  Craig W. Horle, 
‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Craig W. Horle, Jeffery L. Scheib and Joseph S. Foster (eds), 
Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania. A Biographical Dictionary, 1710-1756 
(Philadelphia, 1997), p. 309.  These scholars, however, generally fail to provide us with 
the larger context and importance of Dickinson’s life and his interactions with various 
Atlantic world peoples. 
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places included: from London, Bristol, and Madeira, to Pennsylvania, New York, 
Virginia, South Carolina, Jamaica, Antigua, Surinam, Curacao, the Central American 
coast, and Saint Domingue.  These many trans-imperial and trans-Atlantic affairs 
generated great prosperity for Dickinson; yet, misfortune visited him on numerous 
occasions.  Despite his mercurial balance sheet, Dickinson, along with his immediate 
family, actively managed the prosperity and peril of the late-seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries.  
By maintaining nearly 10,000 acres in Jamaica, a vast amount of real estate in 
Pennsylvania, and conducting trading affairs on four continents, Dickinson created a 
trans-Atlantic network that historians will find useful in explaining the development of 
the Anglo-Atlantic world.  The hard work of this first-generation Anglo-Jamaican and 
Anglo-Pennsylvanian created a legacy for several generations of Dickinsons thereafter.  
Yet, nothing for Dickinson, like the period in general, was certain.  His fortune and 
misfortune were intimately intertwined and within two decades of Dickinson’s death his 
entire trans-Atlantic estate was dismantled. Good, bad, or indifferent, Dickinson lived the 
Atlantic world. 
 Jonathan Dickinson was born in 1663 in Port Royal, Jamaica, the son of Francis 
and Margaret Dickinson.6  He was the grandson of the Anglican rector of Appleton, 
Berkshire, Reverend William Dickinson, and the nephew of Doctor Edmund Dickinson, 
an Oxford-educated personal physician of Charles II and James II.7  When Dickinson’s 
father, Captain Francis Dickinson, came to Jamaica, he was not particularly wealthy, but 
                                                           
6 Dickinson’s birth record remains undiscovered but working backward from his 
age (59) at the time of death (which is documented) it appears that he was born in 1663.  
7 Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, p. 124; Horle, ‘Jonathan 
Dickinson’, in Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania, p. 309. 
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he appears to have been, at least, well connected.8  Oliver Cromwell, for example, 
permitted Francis to raise a troop of horses for the ill-fated Western Design expedition of 
1654.9 
While the events of Jonathan Dickinson’s life before the 1690s are almost 
completely unknown, it is evident from his letters that he spent his adolescence and early 
adulthood splitting time between this family’s plantations in St. Elizabeth and their store 
in Port Royal.10  Growing up in the fields of the plantation and in the halls of the counting 
house in Port Royal, Dickinson experienced the prospects and perils of his father’s sugar 
planting and trans-Atlantic trade.  In 1685, Jonathan Dickinson married Mary Gale.11  
More than likely, Francis Dickinson and John Gale, another prominent merchant and ex-
military man living in Port Royal, made this match to solidify their trading relationship.  
Although Dickinson at some point acquired a house in Spanish Town and apparently 
worked in his father’s store in Port Royal, he hinted in 1698 that he was more familiar 
with the life of a planter.12   
 The 1690s in Jamaica, the subject of Chapter Two, was an enduring period of 
great uncertainty.  During this decade, slave revolts, inconsistent labor supplies, foreign 
invasions, disease, internal political squabbles, religious persecution, lack of support and 
                                                           
8 Harrold E. Gillingham, ‘The Estate of Jonathan Dickinson, 1663-1722’, The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of Biography and History, 59:4 (1935), p. 420. 
9 Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, pp. 3-5.  For the English 
conquest of Jamaica see: Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp.151-53. Carl Bridenbaugh and 
Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line. The English in the Caribbean, 1624-
1690 (New York, 1972), pp. 201-04. S. A. G. Taylor, ‘Military Operations in Jamaica, 
1655-1660, An Appreciation’, Jamaican Historical Review, 2:1 (1949), pp.7-25. 
10 This is a supposition gleaned from examining the tone of Dickinson thousands 
of personal and professional letters. He never clearly states where he spent the majority 
of his adolescence. 
11 Gillingham, ‘The Estate of Jonathan Dickinson’, p. 420.  
12 Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, p. 309. 
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supply from the mother country, and the resulting destruction of natural disaster 
combined in pushing the colony to the brink of collapse.  Accordingly, Dickinson 
decided to leave the struggling island for the bourgeoning mercantile port and Quaker 
haven, Philadelphia.  His journey to Philadelphia from Jamaica was perilous. 
Several weeks after departing Port Royal, Dickinson, (along with his wife and 
infant child, Jonathan, a Philadelphia ship captain, a Caribbean crew, and eleven enslaved 
Africans), was shipwrecked along Florida’s east coast.  The events along Florida’s east 
coast in 1696, the subject of Chapter Three, fundamentally altered Dickinson’s 
perception of the world and his position within it.  His journal, published as God’s 
Protecting Providence in 1699, relating the details of his interactions with several 
autonomous Native American peoples and their Spanish counterparts altered historical 
and ethnographic understandings of European and Native American interactions in the 
American Southeast.13  The physical, emotional, and financial hardships Dickinson and 
company faced during their two months in Florida proved to be only the beginning of 
Dickinson’s woes.  The journey resulted in a net loss of nearly £2,000.  Nearly destitute, 
Philadelphia’s Quaker society integrated Dickinson into their community by providing 
temporary positions in the provincial government, which they dominated. 
Dickinson and his family found it difficult to adjust to life in Philadelphia (the 
subject of Chapter Four).  His first business ventures resulted in significant financial 
                                                           
13 The full title of the first published edition: God’s Protecting Providence: Man’s 
Surest Help ad Defence In the time of the greatest difficulty and most Imminent danger; 
Evidenced in the Remarkable Deliverance of divers Persons, From the devouring Waves 
of the Sea, amongst which they Suffered Shipwrack, And also, From the more cruelly 
devouring jaws of the inhumane Canibals of Florida. Faithfully related by one of the 
persons concerned therein, Jonathan Dickinson (London, 1701).  Many scholars in 
history, anthropology, and literature have utilized the journal in their studies, but 
surprisingly, an Atlantic treatment of the journal, like that of Dickinson’s life, remains 
unwritten. 
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losses (at least £300) while bad markets, poor supply, and improper goods continually 
stymied his efforts to get ahead.  Yet, despite his initial hardships, Dickinson developed 
many important allies who supported his cause in the much larger and much more 
prominent Quaker community in Philadelphia and abroad.  His connections in Jamaica, 
however, proved to be his greatest asset.  The profits from sugar planting often balanced 
his other accounts, his speculation in Pennsylvanian real estate, and his interests in 
England. 
Dickinson spent several years traveling among Jamaica, Philadelphia, and several 
other Atlantic ports establishing important trade linkages.  Dickinson traded in a vast 
array of English, European, North American, and West Indian goods, everything from 
dry goods, spices, sugar, rum, molasses, beeswax, lumber, gunpowder, iron, and enslaved 
Africans and Indians.  In 1702, Dickinson, leaving behind his two eldest children, 
Jonathan and Joseph, in the care of family friends, Samuel and Rachel Preston, 
accompanied by his wife and their youngest son, John, returned to Jamaica for what was 
supposed to be a brief period.  Francis Dickinson’s death in 1704, however, extended the 
Dickinsons’ stay in Jamaica.  Dickinson and his growing family stayed in Jamaica 
splitting time between the plantations in St. Elizabeth Parish, the house in Spanish Town, 
and the merchant business in Port Royal.  Dickinson and his brother, Caleb, co-managed 
the family business after their father’s death.  Under Dickinson’s watchful eye, his sugar 
planting and trans-Atlantic trade, particularly that with Philadelphia, prospered.  After 
many arduous years, Dickinson recovered from the substantial losses associated with the 
shipwreck of 1696 and his initial mercantile failures in Philadelphia.  Dickinson was 
eager to return to Philadelphia with his growing family to enjoy the fruits of his labor.  
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Mary gave birth to her first daughter while in Jamaica and was pregnant with a fifth child 
when Dickinson and his family left Jamaica for the last time, aboard the ironically named 
ship, Happy Return, in the spring of 1709.   
Dickinson’s final Atlantic journey was as perilous as his first.  After being blown 
off course near Cuba, French privateers commandeered Dickinson’s ship.  The French 
privateers took Dickinson, his pregnant wife, their two adolescent children, and a 
prominent Quaker, Thomas Story, to the north shore of Saint Domingue where they 
confiscated the ship and its contents.  Dickinson’s time as a captive in the French West 
Indies fundamentally changed his world-view.  While at Léogane, the Dickinsons were 
treated kindly and were free to go about town.  During his meanderings Dickinson 
witnessed a need for trade in Saint Domingue.  He developed some connections and 
began trading to the island shortly after his arrival in Philadelphia.  Despite losing 
another small fortune in ship and cargo, Dickinson left Saint Domingue after a month.  
He travelled to Martinique, and then to Guadeloupe, where Mary gave birth to Hannah, 
Dickinson’s fifth child and second daughter.  She was the last of Dickinson’s children: 
two born in Jamaica, one in Guadeloupe, and two in Philadelphia.  Dickinson eventually 
made it back to Philadelphia via Antigua but not before developing relationships with 
prominent Quakers on that island. 
When Dickinson returned to Philadelphia, he was no longer a neophyte merchant.  
He had traveled and traded widely; he had survived several harrowing experiences; and 
he had developed a reputation among the Friends of Philadelphia.  From 1710 until his 
death in 1722, Dickinson remained in Philadelphia and continued expanding his 
commercial and political influence.  During this period, Dickinson embarked on a 
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significant political and mercantile career significantly influencing the commercial and 
political policies of the growing mid-Atlantic port city.  Dickinson continued to trade on 
a broad scale with England, Madeira, Jamaica, Curacao, Saint Domingue, Surinam, and 
Antigua importing and exporting an extremely diverse variety of goods, including 
haberdashery, cloth, bread, flour, sugar, rum, molasses, pork, rice, Indian corn, books, 
manufactured goods, and enslaved Africans. 
 To the dismay of some but not all Philadelphian Quakers, Dickinson was 
Philadelphia’s largest single slaveholder and one of the most active slave-traders in 
Pennsylvania during the first two decades of the eighteenth century.14  Dickinson, along 
with a small cohort of West-Indian Quaker merchants, advanced the institution of 
slavery, set the parameters for the trade, influenced legislation regulating enslaved 
Africans, and contended with the uncertain labor market in the Delaware River Valley. 
Dickinson’s vision of the Pennsylvania labor market, the subject of Chapter Five, was 
quite different from the image painted by the many scholars who argue that Philadelphia 
was a relative beacon of equality and prosperity during the eighteenth century.    
Well before his death in 1722, Dickinson frequently suffered from terrible bouts 
of gout.  He occasionally spent months at a time in poor health.  Nevertheless, he 
continued to play an active role in the management of his family plantations in Jamaica 
and his vast ownership of property in Pennsylvania.15  Inconsistent growing years in the 
West Indies, poor sugar markets in England, unreliable sources and markets in 
Pennsylvania, and over-speculation in real estate plagued Dickinson’s finances.  Despite 
                                                           
14 At one point in the 1710s, Dickinson owned more than thirty enslaved Africans, 
more than double that of any other prominent merchants in Pennsylvania. 
15 Dickinson owned more than two-dozen properties in Pennsylvania and spent at 
least £5,000 on real estate during the first two decades of the eighteenth century. 
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having close to £10,000 in tangible assets, Dickinson died nearly £4,000 in debt.  His 
deepest sorrow, however, arose from the death of his wife in 1719 and the subsequent 
misadventures of his children, tragedies from which he never seemed to fully recover.  
After Dickinson’s death, a lengthy legal battle, the subject of Chapter Six, ensued over 
the settlement of this trans-Atlantic estate.  This legal battle between Dickinson’s sons 
and the executors of his will lasted several decades. The episode that eventually outlasted 
all of Dickinson’s immediate family and two of three executors reveals the complexities 
of trans-Atlantic estate management.  The richness of the legal case adds greatly to our 
understanding of Dickinson, his family, and the nature of trans-Atlantic commerce in the 
early eighteenth century. 
Needless to say Dickinson was a very interesting figure.  His importance, 
however, derives from much more than the complexity of the events of his life.  The trials 
and travails of Dickinson are much more than an aberrant and interesting story.  While a 
number of Dickinson’s circumstances may be atypical, Dickinson illustrates an important 
representation of early Anglo-Atlantic peoples.  Dickinson’s life spanned a formative and 
transitional period of the Anglo-Atlantic world.  He often found himself in precarious yet 
defining circumstances.  He not only mixed with leading elements of Philadelphia 
society, but his Atlantic network of friends, co-religionists, and acquaintances stretched 
from England, the African coast, the northern coast of South America, throughout the 
Caribbean, and all along the entire North American Atlantic seaboard.  The events of his 
life involved a multitude of Atlantic world peoples: English, French, Spanish, Dutch, 
African, and Native American.  His fortune and misfortune was created by the 
opportunities and hindrances of operating across vast geographical spaces during a period 
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of great uncertainty, change, and exponential, yet inconsistent, growth.  There are very 
few figures historians can study that so perfectly illustrate the lived reality of the early-
eighteenth century Atlantic world. 
Dickinson provides us an opportunity to examine the development of what 
became the greatest English Caribbean colony, Jamaica, at a time when nothing was 
certain about Jamaica’s future.  He furnishes us with an opportunity to explore the 
complexities of a zone of international interaction along a European frontier, Florida, at a 
time when all parties involved—Spanish, English, French, and Native American—were 
being forced to define and redefine themselves and their relationships with one another in 
North America.  He offers us an opportunity to examine Philadelphia during its origins in 
a period when Quakers were forced to reconcile their material gains with their religious 
sentiments, when Quakers dominated Pennsylvania politics, and when they developed 
countless trans-Atlantic connections that launched Philadelphia to the heights of North 
America’s premier mercantile port. 
  A study of Dickinson also gives us a chance to explore a conflicted man.  
Dickinson was a slave owner and trader; he was a Jamaican planter and Philadelphia 
merchant; he was a father and a businessman; he was a captive and an ambassador; he 
was a wealthy merchant and a destitute county court clerk; he was a politician and a 
businessman; and, as a pious Quaker, Dickinson was driven by self-interest but also 
forced to reconcile his many interests and differences with his religious sensibilities.  The 
actions and repercussions of Dickinson’s trans-Atlantic life are the threads that weave 
this dissertation together. 
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Dickinson’s death in 1722 provides a stopping point for this dissertation.  
Serendipitously the British Atlantic world was a completely changed entity by this time.  
The 1720s saw a distinctive change in Atlantic life as many of the mercantile and 
planting ventures Dickinson was involved with started to really become profitable.  
Dickinson is our main character but the time in which he lived is our main subject. 
Why study this time period? 
 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Anglo-Atlantic colonies suffered from 
economic and political growing pains, religious discord, a number of international wars, 
rampant piracy, natural disasters, slave revolts, Indian wars, increasing economic and 
political constraints from the mother country, and the effects of the evolving disease 
environment.  Surprisingly, historians dedicate relatively little attention to the middle 
years of colonial American history; and, therefore the historiography of the entire Anglo-
Atlantic world around the turn of the eighteenth century suffers from a lack of sustained 
scholarship.  Despite the possibilities offered by this interestingly complicated period 
relatively little work has been done to explicitly explain the social, economic, and 
political transformations apparent at the turn of the eighteenth century.  The question is 
why do historians generally disregard this period? 
Several historians have offered suggestions as to why this period receives 
relatively little attention.  Jack Greene suggests that ‘early American historians have long 
appreciated the extent to which the decades on either side of 1700 were a time of special 
difficulty for the colonies’ and that these years ‘represented a low point in the exertion of 
the expansive energies of the settlers.’16  Trevor Burnard supports that suggestion: ‘one 
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reason for this comparative neglect might be that the years between 1675 and 1720 were 
years of particular difficulty for British settlement in the Americas.’17  Richard Dunn 
contends that ‘the expectations the English brought with them and the physical conditions 
they encountered in the islands [particularly Jamaica and Barbados] produced a hectic 
mode of life that had no counterpart.’18  Natalie Zacek argues, in her recent study of the 
Leeward Islands, that ‘as the seventeenth century drew toward its end, the Leewards 
remained small, crude, frontier societies that seems unpromising to potential settlers and 
investors alike.’19  More recently, Bernard Bailyn has characterized the early part of this 
period as ‘the barbarous years’ of American history.20  While a pervasive sense of decline 
enveloped the writings of contemporaries, these scholars suggest that this sense of 
decline in also evident in the writing of modern historians.21  Yet, these are a very few 
amongst many who articulate this perspective.      
Burnard also suggests ‘another reason for this comparative neglect of this period 
might be that the sources for studying this period are relatively limited.’22  Yet, while 
researching this project, it became evident that limiting my inquiry to documents written 
exclusively to and from Dickinson was the only way to keep the amount of 
documentation digestible for a singular study.  True, some of the sources utilised for this 
dissertation are fragmentary and disjointed but there are ample primary sources from the 
early eighteenth century that remain unexamined.  In the end, the source material for 
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studying Dickinson and his Atlantic world is extremely rich.  By virtue of Dickinson’s 
vast trans-Atlantic endeavors, documentation regarding Dickinson’s affairs is strewn 
across the periphery of the Atlantic Ocean particularly in archives in England and 
Pennsylvania.   
The bulk of Dickinson’s personal correspondence is located in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.  Having died in Philadelphia in 1722 and garnering a considerable 
reputation during his lifetime as a result of his mercantile prowess and literary fame, 
Dickinson’s documents found their way into the holdings of a prominent Philadelphia 
family, the Logans.  The Historical Society of Pennsylvania and the Library Company 
Philadelphia collectively hold more nearly 1,000 of Dickinson’s personal and 
professional letters.  The Library Company of Philadelphia also holds a considerable 
number of editions of Dickinson’s most famous historical piece, his journal of his 
captivity in Florida, published as God’s Protecting Providence.  Several manuscript 
versions of the journal are held at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania as well.  These 
editions provide the source material for this interesting and instructive episode along 
Florida’s east coast.  The Historical Society of Pennsylvania also holds a significant 
number of other documents regarding Dickinson’s estate, including several family wills, 
a number of business ledgers, and a few account books.  These documents provide 
insights into both his estates in Jamaica, as well as his vast trading endeavors based out of 
Philadelphia.  In England, the National Archives provide the majority of source material 
for treating Dickinson’s early life in Jamaica.  Official correspondence, governmental 
reports, and other colonial documents housed in the Colonial Office Series inform much 
of my discussion of Dickinson’s Jamaica.  Newspapers, correspondence from Dickinson 
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counterparts, and secondary literature touching on a multitude of Atlantic world topics 
round out the source base for this dissertation.   
Returning to the question as to why historians generally ignore the turn of the 
eighteenth century, Burnard further contends that this period ‘meets with such bad press’ 
because ‘there are few heroes to celebrate, no founders to compare with men who settled 
Massachusetts or even Virginia and no idealistic challengers to British rule that can be 
found in the revolutionary period.’23  While in some instances these charges may be true, 
this study of Dickinson’s Atlantic world proposes otherwise.  Furthermore, what the 
period lacks in heroes, it makes up in content.  The apparently average, mundane, routine, 
and ‘everydayness’ of Dickinson’s life is the essence of this study.  Understanding 
Dickinson’s world, his connections, and his struggle to survive in the malaise of the 
early-eighteenth-century Atlantic world is fundamental to our understanding of major 
historical turning points.  The period provides many opportunities to explore how 
colonists consolidated both political and economic power as the Anglo-Atlantic colonies 
rose from the ashes of the late-seventeenth century. 
Consequently, histories of the American colonies, the British Caribbean, and the 
British Atlantic may essentially be divided into two categories.  The first, and most 
exhaustive kind of study is the study of the founding of the North American colonies and 
their place within the history of the British Empire or early America.24  The study of the 
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period after 1750, firmly entrenched in the years of controversy that preceded the 
American War of Independence also garners much more attention than this uncertain and 
transformative period at the turn of the eighteenth century.  These particular trends are 
perplexing because they both appear to work backward from seemingly inevitable 
conclusions.  Many works on colonial America tend to promote the idea of a unique 
American identity by exploring and emphasising what was ‘exceptional’ about the 
thirteen American colonies.  Other studies, tied up in imperial-driven histories, seek to 
expound upon the grandeur of the British Atlantic Empire by examining the colonies and 
the mother country’s rise to prominence. 
At the most elemental level, periodisation underlines the arguments of this 
dissertation.  I am arguing that we should examine this transformative period during the 
years from 1655 to 1725 in order to bridge the gap between these two avenues of 
historical inquiry.  It is no longer intellectually sustainable to treat the origins of the 
‘glory days’ of the Anglo-Atlantic world without considering this most fundamental 
period of change and development.  It may be argued that all historically constructed 
periods are transformative in some way.  This dissertation, however, will illustrate that 
the Anglo-Atlantic colonies, and, for that matter, the view of the colonies from the 
metropole was one thing in the mid-seventeenth century, and it was something all 
together different by the beginning of the 1730s.  For example, Jamaica was no longer a 
struggling adolescent colony governed by military-men, pirates, and inexperienced 
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planters. During this period it became an emerging leader of the English colonial 
endeavor.  In the 1730s, Jamaica was a proper colonial plantation society with an 
established elite and a growing body of enslaved Africans.  By the 1730s, Philadelphia 
was no longer a nascent port town.  Instead, Philadelphia represented North America’s 
premier Atlantic port with connections in the West Indies, Africa, and England.  
Furthermore, as a result of this increased production and consolidation of power in 
England, imperial-minded men viewed the colonies as exploitable assets, which needed 
to be reined into the control of the metropolitan officials.  
All this considered, some scholars contend that during the early eighteenth 
century the Anglo-Atlantic colonies underwent massive transformations.  More than two 
decades ago, Ian Steele skillfully argued that ‘between 1675 and 1740 the development of 
communications encouraged, accompanied, and resulted from the creation of an English 
Atlantic economic, political, and social community’.25  Steele’s ‘shared experience’ 
provided the foundation for a proliferation of Anglo-Atlantic world studies that sought to 
illustrate connections across the Atlantic Basin.  Decades later, the idea that change was 
driven by directives from the mother country has begun to wane but many scholars still 
argue that in colonial societies, 
at the extreme peripheries of English civilianization, the one certain measure of 
achievement was the standards of the metropolitan center, and colonists 
everywhere manifested a strong predisposition to reinforce their claims to an 
English identity by cultivating metropolitan values and imitating metropolitan 
cultural forms, institutions, and patterns of behaviour.’26   
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Nevertheless, more nuanced approaches to the Anglo-Atlantic continue to emerge.  
Historians, searching for a more lucid explanation of Atlantic peoples’ actions, have 
begun to examine ‘stories of individual prosperity’ in order to explain how the 
acquisition of wealth and influence allowed the Anglo-Atlantic colonies to become 
lucrative and integrated parts of a whole.27      
Individual stories may not tell the entire story of the many trends of this period 
that proved to be so important in the reshaping of the contours of early American and 
Anglo-Atlantic history.  Typically, both micro and macro studies tend to focus solely on 
the ‘successes’ of the Atlantic world by highlighting the experiences of exceptional 
figures or exceptional places within the British Atlantic Empire.  Yet, England, prior to 
1697, did not have a clearly defined imperial policy.  More importantly, as Nicholas 
Canny argues, Great Britain, as a political entity, did not even exist until 1707.  
Moreover, a sense and definition of ‘Britishness’ remained elusive in the constitutive 
parts of the new United Kingdom, never mind the colonies, 3,000 miles across the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Thereafter, it took British policy-makers years to develop a strategy to 
contend with the dynamic nature of its widely dispersed overseas possessions and even 
longer to attempt to employ any concrete strategies, laws, or regulations to govern those 
places.28  Undoubtedly, internal conflicts in England about the nature of the monarchy 
and the role of Parliament at the close of the seventeenth century retarded the 
development of a coherent colonial policy.29 
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This period, if any, offers an opportunity to study the development of ‘Atlantic 
culture’ not an Anglo-Atlantic, or Franco-, or Spanish-Atlantic.  European conflict with 
Native Americans and the importation of enslaved Africans forced all three parties 
involved, Native, European, and African to reevaluate both their sense of self and also the 
nature of an increasingly dynamic Atlantic society.  It is important to remember that even 
though Native Americans were declining in total number, their role in this transitional 
period was anything but mute.30  This period offers an opportunity to study how the 
everyday experiences of ordinary people shaped the development of the Anglo-Atlantic 
world.  Historians cannot discuss the development of the Anglo-Atlantic colonies without 
considering the role of Native Americans, Africans, and other Europeans. 
The initial impetus for my doctoral research was to understand how and why the 
socio-economic developments of the late eighteenth century occurred.  Why did Great 
Britain rise to prominence?  Why was the trajectory of the colonies decidedly upward?  
In essence, what made the Anglo-Atlantic world so successful?  In pursuing this end, 
however, it became evident that by seeking out antecedents of the glory of the British 
Atlantic Empire I had fallen into the same trap as my predecessors.  This teleological 
approach forced me to unjustly categorise the peoples of North America, the Caribbean, 
and Africa and their interactions into a category of something that did not exist—
‘Britishness.’  Therefore, by treating Atlantic history within national boundaries I would 
be forced to imply that not only were the Anglo-Atlantic peoples and their colonies 
exceptional but also that individual successes, and by extension the successes of the 
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British Empire, were bound to outstrip other European colonial projects in both size and 
wealth.  
Therefore, in order to illustrate a more complete picture of the early eighteenth 
century Atlantic world, I needed to reconcile four facts.  First, the growth and prosperity 
of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was not inevitable.  Second, failures 
and disconnections, as much as successes and connections, contributed to the 
transformations of the early-eighteenth century.  Third, individuals on the ground vying 
for their own survival drove this process of growth.  Finally, individuals and their 
interactions with various other Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans, created the 
essence of Atlantic world history: diverse interactions, propelled by local circumstances 
and self-preservation, without an overstated emphasis on connectivity and metropolitan 
norms. 
 While contemporaries suggested that ‘the very simplicity and crudeness’ of 
colonial societies ‘seem to have fed a residual fear of the corrosive effects of the 
wilderness environment.’  Greene, citing Louis Wright, argues that there was always the 
possibility that colonists would ‘become either so absorbed in the business of making a 
living…or so overcome by cultural isolation from the larger Anglophone world that their 
societies would “insensibly decline.”’31  He further suggests that ‘the last decades of the 
seventeenth century through the first decades of the eighteenth century the colonies 
appeared to be in the trough of cultural decline’.32  Consequently, I argue here that this 
‘failure,’ relative to metropolitan standards, engendered many tangible opportunities for 
personal and colonial growth.  Therefore, colonists negotiated the uncertainties of the 
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period by making, as Greene suggests, an ‘adjustment of inherited forms and practices to 
make them congruent with local conditions’.  This adjustment proved to be their greatest 
asset.33  Still further, this type of ‘creolisation’ should be viewed, as John Smolenski 
argues, as not only adaptive but also ‘creative and generative.’  In essence, through this 
creative process, ‘individuals and groups constructed new cultural habits and identities as 
they tried to make Old-World inheritances “fit” in the New-World environment.’34  In the 
process, however, they engaged in various interactions, adaptations, and incorporations 
that engendered something altogether different from metropolitan norms.  
Undoubtedly, life along the Atlantic Ocean during this period was complicated by 
uncertainty; therefore, creativity, based on local circumstances, was the only way to 
survive.  Uncertainty, failure, disconnections, just as much if not more so as, certainty, 
success, and connectivity, provided many avenues for advancement.  Moreover, during 
this period these avenues were consistently inconsistent, and did not necessarily follow 
neat national boundaries, well-travelled trade routes, or formalised patterns of exchange 
that existed later in the century.  Here then the paradigm of Atlantic history, 
encapsulating many geographic regions and their peoples, proves indispensable. 
Why use an Atlantic framework?  
Carole Shammas suggests that for the proponents of the field, ‘Atlantic history carries 
fewer presuppositions about cultural hierarchies, [and] displays more openness to 
multidirectional effects of cross-cultural interactions.’35  I am further suggesting that for 
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this specific period it is a particularly effective tool to recover the international character 
of the Anglo-Atlantic world.  Atlantic history should involve, as Bernard Bailyn so 
eloquently puts it:  
a creative shift in orientation, from nationalistic, longitudinal, and teleological 
structures toward ‘horizontal’, trans-national, trans-imperial, and multicultural 
view as the mind’s eye sweeps laterally across the past’s contemporary world 
rather than forward to its later outcomes.36   
It must also be, as John Elliott suggests, viewed as a process of ‘creation, destruction, and 
re-creation of communities as a result of movement, across and around the Atlantic basin, 
of people, commodities, cultural practices, and values,’ in various place during different 
periods of interaction.37 
The explanatory power and suggestive implications created by the vision of the 
Atlantic region as a coherent whole are promising.  The interconnectedness of the 
Atlantic world colonies, however, should not be taken for granted.  As Europeans 
scattered into all the accessible parts of the Atlantic world as merchants, seamen, 
missionaries, scholars, posted army officials, government officials, and errant wanderers 
they discovered that experiences in one region could not be replicated in another.  Those 
experiences, however, certainly influenced subsequent interactions and decision-
making.38  The sea and coastal towns around the Atlantic Ocean became places where 
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people of different classes, races, and religions intermingled.  Enslaved Africans, Native 
Americans, indentured servants, ship crews, incorrigible governors, unqualified posted 
officials, indifferent proprietors, as well as, merchants and planters preoccupied with 
finding the best price, made for unruly subjects for all European governments.39  These 
individuals constituted a variety of multinational zones that interacted in a myriad of 
different cultural and socio-economic circumstances that varied according to time and 
place.  David Hancock reminds us that ‘it is important to remember that most people 
came to the colonies as a part of a maritime endeavor, trading company, plantations 
complex, or social, religious, or ethno-cultural group rather than as an instrument of an 
European nation-state strategy.’40 
With this dynamic population and its various personal and professional 
objectives, the Anglo-Atlantic world at the turn of the eighteenth century was far from 
integrated.  English-speaking people, and for that matter everyone, in this era dwelled in 
a chaotic and uncertain world where new exigencies overpowered custom.  Alison Games 
suggests that only by ignoring the particularities of different colonial societies, which 
were defined and altered by the presence of Native American and African populations 
and the proximity of Spanish, French, and Dutch colonies, may one see these colonial 
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societies as English.41  The peopling of England’s colonies by the inhabitants of four 
continents produced a heterogeneity that most fully signified what it meant to live in an 
Atlantic world.  This world was built on the ground and over the water, not in the dreams 
of proprietors, investors, or schemers in England.  It involved ‘the recruitment of a wide 
variety of peoples, their interactions, their conflicts, their partial absorptions, and their 
creation of new cultures’ that were no longer confined to the receiving end of trans-
Atlantic culture but helped to define it.42 
In defining this world, individuals took on the herculean tasks of clearing the 
land, draining the swamps, developing agriculture, domesticating livestock, and 
establishing commerce by creating self-organising networks that by the isolated nature of 
the colonies were decentralised.43  Both local circumstances and larger trends across the 
Atlantic basin guided the creation, maintenance, and destruction of these networks.  
David Hancock suggests that with an increase in the scale of transatlantic trade structures, 
decision-making and implementation were dispersed, often situated close to the action, 
and only loosely directed by governments in Europe and the colonies.44  Thus, people in 
the colonies were left to their own initiatives when developing connections.   
Individuals, sorting through personal endeavors, thoughtfully maintained these 
personal trans-Atlantic relationships.  It is important to remember, however, that while 
linkages, connections, and foundations of the British Atlantic took shape during this 
period, these connective strands were also tenuous, ephemeral, and required active 
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maintenance by all parties involved: individuals, social groups, and states.  Burnard, 
commenting on the nature of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, suggests that ‘networks, 
transatlantic connections, cosmopolitan attitudes, and flux and mobility can be a 
destructive as they are creative.’45  An investigation of the creation, maintenance, and 
destruction of transatlantic relationships will provide valuable insights into how the early 
eighteenth-century Atlantic world functioned on both local and larger Atlantic levels.   
Recent studies, such as David Hancock’s work on Madeira and Michael Jarvis’s 
work on Bermudian trade, illustrate the possibilities of examining oceanic connections 
across the Atlantic world.46  Jarvis skillfully illustrates how humble sailors and seafaring 
slaves operating small family-owned vessels were significant but underappreciated agents 
of Atlantic integration.  Hancock, on the other hand, painstakingly reconstructs the lives 
of Madeira-wine producers, distributors, and consumers, as well as the economic and 
social structures created by globalising commerce, to reveal the intricate interplay 
between individuals and market forces.  In both instances these scholars offer new 
perspectives on the economic and social development of the Atlantic world by 
challenging traditional interpretations that have identified states and empires as the 
driving force behind trade.  In essence, the work of these two scholars inspired this 
examination of Dickinson’s Atlantic world to further articulate how decentralisation 
provided opportunities for early Anglo-Atlantic peoples to develop self-organised 
systems that worked across imperial lines. 
Studying the entirety of Atlantic history, however, is nearly impossible.  The 
creation of separate ‘Atlantic worlds’ is a fundamental necessity because of the character 
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of colonialism.  The reasons for colonisation, circumstances both at home and abroad, 
and the relationship between colony and mother country differed according to the parties 
involved: European, Native American, and African.  The contemporary advantages, 
disadvantages, opportunities, and misfortunes of operating in different realms within the 
Atlantic illustrate that the early Atlantic was a dynamic milieu in which local and 
personal circumstances guided the actions of its people.  The people and their trans-
national experiences bound the Atlantic world together.  Scholars must remember that 
colonial edicts, treaties, trade regulations, and other crown policies often sought to divide 
people into neat ethnic, religious, or national categories, of which those being categorised 
may or may not have paid much credence.47 
Like these contemporary measures, critics of Atlantic history criticize historians 
in the field for dividing their histories into neat national categories while at the same time 
suggesting that a lack of cohesiveness between colonies makes it difficult to speak with 
any confidence about an Atlantic system.  Failing to transcend national boundaries has 
led critics to argue that Atlantic history is simply a repackaging of national or imperial 
histories.  John Elliott argues that historical compartmentalisation, partly because of the 
immensity of the task involved in mastering vast quantities of information in a variety of 
languages and partly because the contrasts between the experiences of it constitute parts 
are so striking, make any attempt to treat the various parts of the Atlantic world in unison 
difficult.48  The early eighteenth century, a critical period of change, crisis, and 
socioeconomic, and political solidification, however, provides an opportunity to study 
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Atlantic history before national boundaries, at least in North America and the Caribbean 
colonies, were clearly defined.   
Another charge leveled against Atlantic history is that a focus on those lands 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean deflects attention away from inland populations and their 
role in the Atlantic world.  Furthermore, with an explicitly Atlantic focus, historians 
seeking to illustrate the connections that tied the various areas of the Atlantic together do 
so at the expense of the development within discrete areas without much concern about 
how those connections and trans-national relations affected the internal histories of the 
areas they connected.49  One cannot study the early-eighteenth-century Atlantic world 
without giving due attention to inland populations, particularly Native Americans.  
Native Americans were clearly abreast of trans-Atlantic trends and European political 
maneuvers and used this trans-Atlantic awareness to their advantage in becoming active 
players in the developing Atlantic world.  Amy Bushnell suggests because Atlantic 
history focuses on ‘European and African Atlantic-crossers’, the settlers occupy the stage 
and the ‘natives stand in the wings’.50  Native Americans must no longer be the 
understudies of the Atlantic history, she suggests.  Although they did not ply the Atlantic 
Ocean, Native Americans and Europeans created, as Daniel Richter suggests, an ‘empire 
of goods’ knitting together their collective fortunes.51   
With these considerations in mind, Atlantic history does not have to be a 
repackaged version of imperial history.  By stepping beyond national Atlantic studies, 
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this work considers a set of shifting Atlantic worlds.  By examining various spheres of 
interactions, this study will reveal that gain for individuals, colonies, or social groups at 
large, often outweighed imperial policy in individual decision-making.  It may also 
demonstrate that personal relationships based on coincidence and religious or familial 
connections also heavily guided decision-making in the early-eighteenth-century Atlantic 
world. 
During the latter half of the seventeenth century, England’s Atlantic colonies, 
both in North America and the West Indies, faced several options that would lead toward 
success or failure.  They might develop into commercial ports, plantation societies, or 
hubs of manufacturing; their particular trajectories were based on how their populations 
integrated into the developing trans-Atlantic colony, the available natural resources, the 
proximity of Native Americans, and the influx of enslaved African laborers.  The 
following chapters discuss the socio-economic divergence of these colonies prior to their 
integration or disintegration in the British Empire of the eighteenth century.  Regionality 
and proximity to other European colonies affected the development of the British 
colonies in distinct ways.  The relationships with Native Americans and the importation 
of Africans influenced the economic and political agendas of the colonies.  Individuals 
and their own self-interest influenced the varied nature of the colonies’ internal 
development and their relationships with other British and non-British colonies.  But how 
connected were disparate parts of the Atlantic world and how dynamic were those 
connections?  What was involved in the creation of those connections and the destruction 
of others?  Is relative dependency of each colony upon one another only recognisable as 
an anachronistic projection of modern historians, or was it as Frederick Tolles posits ‘an 
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almost everyday experience of English speaking people of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries?’52  
Map 1: Dickinson’s Atlantic World 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Following the life trajectory of Jonathan Dickinson, the chapters of this dissertation are 
organised both topically and temporally.  Chapter Two, ‘Growing up Jamaican’, explores 
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the foundations of English Jamaica from the English conquest (1655) through the Port 
Royal earthquake (1692).  The focal point of this chapter, however, is the 1690s.  By 
examining the major problems that Anglo-Jamaicans faced during the 1690s, this chapter 
sheds light on an understudied period of Jamaican historiography through an exploration 
of a substantial period of socio-economic, political, and demographic growing pains.  
This chapter discusses that impact of international war and alliance making, internal 
squabbles—turned rebellion, weather, piracy, epidemics, threats of slavery, and religious 
persecution.  Ultimately, this chapter argues that Dickinson, forced to make a 
contingency plan for the uncertainty of Jamaica, relocated to the infant Pennsylvanian 
colony to buoy his family’s fortunes before they sunk into the uncertain abyss of late-
seventeenth-century Jamaica. 
Chapter Three, ‘Shipwrecked in the Atlantic’, departs structurally from the 
previous chapter.  This chapter addresses Dickinson’s most famous and well-studied 
historical episode, his shipwreck along Florida’s east coast during the fall of 1696.  For 
decades, Dickinson’s journal, published as God’s Protecting Providence, has provided 
the singular English language insight into European and Native American interaction 
along Florida’s southeastern coast during the late-seventeenth century.  This chapter 
examines this complicated event by addressing how the various historical actors, 
European, African, and Native American, reacted to their interactions with one another.  
Dickinson, like his African and Native American counterparts, was forced to develop 
contingency for other unforeseen events during the preceding two-month journey from 
present-day Jupiter Island to Spanish Saint Augustine.  This chapter presents Florida as 
an integral part of the Atlantic world while demonstrating that local circumstances often 
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superseded larger Atlantic currents.  More specifically, this chapter argues that a Native 
American awareness of the larger Atlantic world provided advantages that Native 
American groups utilised to maintain autonomy, as they became active players in the 
European struggle for control of the American Southeast.  Examining the relationship 
between Native Americans, different Europeans, and Africans in an area dominated by 
Native Americans will provide insight into how power and identity were fluid structures 
along this European frontier during this period.   
Chapter Four, ‘Negotiating an Uncertain Atlantic Marketplace’, examines how 
Dickinson actively exhausted every viable opportunity to advance his trading ventures 
despite a myriad of forces working against him.  This chapter further contends that 
Dickinson, along with a small cohort of West-Indian transplants, was largely responsible 
for initiating, developing, and maintaining one of the most significant trade relationships 
of the eighteenth century, the exchange between Philadelphia and Jamaica.  By 
examining how Dickinson contended with uncertain markets, poor supply, and 
inconsistent trade routes, this chapter presents early-Atlantic world traders as 
opportunistically challenging imperial norms and directives from the mother country as 
they carved out inter-colonial and inter-imperial relationships.  Examining Dickinson’s 
endeavors will provide insight into the trans-national nature of early-eighteenth century 
Atlantic trade and presents the future of Philadelphia just as uncertainly as that of 
Jamaica.      
Chapter Five, ‘Negotiating an Uncertain Atlantic Slave Market’, examines a 
critical and paradoxical aspect of Dickinson trans-Atlantic trading career.  By examining 
Dickinson as Philadelphia’s largest single slaveholder and one of the colony’s most 
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prominent slave-traders, the chapter challenges generally accepted ideas that from the 
start of colonisation Quakers in Pennsylvania were fundamentally opposed to the 
institution of slavery.  This chapter explores the uncertain labor market in early 
Pennsylvania to reveal that many Quakers, despite their religious sensibilities, eagerly 
employed enslaved Africans in an effort to propel the colony’s growth along the western 
frontier and across the Atlantic.  Ultimately, I am arguing that marketability, supply, 
quality, and profitability of trading enslaved Africans was more important to Dickinson 
than any nascent and marginal anti-slavery sentiments expressed by fellow Quakers.  
This chapter contends that Dickinson’s vision of Pennsylvania, shared by many other 
contemporary Pennsylvanians, was quite different than some historians have supposed.     
Chapter Six, ‘The Decline of Dickinson’s Trans-Atlantic Estate’, examines 
Dickinson’s personal and professional hardships during the final years of his life, the 40-
year legal battle surrounding his estate, and the estate’s eventual disintegration. This 
chapter provides a counterpoint to the many Atlantic-world histories that emphasise 
continuity, consistent growth, and increased interconnectivity.  In the end, this chapter 
explores Dickinson’s final struggle to contend with the uncertainties of the Atlantic 
world.  More a dénouement than a climax, the ordeal reveals several themes about 
Dickinson’s life.  First, this chapter seeks to personalize a largely impersonal Atlantic-
world narrative.  Much of Dickinson’s life was characterised by his resolve; yet, his 
ambition, in many ways, brought about the collapse of all he struggled to keep together.  
Dickinson’s tumultuous personal life at the end of the 1710s affected his ability to 
effectively manage his trans-Atlantic business.  The extension of Dickinson’s estate in 
Pennsylvania, the maintenance of his family, and poor production on his Jamaican estates 
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created cash-flow problems leaving Dickinson, his children, and the executors of his will 
in a precarious financial situation.  In the final act, the multi-generational struggle to 
settle Dickinson’s debts and the subsequent collapse of his estate serves to close our story 
of Dickinson’s Atlantic world.   
Individuals, like Dickinson, made choices and made connections that wove 
disparate elements of the empire together.  These early developments, the connective 
strands, and the disconnections of this period are the subjects of these chapters of this 
dissertation.  In the end during Dickinson’s life, the Atlantic world he functioned within 
was undergoing fundamental changes.  Sometimes he adjusted accordingly to his 
circumstances. Other times he was unable to contend with larger forces at work 
throughout the Anglo-Atlantic world.  Ultimately, Dickinson and his family paid some of 
the cost for the English colonies becoming Atlantic. 
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CHAPTER 2: GROWING UP JAMAICAN 
 
The Dunghill of the Universe, the Refuse of the whole Creation, the Clippings of 
the Elements, a shapeless pile of Rubbish confus’ly jumbl’d into an Emblem of 
the Chaos, neglected by Omnipotence when he form’d the World into its 
admirable Order.  The Nursery of Heavens Judgments, where Malignant Seeds of 
all Pestilence were first gather’d and scatter’d thro’ the Regions of the Earth, to 
Punish Mankind for their Offences.  The Place where Pandora fill’d her Box, 
where Vulcan Forg’d Joves Thunder-bolts, and that Phaeton, by his rash 
misguidance of the Sun, scroch’d into a Cinder.  The Receptacle of Vagabonds, 
the Sanctuary of Bankrupts, and the Close-stool for the Purges of our Prisons.  As 
Sickly as a Hospital, as Dangerous as the Plague, as Hot as Hell, and as Wicked 
as the Devil.  Subject to Turnadoes, Hurricanes, and Earthquakes, as if the island, 
like the People, were troubled with the Dry Belly-Ach.1 
In 1698, Edward (Ned) Ward, a popular English writer and perhaps the first early-
modern tabloid journalist, published a satirical piece (quoted above) critiquing the many 
unscrupulous promotional techniques aimed at recruiting people to settle the Anglo-
American colonies.2  Ward’s waggish characterisation of Jamaica not only critiqued how 
authors glazed over the dismal conditions in the colonies but also typified a prevailing 
                                                           
1 Edward Ward, A Trip to Jamaica. With a True Character of the People and 
Island (London, 1700), p. 14. 
2  Ward based this piece on a supposed trip to Port Royal, Jamaica in 1687 but 
direct evidence for the trip has yet to be discovered.  Richard Dunn suggests that the 
piece was based entirely on secondary sources. Ward’s, A Trip to Jamaica, appeared in at 
least seven editions and six within the first year.  Capitalizing on the work’s initial 
success, Ward expanded into a series of similarly styled trip-accounts covering New 
England, (which he did not visit as well), Islington, Sadler’s Wells, Bath, and 
Stourbridge. Richard Dunn, Sugar and Slaves. The Rise of the Planter Class in the 
English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill, 1972), p. 149. 
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metropolitan view of the colonies.3  Richard Dunn suggests that after fifty years of 
English occupation, Jamaica ‘had become a bad joke.’4  While Ward’s sardonic 
caricatures painted the colonies as unruly and uncivilized, he touched on many deep-
seeded and tangible issues faced by Anglo-Jamaican settlers at the end of the seventeenth 
century.5  Foreign wars and invasions, organised violence by freebooters, slave unrest, 
unstable labor forces, inconsistent growing seasons, local and trans-Atlantic political 
discord, devastation by natural disasters, and the steady erosion of life by disease were 
ever-present throughout the Caribbean during the colonial period.6  Unfortunately for 
Anglo-Jamaicans and their enslaved Africans, all these malignancies converged during 
the 1690s, nearly bringing about the collapse of the island’s tenuous socio-economic and 
political structures.  
The drama of the 1690s climaxed with the great Port Royal earthquake in 1692.7   
Contemporaries suggested that the divinely-inspired earthquake ‘threw down almost all 
                                                           
3 Richard Dunn, working from E.G.R. Taylor’s Late Tudor and Early Stuart 
Geography, 1583-1605 (New York, 1934) calculated that sixty-eight works were 
published describing the Caribbean, Guiana, or the Spanish Main, forty-two of which 
appeared before 1607. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 23. 
4 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 149. 
5 John E. Crowley suggests that ‘before the 1750s people in Britain…showed 
little need to know how the colonies actually looked’. Crowley, ‘A Visual Empire: 
Seeing the British Atlantic World from a Global British Perspective’, in Elizabeth 
Mancke and Carole Shammas (eds), The Creation of the British Atlantic, (Baltimore, 
2005), p. 283.  Richard Dunn suggests that ‘Englishmen who inhabited Barbados, 
Jamaica, and the Leewards during the seventeenth century rarely bothered to write 
descriptions of what they saw or did’. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 23.   
6 Carl Bridenbaugh and Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace beyond the Line. The 
English in the Caribbean, 1624-1690 (New York, 1972), p. 165; Dunn, Sugar and 
Slaves, pp. 149-50, 177-78.  
7 With over 4,000 inhabitants, Port Royal was the busiest port in Anglo-American 
colonies.  The frontier of Jamaica and its agricultural production, however, lagged far 
behind other more settled English colonies.  Port Royal and its expanding merchant 
community represented the only tangible asset in the island; the colony on the whole was 
in a precarious situation before, and especially after the earthquake. 
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the Houses, Churches, Sugar-Works, Mills, and Bridges through the whole Country,’ to 
smite the ‘wickedest city on earth.’8  Modern historians, however, have shown that the 
immediate effects of the earthquake were confined to Port Royal and the surrounding 
area and that the physical damage resulted from geological and architectural factors 
rather than divine judgment.9  The social repercussions of this natural disaster, however, 
reverberated throughout the colony well after the aftershocks subsided.  In short, the 
earthquake further exacerbated many long-standing issues Anglo-Jamaicans struggled 
with as they sought to codify their own internal social, economic, and political structures 
at the close of the seventeenth century.10   
During the first half-century of English occupation, Jamaica experienced 
considerable growing pains.  Unparalleled death among Europeans, brought on by 
perhaps the single worst disease environment in the Caribbean, created a host of 
problems which colonial elites were forced to confront.11  An unstable labor supply and 
                                                           
8 A Genuine Account of Earthquakes, Especially that at Oxford in the year 1683; 
and another Terrible One at Port-Royal, in Jamaica, In the Year 1692 (London: 1701); A 
True and Perfect Relation of that most Sad and Terrible Earthquake, at Port Royal in 
Jamaica (London, 1692); A full Account of the Late Dreadful Earthquake at Port Royal 
in Jamaica, written in two Letters from the Minister of that Place (London, 1692).  For a 
collection of several contemporary letters regarding the earthquake see: Henry J. Cadbury 
‘Quakers and the Earthquake at Port Royal, 1693’, Jamaican Historical Review, 8 (1971), 
pp. 19-31. 
9 For the most exhaustive account of Port Royal see: Michael Pawson and David 
Buisseret, Port Royal Jamaica (Kingston, 2000); Buisseret, ‘Port Royal, 1655-1725’, 
Jamaican Historical Review, 6 (1966), pp. 21-28.  For a more recent interpretation of 
geological and architectural factors of the earthquake see: Matthew Mulcahy, ‘The Port 
Royal Earthquake and the World of Wonders in Seventeenth-Century Jamaica’, Early 
American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 6:2 (2008), pp. 391-421.  For the impact 
of natural disasters in throughout the British West Indies see: Mulcahy, Hurricanes and 
Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783 (Baltimore, 2006). 
10 For political factionalism see: Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 156-62.  
11 John R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires. Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 
1620-1914 (Cambridge, 2010); Trevor Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society: Marriage and 
Demographic Failure in Early Jamaica’, Journal of Social History, 28:1 (1994), pp. 63-
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an unsettled frontier opened avenues for circumstances that retarded both the growth of a 
proper settler society and Jamaica’s integration into an expanding Atlantic economy.  
During this period, however, Jamaica began a considerable transformation, albeit slowly, 
inconsistently, and punctuated by conflict.  Jamaica transformed from a frontier society 
dominated by ex-English military men turned small planters and privateers, who were 
governed by martial law, into a well-settled plantation society dominated by a 
diminishing number of powerful white planters and their enslaved Africans.12  Through a 
number of political and economic struggles elite Anglo-Jamaicans created a proper 
colonial government and a proper plantation society but this chapter examines the 
struggle at its peak and what caused a considerable exodus of long-time Anglo-Jamaicans 
around the turn of the eighteenth century.   
In 1696, during the height of the chaos engendered by the earthquake, Jonathan 
Dickinson, aged 33, decided to relocate his young family and his mercantile affairs to 
Philadelphia.13  His father, Francis, remained behind to manage the development of their 
family holdings in St. Elizabeth Parish, Spanish Town, and what was left of Port Royal.14  
While Dickinson never explicitly stated why he decided to leave Jamaica in the 1690s, by 
examining the problems Anglo-Jamaicans faced during the period this chapter argues that 
                                                           
82; Burnard, ‘”The Country Continues Sicklie”: White Mortality in Jamaica, 1655-1780’, 
Social History of Medicine, 12:1 (1999), pp.45-72.  For a contemporary account of 
disease in Jamaica see:  
Trapham, Thomas Trapham, A Discourse of the State of Heath in the Island of Jamaica 
(London, 1679). 
12 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 149-187.  
13 Dickinson departed Port Royal, Jamaica on 23 August 1696. 
14 By the 1690s, the Dickinson owned nearly 10,000 acres in St. Elizabeth Parish, 
a counting house in Port Royal, and a secondary store in Spanish Town.  Charles 
Andrews and Evangeline Walker Andrews (eds), Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal or God’s 
Protecting Providence. Being the Narrative of a Journey from Port Royal Jamaica to 
Philadelphia between August 23, 1696 and April 1, 1697 (Hew Haven, 1945), p. 1-22. 
 46 
a number of factors combined in ‘pushing’ him to leave Jamaica.  By examining the 
reasons why Dickinson decided to leave Jamaica, this chapter illustrates that the future of 
Jamaica at the end of the seventeenth century was anything but certain.  On the whole, 
Jamaica was a terribly unsafe place to raise a family.  White mortality peaked during the 
1690s and people left the island in droves.15  Moreover, developing land and settling 
plantations along the southwestern frontier of Jamaica was dangerous and costly, while 
trans-Atlantic trade to and from Jamaica was typically inconsistent.16  Therefore, these 
circumstances forced Dickinson to look beyond the bounds of the island and across the 
Atlantic Ocean to ensure his personal prosperity.  
The 1690s was a distinctive period of decline in Jamaica, after which the island 
took a fundamental turning toward the prosperity of the late-eighteenth century.  This 
chapter seeks to understand the complexities of ‘growing up Jamaican’ in the personal 
sense of Dickinson’s family but also in a much larger context of the colony ‘growing up’ 
in an emerging Atlantic system.  While mid-eighteenth-century Jamaica was quite a 
different place than it was during the seventeenth century, Trevor Burnard suggests, ‘the 
success of the plantation complex in eighteenth-century Jamaica and the social structure 
that it engendered gives a degree of inevitability to its establishment and character in 
                                                           
15 McNeill, Mosquito Empires; Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society: Marriage and 
Demographic Failure in Early Jamaica’; Burnard, ‘”The Country Continues Sicklie”’. 
16 During the seventeenth century, Barbados was clearly the premier Anglo-
Caribbean colony.  David Eltis suggests that ‘Jamaica, by contrast, was settled later and 
gradually became a major sugar producer after 1670, so gradually, in fact, that by 1700 it 
was the Leeward Islands, not Jamaica that first threatened Barbados’ status as the leading 
sugar producer of the English Americas.’ David Eltis, ‘New Estimates of Exports from 
Barbados and Jamaica, 1655-1701’, William and Mary Quarterly, 52:4 (1995), p. 631. 
For the growth of the Leewards see: Stanley L. Engerman, ‘Europe, the Lesser Antilles, 
and Economic Expansion, 1600-1800’, in Robert L. Paquette and Engerman (eds), The 
Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion (Gainesville, 1996), p. 147-164; 
Natalie Zacek, Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 1670-1776 (Cambridge, 
2010).  
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Jamaica’.17  This chapter seeks to examine the colony independent of that ‘inevitability’ 
to better understand how Jamaica ‘grew up’ before the eighteenth century and relatively 
isolated from an Atlantic system.  Historians have only begun to uncover the social, 
economic, and political adjustments Jamaica experienced as it transformed from a colony 
on the verge of collapse into the ‘Constant Mine whence Britain draws prodigious 
riches.’18  Most historians typically study Jamaica during the eighteenth century and 
usually after 1750.19  Therefore, the second half of the seventeenth century as a distinct 
period, during which time fundamental changes took place that altered the nature of the 
eighteenth century colony, rarely receives adequate academic attention.20  This chaotic 
and understudied period provides a number of opportunities to examine several elemental 
changes in the nature of Jamaican society. 
This chapter posits four reasons why Dickinson decided to leave Jamaica in 1696. 
First, the earthquake changed the nature of Jamaican commerce and forced the 
Dickinsons, particularly Jonathan, to look beyond simply trading English manufactures 
for tropical produce to ensure their continued prosperity.  Jonathan, having grown up in 
Jamaica, undoubtedly realised that Jamaica suffered from a want of provisions, enslaved 
                                                           
17 Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society’, p. 64. 
18 Charles Leslie, A new and exact account of Jamaica (Edinburgh, 1740), p. 353 
quoted in Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire: Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in 
the Anglo-Jamaican World (Chapel Hill, 2004), p. 14. 
19 Notable exceptions include: Dunn, Sugar and Slaves; Susan Dwyer Amussen, 
Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society, 1640-1700 
Chapel Hill, 2007); Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line. 
20 There are some exceptions, most notably the work of Nuala Zahedieh. See, Zahedieh, 
The Capital and the Colonies. London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 
(Cambridge, 2010); Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in early 
English Jamaica, 1655-1689 (PhD dissertation, University of London, 1984); Zahadieh, 
‘The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655-1692’, 
William and Mary Quarterly, 43:4 (1986), pp. 570-93; Zahadieh, ‘Trade, Plunder, and 
Economic Development in early English Jamaica, 1655-1689’, The Economic History 
Review, 39 (1986), pp. 205-22. 
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Africans, and other goods that were not being readily supplied to the isolated colony.  
Consequently, Dickinson decided to pursue those essential goods in an effort to capitalise 
on an undersupplied market.  Therefore, he sought new markets and new produce from 
the North American continent.  Dickinson could have decided to relocate to Virginia, 
South Carolina, or New England, but he decided on Philadelphia.  His Quaker 
sensibilities may have drawn him to the only seemingly prosperous English colony at the 
turn of the eighteenth century.  The news and advice he received from recently relocated 
Anglo-Jamaicans about Pennsylvania may have also pulled him toward the mid-Atlantic 
colonies.  The increasing discrimination he, and his fellow Friends, endured in Jamaica 
may be a second reason Dickinson decided to leave Jamaica.  
Third, Jamaica became increasingly unsafe during the 1680s and 1690s and was 
under a constant threat of foreign invasion, particularly from the French.  That threat was 
realised in the 1694 when the French, spurred on by the chaos engendered by the 
earthquake, invaded the island and laid to waste large sections of the northern frontier 
and carried off hundreds of enslaved Africans.21  Invasions or threats of invasion meant 
that frontier settlement stagnated.  That stagnation ultimately hindered the development 
of a strong planter community and hampered their ability to extract the full potential of 
the island.  Fourth, the lack of a reliable labor force stifled the settling of plantations, and 
ultimately profits, for nascent middling planters who would be increasingly marginalised 
by large sugar estates during the first decades of the eighteenth century.  They quickly 
found themselves unable to take the next step to becoming large planters with sizable 
slave forces.  While white laboring-class and ex-military men sought to further their 
                                                           
21 David Buisseret, ‘The French Invasion of Jamaica, 1694’, Jamaica Journal, 
16:3 (1983), pp. 31-33. 
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interests off the island through privateering, slave traders did not sufficiently supply the 
island with enough enslaved Africans to counteract the drain on white labor engendered 
by death and emigration.  The supply of enslaved Africans to Jamaica was wholly 
inconsistent during the seventeenth century, but those Africans who did come to the 
island proved to be consistently rebellious. This rebelliousness further added to the 
uncertainty of frontier life for Anglo-Jamaica planters.   
Therefore, in the mid-1690s when all of these forces combined to bring about the 
near collapse of English power on the island, Dickinson, like many other Jamaicans, 
decided to leave for colonies with more economic potential and less social discord.  This 
collective emigration and the ever-present harbinger of death, tropical disease that 
lingered over the island brought the white population to its nadir in the late 1690s.  In 
short, Dickinson decided to leave Jamaica to seek better mercantile opportunities in a 
colony that was wholly accepting of, and for that matter dominated by, Quakers.  
Dickinson, however, did not turn his back on Jamaica.  Despite the many problems 
inherent in Jamaica, the island’s uncertainty provided many opportunities for ambitious 
men to make considerable profits.  The chaos and uncertainty of Jamaica in the 1690s 
was not solely a cause for concern.  It was also an opportunity to link the prosperous 
colony of Pennsylvania, and the mother country, England, to the fledgling colony adrift 
in the Caribbean.  
Problems with Building a Settler Society 
 
From the first days of the English conquest of Jamaica, Anglo-Jamaican settlers, enslaved 
Africans, and various other Caribbean wanderers faced the hardships of building the 
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infrastructure of Jamaica from the ground up.22  In 1660, the last retreating Spaniards left 
only a collection of dilapidated buildings in a single town, a few over-grown cacao walks, 
wandering herds of feral pigs and cows, and a substantial number of former slaves 
(turned rebels) living in the mountains.23  Governor Edward D’Oyley painted a dismal 
picture of Jamaica in 1660:  
all the frigates are gone, and neither money in the treasury, victuals in the 
storehouses, nor anything belonging to the State is left…the island has a sense of 
being deserted by their own country, which fills the minds of the people with sad 
and serious thoughts.24   
By 1663, the year of Jonathan Dickinson’s birth, Jamaica remained little more 
than an isolated military outpost.  The island contained fewer than 4,000 people including 
a small, but significant, number of enslaved Africans.  Vast expanses of wilderness 
occupied much of the island and very few plantations existed beyond the environs of Port 
Royal. Nearly a decade after the conquest, Anglo-Jamaican planters cultivated fewer than 
                                                           
22 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 149-187 
23 Francisco Morales Pardón, Spanish Jamaica (Kingston, 2003); H. P. Jacobs, 
‘The Spanish Period of Jamaican History: An Assessment of the Present State of 
Knowledge’ Jamaican Historical Review, 3:1 (1957), pp. 79-93; Frank Cundell, Jamaica 
under the Spaniards abstracted from the archives of Seville (Kingston, 1919).  For the 
English conquest of Jamaica see: S.A.G .Taylor, The Western Design: An Account of 
Cromwell’s Expedition to the Caribbean (London, 1969); Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 
20-23, 151-56; A.P. Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688 (New 
York, 1933), pp. 204-223; Cyril Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean (Cambridge, 
1972), pp. 68-91; C.H. Haring, The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the Seventeenth 
Century (Hamden, 1966), pp. 85-112; S.A.G. Taylor, ‘Military Operations in Jamaica, 
1655-1660’, Jamaican Historical Review, 2:1 (1949), pp. 7-25; James Robertson, ‘Re-
writing the English conquest of Jamaica in the late seventeenth century’, The English 
Historical Review, 117 (2002), pp. 813-840. J.L. Pietersz, H.P. Jacobs, and S.A.G. Taylor 
(eds), ‘Two Spanish Documents of 1656’, Jamaican Historical Review, 2:2 (1949), pp. 
11-35. For the impact of disease during the English conquest of Jamaica see: McNeill, 
Mosquito Empires, pp. 97-105. 
24 Public Record Office, CO 1/141, Lieutenant General Edward D’Oyley to 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, 26 July 1660, p. 51. 
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3,000 acres of a total of two and half million available acres.25  While the colonial 
government had established seven parishes, their boundaries were little more than lines 
on map.  Nascent plantations, hunter’s huts, and military outposts dotted the dynamic and 
varied landscape but much of the interior remained unsettled, inhospitable, or occupied 
by incorrigible maroon bands who further discouraged settlement.  By the eve of 
Dickinson’s departure from the island, the uncertainties of the 1690s had nearly erased all 
evidence of what little economic growth Jamaica experienced during the first three 
decades of English colonisation.26  
While Anglo-Jamaicans faced a host of hardships at the end of the seventeenth 
century, white mortality was by far the single largest obstacle to the development of 
Jamaica and probably was the factor above all others that prompted Dickinson to leave 
the island.  During the 1690s, an unstable white population discouraged further 
immigration, fostered considerable emigration, and created labor shortage problems.  
Nevertheless, despite high death rates, thousands of people migrated to Jamaica during 
the first few years of settlement.  Most did not survive the unfavorable conditions on the 
isolated island.27  In 1660, D’Oyley feared that ‘sickness would reduce their already 
small numbers.’28  Four years later, Thomas Modyford suggested that the ‘place is 
generally healthful’ but ‘near the mouths of great rivers and in the low valley grounds, it 
is very feverish to new comers’ during the summer months and ‘anguish’ during the 
                                                           
25 PRO, Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, 1663-1709, p. 20  
26 David Eltis, ‘New Estimates of Exports from Barbados and Jamaica’, pp. 631-
648 
27 In 1670, Sir Thomas Modyford suggested several other reasons why people 
were failing to pursue permanent settlement in Jamaica including rumors that the island 
was to be sold to the Spanish and that the King intended to impose new taxes on the 
native commodities before exportation. 
28 PRO, CO 1/141, Lieutenant General Edward D’Oyley to Commissioners of the 
Admiralty, 1 June 1660, p. 7 
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fall.29  Another letter from 1664 lamented an ‘uncommon mortality’ during the summer 
months.30  Modyford also concluded that certain settlements were worse than others, 
particularly ‘at Port Morant by which many perished’ from disease.31  The death of 
newcomers was certainly worse during particular periods and at particular places, but 
people died in droves in Jamaica throughout each year.32  Trevor Burnard and Richard 
Dunn suggest that before 1661 perhaps as many as ‘12,000 English people came to 
Jamaica.’  By 1662, however, only 3,600 people remained on the island.33  Therefore, this 
initial demographic failure, as Burnard suggests, was not a result of a lack of immigration 
but rather a result of the migrants’ ‘inability to withstand, perhaps, the worst disease 
environment in the Atlantic colonies.’34 
   
                                                           
29 PRO, CO 1/18, A view of the condition of Jamaica, attested by Governor Sir 
Thomas Modyford, 1664 October 1, pp. 258-61. 
30 PRO, CO 1/18, Extract of a letter from Jamaica, 1664, p. 262. 
31 PRO, CO 1/18, A view of the condition of Jamaica, attested by Governor Sir 
Thomas Modyford, 1664 October 1, pp. 258-61. 
32 Conversely, Dunn suggests that ‘Port Royal was a healthier community than 
Bridgetown [Barbados] in 1680, probably because it was free from mosquitoes and hence 
malaria’.  Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 181. 
33 Burnard, ‘European Migration to Jamaica’, William and Mary Quarterly, 53:4 
(1996), p. 772.  McNeill suggests that shortly after the conquest the English ‘imported 
thousands of beggars, vagrants, and prisoners from the British Isles.’ McNeill, Mosquito 
Empires, p. 100. 
34 Mortality varied annually due to severe outbreaks of epidemic disease, 
especially yellow fever.  Jamaican society was especially propitious for the spread of 
yellow fever.  Ironically, the very things that made Jamaica prosperous and which 
encouraged ambitious Englishmen to cross the Atlantic to the tropics were the primary 
contributors to the dreadful demographic conditions that rendered white settlement in 
Jamaica uncertain.  Burnard succinctly relates the irony: ‘the ships that carried West 
African slaves to Jamaica in increasingly large number after 1670 also brought with them 
the mosquitoes that had the yellow fever virus.  Planter cut down forests to grow sugar, 
decreasing the number of birds that were natural predator of mosquitoes.  Consequently, 
the mosquito population surged.  Moreover, sugar refining required clay pots.  Many of 
these pots were discarded and left out in the rain, collecting rain water that prove ideal for 
the breeding patterns of mosquitoes’.  Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society’, pp. 63-82; 
Burnard, ‘The Countrie Continues Sicklie’, pp.45-72. 
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Dickinson’s father, Royal Navy Captain Francis Dickinson, however, was one of 
the lucky few who survived the unforgiving ‘seasoning period’ after his arrival with the 
English conquest of Jamaica in 1655.35  By 1660, the original invading force of over 
7,000 men, as contemporaries suggest, was transformed into a ‘relic of the army, [a mere] 
2,200.’36  Unlike a large portion of his military counterparts, Francis eschewed a life as 
privateer and began a merchant business in Port Royal but he represented the minority.37  
By the early 1660s, very few of Francis’ colleagues showed an interest in settling the 
frontier, most were dead, some had deserted, and a few, mainly officers, had managed to 
get sent back to England.  The conquering army was in such a wretched state because 
most of the officers and soldiers plundered and mutinied instead of working and 
planting.38  Short of supplies, they slaughtered the wild cattle indiscriminately and 
refused to plant provisions.39  Their wastefulness led to scarcity of food that further 
exacerbated the problems of disease and death.40  As a result of the harsh disease 
environment, lack of supplies, and the difficulty of financing, clearing, and planting 
plantations, a majority of the former military men and early settlers from other Caribbean 
                                                           
35 Mc Neill suggests that ‘within three weeks some 3,000 men were sick, and in 
six months the original force of 9,000 men had dwindled to 3,720, of whom more than 
2,000 were “sick and helpless”’. McNeill, Mosquito Empire, p.100. 
36 PRO, CO 1/14, Long Report concerning Jamaica, November 1660.  McNeill 
suggests that by 1660, ‘only some 2,200 troops remained of the roughly 10,000 
committed to the Jamaica campaign…[and] probably 6,000 to 8,000 died of disease’. 
McNeill, Mosquito Empire, p. 101.  
37 Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, p. 5.  
38 Verene Shepherd suggests that ‘the mutinous attitude displayed by the early 
English soldiers and which was aimed at forcing Cromwell to abandon Jamaica as a 
possible English colony did not have the desired effect.’ She further suggests that ‘by 
1657, conditions in the island had reached crisis proportions.’  Verene Shepherd, 
‘Livestock and Sugar: Aspects of Jamaica’s Agricultural Development from the Late 
Seventeenth to Early Nineteenth Century’, The Historical Journal, 34:3 (1991), p. 630. 
39 Shepherd, ‘Livestock and Sugar’, pp. 629-31; S.A.G. Taylor, ‘Military 
Operations in Jamaica’, p. 7. 
40 Haring, The Buccaneers in the West Indies, p. 91. 
 54 
Islands turned toward plundering or sought their fortunes off the island after pillaging 
what little resources left by the retreating Spaniards.41  Therefore, those surviving Anglo-
Jamaicans and their immigrant counterparts quickly gained a very poor reputation. 
Contemporaries characterised the West Indians who joined the invading army as ‘raw 
souldiers, Vagabonds, Robbers, and runagate servants’.42  Other early commentators 
suggested that ‘these islands must be [populated by] the very scum of scums, and meer 
dregs of corruption.’43 
Consequently, encouraging people to settle and plant the island proved to be a 
very difficult task for the governors and promoters of Jamaica especially when 
privateering was such an attractive alternative.44  The year of Dickinson’s birth, 1663, 
Deputy Governor Lyttelton, who was aching to get out of Jamaica, wrote to Secretary Sir 
Henry Bennet ‘wishing he could say the planters had also increased’, but ‘not more than 
200 have come.’  He further lamented that ‘the year ha[d] been very sickly, and carried 
away great number.’45  The detrimental effects of disease prompted the local government, 
as early as 1661, to implement provisions regulating people who wished to leave the 
island.  The Governor and Council of Jamaica ordered that ‘no person leave the island 
                                                           
41 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 153. 
42 PRO, CO 1/17, Charles. Lyttelton, Deputy Governor, to Sec. Sir Henry Bennet, 
15 October 1663, pp. 205-06. 
43 A brief and perfect Journal of the late Proceedings and Success of the English 
Army in the West Indies continued until June the 24th, by I. S. an Eye-Witness (London, 
1655), p. 11. 
44 For a general survey of Jamaica’s governors see: Frank Cundall, The Governors of 
Jamaica in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1936); Cundall, The Governors of Jamaica 
in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1937). 
45 PRO, CO 1/17, Sir Chas. Lyttelton, Deputy Governor to Sec. Sir Henry Bennet, 
pp. 205-06. 
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without his name be up in the Secretary’s office for 21 days, all underwriting cleared.’46 
That same session the Governor ‘prohibited any merchant…to leave the island or take 
away any person without a ticket from the governor’ under the exorbitant penalty of 500 
pounds of sugar.47   
Despite these terrible conditions, Francis, his new wife, Margaret Crooke, and 
their infant son, Jonathan Dickinson, built a life in Jamaica during the late-seventeenth 
century.  Initially, Francis cut his cloth as a small-time merchant.  Despite being granted 
large tracts of land for his services during the conquest, Francis initially lacked the capital 
necessary to start a sugar plantation.  He, like many others, turned to trade.  This trade, 
both licit and illicit, as Nuala Zahedieh aptly argues, financed the growth of Jamaican 
plantations but that growth was largely inconsistent until the eighteenth century.48  
Successfully adding to his holdings, Francis invested in plantation land along the 
southwestern frontier and began to expand both his trading ventures and his considerable 
plantations.  Francis represented an archetype; governors and colonial officials hoped 
others might emulate his accomplishments.  He was English-born; he contributed to the 
economic growth of the colony; he condemned privateering; he used the profits from his 
mercantile business to develop plantations along the frontier; he married an English 
woman and started a family, all extraordinary feats considering the circumstances.  
                                                           
46 PRO, CO 1/140, Orders of the Governor and Council of Jamaica 2-3 July 1661, 
pp. 5-98. 
47 PRO, CO 1/140, Orders of the Governor of Jamaica, pp. 17-20. 
48 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in Early Jamaica, 
1655-89’, p. 222. 
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Francis and Margaret’s marriage and family was extraordinary for two reasons.49  
First, considering the highly imbalanced sex ratio, the simple fact that they were able to 
find suitable partners in Jamaica is remarkable.  In 1662, less than 650 white women 
resided in Jamaica alongside nearly 2,600 white men; at four to one, women were 
extremely scarce when Francis married Margaret.50  In some parishes, especially along 
the frontier and in parishes that were simple military outposts, the sex ratio was even 
more highly imbalanced.  Along the southwestern frontier near the Black River and 
Bower-Savanna, men out numbered women eight to one.  In Ligeanea, the heart of 
plantation country, men comprised sixty-seven per cent of the population.  In Port Royal 
the ratio of men to women, at two to one, was more balanced but was still unfavorable for 
finding a potential mate.  In 1673 the figures across the colony mirrored those in Port 
Royal during the 1660s with around 2,000 white women and 4,000 white men living in 
the colony.51  
Second, the fact that their marriage resulted in a child who lived to adulthood was 
nearly astonishing.  Furthermore, Francis and Margaret had three other children, and 
three of the four led full adult lives well into their fifties, nothing short of a demographic 
miracle.  Genetics must have played a part because Francis also lived a long-life in 
contemporary terms; he died in Jamaica at age seventy-two, but earned immunity was 
also crucial.  The Dickinson children were exposed to tropical diseases such as yellow 
                                                           
49  Francis married Margaret Crooke, daughter of Stephen Crooke, in early 1663 
several months before she gave birth to Jonathan. 
50 PRO, Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, p. 20.  
51 PRO, Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, p. 40. 
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fever at early ages and the immunities they developed as a result put them at a massive 
comparative advantage compared to adult immigrants.52 
Consequently, Jonathan Dickinson and his siblings, Mary, Caleb, and Jabez, were 
part of a very fragile first generation of Jamaican-born creoles.  During the Dickinsons’ 
first thirty years on the island, tens of thousands of people died, including many children.  
In 1662, only an estimated 400 children lived in Jamaica.  Logically, fewer women 
translated to fewer children.  Only twelve children resided along the southwestern 
frontier while in the ‘Angles quarters’ where the sex ratio was five to one, there were 
only fourteen children.  In Port Royal, children comprised thirteen per cent of total white 
population.53  Ultimately, children were scarce nearly everywhere because they were 
much more susceptible to the disease environment than their adult counterparts.  The 
paucity of children in early Jamaica doomed most families to be, at best, one- or two-
generational.54    
It is impossible, however, to know exactly how many children were born in 
Jamaica, and how many immigrated to the island.  In 1670, the year Francis and 
Margaret’s third child, Caleb, was born an estimated 714 white families lived in Jamaica.  
Total population estimates for that same year range widely between 4,000 and 10,000 
meaning that the average family was comprised of between five and fourteen people, 
depending which figure is used.  This seems to be an overestimate in either the 
population figures or the number of families and the discrepancy may be a result of a 
number of indentured servants living in Jamaica tabulated in the population figures but 
                                                           
52 See McNeill, Mosquito Empires. 
53 PRO, Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, pp. 20, 40. 
54 A child will survive yellow fever while adults often do not, but children suffer 
high mortality from neo-natal tetanus (lockjaw), intestinal diseases, and of course 
malaria. 
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not in the household figures. Nevertheless, these figures are clearly not representative of 
the actual institution of the family in Jamaica during the 1660s and 1670s, which begs for 
scholarly attention.55  Even so, given that an average marriage lasted less than ten years 
and less than forty per cent of marriages left surviving children, the size of Francis and 
Margaret’s family and the duration of their marriage was highly unusual.56   
The repercussions of the fragility of marriage and childhood in Jamaica made the 
chances for the growth of a native-born settler population almost nonexistent because, as 
Burnard suggests, the ‘crucial factor determining family size was length of marriage’.57  
Moreover, these conditions worsened as the seventeenth century drew to a close and as 
plantation society took shape because enslaved Africans came to dominate the population 
and small family planters were replaced by absentee planters and immigrant managers.58  
The 1690s, with large numbers of deaths and out-migration, represent the demographic 
nadir of Jamaica during the seventeenth century.  The effects were so widespread and 
destructive that the white Jamaican population remained stagnant for nearly thirty years 
after the 1690s.  The importation of tens of thousands of enslaved Africans changed the 
nature of Jamaican society and as a result of the increasing number of Africans and 
decreasing number of whites the constitution of the Jamaica population became a major 
concern for the governors and other leading elements of Jamaica.  Despite the island 
                                                           
55 See Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society’. 
56 Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society’, p. 69. 
57 Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society’, p. 69. In fact, the Dickinson family grew 
exponentially. At the time of Francis’s death, in 1704, he had four grandchildren. Fifteen 
years later, Jonathan and Caleb had a total of ten children combined, all of whom lived in 
either the mid-Atlantic colonies or England.  Figure one presents four generations of 
Dickinsons. Within two generations, the profits generated by Francis, Jonathan, and 
Caleb’s trans-Atlantic business affairs facilitated the Dickinson’s settlement into gentry-
life in England. 
58 Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire. Thomas Thistlewood and His Slaves in 
the Anglo-Jamaican World (Chapel Hill, 2004); Dunn, Sugar and Slaves. 
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politicians’ intense concern about the low level of white immigration, little systematic 
data survive about population or about annual arrivals or departures.59  Four censuses 
were taken during the period from 1680 to 1730—a number of these records are 
fragmentary, incomplete, or only present gross population totals.  Thus, establishing 
accurate figures of white population levels and migrant flows is fraught with difficulties.  
Table One presents the best tabulation of estimated population figures for the total 
population. 
Table One: Population Estimates for Jamaica, 1655-1730 
Year Total Number of 
Whites 
Total 
Number of 
Blacks 
Total Population 
1655 c. 7,000  ----- ----- 
1658 4,500 c. 1500 ----- 
1660 c. 4,000 ----- ----- 
1661 2,956 514 3,470 
1662 3,653 552 4,205 
1664 2,900-5,000 ----- ----- 
1670 4,200 (+c. 1,500) 2,500 Ca. 8,200; (15,108) 
1673 7,768 9,504 17,278 
1676 c. 7,500 c. 15,000 c. 22,500 
1693 7,365 40,635 c. 48,000 
1698 c. 7, 365 c. 40,000 47,365 
1730 8,230 75,535 83,765 
  35% 
remained in 
the colony 
 
The data for this data was excised for both primary and secondary sources including: 
Haring, The Buccaneers in the West Indies, p. 92; PRO, CO 1/14, Long Report 
Concerning Jamaica, November 1660, pp. 125-40; Noel Sainsbury (ed.), Calendar of 
State Papers, Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1661-1668 (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1880); PRO, Journals of the House of Assembly of Jamaica, 1663-
1826, app. 20; PRO, CO 1/18, Lt. Col. Thomas Lynch to Sec Henry Bennet (Lord 
                                                           
59 The Jamaican government made occasional attempts to foster white settlement 
in the island by passing deficiency laws.  Those attempts were futile and were often 
resisted by the planters.  Dickinson wrote to Isaac Norris complaining about these laws 
that fined owners of enslaved Africans and specified livestock in proportion to the 
number of white men employed. Dickinson devised a plan around these regulations that 
will be addressed below.  
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Arlington), pp. 154-55; PRO, CO 1/18, An account of the state of Jamaica by Sir Charles 
Lyttleton, pp. 264-65; PRO, CO 1/25, Account of present state of Jamaica given in to 
Sec. Lord Arlington by Chas. Modyford, 22 January 1670, p. 5; PRO, Journals of the 
House of Assembly of Jamaica, pp. 28, 40; PRO, CO 1/36, Peter Beckford to Secretary 
Williamson, 26 January 1676, pp. 17-18; PRO, CO 137/4, Beeston to Council of Trade 
and Plantations, 13 October 1698, pp. 225-26; J.W. Fortesque (ed.), Calendar of State 
Papers, Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1697-1698 (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1904), pp. 474-76; Burnard, ‘European Migration to Jamaica’, p. 772. 
 
Since natural increase was essentially out of the question, Jamaican promoters and 
politicians constantly struggled to encourage people to come to the island.  This 
demographic failure fundamentally altered how Anglo-Jamaicans developed plantations, 
established commerce, and promoted security for the island.  In 1660, with the population 
steadily declining, the Earl of Marlborough offered several suggestions to make Jamaica 
a more attractive proposition.  First, he suggested that there be some small vessel readily 
available in the Caribbean to those who might want to relocate.  He also wanted to 
encourage the Royal African Company to make Jamaica ‘a staple for the sale of blacks.’  
Beyond this he supposed that granting religious toleration, allowing island commodities 
to be duty free, and supplying the islands with servants, goods, arms, stores, and women 
might also generate interest in settling the island.60   
English officials also attempted to entice people by offering favorable conditions 
to settle in the island.  The King sent a petition to New England with incentives to 
immigrate to Jamaica.  He offered ‘land [twenty acres to every male over twelve years 
old]…without payment of rent for seven years.’  He also offered a three-year tax holiday 
on their goods, their growth, and their manufactured goods.61  That same week the 
                                                           
60 PRO, CO 1/14, Proposals concerning Jamaica from Earl of Marlborough, 
 1660 November, pp. 123-24. 
61 PRO, State Papers 25/76, The above instructions to the Governor and 
inhabitants of New England, 26 September 1655, pp. 304-06. 
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Council of State began organising a venture to provide provisions, clothing, 
medicaments, tools, and other necessaries for settlers already in Jamaica.62  By the winter 
of 1661 the King extended his land policy to ‘30 acres of land to every person male or 
female, above 12 years of age, who shall reside’ in the island.  In exchange the King’s 
officials required the grantees to ‘serve in arms upon any insurrection, mutiny, or foreign 
invasion.’63  New immigrants, albeit in small numbers, joined the dwindling number of 
soldiers that comprised the remainder of the nearly 7,000 military men that landed as part 
of the expedition against the Spanish.  They, like their military counterparts, died in 
droves.  For example, in December 1656 the Council of State requested that D’Oyley 
invite the sixty English Protestants from Eleuthera, who fled Bermuda amidst religious 
persecution, to Jamaica, and promised to clothe and provide victuals and other 
accommodation for them.64  That same year, Luke Stokes, the elderly governor of Nevis, 
transferred to Jamaica with 1,600 people.  Unfortunately they choose to settle in the 
Morant Bay area, which was particularly unhealthy; within a year Luke Stokes and two-
thirds of his companions were dead.65  Thomas Modyford came to the island from 
Barbados with nearly 1,600 settlers in 1664.  Jamaica received other injections of settlers 
from around the Caribbean, particularly Suriname during the 1670s.66  Their numbers, 
however, were simply not enough to counteract the drain on life in Jamaica.   
                                                           
62  PRO, State Papers 25/76, Order of the Council of State, 27 September 1655, 
pp. 310-11. 
63 PRO, CO 1/15, The King’s proclamation for encouraging of planters in 
Jamaica, 14 December 1661, pp. 183-84. 
64 PRO, SP 25/77, The Council of State to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
English fleet in America, 23 December 1656, p. 949. 
65 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p.123 
66 PRO, CO 1/35, pp.101-02, 178-86. 
 62 
Anglo-Caribbean migrants, however, represented the minority.67  During the 
1670s and 1680s fewer than 2,000 white colonists and 3,500 enslaved Africans migrated 
to Jamaica from other English Caribbean islands.  A large majority of those migrants 
came during the 1670s with fewer than 200 whites and 500 Africans arriving during the 
second half of the 1680s.68  Burnard has illustrated that most new emigrants to Jamaica 
came from England.  Burnard’s study of the period from 1660-1770, with a sample of 
over 3,000 migrants, illustrates that eighty-six per cent of people arriving in Jamaica 
came from England.69  Colonists from other British colonies in the West Indies and North 
America comprised less than two per cent of the total combined. 70    
In the end, the extent of mortality among whites was so great that a transition to a 
self-perpetuating white native-born population never occurred.  Jamaica was unable to be 
transformed into a settler society and remained dominated by sojourners well into the 
first decades of the eighteenth century.71  Moreover, the arrival of unseasoned troops and 
                                                           
67 Sir Thomas Modyford suggested that the Privy Council encourage the 
governors of the Windward Island, especially Barbados, to encourage superfluous 
planters and servants to come to Jamaica by forbidding the establishment of new 
settlements and suppressing false scandals.  He also suggested that they incline the 
nobility, gentry, and merchants to settle plantations while encouraging the Royal 
Company to send ‘plenty of negroes.’  Sir Thomas Lynch had high hopes for Jamaica: 
‘Young colonies, like tender plants, should be cherished and dealt easily with, it being 
better to put soil to their roots than to pluck too early fruit. If Jamaica have easy 
government, be defended from enemies, and supplied with negroes and servants, and 
have no privateering, in six years it may produce as much sugars as Barbadoes.’  
68 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Development’, p. 214 
69 Attempts at populating the colony, from England, with white immigrants 
persisted formally until well into the eighteenth century, but a combination of factors 
ensured the failure of such attempts.  For most Europeans the climate was not the most 
hospitable and the frequency of natural disasters promoted Jamaica’s poor reputation.  
Disease, many of which were endemic to the island, took a heavy tool on newcomers.  
Strife and constitutional conflicts with the mother country resulted in great insecurity, 
which was intensified by the frequent slave revolts.  
70 Burnard, ‘European Migration to Jamaica, 1655-1780’, pp. 769-96. 
71 Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society’, pp. 63-65. 
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settlers from England made matters worse, because they became chronically sick and 
helped spread diseases already present in Jamaica into the civilian population.  In essence 
this demographic problem led to a shift in the composition of Jamaica’s planter class by 
wiping out the small planter class in Jamaica.  The ranchers, cotton planters, and 
provision farmers who died at the turn of the eighteenth century were not replaced and 
their lands were turned over to neighbouring planters who expanded their holdings and 
essentially forced small planters out of the market.72   
By the 1690s, the Dickinsons were not ‘small planters’ anymore but the decline of 
small planting opened up opportunities to import provisions from other colonies. 
Therefore, the repercussions of white mortality offered Francis Dickinson an opportunity 
to expand his holding in Jamaica to nearly 10,000 acres of plantation land.  By the 1690s, 
Jonathan held a large interest in the island. He was also a newlywed with an infant child.  
Ever-present death was probably quite unsettling to the new father but it was not the only 
problem Anglo-Jamaicans faced at the end of the seventeenth century and several other 
factors combined to push Dickinson from his well-settled home in Jamaica. 
Problems with Pirates and Privateers 
 
Anglo-Jamaican officials constantly struggled with sustaining a population on the island 
during the seventeenth century.  Without a settled population the majority of the island 
remained a frontier, and in turn, unprofitable and vulnerable to attack.  To combat the 
issue of insecurity, Jamaican officials looked toward outsiders for protection.73  The first 
                                                           
72 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 164. 
73 Without a naval squadron Jamaica’s position was extremely vulnerable ‘circled 
with the enemy’s countries.’  Barbados and the Leewards were too far away to render 
assistance if Jamaica were attacked.  Although it took only a week from east to west, a 
voyage eastwards from Jamaica to Barbados tacking against trade winds usually took 
seven to eight weeks. Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean, p. 74. 
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governors of Jamaica, until Thomas Lynch in the 1670s, greatly favored and assisted 
Caribbean-based buccaneers especially after English naval support deserted the island.74  
These outsiders proved to be a double-edged sword for Jamaican society.  On one hand, 
pirates/privateers provided a much-needed defense of the infant colony, as well as a 
steady supply of plunder and bullion for the island.  Some historians argue that the 
exploits of buccaneers made Anglo-Jamaicans relatively self-sufficient and provided the 
capital necessary to develop large sugar estates.75  On the other hand, the attractions of 
piracy also enticed many would-be settlers to a life at sea that promised quick returns 
rather than one on the plantation.76  Piracy, privateering, and, later, foreign invasion 
proved to be more immediate threats when former protectors of the colony 
                                                           
74 Former officers of Penn and Venables carried out some of the first raiding 
missions on the Tierra Firme coast, notably at Santa Marta and Riohacha.  Certain official 
participants displayed some ambivalence about these raids, and a few, such as the short-
lived governor Robert Sedgwick, even denounced them as dishonorable.  Jamaica under 
Edward D’Oyley was unabashedly pro-buccaneer and D’Oyley participated in or 
sponsored a number of raiding missions until his removal in August of 1661.  Lord 
Windsor, D’Oyley’s replacement called in all older privateering commissions only to 
promptly replace them with his own commissions, ensuring his cut of the pirate proceeds. 
75 Marcus Rediker suggests that ‘buccaneering, usually associated with the 
dazzling exploits of Henry Morgan, was a source of substantial wealth during the early 
years of English settlement in the “Carbey Island”’.  From 1655 to 1671, Morgan and his 
raiders to sack eighteen cities, four towns, and thirty-five villages in New Spain. Rediker, 
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-
American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, 1987), p.58.   
76 Dunn suggests that ‘between 1655 and 1689 there were two Jamaicas: the 
agricultural colony and the buccaneer’s rendezvous’. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 177.  
Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh suggests that ‘buccaneering siphoned off the most 
adventurous, pugnacious, and greedy of the landless males of the crowed English islands. 
The prospects of booty and plunder from cities of the Spanish Main, let alone the promise 
of three meals a day with plenty of meat, sufficed to attract them to the seventeenth-
century Foreign Legion based on Tortuga. Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace 
Beyond the Line, p. 176.   
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indiscriminately began attacking Jamaican shipping as well as isolated plantations on the 
northern coast and southwestern frontier.77 
From the first days of the English conquest, Jamaica represented an attractive 
base for sailors who lived ‘beyond the line.’78  Located in the heart of the Spanish 
Caribbean, Jamaica was ideally situated to attack Spanish shipping lanes and settlements.  
Attacking ships and settlements, however, posed two problems.  First, the home 
government’s policy regarding raiding settlements and shipping lanes directly related to 
whether or not England was at war with other European countries.  Therefore, the 
distinction between pirate and privateer blurred according to crown policy.  Across the 
ocean many pirates/privateers, spurred on by ambitious colonial governors, acted without 
paying much credence to directions coming from the mother country.  Moreover, in 
retribution for English sponsored attacks, foreign raids and attacks certainly brought 
about unwanted counterstrikes on Jamaican plantations and shipping.  On the other hand, 
if England lost control of the seas, Jamaica, the most isolated frontier in the Anglo-
Caribbean, would be highly vulnerable to foreign attack.  The trade winds that brought 
news, goods, and the fleet from Barbados or Antigua in less than a fortnight were the 
same winds that could bring an invasion overnight from the French or Spanish 
communities on Hispaniola.79  Jamaican shipping lanes ran the gauntlet of all the 
                                                           
77 Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh suggest that ‘ attacks on or by the Spanish, 
Dutch, French, or aborigines (Carib Indians) occurred so frequently that there were 
deemed to be normal happenings’. Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the 
Line, p. 165. 
78 Piracy had been a part of the English involvement in the West Indies since the 
sixteenth century, when fierce Elizabethan sea dogs, epitomized by Sir Francis Drake, 
marauded the Spanish Main. From this and other armed confrontations came the phrase 
‘no peace beyond the line.’ Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, pp. 57-8. 
79 Ian Steele, The English Atlantic. An Exploration of Communication and 
Community, 1675-1740 (Oxford, 1986), p. 29. 
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Caribbean freebooters in peace and all the same enemies battle-dressed as privateers in 
war.  Therefore, Jamaica needed to be more self-sufficient than other English Islands.80   
Considering these issues, Governor D’Oyley lured away a number of English and 
French pirates from the northern shores of Hispaniola and encouraged them to make Port 
Royal their home port.  He counted on gaining naval protection and some revenue from 
their exploits, while the pirates acquired a superlative harbor, which was increasingly 
well defended, a good market for their loot, and better facilities for provisioning and 
repairing their ships.81  Therefore, the island’s strategic position and seemingly lenient 
policy regarding privateers led to Port Royal quickly becoming a base for freebooting 
activities against the Spanish.  Privateering brought in coin, bullion, cocoa, logwood, 
hides, tallow, indigo, cochineal; it attracted an exchange of trade with New England and 
filled Port Royal with merchants.  The poorer planters received a market for their 
provisions; the richer planters were able to buy slaves, in theory.  Taken collectively over 
the long durée, pirates spent their booty quickly in port on drinking, gambling, and 
women and contributed greatly to the exponential growth of Jamaica in the eighteenth 
century.82   
This arrangement, however, posed immediate problems.  First, the dispersed 
nature of the privateers and their varied objectives rendered them unable or unwilling to 
defend the island from a full-scale foreign assault.  Second, they were often disinclined to 
distinguish between an enemy vessel and an English one, when the chance of a prize 
offered itself.  Most concerning, perhaps, privateering became so attractive that merchant 
                                                           
80 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
81 Pawson and Buisseret, Port Royal, Jamaica, p. 25; Newton, The European 
Nations in the West Indies, pp. 256-277. 
82 Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean, p. 76. 
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ships and plantations suffered from a labor shortage.  Finally, with the restoration of 
Charles II, English officials adopted a policy of trying to secure a share of Spanish trade 
by agreement, rather than force.  If this policy was to succeed, attacks of the buccaneers 
must cease. Shortly thereafter, royal officials appointed Thomas Modyford, who, like 
many Jamaican planters, as well as his predecessor, Lynch, opposed buccaneering 
because of its destruction of peaceful trade.83  In 1664, Modyford began sending 
reassuring letters to Spanish officials at Santo Domingo and Cartagena and attempted to 
pursue a peaceful course to open-up free commerce between Jamaica and the settlements 
of the Spanish Caribbean because Spanish contrabandists showed themselves quite 
willing to buy English-held slaves and other goods at Port Royal.84    
Nevertheless, after zealously punishing several unsuspecting buccaneers at Port 
Royal, Modyford quickly understood the error of his ways.  The buccaneers simply 
deserted the port and made for friendlier waters near French-held Tortuga and 
Hispaniola.  This shift led to such a precipitous decline in commerce at Port Royal that 
Modyford changed his mind and began to tolerate and then openly support piracy.  In 
1664, Sir Charles Lyttleton estimated that fourteen or fifteen privateers totaling 1,500 to 
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2,000 seamen of all nations used Port Royal as a base.85  By 1670, twenty such vessels 
with about 2,000 men called at Port Royal and until 1671, the chief interest of Jamaica 
was buccaneering against the Spanish settlements and commerce.86   
By the end of 1672, the mood regarding privateers changed but the practice 
remained.  Reappointed Governor, Thomas Lynch wrote ‘privateering was the sickness 
of Jamaica, for that and planting a country are absolutely inconsistent.’  Five years later, 
Lynch continued to express his concerns about privateering because it ‘discourage[d] 
settlers, enable[d] people to leave the island, [and] hinder[d] correspondence and trade 
with thy neighboring Spaniards.’87  Instead of settling down to agriculture, many Anglo-
Jamaicans traded illegally in slaves and manufactures with the Spanish Main, engaged in 
the logwood trade at Yucatan and were preyed upon by Spanish coast guards, or turned 
pirates.88  Lynch estimated the between 1668 and 1671 Jamaica alone lost about 2,600 
men on buccaneering raids against Tobago, Curacao, Porto Bello, Granada, and Panama; 
in the last expedition four-fifths of the men from Jamaica died, and planting was greatly 
retarded by the labor shortage thus created.89   
The problem was not easy to fix.  In 1680, Lord Carlisle expressed his concerns to 
the Lords of Trade and Plantations: ‘the depredations and injuries of the privateers are 
committed by a sort of men without the reach of the Government.’  Carlisle complained 
that he could not ‘proceed to punishment of any particular person’ because the Spanish 
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had made no explicit complaint.90  The problem persisted into 1681 when the ex-pirate 
turned politician, Sir Henry Morgan, complained that ‘we are much infested by 
pirates…[who] plunder and take vessels belonging to this island.91  Two years later, 
Lynch suggested that despite the people being satisfied and ‘under the perfectest 
peace…our losses and troubles through pirates are intolerable.’  He went on to illuminate 
how Jamaica was more affected than other colonies: 
We have lost divers vessels on the coast of Cuba and in the South Cays, some in 
the Bay of Honduras, others on the coast of the Main…reckoning our 
losses…come to forty or fifty thousand pounds. This falls heavily…on a young 
Colony with a young trade…We are fed by provisions from New England, New 
York, and Ireland, and have fishermen at the South Cays; all these routes were 
interrupted and dangerous.92 
Piracy and privateering posed continual threats to Jamaica.  In 1686, Captain 
Simon Musgrave and several others proposed a possible solution to the threat of piracy.  
They suggested that the government erect a ‘cotton manufacture’ in the island that would 
result in the ‘further settling, improving, and strengthening of Jamaica’ because those 
who might otherwise seek a livelihood in privateering would take employment of the 
‘lower sort of people.’93  In 1687 after Captain Spragge returned to Port Royal with 
Captain Banister, a pirate, and three of his consorts hanging from his yardarm, Lieutenant 
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Governor Molesworth called it ‘a spectable of great satisfaction to all good people and of 
terror to the favourers of pirates.’94  Two months later, Lt. Governor Molesworth reported 
that ‘privateering which never received such checks as I have given it within the last few 
months, nor were we ever so free as wee lately from such vermin.’95  A year later in 
1688, the Duke of Albemarle reported that fifty-six pirates who came into Port Royal 
were arrested and their goods were seized; this served to deter others.96 Yet in 1689, after 
the death of the Duke of Albemarle, Sir Francis Watson reported that Sir Thomas Lynch 
‘stirred up irreconcilable enmity with the French.’  He suggested that his ‘inconsiderate 
management has done more towards the repression of pirates, because they refused to 
come in after ‘his severity and threats.’  Still ‘over a thousand men’ were engaged in 
piracy; Watson feared that that privateers ‘may combine in despair and fall upon the 
island.’97 
Because the coasts of Jamaica were under continual attacks from privateers, 
French, Spanish, or mere renegade English sailing under ‘letters of marque’ issued by 
Monsieur de Casse, governor of the French settlements in western Hispaniola, life on 
remote plantations was insecure and frightening.  Every so often privateers landed along 
the defenseless leeward side of the island burning houses, taking prisoners and stealing 
enslaved Africans.98  While privateers created a host of problems, the possibility of a 
foreign invasion posed a much greater threat to the security of the island.  The damage of 
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buccaneers and pirates was fleeting when compared to the destruction brought on by 
officially sanctioned fleets of French, Dutch, and Spanish warships that cruised the 
Caribbean during the frequent wars between 1660 and 1713.  The Anglo-French wars of 
1666-67, 1689-97, and 1702-1713 proved very destructive in the Caribbean—far more so 
than in North America.  The aim in these wars was to damage enemy property rather than 
to annex it.  French and English expeditions repeatedly raided each other’s islands, 
carried off slaves, burned plantations, and seized shipping.99   
Beginning in the late1670s, the Anglo-Jamaican authorities expressed concern 
about the possibility of a French invasion.  In October 1678, Lord Carlisle suggested that 
if war did break out with France that the ‘island will stand in need of assistance’ because 
of a lack of fighting men; yet another problem posed by the demographic failure in 
Jamaica.100  The next summer, some of those worries were realised when a sizable French 
contingent landed to ‘wood and water at Blewfield’s Bay’ in the western part of the 
island.  Even though they posed no immediate threat, ‘the Point was so alarmed that the 
inhabitants removed their goods and families for fear of French descent.’  Many planters 
frequently sent their families to Port Royal and Spanish Town for safety, further 
disrupting the settlement and profitability of the frontier.101  After this encounter, ‘the 
whole of the inhabitants, soldiers and slaves, were set to work to increase the 
fortifications.’102  After which time Lord Carlisle, in August 1679 suggested that ‘the 
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apprehension of the island from the French fleet is very great.’103  The next month he 
ordered that ‘a hundred more negroes [were] to be added to the slaves at the Point to 
carry on fortifications.’104 
Thereafter, beginning earnestly in the late 1680s, a real French threat emerged.  
Sir Henry Morgan wrote to Lord Sunderland about a French privateer came to the island 
‘to take wood and water,’ during which time ‘she had entertained many runaways and 
debtors off this island;’ he continued, ‘their numbers are increased by the necessitous and 
unfortunate.’  Ironically, he suggested, ‘nothing can be more fatal to the prosperity of this 
Colony than the temptingly alluring boldness and success of the privateers.’105  In 1685 
after a French ship careened ‘on the leeward most part of ye North side of this island, 
rumors began that ‘the French fleet was also about the island.’106 
During the summer of 1689 merchants voiced their concerns and asked for three 
frigates to secure their waters:  
the French are at present very near and powerful enemies of Jamaica, as they can 
sail there in twenty-four hours from Petit Guavos or Tortugas…The island itself is 
long and the plantations begin on the sea are far from one another are liable to be 
spoiled and burned by French pirates.107   
This threat was realised a few months later when Laurens de Graff, a Dutch pirate sailing 
for the French, with a ship and two hundred men, touched at Montego Bay and threatened 
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to return to “plunder the whole North side of the island.”  The Jamaican planters sent 
their wives and children to Port Royal and went about preparing for a possible 
invasion.108  In the end, the total loss of this small-scale raid of Port Maria totaled just 
under £2,500.109  
   In 1692, after the earthquake, a band of Frenchmen ravaged part of the north 
coast.  Several months later, William Beeston suggested to the Earl of Nottingham that 
the French ‘grow too numerous, and in time will overpower us if not prevented before too 
late.’  He continued, ‘the French pickeroons land on our coasts and steal negroes and 
other goods almost every week.’  The French grew increasing bolder because, as Beeston 
suggests, ‘they had good intelligence from some of our villainous deserters.’110 
In March 1694, Fulke Rose explained the defending Jamaica would be more 
difficult than before because the island was lacking seamen.  Many left the island, he 
explained for three reasons: their share of prizes was withheld during Lord Inchinquin’s 
time, the 1692 earthquake and the subsequent sickness, and impressments.  He begged 
that no one be impressed into service.  Most of the men, he supposed, fled to Providence, 
Curacao, or the French Islands.  He also estimated the damage caused by the French 
privateers, ‘which have ruined the remoter settlements of Jamaica’ at £30,000.111 
In April 1694, tensions continued to mount again; the H.M.S. Falcon, cruising off 
the eastern end of Jamaica, drove off six small privateers apparently intent upon a raid, 
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and some time during May, Governor Beeston received a warning from Curacao that ‘the 
French were making great preparations against Jamaica.’  Beeston complained to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations: ‘if we continue to decrease and the French to increase, 
what is to become of the country?’112 The threat of a large invasion was imminent and 
once the French landed the Council of Jamaica ordered that all forts windward to be 
abandoned and that all the people come to Liguanea and Kingston with their ‘cattle, 
negroes, etc.’113  They also ordered that any slave killing a Frenchman shall receive his 
freedom.114  Beeston succinctly reviewed the events to the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations: 
I have already reported our danger from our own weakness and the growing 
power of the French. What I foresaw has now come upon us. The French making 
daily inroads on our out-parts, I sent the Falcon to cruise to eastward and keep 
them off, which she did, for six French sail which were designing to plunder St. 
David’s and St. Thomas refused to fight her, and turned back to Petit Guavos. 
Three strong French men-of-war had just arrived there which, together with 
another already in that port, were sent out in search of the Falcon which they 
easily found and took…on Sunday morning, the 17th inst., their fleet of fourteen 
sail came in sight and came to an anchor in Cow Bay, seven leagues to windward 
of Port Royal. There they landed, and have ever since been ravaging, plundering 
and burning all before them in St. David's or St. Thomas: but I had ordered the 
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people with the best of their goods and many of their negroes to these parts, about 
three days before.115  
He continued: 
Some of our people who have lately escaped from them report that they still 
design against Port Royal and our united strength, when their ships and men are 
reunited. We will do our best to defend it, and I think that if they had any hopes of 
carrying the Island they would not be so barbarous, for they spare nothing alive, 
except mankind, and those they punish and torture. They burn and destroy all that 
will burn, fill the wells with dead cattle and do all the mischief that they can.116 
By the beginning of August Jamaicans had ‘beaten of[f] the French’, but only 
after they had ‘done this people and country a spoil that cannot soon be estimated’.  In the 
end, the French expedition of 3,000 destroyed fifty sugar works, besides many other 
plantations, ‘burnt all wherever they came…killed with barbarous inhumanity every 
living thing they met with’, and captured nearly 1,600 enslaved Africans.117  The parishes 
of St. Thomas and St. David were utterly destroyed and St. George's, St. Mary's and Vere 
are much damaged though not overrun.118  Jamaican commerce, on the other hand, was 
badly disrupted.  Beeston suggested ‘by a moderate computation the cost of the war will 
amount to £10,000; and five of the parishes, instead of helping, must receive relief to 
resettle the people.’119  After the invasion expenses increased, fortifications deteriorated, 
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and communications from England were so few and far between that ‘our enemies [the 
French] ha[d] better intelligence from England than we ha[d].’ 
The worst effect of war, however, was demographic.  The white population, 
which had never been large, declined by nearly thirty per cent during the years from 1689 
to 1713.  Many of those who left or died were small planters who were never replaced. 
So like Barbados a generation earlier, large planters began to consolidate their 
holdings.120  During this period the number of white servants also dropped off 
significantly.  The labor shortage, however, was supplemented by the importation of 
enslaved Africans but that only served to further compound the issue of white mortality 
with the introduction of many African diseases to the island.  During the same period, the 
island’s slave population nearly doubled from 30,000 to 55,000.121  Securing a steady 
supply of labor, however, proved to be a third fundamental problem in expanding the 
plantation economy of Jamaica.  
Problems with Slavery 
 
During the late-seventeenth century, Anglo-Jamaican planters never received a sufficient 
supply of enslaved Africans; in turn, an insufficient labor supply further compounded 
issues arising from white mortality.122  The rate at which slave traders delivered enslaved 
Africans simply could not sufficiently counteract the dearth of white labor.123  Therefore, 
the development of plantations and the extension of sugar culture in Jamaica proved to be 
an exceedingly slow process.  This slow development may be attributed to a lack of 
people, the agrarian system, the social ideas, and the policy of restricted production 
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followed by its great planters but fundamentally a result of an inconsistent labor supply.  
It was nearly a generation after the conquest of Jamaica, in 1655, before that island 
developed a strong planting community.   
English settlers faced the daunting tasks of amassing the resources to get sugar 
planting underway—to clear the land, build roads, houses, forts, harbors, and support the 
labor force until the first crops appeared.  Dickinson, his father, Francis, and his brother, 
Caleb, faced all these problems in St. Elizabeth Parish.  Jamaica had only seven sugar 
works in 1655 producing negligible quantities.  By 1671, this island contained forty-two 
cocoa walks, nineteen indigo works, three cotton plantations, a few small plantations, and 
only fifty-seven sugar plantations.   In 1670 Jamaican sugar plantation produced 500 tons 
of sugar compared to Barbados 7,500 and the Leeward’s 2,000.  By 1700, Jamaica sugar 
production increased considerably to 4,500 tons but that was less than half of Barbados 
(8,200) and considerably less than the Leewards (6,800).  It was not until 1760 that 
Jamaica sugar production outstripped its other West Indian competitors when Jamaica 
produced several thousands tons more than Barbados and the Leewards combined 
(31,600 to 29,500).  From that point forward Jamaican led the way.124  The century-long 
struggle for Jamaica to emerge as England’s leading sugar producer began in the 1660s 
with an insufficient supply of labor. 
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In 1664, Lt. Col., Thomas Lynch remarked in a letter to Sir Henry Bennet that 
Jamaica had ‘many hopeful plantations if supplied with negroes.’125  In 1665, Lynch 
reiterated his concerns about the supply of African slaves, as well as the general decline 
of the population: ‘many of the people that came with the governor are dead and not one 
but himself has yet made any plantation…there has been little improvement this eight or 
ten months.’  He characterised the ‘want of negroes’ as ‘the grand obstruction’ to the 
advancement of the colony.126  To encourage more slave imports, John Style suggested 
that ‘the island would take all the negroes of the Royal Company, if they would give 18 
months credit.’  The credit was necessary because, as Style suggested, ‘so great is the 
scarcity of money, that unless there be free trade or war with the Spaniards, the colony 
will never flourish or hardly be kept.’127  Well into the 1670s, Lynch continued to 
complain about the lack of a labor force.  In 1674, he wrote to Sir Joseph Williamson that 
‘without constant supplies of slaves there can be no custom, navigation, trade, or 
subsistence.’128 
When asked about the condition of the island upon his arrival, Sir Thomas 
Modyford replied to the question: ‘what obstructions do you find to trade and 
navigation?’ He replied simply that “had all nations permission to bring them [enslaved 
Africans], as to Barbados they had till about 1652, this place would suddenly swell up to 
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a great felicity and wealth than ever that did.”129  In 1676, The Royal African Company 
began delivering slaves to Jamaica, but Peter Beckford complained that they were at ‘too 
high rates’ and the planters suffered in their ‘continual want of them.’130  He further 
suggested that, ‘the people of this island [are] much dissatisfied with The Royal 
Company, for they are not furnished with negroes as other plantations.’131 
In November 1680 the planters of Jamaica logged a formal complaint to the 
Crown that The Royal African Company, which had a theoretical monopoly in the island, 
supplied them with an insufficient supply of enslaved Africans and at too high prices.  
Lynch suggested, in 1682, that ‘many men that had money went away without any 
slaves’.  As a result he claimed that ‘it [was impossible] to hinder the importation 
[beyond The Royal African Company] of negroes, for the island is large and slaves as 
needful to a planter as money to a courtier, and as much coveted.’132 
In January 1683 The Royal African Company answered to the king about the 
complaints raised by the Jamaican planters of an ‘insufficient supply of negroes.’  They 
argued that a fixed price was ‘to [their] great prejudice’; therefore, they could not 
continue that trade for three reasons.  At first they suggested that ‘light Spanish money’ 
inflated the price of Jamaican sugars, yet the price had ‘fallen all over Europe’ resulting 
in a loss in their returns.  Second, they suggested that because of a rise in the number of 
‘interloping ships’ along the African coast the cost of enslaved Africans was one-third 
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more than previous years.  Finally, they suggested that because of the first two reasons 
‘commanders and owners of ships employed are so discouraged that very many of them 
absolutely refuse to go to Jamaica.’133   
The planters of Jamaica replied again by arguing that their company did business 
with ‘men of mean or no estate,’ when they might have found better customers.  They 
also suggested that the company has only granted credit that Jamaicans can pay ‘for she 
[Jamaica] is known to pay them better than any other plantations.’  Moreover, they 
argued that their money was current and any issue was because ‘the company has simply 
mismanaged its business.’  Finally, they complained that while ‘there are some who are 
strangers to Jamaica or dislike the Company’s terms, there are always plenty who are 
willing enough to go there.’134  Lynch bitterly remarked: ‘it is the failure to provide 
negroes that is the ruin of all.’135  In 1684 Lynch continued complaining that ‘we have no 
negroes nor hope of negroes this long time.’  Lynch, however, remained dedicated to the 
Royal African Company refusing to buy slaves from a Spanish ship.136  Later that year, 
Lynch expressed his greatest concern after ‘whisperings that [he] was bribed and partial 
to The Royal African Company’ and, taken along with ‘the riots at the Point’ engendered 
by his conflict with the Morgans, caused ‘more trouble than [he] ever had in [his] life.’137 
This political conflict only further compounded the issues regarding the supply of 
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enslaved Africans. Only in June 1684 was Lynch able to report that ‘the Royal Company 
now begins to supply us well.’138 
Five years later, however, in 1689 the Council of Assembly sent an address to 
King James II asserting that despite ‘some thousands of negroes’ being imported by the 
Company to the island, ‘few of these have fallen to the planters’ share.’  The main point 
of contention was that the ‘choicest negroes’ typically went to foreigners because they 
were selected by the factors to ‘suit the Spanish.’  They further complained that even if 
the planters had a chance to buy the slaves with ‘ready money’ they were refused as they 
lacked pieces-of-eight.  Jamaican purchasers were left ‘only the refuse at £22 a head,’ and 
were forced into ‘buying refuse negroes of Jews and beggarly sub-brokers, who buy sick 
negroes at £8 or £10 a head; so that scarce a third of the negroes bought by the planters 
from the Company are still alive.’139   
These problems grew worse after the earthquake and the French invasion.  The 
late-1690s were particularly meager times for everyone in Jamaica.  Slave traders, 
discouraged by uncertain markets and unstable prices, left Jamaica undersupplied.  
During the period from 1693-1698, slave traders imported 7,495 enslaved Africans to 
Jamaica.  While an average of 125 enslaved Africans per month arrived in Jamaica, it 
was insufficient to promote the growth planters desired:  Barbados, during the same 
period, received around 15,000 enslaved Africans, twice the total received by Jamaica.  A 
much more mature plantation colony, Portuguese Brazil, received over 30,000 slaves in 
the same time span, averaging just over 500 slave imports per month, during the same 
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period.  Overall the entire Caribbean received just over 50,000 enslaved Africans during 
this five-year period; Jamaica received around fifteen per cent of that total.  Of nearly 
87,000 enslaved Africans who arrived in New World during this period, less than nine 
per cent landed in Jamaica.  Jamaica suffered from a dearth of slave labor throughout the 
seventeenth century.  Between 1655 and 1699, Jamaica received just over 59,000 slaves 
compared to 94,000 in Barbados and a total of around 330,000 throughout the Caribbean.  
Jamaica received around seventeen per cent of all slaves shipped to the Caribbean and 
around thirteen per cent of all slaves shipped to the Americas during the second half of 
the seventeenth century.140 
Table Two presents the total estimated number of enslaved Africans arriving in 
Jamaica during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and highlights several key 
trends regarding slave arrivals in Jamaica.  First, relatively few enslaved Africans, 
compared with other plantation colonies in the Caribbean, arrived in Jamaica despite the 
number or arrivals doubling between1660 and 1670 and then again in the 1680s.  Second, 
the 1690s witnessed a sharp decline in slave arrivals because many slave traders, beyond 
the already reluctant Royal African company, deliberately avoided Jamaica in the wake 
of the earthquake in 1692 and the French invasion in 1694.  Third, the first decade of the 
eighteenth century marked an enormous upsurge in the rate of importation and a change 
in the nature of Jamaican plantation society.  
Table Two: Immigration Estimates to Jamaica, 1655-1729 
Years Total Number 
of Whites 
Total Number 
of Africans 
Total Migrants 
1655-1661 c. 12,000 445 c. 12,445 
1662-1669 ----- 4,889 ----- 
                                                           
140 All figures regarding slave arrivals were extrapolated from The Trans-Atlantic 
Slave Database, available online at http://www.slavevoyages.org (21 November 2011). 
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1671-1679 5,396 11,816 17,212 
1680-1689 ----- 27, 239 ----- 
1690-1699 ----- 17,332 ----- 
1700-1709 ----- 49,106 ----- 
1710-1719 ----- 44,210 ----- 
1720-1729 ----- 60,889 ----- 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
1655-1729  213, 216  
All figures regarding slave arrivals were extrapolated from The Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Database, available online at http://www.slavevoyages.org (21 November 2011). 
 
Who bought the enslaved Africans in Jamaica is also important question.  Burnard 
argues that the type of slaves, the pattern in which they were purchased, and the people 
who bought them changed over time.  In a study of the Royal African Company during 
the period from 1674 to 1708, Burnard analyses the extent to which slave purchasing was 
a universal activity among whites and the extent to which it was monopolised by wealthy 
officeholders.141  Burnard notes that the Royal African Company sold sixty-seven per 
cent of all slaves arriving in Jamaica before 1690, but in the 1690s and 1700s the 
Company sold just around fifteen per cent of all slaves arriving in Jamaica.142  Just as the 
importance of the Royal African Company declined, so too did the number of purchasers, 
from well over 200 in the 1670s and 1680s to less than seventy-five in the 1690s.  
Burnard argues that small time planters were eventually forced out of the market by the 
growth of larger, wealthier planters.143  A lack of capital and the unsettled nature of the 
economy in Jamaica undoubtedly contributed to the demise of the small planter as well. 
                                                           
141 Burnard tabulated 20,992 slaves that can be assigned to 1,405 purchasers. 
Burnard, ‘Who bought slaves in Early America? Purchasers of Slaves from the Royal 
African Company in Jamaica, 1674-1708’, Slavery and Abolition, 17:2 (1996), pp.68-92.  
142 Burnard, ‘Who bought slaves in Early America’, p. 70. 
143 Burnard, ‘Who bought slaves in Early America’, p. 72. 
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144  One important facet that Burnard highlights is the urban dimension to slave buying 
which created an internal and external trade of slaves on and off the island.  As we shall 
see, Dickinson actively attempted to open a slave trade between Jamaica and 
Philadelphia, going so far as to bring ten enslaved individuals when he departed the 
island, far too many to serve as domestics in Philadelphia.  His brother-in-law, Ezekiel 
Gomersall, was the single largest purchaser of slaves from St. Andrew Parish and this 
connection proved to be an important strand in Dickinson’s weaving of his Atlantic 
web.145  
In the end, no matter which party had a more justifiable complaint, or who was 
purchasing the slaves, slaves were not getting to Jamaica fast enough or cheaply enough 
for Jamaica to expand rapidly.  The number of enslaved Africans arriving in Jamaica did 
not sufficiently meet the demand of Anglo-Jamaican planters for two reasons.  Firstly, a 
substantial number of slaves did not remain in the island because traders often sold their 
slaves off the island to the Spanish at better rates.  For example, on 14 June 1661, 
Governor D' Oyley received a Dutch ship at Port Royal laden with 180 enslaved 
Africans.  He called the Council and urged them to trade with the Dutchman. Technically 
trading with the Dutch was illegal according the Navigation Acts but he urged the 
Council to accept the cargo because of the labor shortage.  The Council refused.  An 
enraged D’Oyley argued that the Council refused because they could not afford the 
asking price. D’Oyley, acting contrary to the Council’s instructions, purchased the entire 
cargo within two or three hours. D’Oyley made ‘rescue and retrivall’, sold forty enslaved 
                                                           
144 The seventeenth century was different from eighteenth century when Jamaica 
was ‘a favored destination for British slave traders. Burnard and Kenneth Morgan, ‘The 
Dynamics of the Slave Market and Slave Purchasing Patterns in Jamaica, 1655-1788’, 
William and Mary Quarterly, 58:1 (2001), pp. 205-228. 
145 Burnard, ‘Who bought slaves in Early America’, p. 82-83. 
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Africans to Major John Coape, a Quaker, and the rest, ‘at great price’, to a Spanish 
ship.146   
Second, many slaves, like their white European counterparts, did not survive their 
first years in the colony.  In 1698, out of nearly 60,000 enslaved Africans imported since 
1655, only a reported 40,000 resided in Jamaica. The death of over nearly a third of the 
African population undoubtedly retarded the development of a stable labor force.  The 
brutal labour regime and high death rates common in the Caribbean further complicated 
matters.  Another possible drain on the labor pool may have been a result of the Council 
of Jamaica ordering ‘that if any negroes shall raise a mutiny, any two justices of the 
peace may order their masters to sell or send them off the island.’147 
Those enslaved Africans who made it to the island, and survived the ‘seasoning 
period,’ posed another real threat to the expansion of Jamaican plantation society and 
provided another legitimate factor that pushed Dickinson to leave the island in 1696.  
Few slave societies present a more impressive record of slave revolts than Jamaica.  The 
first eighty-five years of the English occupation of the island (1655-1740) were marked 
by one long series of revolts, which reached a dramatic climax in the mid-eighteenth 
century.148  During the first dozen years of English occupation, the colonists constantly 
                                                           
146 PRO, CO 1/15, Narrative of the buying and forfeiture of a shipload of negroes, 
4 June 1661, pp. 123-25. 
147 PRO, CO 140/1, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 23 October 1663, pp. 85-
88, 90. 
148 Orlando Patterson, ‘Slavery and Slave Revolts,’ in Richard Price (ed), Maroon 
Communities. Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas (Baltimore, 1996), p. 246. For a 
general overview of the origins of the Jamaican Maroons see: Michael Craton, Testing 
the Chains. Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, 1982). 
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fought the fugitive Spanish Maroons, and while plantation slavery was taking hold, they 
contended with ten sizable slave revolts between 1655 and 1696.149   
In 1656, Major-general Sedgewick rightly suggested that the Spanish maroons 
would prove to be a ‘thorn in the sides of the English’ and ‘a great discouragement to the 
settling of the country.’150  Michael Craton suggests that during the first decade of 
English Jamaica ‘there seem to have been at least four main “polinks”’.151  Through force 
or accommodation Jamaican officials attempted to deal with the threat posed by maroons 
and fugitive slaves but ongoing war with the Spaniards and the Maroons meant that 
Jamaica remained militarized as settlement proceeded.152  In 1663, the Lieutenant 
Governor, Sir Charles Lyttleton and his council, issued a proclamation, offering a full 
pardon, thirty acres of land, freedom from all manner of slavery, to each of them who 
should surrender and bring ‘their children to the English tongue.’153  The Spanish 
Maroons refused the offer and continued to harass Anglo-Jamaicans who made several 
                                                           
149 Los Varmejales was situated in the mid-interior of Jamaica.  Juan de Serras’ 
band was referred to variously as the Vermejales, Vermehali, or Varmehaly Negroes.  
Eventually they formed themselves into a couple groups under elected leaders.  One of 
these groups settled in the mountains overlooking Guanaboa Vale under the bold, astute 
leader called Juan Lubola.  A second group established their village at Los Vermejales 
under their leader Juan de Serras. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 161. 
150 Bryan Edwards quoted in Patterson, ‘Slavery and Slave Revolts’, pp. 230-31. 
151 Most substantial and permanent was that commanded by a ‘Spanish negro’ 
called Juan Lubolo (Juan de Bolas) in the fertile polje of Lluides Vale.  Further to the 
west was the polink of the ‘Varmahaly Negroes’ under the command of Juan de Serras, 
and another lay in the region of Porus, in the modern parish of Manchester.  There are 
also references to a settlement of Spanish negroes in the Blue Mountains. Craton, Testing 
the Chains, p. 70. 
152 Susan Dwyer Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges. Slavery and the 
Transformation of English Society, 1640-1700, (Chapel Hill, 2007), p. 37. 
153  In the summer of 1664 the Council of Jamaica ‘ordered that Mr. Noy go to the 
Vermexales negores…to now whether they will accept Sir. Chas Lyttelton’s articles.’ 
Proclamation of Sir Chas. Lyttelton, Deputy Governor, in accordance with the preceding 
Minutes of Council of Jan. 23 concerning the free negroes. PRO, CO 140/1, pp. 75-79; 
Edwards quoted in Patterson, ‘Slavery and Slave Revolts’, p. 231. 
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unsuccessful attempts to dislodge them.  In August 1665, a special Council of War 
ordered that ‘the Varmahaly negroes having again begun to rob and kill, the island be put 
in a posture of war, and every regiment under military discipline be regulated by a court 
martial.’154  Under pressure from the Anglo-Jamaicans, the group retreated to the 
uninhabited northeastern side of the island.155  From there they constantly harassed 
frontier settlers by attacking nascent plantations, taking supplies, farming implements, 
metal goods, cloth, salt, women, cattle, and pigs.156   
For nearly fifteen years the ‘Vermahaly Negroes’ committed ‘murders, robberies, 
and other outrages’ in Clarendon Parish.  Consequently, the Council in Jamaica ordered 
‘that no person travel two miles from his dwelling place without being armed.’157  
Spanish Maroons forced changes in Jamaican society that further slowed the expansion of 
a settled plantation society.  Their constant depredations forced the colony to remain on 
the defensive and regularly operate under martial law.  To combat the maroons, Anglo-
Jamaican officials raised regiments of planters and merchants, supplementing the losses 
of military men, to patrol remote areas otherwise diverting resources and men that might 
have been used in the developing plantations.  The Maroons, however, proved to be 
superb guerrilla fighters, laying ambushes and picking off white troops as they marched 
through narrow passes in the mountains.158  Maroon settlements physically limited the 
                                                           
154 PRO, CO 140/1, Minutes of a Council of War held at St. Jago de la Vega, 
August 1665, pp. 135-38. 
155 Patterson, ‘Slave and Slave Revolts’, p. 255. 
156 Sheridan, ‘The Maroons of Jamaica, 1730-1830: Livelihood, Demography, and 
Health’ in Gad Heuman (ed), Out of the House of Bondage: Runaways, Resistance, and 
Marronage in Africa and the New World (London: 1986), p. 152. 
157 PRO, CO 140/1, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 2 May 1670, pp. 189-96.  
This declaration occurred after the murder of five hunters and six small settlers in 1670. 
Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 74. 
158 Sheridan ‘The Maroons of Jamaica’, p.152. 
 88 
expansion of the frontier since very few people were willing to clear and settle land too 
many miles away from settled white society.159  Finally, the success of the maroons 
undoubtedly encouraged, or at least provided inspiration, to other would-be rebels 
laboring on plantations along the frontier.160  Many rebels, after their initial uprising, 
quickly retreated to the mountains and other inaccessible areas within the colony: in 1672 
when ‘certain negroes’ in St. Elizabeth parish murdered William Groudan and ‘took to 
the woods.’161  In January 1673, the Council of Jamaica attempted to rein in a growing 
number of enslaved Africans who posed potential threats.  They ordered that masters and 
overseers: 
take care to keep their negroes within their own plantations, and permit none to go 
thence without a ticket mentioning their number and names, and what 
merchandizes they carry with them, and what allowances are granted to them to 
trade.162   
The council was sure that the safety of all planters would result in restraining 
communication between slaves. 
During 1673, in the thinly peopled parish of St. Ann, around 200 enslaved 
Africans killed their master and about thirteen other whites.  After plundering several 
smaller estates and procuring arms and ammunition they retreated to secure positions in 
                                                           
159 Craton suggests that ‘although Jamaica is only 140 miles long and forty-five 
miles wide, it presented almost an ideal maroon habitat.  Tropical, fertile, and watered, 
the island was not only mountainous but, being made mostly of limestone, wonderfully 
pocked and broken in its topography.  The natural cover of dense forest or savanna was 
coupled with karst limestone features such as ‘haystack hills’, caves, poljes, and 
‘cockpits’.  This landscape provided hiding places at the very edges of plantations. 
Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 67. 
160 See Michael Craton, Testing the Chains. 
161 PRO, CO 140/1, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, pp. 305-06. 
162 PRO, CO 140/1, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 8 January 1673, pp. 334-
36. 
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the mountains around the borders of Clarendon, St. Elizabeth, and St. Ann. The first party 
of whites that went after them was ‘nearly destroyed’, and this ‘not only discouraged 
other parties from going against them but also encouraged many other Negros to rise, 
throw off their chains and join up with them.’  This group of rebels formed the nucleus of 
the Leeward Maroons.163  In 1676, the Council of Jamaica reported another group of 
‘rebellious negroes’ in St. Mary’s parish had been causing trouble for nearly two 
months.164  Two years later another revolt broke out within five miles of Spanish Town 
when around one hundred rebels rose up and murdered their master and about twenty 
more of his family after which they:  
betooke themselves to the woods and mountains on the northside of the island, 
where they soon joyn’d with other runaway Negros, and ever since have often 
done much mischeife in St. Mary’s and St. Ann’s precinct by cutting off many 
famallys and have murther’d neare one hundred Christian souls, men, women, and 
children at all advantages.165   
Another rebellion occurred in March 1682:  
when Madam Greg’s Negros slaves, being in number one hundred and five, rose 
in the night and murther’d fifteen Christian soules…[and] betooke themselves to 
the wood, destroying many people, and cutting off many whole famally on ye 
northside, at advantages, and then retreated to their lurking places; which all that 
yeare putt the island to great troble and expence in keeping three hundred men out 
                                                           
163 Patterson, ‘Slave and Slave Revolts’, p. 256. 
164 PRO, CO 140/3, Journal of the Council Minutes of Jamaica, 23 January 1676, 
pp. 449-53. 
165 Buisseret, Jamaica in 1687. The Taylor Manuscript at the National Library of 
Jamaica (Kingston, 2008), p. 276. 
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in parties after them, by whose vigalancy severall of ‘em were slain, other taken 
prisoners, and the rest scatter’d and routed.166 
The following summer in June 1683:  
slaves belonging to Collonel Ivey, at his plantation in the precinct of Vere, nigh 
Withywood, being number 180, most of ‘em Carrammantine Negroas, had all 
conspiered with one consent to rebel, cut off their master, and murther his whole 
family, and then proceed in the lick manner against the other neibouring 
plantations.167 
Between 1685 and 1686 there were several more revolts, the participants of which 
joined with the growing bands of rebels encamped in the leeward part of the island.  The 
underpinnings of a large-scale rebellion were ever present. In May 1685, the Council of 
Jamaica resolved that ‘in consequence of recent disturbances, the negroes’ market at the 
River’s mouth be suppressed.’  They reckoned that ‘the liberty given to the Negroes to 
give a market…had been the ocassion of the disturbance.’168  Nevertheless in early 
August 1685, 150 slaves belonging to Mrs. Grey, at Guanaboa, rose in rebellion.  After 
seizing all the arms on Grey’s estate, they then attacked another plantation, where they 
killed one white and wounded another.  The rebels, who then sought refuge in the hills 
afterward, successfully combated a detachment of seventy soldiers.  In the end, of the 150 
slaves who rebelled, seven were killed in battle, thirty were captured, and fifty 
surrendered.  The rest remained at large and were unsuccessfully hunted by Captain 
                                                           
166 Buisseret, Jamaica in 1687, pp. 274-75. 
167 PRO, CO 140/4, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 11 May 1685, pp. 84-85. 
168 PRO, CO 140/4, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 11 May 1685, pp. 84-85. 
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Davis and his party of Indian trackers.169  The problem continued and as a ‘consequence 
of lack of funds’ the Council ordered that ‘the military parties serving against the negroes 
were discharged.  Order for every parish to provide for its own security by its own party 
or guard.’170  
Taylor mentions another rebellion that occurred in December 1685. He noted that:  
at which time all the Negroes on Port Royal had combined themselves together to 
make a generall insurecction…[and] cunningly contrived thus; to fiere to town in 
the night, and then whilst ye inhabitants had bin employed in extinguishing the 
flames, every Negroa to have seized his master’s arms and soe have made a 
violent onset.171 
In February 1686 a Council of Jamaica was called ‘to advise as to the means of 
suppressing the rebel negroes who are now more formidable than ever before.’  They 
ordered to raise twelve parties to pursue the rebels.172  By April the regiments killed a 
leading figure, Coffee, and subsequently disbanded all but three of the regiments.173  
Nevertheless, ‘operations of the parties against the rebellious negroes’ continued into the 
spring of 1687.  Despite destroying provisions, grounds, and huts and cutting the springs 
they set for wild hogs the rebels ‘seemed to be dispersed into smaller gangs which would 
never await attack.’174 
                                                           
169 PRO, CO 138/5, Molesworth to Whitehall; PRO, CO 140/4, Minutes of a 
Council of War held at Jamaica, 1 August 1685, pp. 89-90; Patterson, ‘Slave and Slave 
Revolts’, pp. 256-57. 
170 PRO, CO 140/4, 12 January 1686, pp. 104-05. 
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174 PRO, CO 140/4, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 26 April 1687, pp. 168-
69. 
 92 
Five years later, in July 1690, between 400 and 500 enslaved Africans belonging 
to Sutton’s (Slater’s) plantation in the parish of Clarendon killed the overseer and after 
seizing all the arms they could carry, proceeded to the next estate, where they killed the 
white overseer and set the house afire.  The troops were called out, and twelve of the 
rebels were killed in the ensuing engagement. In the course of the following month, sixty 
women and children and ten men surrendered.  With 318 of them still at large, however, 
Governor Inchiquin feared ‘that (it) will be very dangerous to the mountain plantations.’  
This group eventually joined the ranks with the Leeward gang already established in the 
mountains ‘and greatly strengthened their party, having good arms and plenty of 
ammunition.175  
In the midst of the chaos created by the earthquake and the French invasion, 
enslaved Africans again revolted and the Council of Jamaica sent parties after them.  
They also ordered that a list of all ‘free negroes’ be drawn up.176  The drain on the white 
population engendered a real fear about the security of the island.  The merchants of 
Jamaica complained to the Council of Trade and Plantations that ‘ without sufficient 
succours the most considerable island belonging to the King abroad may be lost to the 
enemy or left to the mercy of the negroes, to the ruin of the people, the dishonour of the 
nation and the discouragement of the Colonies in general.’177 
Smaller revolts occurred in 1694, 1696, 1702, and 1704, mainly on the northern 
coast, with the rebels slipping off to join other slave fugitives hiding in the mountains, 
                                                           
175 PRO, CO 138/7, Inchiquin to Lords; Patterson, ‘Slave and Slave Revolts’, p. 
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176 PRO, CO 140/5, Minutes of the Council of Jamaica, 16 December 1694, pp. 
298. 
177 PRO, CO 137/4, Memorial of several Jamaica merchants to Council of Trade 
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setting the stage for the Maroon War of 1720 and 1739.178  In this way maroons and 
fugitive slaves continued to distress the island for upwards of forty years, during which 
time forty-four acts of Assembly were passed, and at least £240,000 were expended for 
their suppression.179  Ultimately, the frontier remained unsettled because of the north side 
of the island ‘tis not half soe well settled and planted or inhabited as the southside, by 
reason of many runaway Negros, which lie there lurking in the woods and mountains, and 
have of late done much mischief there’.180 
Conclusion: A Cocktail of Calamities  
 
Richard Dunn suggested that ‘of all the English Caribbean colonies in the seventeenth 
century, Jamaica was by far the most boisterous and disorderly.’  More than three 
hundred years earlier, in 1670, John Style, a fifteen-year resident of the island, offered a 
more biting observation about the island: ‘if the most savage heathens…[were]…present, 
they might learn cruelty and oppression.’181  Others called its main port, Port Royal, the 
‘wickedest city in the west.’182  An English clergyman, Francis Crow, arrived in Jamaica 
in 1687 and ‘found sin very high and religion very low.’183 
Yet, for all the problems and poor reputation, the island in 1655 was one of 
endless possibilities.  Exploiting those possibilities, however, proved to be a difficult 
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task.  Like each of the Caribbean islands settled by the English in the seventeenth 
century, Jamaica had a distinct personality.184  Jamaica was advantageously placed within 
the Caribbean.  Although the island was thousands of miles away from the nearest 
English settlement it was strategically close to Spanish Cuba, French St. Domingue, and 
the Straits of Florida, the oceanic onramp to the Gulf Stream.  This position benefited 
international, albeit oftentimes illegal, trade; yet, this isolation from other centres of 
English settlement left the island exposed and relatively defenseless.  For the very first 
days after the conquest, those who settled the island were left largely on their own to 
develop the island, secure its borders, and develop its social, economic, religious, and 
political infrastructure.  In many respects they failed to do so. 
Their failures were not entirely their own fault because Jamaica lacked significant 
interest from outside investors and the home government.  Neither Oliver Cromwell, the 
original inspiration for capturing the island from the Spanish, nor his successors felt 
disposed to spend money on it.  Land was reserved for the state, but it was never 
developed and was finally abandoned in 1678.  Other outside interests were equally 
reluctant to make direct investment in Jamaican agriculture.185  Without capital or clear 
incentives to settle, English officials continued to struggle with the problem of 
convincing people to live in the island.  Thus, the surviving local residents were left on 
                                                           
184 The island is physiographically diverse, containing relatively high mountains, 
coastal plains, arid interiors, swampy morasses, and karst topography.  Temperatures and 
rainfall vary considerably depending on elevation and access to trade winds and coastal 
breezes, and variation in geological formations, soil types, and flora and fauna are equally 
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185 The dramatic profits of the early sugar days in Barbados were over.  In 
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business of funding a distant colonial venture is reflected in the dispersed nature of 
Jamaican trade. See Dunn, Sugar and Slaves. 
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their own to make what they could of the island’s potential. 
  So, in 1692 when the earthquake struck, the island was contending with constant 
slave rebellions, a lack of labor brought about by the population drain of privateering, the 
inconsistency of the Royal African Company, and the draining of life by disease. 
Therefore, when Dickinson departed the island in 1696, planting was still in its 
infancy.186  The earthquake, which was much more than a natural disaster, highlighted 
Jamaica’s physical, economic, and political isolation.  The devastation engendered a 
series of political squabbles that further divided Jamaicans.  It opened the door for a 
French invasion. Moreover, the mercantile community, the hallmark of Jamaica and 
seemingly the only beacon of hope was swallowed up by the sea with the majority of 
their assets.  Simply put, after the earthquake all the problems of the previous decades 
simply got worse.    
  Beyond the aforementioned issues, after the earthquake more immediate 
problems arose, as did the Jamaicans’ sense of despair.  Petty disputes, robberies, floating 
carcasses, and caring for the sick and wounded were all problems officials faced during 
the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.  Sir William Beeston complained a year later 
that ‘we have also, still, earthquakes pretty frequently, but not with violence enough to do 
ravine though sufficient to terrify.’ 187  The condition of Port Royal left the island 
‘exposed to enemies by land and sea [because]…many of the guns of the forts are under 
                                                           
186 The warning signs for a great earthquake were apparent for several years 
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two fathoms of water.’  The earthquake also created alarm about slave unrest.  ‘The loss 
of small arms,’ the president of the council lamented, ‘makes us very apprehensive about 
the slaves.’188       
In March 1693, Sir William Beeston observed that ‘the island is in a very mean 
condition…[and] the whole country in a melancholy prospect’.  He goes on to suggest 
that ‘the earthquake, sickness, and desertion of discontented people have carried off so 
many as to leave the island very thin of people’.  Moreover he lamented that ‘everything 
is very dear, the sickness and calamities having terrified those who used to bring 
provisions from New England and North America from coming near us’.189  Two years 
later he suggested that ‘the country has fallen into a very low condition under the 
calamities of the past four years by the taxes raised and the want of trade.’190  This ‘want 
of trade’ had terrible effects on Jamaica’s recovery from the events of the early 1690s. 
Beeston related the condition of Jamaica to William Blathwayt: 
We want all necessaries, and ships to carry away our produce, so that if this war 
hold on much longer these Colonies must come to nothing. No people come in, 
many die, some get away from fear, others because they are in debt, and many are 
pressed into the King's ships, which also frightens others away, so by many ways 
we decrease, which disheartens those that have interest and makes them talk of 
removing. The King's ships are in an ill condition from want of recruits of stores, 
provisions, necessaries, and also of officers and seamen; so that they are of great 
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expense to the King, and by their wants hindered of being of much use to the 
country.191 
In the midst of all this turmoil, Dickinson decided to leave the island.  Beeston 
remarked about the general exodus: ‘the private Colonies also entice our people away 
daily, telling them of living there easy and quiet.’192  Early in 1697 Beeston suggested 
that ‘by this [the problems of the last few years] we are much weakened, there are no 
seamen left to sail our vessels (by which trade is decayed), no men to man our privateers, 
and few men left in the country but masters of families.’  He continued, ‘moreover, the 
Northern plantations, that used to furnish us with provisions and necessaries, come not 
near us, whereby provisions are become scarce and dear, which much discourages the 
inhabitants.’193   
In many ways Dickinson was ‘pushed’ to leave the island but in other ways the 
uncertainty of Jamaica, as evidenced by the many complaints about a lack of provisions, 
supplies, and trade, ‘pulled’ Dickinson from island.  In the summer of 1696, Dickinson, 
decided to leave for Philadelphia to escape the harsh reality of living in Jamaica during 
the 1690s and perhaps, also to exploit the potential created by the chaos of the preceding 
decades.  Dickinson, his wife Mary, and their infant son Jonathan, aged six months, 
accompanied ten of Dickinson’s enslaved Africans, an Indian girl, a Philadelphia ship 
captain, and a salty Caribbean crew aboard the Reformation with a substantial cargo of 
trade goods and around 1,500 pieces of eight. 
                                                           
191 PRO, CO 137/4, 19 June 1696, p. 31. 
192 PRO, CO 137/4, Governor Sir William Beeston to Lords of Trade and 
Plantation, 22 July 1696, p. 40. 
193 PRO, CO 137/4, Governor Sir William Beeston to Council of Trade and 
Plantations, 27 January 1697, pp. 125-26. 
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In the wake of the Reformation, the struggling island of Jamaica continued to 
hobble along but fundamental changes were well in motion.  Dickinson was embarking 
on a life-altering voyage; the Dickinson family was embarking on a trans-Atlantic 
mercantile empire; and, the island of Jamaica was leaving behind its impetuous childhood 
of the seventeenth century as it grew into a plantation colony.  At the turn of the 
eighteenth century, Jamaica was finally becoming Atlantic.     
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CHAPTER 3: SHIPWRECKED IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 
 
About One a Clock in the Moring we felt our Vessel strike some few strokes, and 
then she floated again for five or six Minutes, before she ran flat aground, where 
she beat violently at first; the Wind was violent; and it was very dark, that our 
Marriners could not see Land: The Seas broke over us, that we were in the quarter 
of an hour Floating in the Cabin.  By this time we felt the Vessel not to strike 
often; but several of her Timbers were broken, and some Plank started; the Seas 
continued breaking over us, and no Land to be seen.  We concluded to keep in the 
Vessel as long as she would hold together.  About the third Hour this Morning, 
we supposed we saw Land at some considerable distance.  And at this time we 
found the Water began to run out of the Vessel, and at Daylight we perceived we 
were upon the Shoar, on a Beach lying upon the Breach of the Sea; which, at 
time, as the Surges of the Sea reversed, was dry…We rejoyced at this our 
Preservation from the raging Seas; but at the same Instant feared the sad 
Consequence that followed.1 
As the sun rose upon the mangled and beleaguered Reformation, on 23 October 
1696, Dickinson and company found themselves hundreds of miles from the nearest 
European colony and stranded amongst Native Americans.2  After avoiding French 
                                                           
1 God’s Protecting Providence. Man’s Surest Help and Defence In the times of the 
greatest difficulty and most Imminent danger; Evidenced in the Remarkable Deliverance 
of divers Persons, From the devouring Waves of the Sea, amongst which they Suffered 
Shipwrack, And also, From the more cruelly devouring jawes of the inhumane Canibals 
of Florida. Faith related by one of the persons concerned therein, Jonathan Dickenson 
(London, 1701), pp. 3-4. This edition of the journal is cited hereafter as God’s Protecting 
Providence. 
2 The earliest historical reference to barkentines is 1693 and from then until about 
1875 barkentines and schooners were not distinctly different types of ships.  Samuel 
Galpin suggests that ‘the American coasting and West Indies trade was the nursery where 
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pirates, the tumults of tropical weather separated Dickinson’s small barkentine and its 
company of twenty-four passengers from the protection of a convoy bound for England 
via Philadelphia.3  Eventually, the storm pushed the Reformation ashore as it tore apart 
amongst crashing waves along Florida’s southeastern coast.4  As Dickinson suggested in 
the quotation above, their prospects for survival were dire.5  
                                                           
many variations of the fore-and-aft rig were developed.  It is difficult to guess what 
Dickinson’s barkentine looked like but Galpin ‘imagines a small three-masted vessel, 
carrying square sails on the foremast only, one be might be close to the early topsail 
schooner or barkentine type.’ Charles Andrews and Evangeline Walker Andrews, 
Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal or God’s Protecting Providence. Being the Narrative of a 
Journey from Port Royal Jamaica to Philadelphia between August 23, 1696 and April 1, 
1697 (New Haven, 1945) p. 133. 
3 As a result of the ongoing threat of French privateers in the Straights of Florida 
and the Bahamas, the Reformation sailed in a convoy of a dozen merchantmen under the 
protection of the Hampshire, Captain Fletcher.  During their second day at sea ‘a sloop 
from Port Royal [John Kelly]…gave an account of the French fleet’s being at Cape 
Antonio’.  A week later the Reformation ‘lost sight of the Hampshire Frigate’. Nearly 
two weeks later, the Reformation, fighting contrary winds and ‘fearing [they] were 
amongst the French fleet, stood off Havana preparing to negotiate the uncertainties of the 
Straights of Florida.  Seven days later Dickinson wrote: ‘this day the storm began at N.E.’ 
Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, pp. 25-27.   
4 The Reformation ran aground on present-day Jupiter Island.  Richard Limpeney, 
the mate, with a quadrant and seamen’s calendar reckoned their latitude to be twenty-
seven degrees and eight minutes.  This positioning placed the castaways just south of the 
present-day St. Lucie Inlet.  The castaways were marginally closer to St. Augustine than 
Havana at about 250 and 350 miles away respectively.  Historians and anthropologists 
debate about exactly where Dickinson landed and the location of the Native American 
groups he describes. For the most recent and most thorough exploration of debates 
surrounding locations of places described in Dickinson’s journal see: Alan Brech and J. 
F. Lanham, ‘The Location of the Paramount Town of the Ais Indians and the General 
Location of the Indians of Santa Lucia’, The Florida Anthropologist, 64:3-4 (2010), pp. 
115-48. 
5 The castaways included twenty-four people: Jonathan Dickinson, his wife, 
Mary, their infant child, Jonathan, a Quaker missionary Robert Barrow on his way home 
from a proselytising tour of the Caribbean, and Dickinson’s kinsman, Benjamin Allen.  
The crew included five common sailors: Solomon Cresson, Joseph Buckley, Thomas 
Fownes, Thomas Jemmet, and Nathaniel Randall.  The captain, Joseph Kirle hailed from 
Philadelphia, he and his mate, Richard Limpeney, were accompanied by John Hilliard, 
the master’s boy and Ben, the master’s slave.  Dickinson brought with him ten enslaved 
Africans: Peter, London, Jack, Cesar, Cajoe, Hagar, Sarah, Bella, Susanna, and Quensa.  
Venus, an Indian girl, died en route from Jamaica. 
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 Florida in the late seventeenth century was a world apart from settled society.  It 
was a savage wilderness rife with uncertainty and teeming with innumerable insecurities.6  
For Dickinson, the storm utterly destroyed the promise of Philadelphia; Jamaica, at least 
in relative terms, might have seemed a bit more comforting in light of the hopelessness 
that this ‘very dismal’ place evoked.7  Yet the peninsula, despite its unfamiliarity to 
Dickinson, his family, his enslaved Africans, and the Caribbean crew, was still very 
much a part of an emerging Atlantic community.  Florida’s transition from colonial 
outpost to a well-settled plantation colony never occurred; therefore, an examination of 
the conditions in the colony at the turn of the eighteenth century offer an interesting 
counterpoint to the previous discussion of Jamaica’s growing pains.8  Nevertheless, 
Florida, like Jamaica, was in the process of becoming Atlantic at the turn of the 
eighteenth century.9   
While Florida never produced the wealth of the Caribbean, it did represent a 
geographical and cultural crossroads where Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans 
                                                           
6 Because Spaniards failed to develop permanent settlements along the 
southeastern coast, we might assume that the Native American polities that existed in 
1513 continued into the 1690s and, though populations may well have been lowered from 
pre-Columbian levels, the Native Americans continued to live much as they had, while 
adjusting to the new opportunities presented by Europeans.   
7 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 4. 
8 Amy Bushnell suggests several factors that retarded the growth of Spanish 
Florida including ‘the crown’s protective attitude toward natives, the obstacles of trade, 
the shortage of currency, the problems of food distribution, the slow Spanish increase in 
population and the rapid native decrease, and the exhausting wars.’ Bushnell, The King’s 
Coffer. Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702 (Gainesville, 1981), pp. 
1-14. 
9 One of the advantages of Atlantic history is that the paradigm allows historians 
to include places like Florida to provide better insights into the variety of Atlantic 
experiences possible during this period.   
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interacted in interestingly complicated ways.10  Nearly every ship departing the 
Caribbean Sea passed the peninsula traveling along with the Gulf Stream Current toward 
the North Atlantic Drift and back to Europe.11  English, French, Dutch, Spanish, 
Catholics, Protestants, Quakers, merchants, pirates, gold fleets, slavers: all types of 
peoples encompassing a multitude of economic, political, and social agendas passed by 
the peninsula every year for generations.  Many of these trans-Atlantic travelers called 
along the east coast of Florida for freshwater, wood, and trade.  In the process they 
created cross-cultural perceptions of the ‘other’ that influenced subsequent interactions 
and influenced the developmental direction of the peninsula.   
Florida, because of its strategic position and seemingly boundless, but rarely 
realised, possibilities for profit, represented a considerable source of concern for the 
                                                           
10 The variegated nature of the castaways and Dickinson’s relation of individual 
reactions to the events along the east coast of Florida are particularly useful when 
discussing the complex relationship between Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans. 
11 The dominant ring of North Atlantic current revolves, more reliably than the 
wind circle, around the warm, usually calm, and weed-cluttered, Sargasso Sea.  It is 
flanked on the west by on of the world’s greatest currents, the Gulf Stream, which can 
add 130 miles a day to the speed of a ship.  This gargantuan water jet swings toward the 
east as it leaves the continental shelf near Cape Hatteras and begins to slow and meander 
off the south coast of Nova Scotia until it becomes indistinguishable in the North Atlantic 
Drift beyond the Grand Banks off Newfoundland.  Ian Steele suggests that ‘the main 
patterns of the winds, currents, and marine biology have altered relatively little in the 
centuries since the discovery of the New World…[but] in this cooler phase [what some 
have called “the Little Ice Age (1550-1850)” the wind patterns of the North Atlantic were 
apparently a little less regular…[and] the strength of the Gulf Stream also seems to have 
lessened in this cooler period.’ Ian Steele, The English Atlantic. An Exploration of 
Communication and Community, 1675-1740 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 6-7.  Michael Jarvis 
suggests that ‘cooler waters would have produced a stronger but more erratic Gulf Stream 
flow and northeasterly wines and more frequent and intense mid-ocean storms’.  Michael 
Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade. Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 
1680-1783 (Chapel Hill, 2010), p. 13.   
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Spanish, English, and French colonial officials in the early eighteenth century.12  For 
Spain, Florida, at the end of the seventeenth century, represented a precious northern 
buffer zone for an increasingly indefensible empire.  For the English, Florida was a 
source of both prestige and problems.  At the turn of the eighteenth century, La Florida 
(present-day Georgia and Florida) represented the last piece, albeit one dominated by 
Native Americans, in an expanding North American Atlantic seaboard.13  Conversely, the 
Spanish colony provided a vexing haven for runaway-slaves from South Carolina.14  
These threats needed to be nullified to allow the expansion of South Carolinian 
plantations and, more importantly, for an English consolidation of power along the North 
Atlantic seaboard.  The French, from settlements along the Mississippi, looked upon the 
same area with jealous eyes as well.  Florida, particularly the Gulf Coast, represented a 
necessary piece in linking French possessions, via the Mississippi, in Canada to those in 
the American South and the Caribbean.15   
Yet for all the potential for study, this period, the late-seventeenth century and the 
geographic area, specifically southeastern Florida, remain relatively understudied by 
Atlantic world historians.  In a recent volume on the transformation of the Gulf South, 
Daniel Unser Jr. remarked on the ‘lingering indifference shown by many early American 
historians’ toward this region despite the ‘central role of religion in colonialism and the 
                                                           
12 Paul Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers (Bloomington, 2002); Daniel Usner Indians, 
Settlers, and Slaves in the Frontier Exchange Economy. The Lower Mississippi Valley 
before 1783 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1992). 
13 Eventually in 1763, the British took Florida.  After the American War of 
Independence, however, British officials returned the problematic peninsula to the 
Spanish. 
14 Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana, 1999), pp. 23-60. 
15 For an interesting contemporary account of the potential of the American Southeast 
see: Daniel Coxe, A Description of the English Province of Carolana, by the Spaniards 
call’d Florida, and by the French La Louisiane, (London, 1722). 
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contest among empires for Indian trade and territory.16  Usner suggests that for most of 
the last two centuries, historians examined Gulf Coast colonisation in the shadow of a 
nationalist history of the United States that privileged its founding English colonies.  
Usner further contends that historians actively shaped representations of life in places like 
seventeenth-century Florida to contrast with life along the Atlantic seaboard of North 
America purposefully ‘essentialising’ cultural differences between European nations in 
order to explain why England’s colonies purportedly grew and expanded more 
successfully than others.17  Amy Bushnell suggests that ‘students of Atlantic history 
focused on the societies, plantations, and commerce of the English, French, Dutch, and 
Portuguese colonists and on enslaved Africans, leaving Spanish colonists to their own 
historians and Indians to ethno-historians.’18  Jack Greene contends that ‘the new 
multicultural interest in the non-British roots of United States civilization…has remained 
relatively unconcerned with large cultural worlds to which the areas of Spanish and 
French penetration were attached…[thus] early American historians [continue] to be 
largely uninformed about the extensive and rich historiography produced…on those 
larger Spanish and French cultural worlds.’19   
                                                           
16 Daniel Usner Jr., ‘The Significance of the Gulf South in Early American 
History’, in Richard Brown (ed), Coastal Encounters. The Transformation of the Gulf 
South in the Eighteenth Century (Lincoln, 2007), p. 13. 
17 Usner, ‘The Significance of the Gulf South in Early American History’ in 
Coastal Encounters, p. 14. 
18 Amy Bushnell, ‘Indigenous America and the Limits of the Atlantic World, 
1493-1825’, in Jack Greene and Philip Morgan (eds), Atlantic History. A Critical 
Appraisal (Oxford, 2009), p. 191. 
19 Greene further suggests that ‘such de-contextualization cannot be expected to 
produce comprehensive understandings of the histories of the areas that suffer it, much 
less to enrich them’. Green, ‘Hemispheric History and Atlantic History’, in Greene and 
Morgan, Atlantic History, pp. 300-01. 
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Therefore, I have several objectives in this chapter examining Jonathan 
Dickinson’s journal of his brief time in Florida.  First and foremost, by utilising 
Dickinson’s journal, this chapter places Florida in an Atlantic world context and seeks to 
integrate Native Americans into that story to illustrate that Florida was not simply an 
isolated outpost and a string of missions.  Rather, Florida, as early as the turn of the 
eighteenth century, was firmly entrenched in an expanding and evolving Atlantic world.20  
As an area of cultural clashes and political and economic maneuvering between various 
Europeans and Native Americans, Florida witnessed many trans-national cultural, 
ideological, and material exchanges.  Examining Florida as an ‘Atlantic area’ provides an 
interesting opportunity to explore how various Native American groups reconciled an 
evolving Atlantic world with their traditional worldview, intertribal relations, and their 
relationships with Europeans.21  Florida also provides an opportunity for historians to 
look outward from the interior toward the wide Atlantic to see how large international 
currents, such as political ideology, religious ideology, and material desires, affected 
                                                           
20 Historians of Florida typically treat the peninsula in isolation and rarely 
endeavor to integrate Florida historiography into an Atlantic world framework.  There are 
two primary veins of scholarship on early Florida: one addresses Native Americans prior 
to European arrival and their subsequent reactions to the Spanish.  Another focuses on 
Spanish efforts to settle the peninsula.  The relationship of Native Americans to other 
Europeans and the larger Atlantic world receive occasional commentary but remain 
largely unexplored. Consequently, the traditional historical narrative suggests, despite 
nearly 150 years of Spanish efforts, that Florida remained a provincial backwater valued 
only for its strategic position at St. Augustine.   
21 One of the major criticisms of Atlantic history, as suggested by Jack Greene, is 
that by focusing on lands bordering the Atlantic Ocean historians deflect attention away 
from inland populations and their role in the Atlantic world. Furthermore, with an 
explicitly Atlantic focus, historians seeking to illustrate the connections that tied the 
various areas of the Atlantic together do so at the expense of the development of local 
areas without much concern about how those connections and trans-national relations 
affected the internal histories of the areas they connected.  Greene and Morgan, 
‘Introduction: The Present Stat of Atlantic History, in Greene and Morgan, Atlantic 
History, pp. 5-7.    
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local circumstances.  Cross-cultural exchanges impacted both people along the coast and 
also those throughout the interior of the American Southeast.  Daniel Richter suggests 
that ‘as the seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth…eastern North America was 
not longer a “new world” for anyone.22  
Thus, this chapter directly engages several historical interpretations of 
Dickinson’s interactions with the Native Americans along the coast of southeastern 
Florida.  The proceeding analysis suggests that previous historical interpretations, by 
failing to consider the directives of the Native Americans, misrepresent the actions of the 
historical actors in Dickinson’s journal.23  Finally, this chapter examines the complex 
interplay of competing Native American groups and different Europeans along the east 
coast of Florida, as well as the greater American Southeast, at the end of the seventeenth 
century to illustrate how Native Americans actively participated in, and in some cases 
dominated, exchanges with Europeans and the European struggle for control of the 
American South.24   
In the end, this chapter illustrates the extraordinary pace at which Native 
Americans and Europeans adapted to the vast changes of the period and made decisions 
based on both local and trans-Atlantic influences.25  Contingency by all parties, European 
and Native American, marked these exchanges and for the first time, Dickinson’s 
                                                           
22 Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country. A Native History of Early 
America (Cambridge, 2001), p. 151. 
23 This chapter particularly engages the single sustained commentary on 
Dickinson’s journal: Andrews and Andrews, God’s Protecting Providence. 
24 Richter suggests that ‘facing eastward, the most remarkable characteristic of the 
early eighteenth century becomes neither conflict nor amity but instead the degree to 
which Indian and Euro-American—and particularly British American—histories moved 
along parallel paths in a single, even more consolidated, transatlantic imperial world.’ 
Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, p. 151. 
25 Reinier Jansen first published Jonathan Dickinson’s journal in 1699 in 
Philadelphia. 
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contingency plans were a matter of life and death.  Contingency, as also occurred in 
Jamaica, greatly influenced the development of this transitional period.  While individual 
contingencies influenced the development of the Anglo-Atlantic particularly in isolated 
colonies and along frontier and boarder zones, the failure of individuals to negotiate 
similar uncertainties is the story of the late-seventeenth century Florida.26    
Native American Background 
 
During their two-month, 250-mile trek from present day Jupiter Island to Saint 
Augustine, Dickinson and company interacted with three autonomous Native American 
groups, the Jobé, the Santaluces, and the Ais, as well as several mission-reduced Native 
American groups.27  Influenced by prior experiences and popular perceptions of the 
‘other’, each group held distinct expectations, prejudices, and attitudes about interactions 
with outsiders.  Native Americans had interacted with Europeans along Florida’s east 
                                                           
26 Even though the Spanish fiercely defended their vast American colonial empire, 
making Florida solvent proved to be impossible.  Notwithstanding the scarcity of Spanish 
settlers, La Florida witnessed determined efforts by Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries to 
convert the region’s native peoples.  David Webber suggests Spanish ‘missionaries failed 
to advance permanently, defend effectively, or Hispanize deeply North American 
frontiers in the seventeenth century.’  Paul Hoffman suggests, ‘Spain normally stood on 
the defensive in La Florida,’ frequently failing to protect and respect friendly Indians to 
resolve friction between settlers and priests, or to regularise royal support through 
subsidies (situados) directed from Mexico or Cuba.  Ultimately Spanish Florida was not 
prepared for the challenges raised by the founding of Charleston in 1670 and the 
relentless, and sometimes violent, expansion of Anglo-America settlers into Carolina and 
Georgia.  The Spanish was forced to recognise the permanence of the English settlement 
of Carolina in 1670 in the Treaty of Madrid.  Two years later construction of the Castillo 
San Marcos began.  The preceding quotations were excised from: Brown (ed), Coastal 
Encounters, pp. 3-4. 
27 Dickinson and company spent just over two months along the east coast of 
Florida, a month of which was spent at the Jece, the paramount Ais village south of 
present-day Cape Canaveral. For general discussion of the Native Americans along 
Florida’s east coast see: John Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, 1513-1763 
(Gainesville, 2003); Milanich, Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe 
(Gainesville, 1995), pp. 52-60, 63-69, 79-92; Eugene Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians 
of the Ays Coast’, (Unpublished Manuscript, on file at P.K. Younge Library, University 
of Florida, Gainesville, 1967). 
 107 
coast for nearly two centuries before Dickinson and company arrived in 1696.28  The 
interactions, most often between the Spanish and Native Floridians along the east coast, 
had a long and often unsavory tenure.29  In general, Native American interactions with 
Northern Europeans are episodic but they offer insight into how Native American groups 
developed different opinions about separate groups of Europeans.  Due to the relatively 
sparse documentary record, scholars have been forced to rely on vignettes, like 
Dickinson’s shipwreck, to examine European and Native American relationships south of 
the Spanish mission provinces.30   Therefore, it is important to remember that these 
relationships were not static and that treatment of European castaways varied according 
to time and place.  Native Americans, however, consistently and consciously 
incorporated their world-view into the expanding European colonial endeavor.31  James 
                                                           
28 Lyon details a collection of Spanish and Native American interactions along 
Florida’s east coast during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.   
29 Peter Wood suggests that ‘during the initial five or six generations of contact 
with slave raiders, European viruses, and Christian missionaries, Florida’s native 
population declined enormously.  Peter Wood, ‘The Changing Population of the Colonial 
South: An Overview by Race and Region, 1685-1790’, in Peter Wood, Gregory A. 
Waselkov, and M. Thomas, Hatley (eds), Powhatan’s Mantle. Indians in the Colonial 
Southeast (Lincoln, 1989), p.51-56.  
30 In the small body of historical literature which touches directly upon these 
Native American groups, eyewitness accounts are limited to the Menendez party or its 
chroniclers, Spanish governmental, military or religious records following initial 
conquest, and a few outside accounts.  Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays 
Coast’, p. 4.  Lyons discusses the historiography up to the 1960s in this unpublished 
paper as well.  Milanch suggests that without Dickinson’s account ‘we would know little 
about the Hobe or the Ais, to the north. Milanich, Florida Indians and the Invasion from 
Europe, p. 56.   
31 See Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country; Karen Ordahl 
Kupperman, Indians and English. Facing Off in Early America (Ithaca, 2000); Peter 
Wood, Gregory Waselkov and M. Thomas Hatley (eds), Powhatan’s Mantle; Cynthia 
Van Zandt, Brothers among Nations. The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early 
America, 1580-1660 (Oxford, 2008); Steven Oatis, A Colonial Complex. South 
Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680-1730 (Lincoln, 2004); Alan 
Gallay, Indian Slave Trade. The Rise of the English Empire in the American Southeast, 
1670-1717 (New Haven, 2002).    
 108 
Axtell suggests that ‘since the Spanish flotas contained black Africans and light-skinned 
Spaniards as well as more familiar brown-skinned Indian people from Central and South 
America, the Floridian’s world view had to expand to incorporate and account for these 
strangers and geographies and cultures from where they came’.32 
The introduction of Africans to this complicated web of interaction only further 
illustrates the dynamic nature of the multi-cultural world of late-seventeenth century 
Florida.  Enslaved Africans accompanied many of Florida’s early exploration 
expeditions, worked in and around St. Augustine, and occasionally ran away to Native 
American villages to the south.33  Bushnell suggests that a considerable number of 
enslaved Africans ran off and intermarried with the Ais during the seventeenth century.34  
Jane Landers further contends that Africans realised the benefits associated with their 
proximity to autonomous Native American groups along Florida’s east coast.  For 
example, in 1603 the Ais gave refuge to seven enslaved Africans from St. Augustine.  
Five were later recaptured but two others were said to have married Indians and were 
never retrieved.35  These episodic encounters provided historians with opportunities to 
                                                           
32 Axtell further suggests that ‘this is never a small undertaking because it 
involves a major adjustment of a people’s ethnocentric sense of uniqueness at the navel 
of the universe.  If it does not reduce their sense of superiority, it certainly complicates it 
by introducing disturbing intimations of cultural relativism. James Axtell, The Indians’ 
New South. Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast (Baton Rouge, 1997), p. 14. 
33 Jane Landers suggests that ‘enslaved Africans first entered the region in 
significant numbers in 1526. Landers, ‘Africans and Native Americans on the Spanish 
Florida Frontier’, in Matthew Restall, Beyond Black and Red. African-Native Relations in 
Colonial Latin America (Albuquerque, 2005), p. 55.  
34 Bushnell, The King’s Coffer, p. 22. 
35 Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana, 1999), p. 287. 
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examine how Native Americans adjusted to their involvement in the expanding European 
colonial endeavor.36   
Native American integration of the European colonial endeavor into their 
worldview, however, should not be taken for granted.  Unlike the sedentary, agricultural 
people of northern Florida, who in large part rendered obedience to the Spanish king and 
his colonial representatives and accepted Christianity, the Native Americans of central 
and south Florida typically maintained their autonomy.37  Fewer contacts with the 
Spanish may have contributed to these groups’ ability to maintain relative autonomy.  
Jerald Milanich argues that the Spanish showed little interest in the Native American 
groups along the Florida southeast coast because of their small numbers and non-agrarian 
lifestyle provided little material for the colonists at St. Augustine.38  Milanich further 
suggests that the distance from St. Augustine made maintaining missions in south Florida 
nearly impossible.39   Fierce resistance to foreign intrusion also limited efforts to settle, 
proselytise, and trade further south along the peninsula.40 
                                                           
36 For a general background of slaves in early Spanish Florida see: Landers, 
‘Africans and Native Americans on the Spanish Frontier’, pp. 54-62. 
37 The native groups of central and southern Florida did not farm maize and 
probably did not cultivate any crops.  Villages and populations were probably smaller and 
less densely distributed than in northern Florida.  Consequently, the establishment of 
missions and the control of native populations were much more difficult in the southern 
two-thirds of the state than in the northern third. Milanich, Florida Indians and the 
Invasion from Europe, p 34. 
38 Milanich, Laboring in the Fields of our Lord. Spanish Missions and Southeast 
Indians (Gainesville, 2006), p. 35. 
39 Milanich, Laboring in the Fields of our Lord, p. 35. 
40 Several missionary and military operations south of Cape Canaveral failed during the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  A final missionary effort south of Lake 
Okeechobee (Calusa territory) took place two years after Dickinson departed St. 
Augustine but like previous attempts this final attempt failed because of fierce Native 
American resistance.  By 1680, however, friars had begun to work among Mayaca-
speaking peoples whom Dickinson identified as Ais.  None of these missions, however, 
involved peoples living immediately along the coast.  For a description of late-
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The Ais Indians dominated the central southeast coast of Florida.41  They lived 
from present-day Cape Canaveral southward into St. Lucie County.  The influence and 
mandate of the chief of Ais extended as far south as the upper keys at least in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.42  The evidence, however, is conflicting 
regarding the place of the Jobé within the Ais Province during the third quarter of the 
seventeenth century.43  It appears that the area from the Jeaga village, just south of Jobé, 
through Tequesta into the upper keys represented something of a unit apart from the Ais 
proper, even though they were within the region influenced by the Ais cacique’s 
                                                           
seventeenth century missionary attempts see: Hann, Indians of Central and Southeast 
Florida, pp.90-98; Hann, Mission to the Calusa (Gainesville, 1991).  
41 Two peoples, the Calusa and the Ais, dominated most of coastal south Florida 
and its immediate hinterland from the sixteenth century to the early years of the 
eighteenth century.  The Calusa represented the most important aboriginal group in 
southern Florida in terms of population size and density, political and military power, and 
influence.  In the sixteenth century and eighteenth centuries they inhabited the coastal 
region of southwestern Florida including Charlotte Harbor, Pine Island, San Carlos Bay, 
and Estero Bay.  The Calusa were clearly the more influential of the two peoples, 
exercising hegemony over most of Florida southwest coast, the Keys, parts of Lake 
Okeechobee region, and, at times, even the Biscayne Bay area.  Through alliance with the 
Ais or through prestige, the Calusa head chief received treasure from Spanish shipwrecks 
along Florida southeast coast.  The chief of Ais was an ally of the Calusa head chief in 
the 1550s and 1560s and, possibly, something more—in view of the goods and people 
from shipwrecks he sent to Calusa’s head chiefs in that era.  Ais’s chief exercised 
hegemony or had influence all the way down the southeast coast to Biscayne Bay and the 
first of the keys below it. Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, 1513-1763, p. 2; 
Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast,’ p. 3  
42 The Ais region encompassed the coast, the adjacent mainland, and probably a 
section of the St. Johns River in Brevard County.  West of the Ais, in the south-central 
area of the state, from Orange County south into Osceola County and parts of Polk and 
Highland counties, lived another native group, the Jororo.  To the north of the Jororo 
within the St. Johns River drainage, from Seminole County north to Lake George, were 
the Mayaca Indians.  Two of these three groups, the Jororo and the Mayaca, are often 
mentioned together in Spanish documents. As a consequence of their location, the Jororo 
and the Mayaca remained relatively isolated from Spanish initiatives.  It was only after 
the native populations at the northern missions were severely decimated that the 
Spaniards began missionary efforts in the 1690s. Milanich, Invasion from Europe, p. 63. 
43 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, p. 61. 
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hegemony.44  Apparently, the Jobé represented the southern limit of Ais influence.45  The 
Santaluces, a subsidiary Ais tribe, lived roughly halfway between the Jobé village and 
Jece, the paramount Ais village, on the mainland near Cape Canaveral.  While none of 
these Native American groups maintained sustained contact with the Spanish at St. 
Augustine, Spanish relations influenced the Ais more than the other smaller groups.  
Nevertheless, the Ais, like the Jobé and the Santaluces, maintained relative autonomy in 
their interactions with the Spanish.46  Experiences with the Spanish and the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with that contact varied according to a Native American 
proximity to St. Augustine. 
From the first recorded encounter between Florida’s Native Americans to the eve 
of Dickinson’s arrival, Native Americans typically dominated their interactions with 
Europeans.47  As a result of their less than felicitous interactions with Native Americans, 
the Spanish struggled to make a positive impact on the southeastern Native Americans.48  
In 1513, the exploratory mission of Juan Ponce de Léon, in need of provisions, sent men 
ashore in the vicinity of Jupiter Inlet, near the village of the Jobé Indians.  Skirmishes 
                                                           
44 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, p. 200. 
45 During the early colonial period, native groups must have lived in coastal 
Broward County, because Spanish artifacts have been found there as well.  Both the 
Jeaga and the Jobé, as well as other groups, are named in 1675 Spanish document that 
lists the groups on that Atlantic coast south of Cape Canaveral as the Ais, Santaluces, 
Jeagas, Jobé (Hobe), Viscaynos, and Matecumbes.  The Viscaynos, from whom the 
modern Biscayne Bay derives its name, may be the Tequesta. 
46 This is evidenced by repeated Spanish failures to established garrisons and 
missions to be detailed below.   
47 For a general first sustained overview of Spanish-Native American interactions see: 
Charles Higgs, ‘Spanish Contacts with the Ais (Indian River) Country’, Florida 
Historical Quarterly, 21:1 (1942), pp. 25-39. 
48 Milanich, Florida’s Indians from Ancient Times to Present (Gainesville, 1998), 
p. 134. 
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took place and the Spaniards kidnapped one Native American to be used as a guide.49  
The negative reaction to the arrival of Ponce de Léon might indicate a history of 
unwelcome voyages (possibly slavers) to Florida’s east coast.50  Throughout the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries intermittent contact continued along the southeast coast 
between the Native Americans and Spanish survivors of shipwrecks as well as Spanish 
slavers.51  Generally, Native Americans enslaved the survivors or killed them on first 
encounter.  After the initial conflict with Ponce de Léon and Caribbean slavers, 
shipwreck victims could expect little mercy from the Native Americans along Florida 
southeast coast.52  
Occasionally, the Spanish received friendly receptions and promises of allegiance 
from Native American leaders.53  Ambiguous allegiances usually proved to be short-lived 
as initially good relations soured after mistreatment.54  Certain occasions and interactions, 
however, provided great benefits for the Ais but the immediate goals of the caciques 
typically dictated the nature of these interactions.  For example, the salvaging of Spanish 
                                                           
49 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, p. 1.  
50 Although slave raids and shipwrecks were sporadic and unannounced, Spanish 
entradas into the interior were large, noisy, and soon predictable in their methods. Axtell, 
The Indians’ New South, p. 15. 
51 For a general overview of first contacts between Native American and the 
Spanish see: Jerald Milanich, and Susan Milbrath (eds), First Encounters. Spanish 
Explorations in the Caribbean and the United States, 1492-1570 (Gainesville, 1989).  
52 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, p. 12. 
53 In 1565, Pedro Menendez de Avilés established ‘good relations with Cacique of 
Ays’. In 1580, Governor Pedro Menendez announced the ‘establishment of peace in the 
area of the Ays coast.’ In 1605, ‘caciques visit St. Augustine and agree to maintain peace 
and send some Indians for Christian instruction.  In 1607, Governor Pedro ye Ybarra 
reported that ‘conditions are now safe along a 100-league stretch of Florida coast’.  In 
1628, Governor Borja reported that the caciques of the south coast are happy and the area 
is now secure and the Indians have renounced their former relations with the English and 
the Dutch. Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, pp. 27-32. 
54 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, p. 78. 
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ships and the division of the spoils among chiefs may have created a cause for positive 
relations with Europeans: 
I desire to speak of the riches found by the Indians of Ais, which is perhaps were 
as much as a million…or over, in bars of silver, in gold, and in articles of jewelry 
made by the hands of Mexican Indians, which the [ship] passengers were bringing 
with them.55 
James Axtell suggests that ‘Floridians eagerly collected these metals from the wrecks, not 
because they appreciated their monetary value in European standards—they did not—but 
because of their color, brilliance, and possibly weight and their uses as media for their 
own artistic forms’.56  Eugene Lyon suggests that there is evidence for shipwrecks from 
the Spanish gold fleets of 1554, 1536, 1618, 1622, 1634, and 1715 in the area inhabited 
by the Ais.57  Lyon contends that ‘salvaging became a persistent and ingrained part of the 
culture’ of the Ais.58  Conversely, if we consider that only one shipwreck from the gold 
fleets occurred each generation, Lyon may have over-stated their historical importance.59  
In effort to curtail or at least regularize the practice of salvaging, Spanish officials 
attempted to negotiate peace agreements with their Native American counterparts.  
                                                           
55 D’ Escalante Fontenada quoted in Milanich, Invasion from Europe, p. 42. 
56 Axtell, The Indians’ New South, p. 13. 
57  In addition to ship lost out of the flotas, many other vessels wrecked on the 
reefs and sandbars along the Ais coast.  The southernmost of the ships of Jean Ribault’s 
ill-starred 1565 expedition was lost on the shores of Cape Canaveral. In 1570 and 1571, 
six smaller ships were driven ashore; one was destroyed by the Ais.  A document of 1630 
mentions Flemish prisoners or the Ais, evidently from a shipwreck.  Three Dutch ships 
sunk near the Ais Inlet in 1626.  Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, pp. 
7-8. 
58 Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, p. 8. 
59 For a general overview of shipwrecks along Florida’s coast see: Robert Marx, 
Shipwrecks in Florida Waters. A Billion Dollar Graveyard (Chuluota, 1985). 
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Eventually, the Spanish made a breakthrough with the Ais cacique and the Native 
Americans subject to him because the cacique promised to provide provisions to the 
survivors from any Spanish ships and send them on to St. Augustine.  During the early 
seventeenth century, the Ais also agreed to capture enemy survivors and report their 
presence to the governor.  Nevertheless, their promise to the Spanish was tenuous at best.  
Despite efforts by Spaniards to proselytise and to forge political alliances, the Native 
Americans of central and south Florida shunned those attempts and retained their vital 
role and complex socio-religious systems, inter-regional relations, and independence.60  
Native Americans south of St. Augustine undoubtedly understood the 
ramifications of a constant Spanish presence in their villages including the loss of land 
and as non-agrarian peoples and the loss of their traditional subsistence methods as well.  
A constant Spanish presence might also alter the power structures among the peoples of 
southeast Florida.  Therefore, it stands to reason that the Ais and their subsidiaries limited 
their contact with Spaniards to occasions that provided immediate benefits.  This type of 
vacillating behaviour, especially in the face of military expeditions, kept the Spanish 
‘perpetually puzzled and irritated’ with their Native American counterparts.  While the 
Spanish characterized Native American actions as ‘treachery’, Lyon suggests that ‘all the 
Indians were doing was temporarily yielding ground when confronted by an immediate 
and present force, and then returning to their way when the threat was gone.61   
These interactions, however, led to changes in the socioeconomic and political 
organisation of the Native Americans along Florida’s southeast coast.62  The Native 
                                                           
60 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, pp. xi-xii. 
61 Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, p. 13. 
62 In the early colonial period, an increased European presence made life for 
Native Floridians more difficult.  Introduced diseases and the colonial system reduced 
 115 
Americans became increasingly connected not only to Spaniards but also with other 
Europeans and the African counterparts.  Consequently, Native Americans began to 
consider the benefits of keeping castaways alive, particularly for ransom, while 
developing trade relations rather than killing Europeans they encountered.  These groups 
continued to trade with Atlantic world interlopers as they came ashore for wood and 
water.  Amy Bushnell suggests that the Ais traded with French corsairs for ambergris, a 
perfume fixative, and sassafras and china root, popular specifics for syphilis.63  They also 
interacted with English and Dutch corsairs who lurked near the coast of Cape Canaveral 
looking to attack Spanish shipping lanes.64  The Ais also witnessed, on several occasions, 
Europeans interacting with each other along their coasts as well.  In 1627, a Dutch fleet 
drove a Spanish frigate aground near Cape Canaveral.  They skirmished with the 
Spaniards, stripped the frigate of its contents, burned the frigate to the waterline, and 
anchored off the Ais village.  In the end, the Dutch, with ‘gifts and cajolery’, successfully 
established relations with the Ais.  When the Spanish arrived in the village to purge the 
Dutch, who had already retreated, they found six English and French pirates being held 
captive.  Rojas y Borja suggested that they were being held until they could be brought to 
St. Augustine.65  Their presence, however, seems strikingly similar to Dickinson’s 
captivity discussed below. 
                                                           
populations, caused alterations of traditional political systems, and disrupted what had 
previously been adequate subsistence systems. Milanich, The Invasion from Europe, p. 
33. 
63 Bushnell, Situado and Sabana. Spain’s Support System for the Presidio and 
Mission Provinces of Florida (Athens, 1994), p. 64; Bushnell, ‘Republic of Spaniards, 
Republic of Indians’, in Michael Gannon (ed), The New History of Florida (Gainesville, 
1996), p. 68. 
64 Bushnell, The King’s Coffer, p. 8. 
65 Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, p. 90. 
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To combat the problems posed by Northern Europeans trading with the natives of 
Florida’s southern coast, the Spanish governor continued to pursue friendly relations with 
the Ais.  Borja noted that ‘on the occasions when English and Dutch ships have arrived 
on the coast of these Indians, they have not admitted them or traded with them. And they 
have come to give me news that there are enemy ships on the coast.’66  The key here is 
the Native Americans’ refusal to ‘admit’ or ‘trade’ with the English or the Dutch.  The 
Spaniard says nothing about them being put to death, a treatment apparently reserved for 
his countrymen.67  Nor could he really testify to how Native Americans treated other 
Europeans while the Spanish were not present.  This omission suggests that the relations 
between Northern Europeans and the Native Americans along Florida’s southeast coast 
were somewhat different to that of the Spanish.  At the very least, Native Americans, 
especially the Ais, made clear distinctions between different groups of Europeans.  
Whether these distinctions were based on the national origins of the Europeans or on the 
immediate goals of the Native Americans is unknown.  Therefore, when Dickinson and 
company were shipwrecked along Florida’s southeastern coast in 1696, they entered into 
a complex web of resistance and cooperation between Europeans and Native Americans.  
In the end, Dickinson found that Native Americans were both very knowledgeable about 
different European nations and distinguished closely between them.   
Problems with the Shipwreck 
 
Having unknowingly arrived in this complex web of interaction, the castaways attempted 
to consolidate the wreckage of the Reformation during the early morning hours of 23 
                                                           
66 Rojas y Boria quoted in Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, pp. 89-90. 
67 For a discussion of the numerous executions of Spanish missionaries and 
military men see: Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, pp.78-103 and Milanich, 
Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe, pp. 99-163. 
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October 1696.  Dickinson and London, one of Dickinson’s ten enslaved Africans, were 
searching for some type of suitable shelter when: 
About the Eighth or Ninth hour, came two Indian Men…from the Southward, 
running fiercely, and foaming at the Mouth, having no Weapons but their Knives, 
and forthwith, not making any stop, violently seized the two first Men they met 
with…they used no Violence, for the Men resisted not…Their Countenance was 
very Furious and Bloody…the rest of our Men followed from the Vessel, asking 
me what they should do, whether they should bet their guns to kill these two; but I 
perswaded them otherwise, desiring them to be quiet, shewing their inability to 
defend us from what would follow, but to put our Trust in the Lord, who was able 
to defend to the uttermost….whilst these two…stood with a wild furious 
Countenance, looking upon us; I thought with my self to give them some Tobacco 
and Pipes, which they greedily snatch’d from me, and making a snuffing Noise 
like a Wild-Beast, turned their backs upon us, and ran away.68 
Post-storm reconnaissance missions were regular occurrences along Florida’s east coast.  
Spanish prisoners reported that they often saw their captors head for the local beaches 
after a storm and return with ‘great wealth, in bars of silver and gold, and bags of reals’.69 
Lyon suggests that Native Americans ‘had made adaptations to a wrecking and salvage 
complex’ and essentially became experts at the task.70 
Once the two Native American scouts left the wet, weak, and lame castaways, 
Dickinson and company:  
                                                           
68 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 5 
69 Escalente Fontaneda quoted in Axtell, The Indians’ New South, p. 13. 
70 Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, p. 14. 
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communed together, and considered our Condition, being among a barbarous 
People, such as were generally accounted Men-Eaters, believing those two were 
gone to Alarm their People: We sat our selves down, expecting Cruelty and hard 
Death, except it should please Almighty God to work wonderfully for our 
Deliverance.  In this deep Concernment some of us were not left without Hopes; 
blessed be the Name of the Lord, in who we trusted As we were under a deep 
Exercise and Concernment, a Motion arose from one of us, that if we should put 
our selves under the Denomination of Spaniards (it being known that that Nation 
had some Influence on them) and one of us, named Salomon Cresson, speaking 
Spanish Language well, it was hope’d this might be a means for our Delivery; to 
which, the most of the Company assented.71 
 These two passages from Dickinson’s journal are very revealing because they 
highlight several ideological strands that influenced the castaways’ world-view and 
decision-making process.72  First, for Dickinson, Robert Barrow, a Quaker missionary, 
and the editors of the first published edition of the journal, surviving this ordeal in Florida 
was a matter of putting faith in the Lord.73  For an eighteenth-century Quaker audience, 
                                                           
71 God’s Protecting Providence, pp. 5-6. 
72 Dickinson recorded the events of his time in Florida after his arrival in 
Philadelphia with prompting from the Society of Friends. Two manuscript copies, one 
previously undiscovered which I am preparing for publication, of the journal are located 
at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.  The first published edition (1699) remains 
relatively true to the manuscript; however, some of the language was modified while 
other passages were excluded all together.  Joseph Kirle confirmed the accuracy of 
Dickinson’s account. 
73 Barrow was a well-traveled and oft-persecuted Quaker missionary.  Barrow 
spent twenty-six years ministering throughout Wales, Scotland, and Ireland.  Barrow was 
a close friend of George Fox and a highly regarded member of the London Quaker 
meeting.  Barrow first arrived in Philadelphia in 1695.  Barrow, accompanied by another 
Quaker missionary, Robert Wardell, traveled along the east coast of America and the 
Caribbean. By the fall of 1696, Wardell died and Barrow resided in Elizabeth Parish, 
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‘God’s protecting providence’ was the central theme of the journal.74  To further illustrate 
the glory of God, God’s providence was actively juxtaposed with the harsh environment 
and the barbarous ‘devouring jawes of the inhuman canibals of Florida.’75  The prefacer 
of the original journal, presumably Samuel Preston, suggested that the castaways were 
‘so affected with such eminent appearances of the protecting hand of Providence, for 
their help, preservations, and deliverance that they are not willing to confine it to them 
only, but to publish to the world; that the fame of God may be spread from sea to sea.’76 
  Captivity narratives in general often included a theme of redemption by faith in 
the face of the threats and temptations of a foreign place and an alien way of life. 
Emphasising the harshness of the voyage was a standard practice for many deliverance 
narratives published during the seventeenth and eighteenth century.  These stories present 
tales of families sundered, communities destroyed, and boarders shifting and vulnerable 
to attacks by native peoples and their European allies.  Lorrayne Carroll suggests that 
‘much of the their force derives from the fear of an uncertainty attendant on the captive’s 
                                                           
Jamaica with his fellow religionists.  Discouraged by the conditions prevailing among the 
Friends in Jamaica, he left with Dickinson for Philadelphia. For a biographical sketch of 
Barrow see: Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, pp. 118-24.   
74 God’s Protecting Providence was an eighteenth-century bestseller.  Its value of 
a Quaker tract was instantly recognised.  The title pages of the various reprints of the 
journal reveal the importance of God in the narrative.  After the first edition in 1699, 
Dickinson and Barrow feature equally.  With each new edition Barrow, a Quaker 
missionary suffering his last ordeal, becomes the real hero, Dickinson remains merely the 
author.  Nevertheless Dickinson is the model of the emerging Quaker man of business, 
and his text alternates between the story of his competent actions and a hagiographic 
appreciation of Barrow, the elder, beloved missionary, whose death near the end of the 
narrative provokes a textual apotheosis. Lorrayne Carroll, ‘Captivity Literature’, in Kevin 
J. Hayes (ed), Oxford Handbook of Early American Literature (Oxford, 2008), p. 155.  In 
all, the journal appears in sixteen editions and in three different languages: English, 
Dutch, and German. For a discussion of the various editions see: Andrews and Andrews, 
Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, pp. 163-96   
75 God’s Protecting Providence, title page. 
76 God’s Protecting Providence, preface. 
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position in hostile, little-known North American locales.’  She continues: ‘all captivity 
texts derive their narrative power from the image of the suffering captive.  They 
emphasise individual experiences of privation, loss, injury, death, occasional escape, and 
redemption—both physical and spiritual.’77  Many of these accounts reinforce pernicious, 
ethnographic images of natives as primitive, but some also (and simultaneously present 
images of sophisticated and effective native practices—in warfare, political negotiation, 
and spiritual exercises.78  Dickinson’s journal achieves all of these literary elements. 
In fact Dickinson’s journal is described in the Cambridge History of English and 
American Literature ‘in many respects [as] the best of all the captivity tracts.’79  The 
popularity of Dickinson’s journal may have resulted from its fanciful setting.  In general, 
the Puritan captivity account gave New England readers a sense of the landscape and 
native peoples that shaped their lives.  The Dickinson Quaker narrative, on the other 
hand, offered the far more exotic local of southern Florida, a place far removed from the 
daily experiences of Philadelphian readers.  Carroll suggests that God’s Protecting 
Providence portrays Dickinson as a ‘heroic, authoritative, and sensible captive, one who 
negotiates assuredly with his captors.’80  In this way, Dickinson’s captivity narrative 
served the Society of Friends as it moved from radical sect to mainstream institution by 
illustrating how a Quaker, under duress, capably manages the problems associated with 
temporal life (Dickinson) while it also offered a model of Quaker piety and resignation in 
                                                           
77 Carroll, ‘Captivity Narratives’, p. 145. 
78 Carroll, ‘Captivity Narratives’, p. 144. 
79 ‘Colonial and Revolutionary Literature, Early National Literature, Part I, 
Travellers and Explorers, 1583-1763’, in A. W. Ward, A. R. Waller, W. P. Trent, J. 
Erskine, S. P. Sherman, C. Van Doren (eds), The Cambridge History of English and 
American Literature, (New York, 1907-21). 
80 Carroll, ‘Captivity Literature’, p. 155. 
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death (Barrow).81  In addition, the narrative might be viewed as an example of the 
Society of Friends’ purposeful creation of its own history.82  
In reality, Dickinson’s survival strategy required pragmatism rather than 
providence.  At some point during his travels, Dickinson became aware of the Native 
Americans’ ‘love of tobacco’.  His gift of tobacco to the Native American scouts suggests 
an attempt to cultivate a positive relationship with the two Native American scouts.  
Native Americans were familiar with this type of reciprocity based on their prior 
experiences with the Spanish who often “bribed” them to do their bidding.  Prestige items 
salvaged from shipwrecks or gathered through trade had long become a part of their local 
economic system.83   
Moreover, satiating the scouts with a gift provided time for the castaways to 
devise a plan for their survival.  In the interim, the castaways decided to masquerade as 
Spaniards because they believed them to have ‘some influence over them [Native 
Americans].’84  Their ruse, however, was hopelessly flawed.  Only one castaway, 
Solomon Cresson, of the twenty-four castaways could speak Spanish beyond a few 
words.85  Regardless, Dickinson and Kirle ‘instructed’ the crew and the enslaved Africans 
                                                           
81 Captivity texts appeared in many different forms and exhibit stunning breadth 
of purpose, functioning as conversion tales, proto-ethnographic text, compendiums of 
historical and geographic data, sermons, travelogues, commercial advertisements, 
political and religious propaganda, and accounts of current events. Carroll, ‘Captivity 
Literature’, p. 143. 
82 Carroll, ‘Captivity Literature’, pp. 155-56. 
83 Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, pp. 8-9. 
84 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 6. 
85 Cresson, of Huguenot descent, was born in Harlem, New Amsterdam in 1674.  
After his father’s death he relocated to Curacao.  Cresson maintained business 
connections with the mid-Atlantic, particularly in Philadelphia but through poor business 
deals arrived in Jamaica penniless and was obliged to ship as a common sailor on board 
the Reformation bound for Philadelphia.  For a biographical sketch of Cresson’s family 
see: Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, pp. 115-18. 
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in rudimentary Spanish grammar and instructed them how to interact with Native 
Americans.  Dickinson, unaware of the complexities of the Native Americans’ various 
relationships with the Spanish, figured they might fare better if the Native Americans 
believed them to be Spanish.’86  These two decisions, the gift of tobacco and pretending 
to be Spanish, illustrate that ideas about Europeans and Native Americans circulated well 
beyond the peninsula.  Native Americans, however, interpreted the castaways’ actions 
quite differently than the castaways intended.  For the Jobé, the significance of the 
shipwreck waited in the wreckage.  Dickinson in company simply provided another 
opportunity for the Jobé to gather riches and information that they might utilize in their 
interactions with their local Native American counterparts, as well as the Spanish.    
The Anglo-Caribbean castaways’ survival stratagem of donning Spanish identities 
was one of astounding assumptions.  For the ruse to work, as Amy Bushnell suggests, 
none of the Native Americans could know enough Spanish to penetrate their clumsy 
disguise.  Yet they must collectively know enough about Spanish reprisals to refrain from 
harming Spaniards and enough about Spanish rewards to render them assistance.87  Little 
did the castaways know that Spanish authority did not necessarily reach into the lower 
reaches of the peninsula.  Nor did they really know what would have happened to them if 
they revealed their true nationality.  Ultimately, however, the castaways had few options.  
This stratagem, moreover, was contrary to English pride and to Quaker principles.  
Perhaps, in the mind of the castaways, nothing but the fear of Spanish retaliation or the 
                                                           
86 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 6. 
87 Bushnell, ‘Escape of the Nickaleers: European-Indian Relations of the Wild 
Coast of Florida in 1696, from Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal’ in Brown (ed), Coastal 
Encounters, pp. 35-36. 
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expectation of ransom would keep the ‘savage men’ at bay.88  This first encounter, 
however, provided the castaways with little cause to think that pretending to be Spanish 
would preserve their lives.   
Evidently, the Jobé decided to spare the castaways’ lives on their own accord 
rather than because of the castaways’ successful ruse.  Just like Spanish authority, the 
influence of Englishmen pretending to be Spanish did not garner much respect from the 
Jobé.  The circumstances of Dickinson’s survival directly related to Native American 
perceptions of their changing world and an extraordinarily complex and multi-
generational exchange that involved a multitude of local and trans-Atlantic influences.  
Native Americans used these ideas to inform their decisions when Europeans appeared on 
their shores.  
When shipwrecks occurred along Florida’s east coast, the news of the castaways 
traveled fast. Within several hours the Jobé returned to the shipwreck in ‘very great 
number all running and shouting.’89  While the majority of the approaching Jobé went to 
plunder the vessel, the ‘Cassekey with about thirty more came down’ on the Dickinson 
party in a ‘furious manner.’90  Surrounding the castaways as they sat upon their salvaged 
trunks and chests, the Jobé cried, ‘Nickaleer, Nickaleer!’  At first the Dickinson party did 
not understand the exclamation but after a reference to ‘Espania’ the party supposed that 
at first the Indians meant English.91   
                                                           
88 Bushnell, ‘Escape of the Nickaleers’, p. 35. 
89 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 6.      
90 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 6. 
91 The label haunted the castaways for their entire journey.  Found only in this 
account, ‘Nickaleer’ seems to be Dickinson’s attempt to reproduce the Native American 
pronunciation of the Spanish Inglaterra or Angleterre. Bushnell, ‘Escape of the 
Nickaleers’, p. 244. 
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The Jobé, unsure of the castaways’ nationality or their potential value as hostages, 
surrounded the survivors with ‘their knives in their hands ready to execute their bloody 
design.’  The cacique stood behind Dickinson while others were ‘taking hold of 
some…by the heads with their knees set against [their] shoulders.’ Bewilderment and 
fear grew as the castaways listened to the Jobé: ‘they were in high words, which we 
understood not.’92  After a brief discussion, the Jobé decided to spare the survivors in 
order to receive the goods locked in the trucks, chests, and scattered about the beach.  
Lyon suggests that the ‘importance of salvaging can be inferred from the uses to which 
they put the goods recovered, and the evident relative value to which they place upon 
them’.93  The Jobé stripped most of the party of their personal possessions and continued 
pillaging the shipwreck ‘casting forth what ever they could lay hold on, except rum, 
sugar, molossoes, beef, and pork.’94   Evidently, the Jobé ascribed very little value to 
perishable items or as Milanich suggests ‘perhaps the rum, sugar, and molasses were 
valued commodities to which another chief whose military might the Hobe feared had a 
standing claim.95  Nevertheless, Dickinson seemed impressed with Jobé efficiency and 
skill in salvaging the Reformation.    
Without a real sense of the discourse of the Native Americans’ ‘high words’ it is 
difficult to speculate about their debate.  The castaways’ clumsy disguise might have put 
just enough doubt in the minds of the Jobé but the apparent shift from ‘bloody-minded 
creature[s]’ to indifferent salvagers, however, probably resulted from a well-argued 
                                                           
92 God’s Protecting Providence, pp. 5-7 
93 Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, p. 9. 
94 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 6. 
95 Milanich, Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe, p. 58. 
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discussion regarding the costs and benefits of captivity or execution.96  The particulars of 
the debate will never be known, but two things are certain.  First, Native Americans along 
Florida’s east coast made real distinctions between different Europeans because of prior 
experiences with different groups.  The three autonomous native groups, the Ais, the 
Santaluces, and the Jobé, repeatedly inquired about the castaways’ national origins even 
though they could probably recognise the physical, cultural, and linguistic differences 
between the Spanish and the English.97  Why they were insistent on confirming their 
identity, however, varied according to each tribe’s proximity to St. Augustine and their 
relationship with the Spanish.  Second, these distinct opinions about different Europeans 
and distinguishing between them were necessary in deciding how they treated the 
castaways.   
 Despite a growing awareness of a larger Atlantic world, the Jobé cacique’s most 
immediate concern was with the dominant Native American group along Florida’s 
southeast coast, the Ais. Yet, they also had to consider the Spanish.  If Dickinson and 
company were Spanish, as they suggested, a recovery expedition would be expected to 
follow when the anticipated ship did not arrive in St. Augustine.  If they were English and 
traveled south the castaways would go unnoticed by the Spanish at St. Augustine and, 
more importantly, by the Ais, who would otherwise demand tribute from the shipwreck.  
When Dickinson expressed his desire to move north, the cacique insisted they travel 
south to his ‘town.’  Dickinson suggests that the cacique wanted them to ‘go to the 
southward for Havana, and that it was but a little way.’98  Dickinson ‘press[ed] him more 
                                                           
96 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 7. 
97 At one point Dickinson heard a Jobé man call one of the castaways an ‘English 
Son of a Bitch.’ Andrews and Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, p. 37. 
98 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 8. 
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urgently, to let [them] go to St. a Lucea’ but the cacique warned that they would have 
their ‘throats and scalps cut and be shot, burn’d, and eaten.’99  The cacique foretold this 
dramatic prediction, as Dickinson rightly perceived, as a diversion to make going south 
appear more attractive.  The cacique’s main concern was securing the plunder from the 
shipwreck and by sending the castaways south the plunder would be safe against other 
inquiries.  In the end, as Dickinson’s suggested, the Jobé cacique ‘had heard of these 
places [Havana, Santa Lucía, and St. Augustine] and knew which way they lay.’100  
During this early exchange, the Jobé cacique illustrated a keen awareness of his local 
milieu as well as his place within the larger Atlantic world.     
After three days at the Jobé village, the cacique permitted the castaways to go 
north toward St. Augustine; however, he delayed their departure until he secured his 
plunder, particularly the 1,500 pieces of eight.  The cacique and three of Dickinson’s 
enslaved Africans headed northward while the village was ‘busie with what they had 
taken out of [the] vessel…sewing some cloth together, stringing our beds, mending locks 
and chests.’101  When the cacique returned with the boat, the three enslaved African 
porters related that ‘the chief business was to remove the money from one place to 
another and bury it.’102  
The cacique’s choice to use Dickinson’s enslaved Africans as porters are 
intriguing. Dickinson supposed that the cacique did not trust his own people. The cacique 
may have simply viewed the enslaved Africans as more able-bodied laborers and 
                                                           
99 The fort named Santa Lucia, established by the garrison left by Pedro 
Menendez at the Ais Inlet in 1565 after they removed to the south, was incessantly 
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100 God’s Protecting Providence, p. 7. 
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 127 
probably understood the relationship between enslaved Africans and their Europeans.  
Either way, it is clear that the Jobé cacique made a distinction between his white captive 
and his black captives.   
The Jobé mended locks and hid plunder not because he did not trust his own 
people but because he aimed to keep it from his Native American counterparts, and 
perhaps the Spanish, whom Dickinson encountered on his travels northward.103  Burning 
the Reformation to the waterline, which the Jobé did after first contact, further concealed 
the size of the prize.104  The Jobé cacique’s preparations were all justified because once 
Dickinson and company related what they lost to the Ais, and later to the Spanish, they 
both sent recovery expeditions for the lost goods.   
Maltreatment, abuse, and a general air of hostility characterised the first 
encounters of the castaways with both the Jobé and the Santaluces; however upon 
reaching their respective villages the Native Americans treated the castaway much more 
kindly.  Despite this obvious complication, most historians who have commented on 
Dickinson’s journal argue that the Native Americans in Florida treated the castaways 
particularly poorly because they were English.  Physical abuse and stripping the 
castaways of their personal property characterise the worst of the maltreatment.  
Therefore, historians have difficulty explaining or supporting with evidence why the 
Native Americans would treat the English so poorly.  Amy Turner Bushnell suggests that 
‘the wild coast Indians...had good reason to hate the English, for they know them as man-
                                                           
103 Evidently, the Jobé understood the value of precious metals and money to the 
Spanish, for the Spanish had made this value quite clear in the course of many contact. 
Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, p. 10. 
104 Lyon suggests that ‘the Indians burned the wreck, possibly to obtain the metal 
fittings for use’. Lyon, ‘More Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast’, p. 9. 
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stealers.’105  Charles Andrews argues that their antipathy towards the English resulted 
from their knowledge of the longstanding hostility between the Spanish and the English 
and their ‘familiarity with such a situation…could have become an established conviction 
with the Indians.’106  The author of the preface to the original edition of the journal was 
less certain: ‘whether their cruelty against the English proceeds from their being under no 
apprehension of danger from them…or whether it proceeds from any particular disgust 
offered them by some English I shall not determine.’107  In short, these historians argue 
that the poor treatment of the castaways resulted from a long history of enslavement and 
maltreatment on the part of the English, an awareness of European political maneuvers, 
or an apparent lack of threat posed by English castaways.  Ultimately, the commentators 
focused on the English and not on the true European presence in Florida, the Spanish.   
I contend that the Native Americans did not treat the English poorly at all.  In fact, 
the castaways simply experienced a complex expression of a standard protocol developed 
by Native American after dealing with decades of shipwrecks.  Events such as these, 
while devastating the Dickinson party, were regular occurrences along the east coast of 
Florida.108  Consequently, Native Americans developed a series of actions to deal with 
stranded Europeans.  The Native Americans first cowed castaways into submission 
regardless of national origin. Second, they analysed the costs and benefits for keeping the 
                                                           
105 Bushnell, ‘Escape of the Nickaleers’, p. 58. 
106 Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal, pp. 156-7. 
107 God’s Protecting Providence, preface. 
108 In August 1682 Sir Thomas Lynch wrote to the Governor of New Providence 
about his position in the Bahamas: ‘it is known that your Islands are peopled by men who 
are intent rather on pillaging Spanish wrecks than planting, that they carry on their work 
by Indians kidnapped or entrapped on the coast of Florida, and that all the violence you 
complain of arises only from disputes about these wrecks.’ J.W. Fortesque (ed), Calendar 
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castaways alive.  Third, and most importantly, they secured whatever plunder they could 
from the shipwrecked vessel.  After establishing the status quo, Native Americans 
decided the fate of castaways. 
The aforementioned suppositions from previous historical interpretations of 
Dickinson’s journal about Anglo-Native American interactions are not particularly well 
founded.  First, the idea that the English maintained a reputation amongst the Native 
American groups of south Florida to be slavers seems to be unlikely for three reasons: 
timing, location, and duration.  Bushnell argues that ‘the English treated the wild coast 
like a labor pool, seizing the natives at will and taking them to distant places where they 
were forced to labor under dangerous conditions where few would survive.’109  Bushnell 
highlights several occasions when the English took native captives including Robert 
Searles’ sack of St. Augustine in 1668 when he took a number of captives black, white, 
and Native American; a buccaneering occupation of Apalache on the Gulf in 1682; and 
William Phips’ salvage expedition of the Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion in 1687 when 
Native American divers worked on the site.  The lynchpin of the argument, however, is 
Dickinson’s relation of a Native American captive who had been taken by an English 
merchantman and subsequently made his way back to the Ais village via Havana.110  
Bushnell also suggests that English slave raids from South Carolina during Queen Anne’s 
War might have generated this reputation as well.  
                                                           
109 Bushnell, ‘Escape of the Nickaleers’, p. 56. 
110 At Jece Dickinson describes a ‘man in this town who, some years past, had 
been taken off by some of our English sloops, for a diver on the wreck to the eastward of 
Cuba, where he was sometime: but the vessel putting into Cuba, for water, this Indian 
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Kirle, Solomon Cresson, and some of us into his house, seeming very cheerful, asking if 
were would eat’. God’s Protecting Providence, p. 41-42. 
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On the contrary, Native Americans may have viewed Robert Searle’s raid of St. 
Augustine as an attack on the Spanish, not as a direct affront to Native American villages 
some 250 miles south of the Spanish settlement.  Searle’s interests focused on weakening 
the Spanish garrison more than taking Native American captives.  The occupation of the 
gulf coast community during 1688 was even more far removed from life along Florida 
southeast coast.  The recovery expedition of William Phips might be viewed as a direct 
threat to Native American autonomy but it is important to remember that the Ais received 
certain benefits for their service as wreck divers.  Finally, while Creek and Yamasee raids 
did occur in Spanish Florida prior to the beginning of the War of Spanish Succession, 
none of those raids took place south of Saint Augustine until after 1701, nearly four years 
after Dickinson and company departed Florida.111  Alan Gallay, the chief scholar of the 
Indian slave trade in the south, only mentions in passing that English sponsored slave 
raids occurred south of Timucuan territory at all.112  Furthermore, the English were not 
the enslavers themselves, only the middlemen between the raiders and the marketplace.113 
Andrews suggests that Native American antipathy towards the English resulted 
from their knowledge of the longstanding hostility between the Spanish and the English.  
While Native Americans along the Florida southeast coast were certainly aware that the 
Spanish did not enjoy the English presence on the peninsula, the Native Americans also 
realised the impermanence of the English settlement in the region.  The Ais had first-
hand knowledge of English settlement in the Caribbean; whether or not the Jobé were 
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Spaniards. 
112 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, p. 148. 
113 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, p. 69 
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aware of an English presence in the Caribbean or South Carolina is uncertain.114  The 
arrival of English corsairs and merchantmen along the southern coast may have been 
viewed as an opportunity for trade, evident from a number of English goods at Jece.  
Dickinson suggests that ‘we saw many tokens of some of our nations…two English 
canoes, one of cedar the other of cotton tree like those of Jamaica, several blocks and 
sheaves of lignum-vitae; several tools and knives, and more particularly, a razor, on the 
haft…Thomas Foster.  Some of these things look as though they have been several years 
amongst them, some but a few.’115  The presence of English corsairs and traders may 
have also been viewed as a welcome distraction for the Spanish.   
In any event, the idea that Native Americans directly adhered to Spanish 
perceptions of the English does not clearly represent their evolving perspectives 
regarding different Europeans.  Native Americans wanted simply to adapt and adopt what 
they found desirable and attractive from the Europeans.  Gallay argues that Native 
Americans had ‘no intention of accepting the Europeans model for new behaviour, or of 
exchanging their culture for a new one, or, not least, of accepting European dominance 
over them’.116  Native Americans along Florida’s southeast coast were autonomous and 
made decisions based around their immediate goals.  In the end, Andrews’ supposition 
paints the Native Americans along Florida’s southeast coast as subject to Spanish 
authority.  Spanish influence among the Native Americans must not be misinterpreted as 
apathy for, or adherence to, European initiatives.  
Finally, the prefacer of the original journal, Samuel Preston, suggests that the 
English did not present a threat to the Native Americans and that their helplessness 
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created an occasion for maltreatment.  This would probably be the case for any half-
drowned and half-starved castaway regardless of national origin.  In all of these 
arguments, these authors highlight the impact of European actions and their 
repercussions.  If we consider the 150-year relationship with the Spanish, during which 
time Native Americans executed many Spanish soldiers, missionaries, and castaways, it 
appears that the Dickinson party received particularly good treatment.117  The violence 
and the death threats, while real to the castaways, simply illustrate an elaborate scheme 
aimed at defining the power dynamics between captives and captors.  More than likely, 
none of the native groups Dickinson encountered intended on killing the castaways.  The 
castaways’ view of the Jobé, and all the Native Americans they encountered, as 
bloodthirsty pagan cannibals was an image created in their own minds a result of the 
growing literature and prejudices about Native Americans that circulated around Europe 
and the Atlantic colonies.   
 During these complex exchanges, Native American balanced their acts of ferocity 
with acts of kindness.  Dickinson, as the author, glossed over the kindness of Native 
Americans in the published account in order to highlight his dire circumstances and the 
glory of God’s deliverance.118  After the initial encounter, the Jobé cacique stayed with 
Dickinson while the ‘some hundreds’ of Jobé pillagers continued to salvage goods from 
the wreck.  Contrary to the image of a ‘blood thirsty savage’ at first encounter, now the 
‘Cassekey’s heart was tendered toward us…and for the remaining part of the day [to] 
                                                           
117 From first contact to the eve of Dickinson’s arrival in Florida, the Native 
Americans and the Spanish had a contentious relationship.  Milanich outlines a number of 
cases when Native Americans along Florida's east coast executed Spanish soldiers and 
missionaries in Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe, pp. 99-164. 
118 Dickinson’s language in the unpublished manuscript version of the journal is 
much more forgiving in regards to the positive treatment his and the other castaways 
received from their Native American captors. 
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keep off the petty-robbers.’119  When the rain started again the cacique signaled that they 
should build a shelter in which he ‘stayed with them and the trunks he reserved for 
himself.’120  He also retrieved several coats for those in the tent.  Late in the evening a 
group of Indians brought a slaughtered hog to the tent for the castaways to eat.  Upon 
their arrival to the Jobé village, the cacique offered them water and constructed a 
makeshift shelter connected to his wigwam ‘of some sticks…with small palmetto tyed 
and flattened to the stakes; he also provided three reed mats.121  The ‘Cassekey’s wife’ 
suckled Dickinson’s infant child.  Another Jobé Indian ‘brought a fish boiled on a 
palmetto leaf and sat it down amongst us.’  This was hardly the treatment one might 
expect of a ‘barbarous’ people’ preparing for a mass execution.122   
The following morning the cacique’s hospitality continued with his son gathering, 
‘in two hours…as many fish as would serve twenty men.’123  Some of the Native 
Americans took kindly to particular castaways, as Dickinson wrote, ‘Solomon Cresson 
was mightily in one Indian’s favor, who would hardly stir from his wigwam, but 
Solomon must be with him, and go arm in arm, which Indian amongst his plunder had a 
morning gown, which he put on Solomon.’124  Others took to Christianity, or rather to the 
reading of the Bible:  
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some of them, especially, the Cacique’s son, would take great delight in our 
reading, and would take the Bible or other book, and give to one or other to read; 
the sound of which pleased them, for they would sit quietly and very attentively to 
hear us.125   
It is important to remember that the readings were all in English, not Spanish as 
they pretended to be.  After three days at the Jobé village, Dickinson and company 
departed for St. Augustine.  The cacique gave them several things including ‘five or six 
pounds of butter, some sugar, a rundlet of wine, some balls of chocolate,’ and a large 
bowl to bail water from the leaky boat.126  The night before the cacique ‘seem’d very 
generous to my wife and child’ and gave her several useful things.127  In exchange, 
however, the cacique was ‘resolved on’ keeping one of Dickinson’s enslaved African 
boys, Cæsar.128  Here again, the cacique was making clear distinctions between his white 
and black captives. Evidently, the cacique viewed the enslaved boy as part of his plunder 
and required him in exchange for the goods he gave back to Dickinson before his 
departure.   
When the castaways arrived at Santa Lucéa, twenty miles up the coast, two 
Santalucean fishermen observed the castaways from across the inlet and quickly headed 
for their village.  Within the hour a large group of Santaluces arrived at the inlet with 
their bows and arrows.  They ‘came in the greatest rage that possible a barbarous people 
could.’129  When coming upon the castaways, they cried ‘Nickaleer, Nickaleer’ while the 
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castaways ‘sat all still, expecting death.’ After the ‘Indians had taken all but their lives’ 
they ushered the castaways across the inlet.130   
Map 2: Dickinson’s La Florida 
 
 
Here again, the Santaluces balanced their initial act of ferocity with acts of 
kindness.  While some were for ‘prosecut[ing] their bloody design’ others interceded on 
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the castaways’ behalf.131  The castaways ‘felt the rage of some of them’ as they continued 
to throw rocks, shoot arrows, and strike them as they made their way to the village. 
Conversely, some of the captors protected the castaways.  A Santalucean woman gave 
Mary Dickinson a pair of breeches.  When an overzealous captor forced a handful of sand 
in baby Jonathan’s mouth the cacique’s wife came to their aid and stayed with them until 
they reached the cacique’s house.  Thus, as Dickinson suggests ‘a mighty strife there was 
amongst them; some would kill us, others would prevent it: and thus one Indian was 
striving with another.’132  This ritualised gauntlet meant to serve as an intimidation 
technique used to cow the castaways into submission much like the Jobé.  In retrospect, 
massacring the captives seems like a fairly implausible objective.  
While at the council house, the Santaluces gave Mary Dickinson and the enslaved 
African women deerskins to cover their cold and broken bodies; the men received 
breechcloths of woven grass.  The Santaluces appointed a place for the castaways and 
provided mats to lie down; however, the place was “extremely nasty…[and] swarmed 
with abundance of many sorts of creeping things.’133 The Santaluces debated while the 
castaway listened apprehensively.  The cacique attempted to talk with Solomon but to no 
avail.  The Native Americans went about brewing and drinking ‘Cassenna’ and smoking 
tobacco.134  Around noon the Santaluces brought the castaways some boiled fish.  The 
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day progressed with singing, dancing, and drinking ‘cassenna’.  The following day the 
cacique ‘looking on us pleasantly,’ offered gifts to some of the castaways.  Mary received 
roasted clams to share with the rest of the castaways, while a Santalucean woman suckled 
baby Jonathan to the point that he ‘began to be cheerful and have an appetite to food.’135  
The Santaluces continued to inquire about the party’s national origins and 
Cresson continued to suggest that they were Spanish.  The Santaluces, however, pointed 
to those with dark hair and suggested they were Spanish but those with light hair they 
were doubtful about.  Whether or not the Santaluces believed the castaways to be 
Spanish, they decided to send them on to the next village.  Dickinson suggested that they 
were ‘satisfied…that most of us were Spaniards.’  More than likely they were satisfied 
with what a visiting Jobé ambassador related about the plunder.136 
When the castaways reached the Jece, the paramount Ais village, they endured 
quite a different welcome.  The Ais, who maintained relatively regular contact with the 
Spanish, and had a longer, or at least better documented, history with St. Augustine, 
welcomed the castaways.  At Jece they met the ‘commander of the northern part of this 
coast, an ancient man, his beard and hair gray.’137  The Ais cacique embraced the Kirle 
and suggested that ‘those people, who had served us thus, in stripping us, were rouges, 
but we were his camerades or friends.’ The cacique promised to ‘carry us to Augusteen’ 
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in few days.138  Dickinson suggested that ‘the old “Cassekey”’ seemed to have 
compassion for us.’139  
In contrast to their arrival at Jobé and Santa Lucéa, the cacique immediately 
welcomed the castaways into the village without the expected gauntlet of abuse.  A 
performance of ferocity was apparently not needed to ensure the castaways’ good 
behavior.  The Ais escorts brought the castaways to the council house where the cacique 
washed Robert Barrow and Mary Dickinson’s feet.  The Ais distributed some canvas and 
ginger bags to the castaways to be used as clothing.  They also offered Mary a piece of 
linen to cover baby Jonathan as well as a substantial amount of foodstuffs.  Joseph Kirle 
received a coat.  An Indian woman came ‘laden with baskets of berries’ for them to eat 
and another brought in a parcel of large ‘drums.’   
At Jece, the castaways met another vessel’s company that was shipwrecked the 
same night as was the Reformation. Their company was comprised of six Englishmen and 
a woman.140  When they came to the inlet south of Jece they turned back to retrieve their 
boat.  Shortly thereafter several Ais, clearly aware of different Europeans, came down 
upon them asking ‘what nation they were, if Spaniards, English, or French?’141  The 
castaways answered that they were Spanish but when the Indians looked angry they soon 
confessed to their English origins.  The Ais scouts stripped the castaways and forced 
them to walk northward toward the town.  Here again upon their entrance in the village 
the cacique gave them some clothing.  Moreover, as Dickinson relates, ‘no violence [was] 
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offered to their persons.’142  The ‘Nantwich castaways’ received plenty of fish and berries 
to the time of Dickinson arrival.  The Ais lodged the captain in the cacique’s ‘house’ 
while the others were lodged in the other ‘Indian-houses.’  When Dickinson and company 
arrived at the Ais village, the cacique suggested that the Nantwich castaways vacate the 
‘Indian houses;’ they refused and were not forced out.  Both parties received a variety of 
berries and a large parcel of fish.  Neither party received death threats from the Ais.  
Even in the middle of a violent storm that flooded the village, the Ais provided berries for 
the castaways.  Mary repeatedly ‘went a-begging’ to the Indian women to suckle baby 
Jonathan; ‘they seldom denied her’.  Several days after the storm the castaways received 
the ‘greatest plenty’ of fish they received since arriving in Florida.  In general, the Ais 
treated the castaways with kindness or, at worst, with apathy.   
Bitter infighting, however, threatened to tear the castaways apart.  In the 
manuscript version of the journal (excised from the printed version), Dickinson relates 
how ‘there gr[e]w a division amongst us some or most of ye Marriners of our Vessell”.   
He suggested they:  
in ye greatest joyletry [and] very prophane…would appear like anticks before ye 
Indians to make them laugh at their folly [and] at ye same time would bler terrible 
oaths with cursings [and] Damings which at any tyme yet either Barrow Kirll or 
myself would reprove them. 
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Dickinson lamented that his ‘reproofs begot their dislike at length, perfect hatred’.  So in 
times of need they refused to supply Dickinson, his wife, or Kirle with any provisions 
and  ‘publiquely declared yet if wee perished for want they would not help us’.143  
In another incident recorded in the manuscript version of the journal but excised 
from the printed versions, Dickinson’s enslaved Africans utilized the uncertainty of the 
circumstances to their advantage.  Dickinson recorded how his enslaved Africans 
‘through fear of ye Indians and other ill councell’ would not ‘come nigh to help my wife 
to tend her child…Especially one Negroe woman named Sarrah’.  Dickinson complained 
that she would ‘taunt, demendre, & abase not only my wife but any of us all to our faces’.  
Dickinson further suggested that having gained the cacique’s favor, Sarah ‘would vilify 
us and at times when food and watter was scarce [and] would bee our hinderance from 
having it from ye Indians which wee might have had it not have been for her’.  Dickinson 
could not reconcile how she ‘would deny us to bee her master or mistress [and] laugh and 
deride us at ye same time all which would increase our troubles.’144  Africans, at least in 
this instance, took advantage of the leveling effects of the being stranded among Native 
Americans.   
Eventually tensions eased and Dickinson enquired if the crew of the Nantwich 
was to go to St. Augustine as well.  The cacique refused to take them because they were 
‘Nickaleer, no Camerade.’145  Dickinson interpreted that statement to imply that the 
English were not friends of the Ais.  The cacique intended for them to go southward.  He 
did not suggest that they were to be put to death.  More than likely the cacique was 
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unaware of the relatively new alliance between the Spanish and English.146  Even so an 
alliance probably meant very little to the Ais cacique and it is plausible to suggest that 
when the cacique suggested that the English were ‘no camarade’ he was referring to the 
longstanding animosity between the English and the Spanish not to an animosity between 
the Ais and the English.  Dickinson, like the historians who have examined his text to 
date, failed to consider the relative point of view of the Native Americans.  This is further 
evidence of Native Americans’ acute awareness of the evolving Atlantic world.147   
As stated earlier, sustained contact with the Spanish better informed the Ais about 
European protocol and the advantages and disadvantages associated with interacting with 
castaways and Spanish authorities.  More experience meant a better understanding about 
Spanish recovery expeditions and the potential value of different European hostages.  
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Consequently, the Ais cacique probably wanted to send the English castaways south for 
two reasons: first and foremost, the English survivors would not generate any kind of 
compensation; second, the arrival of English castaways in St. Augustine would probably 
result in an unwanted visit from a Spanish recovery expedition.  On the other hand, by 
delivering the ‘Spaniards’ to St. Augustine there might be a chance at some type of 
recompense.  By sending the Englishmen southward the Spanish would remain unaware 
of the shipwreck and the plunder would remain in their hands.  
Recovering the plunder from the wreck of the Reformation was the immediate 
goal of the Ais cacique.  Shortly after the castaways’ arrival, the Ais cacique inquired 
about Dickinson’s losses.  Dickinson related that the Indians at ‘Hoebay’ confiscated a 
great deal of clothing and money.  Upon hearing this he ‘grew covetous and said, he 
would go and get some of it from them.’148  The next morning the cacique with ten men 
and two canoes headed southward for ‘Hoebay.’ He promised that upon his return he 
would carry them to St. Augustine.  
As stated earlier, the Jobé village represented the southern limit of Ais hegemony.   
Evidently the Jobé cacique hid the Spanish coin before Dickinson’s departure for good 
reason.  Several days later, the Ais cacique returned triumphantly atop one of Dickinson’s 
chests.  He also brought Cæsar along with him.  The village received the cacique ‘with 
great homage.’149  He gave an account of his adventure during which time ‘he would 
often mention Nickaleer which caused us [the castaways] much fear.’150  The cacique 
continued to inquire about the castaways’ national origins. He showed them goods that he 
knew to be English while asking if they belonged to the castaways.  This is further 
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evidence of the Ais’s awareness of their changing world.  The Spanish coin, however, 
provided Dickinson with a meek defense but the cacique became wary of taking them to 
St. Augustine.  Perhaps he concluded that the value of the plunder outweighed the worth 
of any Spanish reward and consequently he decided not take the party to St. Augustine 
and ‘laid all our hopes in the dust.’151 
Dickinson continued to lobby for his company’s departure to St. Augustine 
eventually convincing the cacique to allow Solomon to go to St. Augustine.  The ‘old 
Cassekey,’ Solomon Cresson, and six Native Americans in a canoe set out for St. 
Augustine with a small chest with ‘nigh one hundred pieces of eight.’152  Presumably, the 
cacique planned to bring enough gold to St. Augustine to prevent Spanish authorities 
from coming to his village to inspect the size of the plunder.  The gift of gold is 
comparable to the gift of cassina herbs, smoking herbs, and moss pillows to the 
Santaluces from the Jobé ambassador.  Dickinson unknowingly observed a complex 
network of hegemonic exchange.  The word of the shipwrecks, however, was well ahead 
of the cacique. 
Approximately two weeks after the cacique’s departure for St. Augustine, eleven 
Spaniards and one Native American interpreter arrived at Jece and ‘embraced us 
[Dickinson and company] very cheerfully.’  The power dynamic changed with the arrival 
of the Spanish.  Clearly Spaniards, even in small numbers, garnered some respect 
amongst the Ais.  The ‘old Cassekey…seemed much dejected.’  He lost what he had 
taken from Jobé to the Spaniards and his hope of delivering Spaniards for a reward would 
not be realised.  The Native Americans along the southern coast gambled and lost. 
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Dickinson’s relation of the events, however, indicated that the normal method of 
recovering salvaged goods from the Native Americans along Florida’s southeast coast 
was barter and trade rather than dominance.  Bushnell contends that Native Americans 
had:  
many things that Spaniards wanted: sassafras, amber, deer and buffalo skins, nut 
oil, bear grease, tobacco, canoes, storage containers, and, most of all food…and 
the Indians…wanted what the Spanish had: weapons, construction and cultivation 
tools, nails, cloth, blankets, bells, glass beads, church ornaments, and rum.153   
Dickinson suggested that the Spanish attempted to persuade the Native Americans to 
‘bring [goods] to light’ by offering to buy things with tobacco.154  A leaf or half leaf of 
tobacco would purchase a year of linen or wollen, or silk from the Indians.  Dickinson 
noted that the Ais had stores of silk, linen and wollen cloth, which they dolled to the 
Spaniards by the yard.155  Five pounds of ambergris could buy, at St Augustine, a looking 
glass, an ax, a knife or two, and three or four mannocoes (five or six pounds) of 
tobacco.156  By the time Dickinson arrived, Native Americans had learned that they could 
salvage goods from shipwrecks to manipulate their trade relationships with Europeans, 
particularly the Spanish.   
In line with all those who encountered the castaways, the Spanish captain inquired 
as to where Dickinson and company were shipwrecked and made it known to them that 
he intended to go there to retrieve what the Jobé kept from the vessel.  The castaways 
implored him not to go there because they feared for their lives in the absence of the 
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Spanish.  The castaways thought they could rest easier in the care of the Spanish.  
Ironically, with the arrival of the Spaniards the castaways’ plight became harder as they 
quickly began the journey north to St. Augustine.  The Spanish captain forced the 
castaways to proceed in two parties always making Kirle and the Ais guides go ahead.  
The two groups met at a place where they were to ‘hale our boats over land, being a 
quarter of a mile from sound to sound.’157  At this place, the Spanish captain, with 
another reciprocal gesture, gave a Native American a ‘leaf of tobacco, commanding him 
to go, with all speed, and bid his cacique, with all his able men, come and help’ get the 
boats across the land. 158  By the time they arrived the job was completed; the Spanish 
captain gave the cacique ‘a leaf of town of tobacco’ for his trouble and the cacique 
reciprocated with a ‘stately parcel of fish’ which the soldiers shared with Mary Dickinson 
and Penelope.159  The Spanish, however, did not share the fish with the remaining two-
dozen castaways.   
The actions of the Spanish distressed the castaways. Dickinson, however, 
appeared more comfortable with their new European counterparts even if they showed 
little regard for the plight of the castaways.  As the weather turned cold, the Spanish 
constructed a shelter with mats, but would not ‘let us meddle with them [the boats]’ to get 
shelter from the wind.160  Moreover, on the next day when the company came across an 
‘Indian plantation’ full of ‘pumpion vines’ but the ‘Spaniards were too quick for us, and 
got all before us.”  Furthermore when a piragua, sent to recover goods from the Native 
American further south, delivered some provisions; bread, corn, and strung beef, to the 
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company ‘it was kept from us, except a piece of strung beef, the Captain of the 
Spaniards’ gave to Mary Dickinson.161  Finally, Dickinson and Kirle thought the leader of 
the Spanish expedition, Captain Sabastian Lopez, conspired against them when he ‘drew 
up a writing’ for them to sign placing them and their African slaves ‘at the disposal of the 
Governor of Augustine.’  Dickinson refused to sign the document. By this point the 
Spanish had carried the castaways safely within the Spanish domain. The Spanish 
abandoned the castaways to return southward to the shipwreck to recover what they could 
from the Native Americans.  The Spanish escorted the English castaways because it was 
protocol under a recent treaty between the two countries.  The treaty, however, did not 
erase years of national and religious animosities that erupted again several years later.  
Once the Spanish returned south for the goods left at Jobé, the castaways 
remained in the hands of the Native Americans of Florida.  These native groups, 
however, were different from those along the southeast coast.  Spanish missionary efforts 
focused in North Florida in the seventeenth century amongst native groups who spoke 
dialects of the Timucua language.  While not a single political unit, the Timucua 
encompassed a group of around thirty simple chiefdoms each comprised of two to ten 
villages.162  The castaways interacted with the eastern Timucua who inhabited the coastal 
areas from Cape Canaveral to St. Augustine.  The various Timucua speakers lived in 
different environmental zones. All of the groups practiced some agriculture but many 
relied heavily on hunting, fishing, and gathering.  The key distinction between the 
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Timucua and the Native Americans of southeast Florida was their adherence to Spanish 
authority.  The Spanish maintained this authority through the establishment of the 
missions and military outposts.163 
The castaways continued north with one Spaniard and their Native American 
guides.  At each village the Native Americans provided provisions for the castaways.164  
The further north they travelled, however, the Native Americans became less 
accommodating to the castaways.  Perhaps for two reasons: one, they may have been 
more accustomed to maltreatment and tacitly resistant to the Spanish or they may have 
been, as Spanish allies, less accommodating to people who were not Spanish.  At each 
sentinel outpost the Spanish expressed little concern for the castaways suggesting that 
they should continue on to the next sentinel’s house.  In fact several were left to die along 
the shore after the Spanish sentinels refused to accommodate them.  Dickinson relates the 
day:  
our people, black and white, made all speed, one not staying for another, that 
could not travel so fast, not but I, with my wife and child, Robert 
Barrow…Benjamin Allen, and my negro London, whom I kept to help carry my 
child keeping together; the rest of our company had left us, not expecting to see 
some of us again; especially Robert Barrow, my wife and child.165   
For the remainder of the day, Dickinson remained a good distance behind the 
larger party only four of which he could see.  Dickinson sent London to ask them to 
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slacken their pace; they did not.  Later the evening ‘in the midst of these reasonings and 
doubtings’ Dickinson and company saw a Spaniard on top of the sand bank.  They made 
their way to the sentinel’s house where the Spaniard offered them room by the fire, plenty 
of hot cassina, cornbread, and a ‘kersey-coat’ for Mary.  The Spaniard refused, however, 
to go back for the others; he argued, ‘the weather was not fit to go out.’  Dickinson 
‘begged of them hard’ to let them stay for the night but several of the castaways had to 
sleep in a small thicket of trees during the ‘hard frosty night’.166  In the end, five of the 
castaways died of exposure that day: Benjamin Allen, Jack, Ceasar, Quensa, and baby 
Cajoe.  The Spaniards not being able to maintain the castaways continued to send them 
further north as quickly as they came to each house.   
Eventually another boat from St. Augustine came to fetch the castaways.  The 
Spanish escorted the Dickinsons directly to the governor’s house.  Had Dickinson been 
more aware of protocol, he might have noticed where the governor received him—not at 
the landing, as an honored guest, nor at the entrance to the Government House as an 
equal, but rather standing formally at the top of the stairs.167  Once he established his 
space and exerted dominance over Dickinson, don Laureno de Toress y Ayala was 
gracious.168  The governor’s treatment of the Dickinsons was strangely similar to that 
they received from the various Native American caciques along their way.  They received 
wine, food, and clothing. They were quartered in the governor’s house.  While the hard 
part of the ordeal was over, the 500-mile journey was just halfway completed.  Another 
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250 miles of Native American territory separated Spanish Saint Augustine and English 
Charlestown.  During this journey, only briefly recorded in Dickinson’s journal, 
Dickinson entered into an even more hotly contested zone between several Native 
American tribes, the English, and the Spanish.169   
To prepare for the second leg of the trip, Kirle and Dickinson intended on selling 
several enslaved Africans to buy clothes and provisions.  The governor, however, refused 
to allow such sales and instead extended the castaways credit to be paid back by the 
governor of Charlestown.  Dickinson procured a ‘quantity of Indian corn, peas, stringed 
beef, salt and earthen pots…seven blankets [at a great price]…five roves of ammunition, 
and bread…totaling four hundred pieces of eight.’170  In exchange, ‘we should forget him 
when we got amongst our nation, and also added that if we forget, God would not forget 
him…because what ever he did he did for charity’s sake.’ 171   
The journey from St. Augustine to Charlestown took just under a month during 
which time Dickinson and company called at various Indian towns along the way: Santa 
Cruce, St. Wans, St. Mary’s, St. Philips, Sappataw, St. Catalena, and various other 
unnamed villages.  In Spanish territory, these ‘Indian towns’ were mission or garrison 
towns that served as a buffer between the typically contentious settlements of St. 
Augustine and Charlestown.172  Dickinson’s journey illustrated a different view of these 
settlements from his view of those in Southeast Florida: ‘they have a friar and a 
worshipping house, the people are very industrious, having plenty of hogs and fowls, and 
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large crops of corn.’173  In typical European style, Dickinson praised their more settled 
ways of life.  These groups often brought in victuals and supplies for the large canoe-
going convoy.   
Beyond the mission towns, Native Americans affiliated with the Spanish typically 
treated Dickinson and company well but the Yamasee Indians of Carolina were 
suspicious of the party.  Perhaps more sustained contacts with the English in South 
Carolina created an air of suspicion surrounding Spanish and their Native American 
allies.  One of the Native American guides, a cacique from St. Wans was related to the 
Yamasee and when they met the Spanish captain encouraged Dickinson to write the 
governor of Carolina, which the Yamasee carried north for them.   Along their travels 
they happened across several merchants from Carolina, with four Indian slaves and laden 
with skins.  Three of the Yamasee fled to the woods ‘fearing the Spanish.’174   
Dickinson’s time along Georgia and South Carolina occurred on the eve of the 
most destructive period of the early colonial history of the American Southeast.  Within a 
decade the English and Spanish would be once again engaged in a life and death struggle 
for control over the area’s resources.  During the struggles Europeans pitted Native 
American groups against one another.  The end result was catastrophic.  The English with 
their new Native American allies threatened to topple not just the mission system but also 
the entire Spanish presence in Florida.  What weakened Spain even more—and at just the 
wrong time—was France’s reentry into the South in 1699.175  Spain now had new 
boarders to defend and on the eve of Dickinson’s arrival in Florida, the entire South was 
in a period of adjustments and transition.  The establishment of Spanish, English, and 
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French colonies adversely enmeshed native peoples in European rivalries.176  
Nonetheless, as Richter suggests, almost everywhere Europeans went they found peoples 
trying to make some kind of alliance with them to gain access to the goods and power 
they might possess.  These efforts to reach out to people of alien and dangerous ways are 
most striking in the way in which the arrival of newcomers exacerbated conflicts of one 
Native group with another.  Contact with the Europeans inspired bitter conflicts over 
access to what the Europeans had to offer.177 
Gallay suggests that two economies grew side by side in English Carolina. The 
first was a frontier exchange with Native Americans that brought in animal pelts and 
Indian slaves.  This trade generated much needed capital and commodities to develop a 
plantation system, which produced food and wood products.  At the heart of both 
economies lay slavery—slaves as laborers and slaves as commodities.178  As in Jamaica, 
a long period of warfare, internal squabbles, and political realignments characterised this 
transition from frontier economy to plantation economy.  Even with this economic 
expansion, between 1670 and 1730, South Carolina struggled to survive.  Institutional 
weakness, political and economic uncertainty, and lawlessness characterised the colony, 
and many Carolina settlers shared no common purpose but to accumulate riches.  During 
most of the proprietary period, the struggle for control over Native American affairs 
defined the colony’s history and shaped the fortunes of all involved.179  
The English recognised the importance of the missions to the colony of La 
Florida.  Weakening the missions, they knew, would weaken Spain’s hold on La Florida.  
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Having established the Charlestown settlement in 1670, English interests began to chip 
away at the missions to the south, beginning with raids in 1680 on San Buenaventura de 
Guadalquini on St. Simons Island and Santa Catalina de Guale, both on the Georgia 
coast.  In the space of five years, 1702-1706, moreover, the South changed forever.  
Disease and an alliance between the English and Native Americans decimated Florida’s 
aboriginal population.180  The Apalachee mission system collapsed.181  Slave raiders 
drove the Timucua from their homes and enslaved many more.  The French and the 
Alabama, Choctaw, and Chickasaw struggled for control over the Gulf South.  The 
English confined the Spanish in northern Florida to the environs of Saint Augustine and 
Pensacola; their Native American allies now raided for Native American captives as far 
south as the Florida Keys.  In the entire South, no one was immune nor could remain 
isolated from European competition, and all Native Americans had to contend with the 
English quest for slaves.  After 1706, reformers in Carolina called for new Indian 
policies, greater government control of trade, and a reconsideration of the meaning of 
empire.182  The French and Spanish spent much of the decade trying to stop the British 
and allied Indian slave raids.  For the Spanish, ending slave raids was a matter of 
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survival—the raiders decimated their most powerful allies, leaving the colony almost 
undefended.183   
After the swirl of invasion that began with the English failure to take Saint 
Augustine in 1702 and ended with the Franco-Spanish fiasco against Charlestown in 
1706, the Europeans scurried for alliances with Native Americans.  South Carolina’s 
phenomenal success in destroying Spanish missions raised English prestige and 
facilitated the recruitment of larger Native American forces for campaigns against their 
enemies.184  Within several years, however South Carolinians so alienated their allies that 
they banded together in a pan-Indian movement that ended the large-scale slaving of 
native peoples.  Steven Oatis suggests that:  
the Yamasee War hit South Carolina as a horrifying shock that forced many 
colonists to reconsider everything they had previously believed about the 
southeastern Indians.  A certain degree of paranoia had always played a role in 
South Carolina imperialism, but no one had really expected such a disaster to 
occur during a period of relative peace and prosperity.185   
During their worst crisis of the early colonial period, South Carolinians faced not 
a single monolithic Indian enemy but a number of different Indian enemies who fought 
with different motives and different levels of intensity that were predicated by varying 
degrees of interactions with the colonists.186  The Yamasee War devastated South 
Carolina and it took years for South Carolina to rebuild.  By 1730, however, the colony 
emerged in a dramatically new form.  A plantation-based economy revolved around rice 
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while continuing to produce cattle, food, and wood products for West Indian markets.187  
Even before the Yamasee War gave economic precedence to the plantation over the 
Indian trade, colonists understood that the colony’s future lay in agriculture. In the 
aftermath of the Yamasee War, slaveholding Carolinians yearned to stabilise their 
political system by removal of the Lords Proprietors in exchange for royal colony 
status.188 As the colony’s first half century drew to a close, pioneering life was giving 
way to plantation life as the dominant mode of existence, and Europeans and Indians 
were rapidly giving way to Africans as the dominant demographic presence in the coastal 
lowlands.189   
Conclusion: A Cassina Toast  
 
Seventeenth-century Florida was a dynamic place where several autonomous Native 
American groups interacted with a number of different Europeans and their Native 
American allies living in mission towns around Saint Augustine.  Native Americans 
along the southeast coast were not mere dupes caught up in the events of the colonial 
period.  They maintained their way of life, their socio-political organisation, and their 
religion.  They not only took an active role in the new world developing around them, 
they utilised the standing animosities of different Europeans to their advantage.190  Their 
autonomy and their awareness of different Europeans influenced how the castaways 
would be treated during their time along Florida’s east coast.  But the process was 
complicated and unstable.  Even though previous understandings, expectations, and 
generalised ideas about the ‘other,’ played important roles, the contacts themselves 
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caused readjustments and rethinking as each side was forced to reformulate those ideas in 
the face of unexpected actions.191  What advantages Native Americans could garner from 
different castaways also influenced intertribal interactions.  Most importantly, local 
circumstance guided how the castaways from the Reformation moved from village to 
village.  
In the context of competing empires, it appears that for this brief period, the 
Native Americans were victorious in contending with the uncertainties of this period. 
While the ultimate demise of these three groups waited on the horizon, Dickinson’s 
journal presents a collection of highly sophisticated Native American groups who 
actively contended with the same issues Europeans faced at the turn of the eighteenth 
century.  Europeans and Native Americans sought to maintain traditional ways of life, 
adjust to new trade opportunities, and incorporate new peoples and their actions into their 
collective worldviews. The Jobé, the Santaluces, and the Ais all figured out how to work 
these shifting circumstances to their advantage.  In the end, these groups successfully 
maintained their autonomy and in some instances enhanced their position along this 
European frontier.  They successfully incorporated Europeans and their goods into their 
world when it provided benefits.  Generally, historians view Native American successes 
and failures in European terms but if we consider how agile these groups proved to be in 
their interactions with a diverse group of random Europeans, we can clearly recognize 
their successes. 
By examining the events of Dickinson’s shipwreck, I developed a clearer picture 
of the interactions of a diverse group of Atlantic world peoples during a brief period 
along a European frontier zone.  This exploration of a particularly intriguing international 
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sphere of interaction highlights that despite Florida’s reputation as a backwater, the 
peninsula was deeply impacted by the material and ideological currents that were 
circulated by Spaniards, Native Americans, and other wayward Europeans and that 
Florida was not marginal to Atlantic history.  Florida deserves an exclusively Atlantic 
treatment particularly because the dynamic nature of the people who interacted there 
represents the core of Atlantic history.  Atlantic history is not necessarily about 
understanding English colonies or Spanish colonies or an African or Native experience in 
the context of those competing Europeans.  Atlantic history should be about the world all 
these people created together.  This is not a world constructed by historians; rather, it is a 
world cultivated and maintained by people contending with the uncertainties of the 
colonial period.  A truly Atlantic experience awaits scholars willing to challenge 
historiographical norms and reconcile that individuals and their interactions with all types 
of Atlantic peoples guided the development of the colonial period.      
I further attempted to ‘deliver’ Dickinson’s journal from historical obscurity.  For 
too long, historians have viewed the events of Dickinson’s journal within an imperialist 
lens.192  While Dickinson’s journal frequently appears in the footnotes of anthropological, 
historical, and literary monographs, scholars have collectively disregarded the richness of 
the account.  Traditional approaches to captivity narratives and the ethnographical 
commentary contained therein deserve to be reevaluated.  Ultimately, the complexity of 
the multicultural interactions of Dickinson’s journal have been muted by scholars who 
perpetuate standard narratives about European and Native American interactions.  Many 
opportunities await scholars willing to reconsider Dickinson’s journal.  I utilised 
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Dickinson’s narrative to explore how local and trans-Atlantic cultural, religious, and 
political currents of the late-seventeenth century Atlantic world influenced the 
interactions of a diverse group of Atlantic world peoples to reveal the complex interplay 
between power and perception.  I also illustrated that the late-seventeenth century 
Atlantic world, especially along a European frontier, was a very uncertain and dynamic 
place where new exigencies outweighed customs      
The peoples involved in the shipwreck narrative represent a cross-section of the 
eighteenth-century Atlantic world.  Breaking out of traditional historiographical 
approaches is a difficult task.  Future consideration may be given to exploring how the 
experiences of the castaway women differed from those of their male counterparts or to 
how enslaved Africans viewed their captivity differently than their white counterparts.  
Even though Dickinson’s narrative is a single event, the multi-cultural interactions from 
the narrative cannot be treated in isolation.  By examining this multi-cultural episode, this 
chapter suggests that British colonials did not exclusively guide the development of the 
British Atlantic colonies.  The interactions of British colonials with other Europeans, 
Africans, and Native Americans along several European frontiers had profound effects on 
the development of the Atlantic world colonies and their subsequent convergence into the 
British Empire.  Florida, however, remained a source of problems for the English well 
into the eighteenth century. 
Dickinson’s experiences in Florida certainly influenced his perceptions of the 
Atlantic world.  By 1699, London was the sole survivor of Dickinson’s enslaved Africans 
who had accompanied him in Florida.  Shortly after arriving in Philadelphia Dickinson 
began to engage in trade to the Caribbean and unfettered he returned to the sea.  The peril 
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of Florida fundamentally altered Dickinson’s entrance into Philadelphia’s mercantile 
society.  The prospect and potential of the mid-Atlantic, however, fell short of Dickinson 
expectations. Dickinson’s Atlantic world was changing once again and he would have to 
adjust accordingly.  
 
 
 
 158 
CHAPTER 4: NEGOTIATING AN UNCERTAIN ATLANTIC MARKETPLACE 
 
It seems strange yet this place hath not a Trade with Jamaica, its trade with 
Barbadoes is very considerable & the produce of [that] country at a great rate 
amongst us.1  
Before departing Jamaica, Dickinson, encouraged by a plethora of promotional 
tracts and popular misconceptions, probably envisioned Philadelphia as a bustling port 
teeming with opportunity.2  When Dickinson arrived in Philadelphia on 1 April 1697, 
‘Penn’s Woods’ had developed exponentially since its inception in 1681 but the colony 
did not resemble the beacon of hope Dickinson envisioned.3  Nevertheless, the emerging 
port town must have been a welcome sight after Dickinson’s long and arduous journey 
from Jamaica.  The nine-month journey took the lives of seven of the original passengers 
aboard the Reformation and left indelible marks on Dickinson, his family, and his 
enslaved Africans as they attempted to adjust to life in Pennsylvania.4  
While both trans-Atlantic and local circumstances upset the consistency of trade 
to and from the adolescent port city, political squabbles, unscrupulous business affairs, 
                                                           
1 Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Maria Dickinson Logan Family Papers, 
1671-1890, Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, 1698-1701, Jonathan Dickinson to Francis 
Dickinson, 28 November 1698. 
2 The literature promoting Pennsylvania to investors and potential immigrants 
presented a productive and socially harmonious colony, one free from economic 
dislocation, conflict with Native Americans, and political or cultural anxieties.  In reality 
Pennsylvania suffered from the same issues of many Anglo-Atlantic colonies. John 
Smolenski, Friends and Strangers. The Making of Creole Culture in Colonial 
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 2010), p. 83. 
3 Even though Penn pre-established much of the machinery of government, the 
first years of Pennsylvania were distinguished not by the orderly establishment of 
political institutions and purposeful development of the economy, but rather by wholesale 
confusion and chronic friction between sections, groups, and individuals. Gary Nash, 
Quakers and Politics. Pennsylvania, 1681-1726 (Princeton, 1968), p. 48. 
4 For a general survey of the mid-Atlantic colonies see: Ned Landsman, 
Crossroads of Empire. The Middle Colonies in British North America (Baltimore, 2010).  
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inconsistent markets, unstable labor supplies, deteriorating relations with Native 
Americans, and infighting amongst the colony’s leading figureheads created substantial 
worries for Pennsylvania colonists.5  Despite the arrival of many colonists at the turn of 
the eighteenth century and an increasingly diverse economy, the future of Pennsylvania, 
as it was in Jamaica, was still uncertain.6  Consequently during the summer of 1697, 
Dickinson once again found himself in a difficult spot.  Nearly penniless and without 
employment as a result of his shipwreck in Florida, Dickinson decided that trans-Atlantic 
trade would provide the best opportunity for personal advancement but new uncertainties 
would hamper his already precarious road to prosperity.   
At the turn of the eighteenth century, uncertainty and irregularity plagued trans-
Atlantic trade routes.  Colonial markets were unpredictable and unreliable while 
plantation productivity, in many colonies, was clearly inconsistent.  In effort to gain more 
economic control over colonies, and their potential profits, both local and imperial 
legislators attempted to regulate trans-Atlantic merchantmen and their commerce.  The 
social and economic direction of the Anglo-Atlantic colonies, as a coherent whole, 
however, remained just a vague outline of what imperial officials envisioned.  
                                                           
5 Smolenski suggests that ‘from one angle, early Pennsylvania’s governing 
Quakers look almost like a cliché—a dissenting group so long denied power that they 
became intoxicated with even a whiff of it.’  Gary Nash suggests that early Quakers 
created ‘a make-believe world’ in which ‘words became more important that actions and 
points of ceremonial propriety took precedent over legislative proposals.’  Smolenski 
further argues that ‘beneath these persistent conflicts’ both internal and external ‘about 
the management of the political, diplomatic, and legal discourse lay unresolved questions 
about the nature of colonial authority and identity in early Pennsylvania’.  Smolenski, 
Friends and Strangers, pp. 105-09; Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 293. 
6 The ‘human ground swell’ that broke upon Pennsylvania’s shores in the first 
four years of settlement was evidence of the hopes and aspirations, which Penn had 
aroused with his strenuous promotional efforts.  By the close of 1685, when the first great 
wave of immigration ended, almost ninety ships had delivered about eight thousand 
immigrants to Pennsylvania. Nash, Quakers and Politics, pp. 49-50. 
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Engendered by the diverse nature of their settlement, colonial societies were comprised 
of widely dispersed peoples from various social backgrounds.  Consequently, the 
multifarious colonists with their oft-incongruent goals lived under ill-defined social, 
economic, and political structures 
The development of relatively isolated colonies that stretched from New England 
to the West Indies evolved according to regional and local circumstances without much 
direct control from a nascent imperial governmental structure, which continually failed to 
regulate the interactions between the colonists, indigenous peoples, and other Europeans.7  
As a result, provincial governments and commercial marketplaces, at least at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, displayed a marked diversity.  This diversity resulted 
from the individual attempts of the colonies to regulate their relationships with their 
immediate Native American and European neighbors.  By extension, inter-colonial 
relationships, like the personal connections that came to weave these disparate places 
together, continually evolved according to the directives of individual agendas.   
Lack of imperial oversight created a logistical nightmare for those commissioned 
to regulate the affairs of the Anglo-Atlantic colonies. This uncertainty at home, however, 
created opportunities abroad for enterprising individuals willing to shoulder the risks of 
trans-Atlantic and international commerce.  Largely left to their own designs, colonial 
merchants, who were ‘on the ground first’, exhausted every viable avenue for personal 
advancement by developing and maintaining reciprocal relationships in colonies around 
                                                           
7 Ian Steele suggests that ‘the variety of experiences in the English colonies 
attending the Glorious Revolution in England is suggestive.  The West Indian colonies all 
went through a six-month period of uncertainty without actual revolution.  The range of 
experience in the North American colonies emphasizes their relative isolation from each 
other that winter.’ Ian Steele, The English Atlantic. An Exploration of Communication 
and Community, 1675-1740 (Oxford, 1986), p. 109. 
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the Atlantic Ocean.  As Peter Wood suggests, ‘freed from old pressures and surrounded 
by new ones, men and women from three continents forged intimate relationships based 
upon diverse traditions and precarious circumstances.’8 
Despite legislative attempts to regulate the affairs of Anglo-merchantmen, inter-
colonial and trans-national trade provided great opportunities for profits during the latter-
half of the eighteenth century.  As the number of locales immersed in Atlantic 
connections increased, overlapping transatlantic and inter-colonial connections grew 
increasingly complex.9  During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, however, 
many of these well-defined trade networks simply did not exist. While studies of trans-
Atlantic networks lie at the heart of Atlantic-world historiography, the formation of 
individual networks—family, ethnic, religious, business, and social—has not received as 
much scholarly attention as it deserves.  Typically, historians treat trans-Atlantic 
connections as impersonal mechanisms without regard to individual agency or local 
circumstances.  Therefore, much of the historiography inadvertently implies that inter-
colonial networks always benefited the mother country and that individuals worked for 
the collective advancement of the Anglo-colonial endeavor.  The following exploration of 
Dickinson’s Atlantic network, however, reveals that Atlantic world commerce emerged 
as a result of lower-order relationships, which serendipitously created larger and very 
useful economic and social institutions. This examination carefully considers that early-
eighteenth-century Anglo-Atlantic traders attempted to take advantage of trade to further 
their own personal commercial and social goals in the context of their local situations.  
                                                           
8 Peter Wood, Black Majority. Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 
through the Stono Rebellion (New York, 1974), p. 98. 
9 April Lee Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia. Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth 
Century (Philadelphia, 2004), p. 39. 
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The creation of a framework for the expansion of what became the British colonial 
endeavor after 1707 was perhaps more circumstantial than is currently assumed by 
scholars.   
Undoubtedly, historians of the Anglo-Atlantic recognise the importance of 
colonial trade carried on between North America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa, 
Nevertheless, as Richard Pares argues, ‘the first founders of the English colonies did not 
distinctly mean to establish complementary sources of supply…only after some years of 
trial and error did a familiar pattern of American trade emerge.’10  From this vantage 
point, a vantage point well-articulated by April Lee Hatfield, ‘trade patterns evolved in 
response to the desire to find markets for goods in nascent colonial economies already 
undergoing significant regional specialisation.’11  Moreover, as Bernard Bailyn suggests, 
that ‘intricate commercial mechanisms…[with] many interrelated parts…[was] not an 
impersonal machine existing above men’s heads, outside their lives, to which they 
attached themselves for purposes of trade.’  Rather, ‘Atlantic world merchants of the late-
seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries…witnessed the creation of this network of 
trade…[and] they knew that human relationships were the bonds that kept its parts 
together.’12  David Hancock, who skillfully illustrates these types of ‘lower order 
relationships,’ which resulted in many trans-Atlantic networks, contends that ‘inter-
imperial commerce, both legal and illegal, shaped everyday life in the Atlantic world.’  
He further suggests that by ‘establishing links and building networks, the people of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Atlantic world created an infrastructure that bound 
                                                           
10 Richard Pares, Yankees and Creoles. The Trade between North America and the 
West Indies before the American Revolution (Cambridge, 1956), p. 2.  
11 Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia, pp. 41-42. 
12 Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (New 
York, 1955), p. 87. 
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them together—as each others’ suppliers and customers, as partners, agents, and 
competitors, and eventually as compatriots.’  Yet Hancock laments the fact that 
historians, ‘by confining themselves to studying particular imperial and colonial 
constructs, have developed neither the historiography nor the models to understand and 
fully explain the intertwined nature of the early modern Atlantic economy.’13   
 Dickinson and a small cohort of West Indian transplants were largely responsible 
for initiating, developing, and maintaining one the most significant trade relationships of 
the eighteenth century, the exchange between Philadelphia and Jamaica.  As evidenced 
from the quotation above, this complementary avenue of exchange did not exist when 
Dickinson arrived in Philadelphia in 1697.  Furthermore, as a result of larger Atlantic 
influences this type of trade developed along lines that were anything but exclusively 
English.  As Hatfield suggests, ‘merchants and mariners looked across national 
boundaries to gauge themselves against “outsiders” in cultural terms; they did so without 
apparent hostility or violence, willing perhaps to recognise that the functioning of the 
Atlantic world depended on commercial cooperation despite national, ethnic, cultural, 
and religious differences.’  Thus, by creating a proximity that made such differences 
more familiar, merchants like Dickinson defined what it meant to be an Atlantic world 
merchant.14 
 The purpose of this chapter is to unpack the idea that ‘the reality of 
decentralisation and the power of agency complicates the traditional understanding of 
states and empires’.  If we abandon the idea of the centrality of the mother countries, their 
rulers, and their institutions, we might imagine a grittier and more organic Atlantic world 
                                                           
13 David Hancock, Oceans of Wine. Madeira and the Emergence of American 
Trade and Taste (New Haven, 2009), p. xxii. 
14 Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia, p. 67. 
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constructed from the strands of individual lives and the repercussions of their actions 
rather than an Atlantic world engineered from above the heads of its constitute parts.15  
Considering that colonists did not intentionally set out to create an inter-imperial Atlantic 
marketplace nor did they plan to develop Atlantic-wide institutions or networks, this 
chapter argues that as a result of the uncertainties of trans-Atlantic commerce at the turn 
of the eighteenth century, Dickinson actively exhausted every viable opportunity to 
advance his personal ventures despite a myriad of forces working against him.  By 
extension, this chapter argues that Pennsylvania colonists, as did their Anglo-Jamaican 
counterparts, struggled to find their place within the emerging Atlantic world.  They did, 
however, find a place in this world and by doing so shaped the patterns of the Atlantic 
world in significant ways.  
This chapter is organised into four sections.  The first briefly examines the 
imperial superstructure of the Anglo-Atlantic world at the turn of the eighteenth century 
to provide the context for the environment in which Dickinson operated.  A brief 
examination of Dickinson’s initial arrival in Philadelphia, his transition from a Jamaican 
planter to Philadelphia merchant, and his initial mercantile failures provides the personal 
context for examining the development of Dickinson’s trans-Atlantic network.  By 
providing the context for the problems Dickinson faced as an early-eighteenth-century 
trans-Atlantic merchant including finding viable goods and markets, obtaining credit, 
negotiating restrictions placed on merchants by the imperial and provincial governments, 
as well as the unilateral threat of piracy, the last section examines how Dickinson 
mitigated the difficulties of early-eighteenth-century trans-Atlantic trade.  Ultimately, this 
chapter aims to shed light on Arthur Jensen’s suggestion that ‘the earliest settlers in 
                                                           
15 Hancock, Oceans of Wine, pp. xiii-xxix. 
 165 
Pennsylvania were convinced of the desirability of trade, [but] they were less certain 
about the final nature of the trade which was to emerge.’16   
Atlantic Superstructure 
 
Ian Steele argues that ‘by 1675 the time of the tentative and often tragic beginnings of 
isolated English colonies were in the past.’  Despite the fact that the populations and 
economies of Jamaica and the Carolinas were still in their infancy and even though 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia were still to be founded,’ Steele contends that 
‘the outline of the political economy of the English Atlantic empire [had] already 
developed…[and the] English had declared and defended an Atlantic maritime empire.’17  
By 1675, England may have ‘declared and defended’ an Atlantic maritime empire but 
English officials had yet to define what the Atlantic empire meant or how it was 
supposed to function.  Nevertheless, efforts to define the relationship between the mother 
country and its colonies began in earnest during the mid-seventeenth century.  
Wesley Frank Craven suggested that ‘it is easy, as one reviews the sum total of 
the actions taken by the king and Parliament during the five years immediately following 
the Restoration, to state…the main features of what may be described as an emerging 
colonial policy.’  Undoubtedly, ‘the English government, which theretofore had given 
only fitful attention to the colonies, obviously now had come to place a higher value on 
the colonies.’18  Charles II, in an attempt to bring so many remote colonies under uniform 
inspection for their future regulation, security, and improvement, signed a commission 
appointing thirty-five members of the Privy Council, the nobility, gentry, and merchants, 
                                                           
16 Arthur Jensen, The Maritime Commerce of Colonial Philadelphia (Madison, 
1963), p. 6. 
17 Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 17. 
18 Wesley Frank Craven, The Colonies in Transition, 1660-1713 (New York, 
1968), p. 58. 
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to a Council for Foreign Plantations.  This council required from every governor an exact 
account of the constitution of his laws and government, the number of inhabitants, and, in 
short, all the information he was able to give regarding individual colonies.19  Poorly 
organised and ill-equipped, however, the home government failed to define an over-
arching colonial policy.20  Craven further suggested that:  
there was no colonial office to provide assurance of informed and coordinated 
acts by different branches of the government; the councils of trade and plantations 
which functioned, on and off, during the course of the fifteen years after the 
Restoration had no archives worth mentioning, no staff of bureaucratic experts to 
guide them; and membership was at times cumbersomely large, and might vary 
according to the fortunes experienced by politicians in contests over other and 
more important questions.21   
Several decades later, in 1696, the Board of Trade replaced the Lords of Trade.  
Though naturally subordinate to the will of the Privy Council, the Board of Trade was in 
no sense a committee of the Council. Strictly speaking, the Board of Trade possessed no 
real power of its own and its function remained merely advisory.22  
Nevertheless, these early regulatory committees passed important legislation 
attempting to regulate trans-Atlantic and inter-imperial trade.  By regulating direct 
colonial trade with other European countries, the Navigation Acts of 1660, 1662, and 
1663 aimed to redefine the colonial relationship by forcing colonial development into 
                                                           
19 Noel Sainsbury (ed), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and 
the West Indies, 1574-1600 (London, 1860), p. 492  
20 For a general overview of imperial reform in the late seventeenth century see 
Charles Andrews, Colonial Period of American History (4 vols., New Haven, 1937). 
21 Craven, The Colonies in Transition, p. 48; Charles Andrews, British 
Commissions, Councils, and Committees, 1622-1675 (Baltimore, 1908).  
22 Craven, The Colonies in Transition, p. 255. 
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lines favorable to England.23  Under the Navigation Acts, English territories and Anglo-
merchants comprised a unit, the success of which was to be measured by their ability to 
gather riches at the expense of rival states.24  In short no goods could be imported into or 
exported from the colonies save in English ships—English built, English owned, and 
English manned.  In other words, the Navigation Acts granted English shipping an 
unqualified monopoly on all trade with the colonies.25  By excluding other Europeans, 
colonial regulation attempted to make England self-sufficient in their supply of New 
World commodities while the colonies provided a fixed market for manufactured goods 
from England.    
The Navigation Acts, as Craven suggests, ‘help to mark, as they undoubtedly 
helped to stimulate, one of the most significant developments in the long history of 
England’s economy…[but] it is important to remember that these developments stretched 
out over the next fifty years and one must not overestimate the farsightedness of those 
who enacted the legislation.’26  Ultimately, due to a lack of rigorous enforcement, the 
                                                           
23 For the Navigation Acts see: Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation 
Acts. A Seventeenth Century Experiment in Social Engineering (New York, 1939). 
24 Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, p. 113. 
25 It further required that certain colonial products, enumerated by name, to be 
shipped only to England, Ireland, or another of the English plantations.  The first 
enumerated commodities were sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, ginger, fustic, and other 
dyewoods. Craven, The Colonies in Transition, p. 35. See also: Frank Wesley Pitman, 
The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-1763 (New Haven, 1917). 
26 The reactions to the legislation in the colonies varied. For example, if England 
after 1660 held a monopoly of colonial tobacco, the colonists in turn were given, through 
preferential tariffs and other devices, a virtual monopoly of the English market for 
tobacco.  The colonists also enjoyed additional compensations for the restrictions 
imposed upon their trade and the encouragement for the development of their own 
merchant marine.  This case should not discount the significance of immediate, vigorous, 
and continuing protest by the colonists.  These protests, as expected, came chiefly from 
the colonies producing enumerated commodities.  New England suffered no adverse 
effects from the legislation but Virginia and Barbados colonists faced with the prospect 
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Navigation Acts served only to deter, but not prevent, international trade.  In some cases, 
the acts opened new avenues for trade and may have made illicit-trading all the more 
profitable.  In the end, Dickinson, along with many other trans-Atlantic merchants, 
simply ignored the Navigation Acts. 
First Arrival and Early Transitions 
 
Despite the burden of increasing regulations, Dickinson developed and maintained an 
impressive trans-Atlantic and multi-national trading network for nearly twenty-five years.  
Dickinson’s trans-Atlantic network functioned on several levels.  His network, like his 
worldview, constantly evolved to meet the demands of the dynamic emerging Atlantic 
economy.  Immediate family and their relations by marriage comprised Dickinson’s 
innermost circle.  Dickinson’s family, at least by the early 1700s, stretched from Jamaica, 
to the mid-Atlantic colonies, and across the ocean to England.27  Beyond his family 
connections, the Quaker community served Dickinson, like many other Quaker 
businessmen, in developing a much larger Atlantic network.28  Despite never meeting a 
number of his business associates, they shared a common connection to the Society of 
                                                           
of a rigidly limited English market incapable of absorbing their full crops at favorable 
prices. Craven, The Colonies in Transition, pp. 33, 38-39. 
27 Dickinson immediate and extended family members included: Ezekiel 
Gomersall (Brother-in-law in Jamaica); Caleb Dickinson (Brother in Whiltshire, England 
and Jamaica); Francis Dickinson (Father in Jamaica Joshua Crosby (Brother-in-law in 
Jamaica); Joseph Crosby (Brother-in-law in Jamaica); Leonard Vassall (Brother-in-law in 
Jamaica); Mother Griffits (Mother-in-Law in Jamaica); Isaac Gale (Brother-in-law in 
Jamaica); Jonathan Gale (Brother-in-law in Jamaica); Mary Dickinson Gomersall (Sister 
in Jamaica); Nat Herring (Cousin in unknown location); Joseph Smith (Kinsmen in 
Virginia); Walter Newberry (Cousin in London); Robert Lurting (Cousin in unknown 
location) 14. Thomas Hyam (Cousin in London) 
28 See Frederick Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House (New York, 1948); 
Tolles, Quakers and Atlantic Culture (New York, 1960); Nash, Quakers and Politics; 
Smolenski, Friends and Strangers. 
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Friends that served to maintain their circum-Atlantic relationships with Dickinson.29 
During his trading career, Dickinson maintained relationships with at least fourteen 
extended family members on three continents and 102 business associates including 
eighty-four Quakers outside of Philadelphia.30  
In the 1960s, Frederick Tolles suggested that:  
nowhere is the cultural unity of the North Atlantic littoral more apparent than in 
the little world the Society of Friends created a distinctive community—a spiritual 
imperium in imperio—which outlasted the breakup of the old British Empire and 
still persists to a remarkable degree in the modern world.31   
Quakerism, by its very nature, was always a transatlantic religion because meetings in 
America actively kept regular and close contact with meetings abroad.32  For all intents 
and purposes, the Society of Friends made Pennsylvania their unofficial Quaker 
headquarters in North America.33  Therefore, the commercial success of Quaker 
                                                           
29 The driving force behind the development of Pennsylvania was undoubtedly the 
Society of Friends.  Persecuted nearly everywhere else around the Atlantic, Quakers 
found a safe haven in the woods along the Delaware River.  Their freedom from outside 
persecution, however, did not ameliorate various pressures from within.  Many Quakers 
struggled with political, cultural, and religious issues during their rise from obscurity to 
Atlantic world prominence.  How to govern, how to conduct diplomacy, business, and 
everyday affairs became flash points for Quakers to define and redefine what it meant to 
be a proper Quaker.  Rising to economic prosperity often times made it difficult to 
reconcile ‘plain living.’ See Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House; Tolles, Quakers 
in Atlantic Culture; Nash, Quakers and Politics; Smolenski, Friends and Strangers.  
30 See Library Company of Philadelphia, Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, 1715-
1721. 
31 Tolles, Quakers and the Atlantic Culture, p. 3. 
32 Karen Wulf, ‘“Of the Old Stock”: Quakerism and Transatlantic Genealogies in 
Colonial British America’, in Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas (eds), The 
Creation of the British Atlantic World (Baltimore, 2005), p. 310. 
33 By the opening of the eighteenth century, Quakerism found wide distributed 
and the bounds of their religious body were virtually identical with those of the old 
British Empire.  Although no estimate of population for the seventeenth century is better 
than a guess, it is likely that there were close to 50,000 Quakers in the British Isles in 
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merchants, like Dickinson, who aggressively established their place within the Atlantic 
trading world accounts for a majority of Pennsylvania’s economic growth.34  By virtue of 
their commercial, religious, personal, and family contacts, the Philadelphia Quakers kept 
in close touch with the entire North Atlantic world.35  Tolles further contends that while:  
the intelligence which they received through their correspondents and from 
itinerant “public Friends” was chiefly concerned with prices current and the 
prosperity of the Truth, inevitably it broadened their view of the world, tending to 
overcome the provincialism so likely to be characteristic of a colonial people.36 
The lives of people like Dickinson show the highly permeable nature of the late-
seventeenth-century English colonial world.  With frequent travel between colonies, 
some social and economic communities easily bridged geographical distance and political 
boundaries but did so only by actively maintaining personal connections.  Many of these 
personal connections were maintained for the purposes of profitable trade.    
In 1696 Dickinson fell victim to geographic distance and political boundaries 
during his time in Florida.  Thankfully, in Dickinson’s greatest time of need the Quaker 
community came to his aid once he arrived in Philadelphia.  Dickinson’s adventure from 
Jamaica to Philadelphia, via Spanish Florida, exposed Dickinson to a multi-national 
world relatively unfamiliar to him in Jamaica but also opened his eyes to the potential 
that waited beyond the shores of Jamaica.  When Dickinson arrived in Philadelphia on 1 
                                                           
1700 and at least 40,000 in the Western Hemisphere. Tolles, Quakers and the Atlantic 
Culture, p. 24. 
34 Ned Landsman, ‘The Middle Colonies: New Opportunities for Settlement, 
1660-1700’ in Nicholas Canny (ed), The Origins of Empire (Oxford, 1998), p. 363. 
35 Between 1652 and 1702 almost 150 Quaker ministers visited America from 
England. Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia, p. 124; Tolles, Quakers and the Atlantic Culture, p. 
14. 
36 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, p. 91. 
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April 1697, he faced considerable personal and professional obstacles brought on by his 
ordeal along the Florida coast.  Dickinson, his young family, his enslaved Africans, and 
his friend, Robert Barrow, endured an epic eight-month journey from Jamaica to 
Philadelphia.  As a result of the shipwreck Dickinson lost nearly £2,000 in stolen or 
abandoned cargo and bullion.37  Therefore, he arrived in Philadelphia nearly destitute. 
Without capital to invest in any sort of trade, land, or agriculture, Dickinson relied on his 
family and friends to support him.38  The greater Quaker community offered to support 
his family by finding him temporary employment within the Quaker-dominated 
provincial government.39     
The residual effects of malnutrition, exposure, as well as, months of physical and 
psychological abuse, plagued the minds and bodies of the Dickinsons and their enslaved 
Africans for years.  Witnessing the deaths of a dear friend, Robert Barrow several days 
after their arrival in Philadelphia, as well as a kinsman, Benjamin Allen, and several 
enslaved Africans only added to a lingering sense of despair in the months that followed 
their ‘deliverance’.  A year after arriving in Philadelphia, Dickinson lamented to his 
                                                           
37 This figure includes £1,500 in Spanish coin and goods lost during the 
shipwreck. 
38 Luckily for Dickinson he had  ‘friends that [were] willing to promote [him] to 
support [his] famaly.’  Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Maria Logan Family Papers, 
Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 14 May 1698.  Prominent 
Friends in the Philadelphia assembly suggested him for a position as a clerk in 1698.  He 
also held that same position in Philadelphia county court from 1698 to 1699. Both of 
these positions, however, were meant to be a temporary fix until Dickinson could get 
financially on his feet. Craig W. Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Craig W. Horle, Jeffery 
L. Scheib and Joseph S. Foster (eds), Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania. A 
Biographical Dictionary, 1710-1756 (Philadelphia, 1991), p. 309; Charles Andrews and 
Evangeline Andrews, Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal or God’s Protecting Providence. 
Being the Narrative of a Journey from Port Royal in Jamaica to Philadelphia between 
August 23, 1696 and April 1, 1697 (New Haven, 1495), p. 131. 
39 Dickinson served as a clerk for the General Assembly of Pennsylvania in 1698 
and as a clerk for the Philadelphia County Court in 1698 and 1699. 
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brother, Caleb, that his sufferings on route ‘laide a foundation of weekness.’  He further 
suggested that he was ‘sinsible of the sharp Tokes of them at Times.’40  The emotional 
impact of leaving Jamaica, shipwrecking in Florida, and relocating to Philadelphia also 
took a considerable toll on Mary Dickinson.41  Dickinson explained to his brother, Caleb, 
about Mary’s initial apprehension regarding their departure from Jamaica:  
at our first comeing ye thoughts of our losses & various exercises in parting with 
nere and deare relations and forsaking our native country coming 
through…strange land…brought great trouble on my poore wife not easely to be 
demonstrated.42   
The harshness of their first Pennsylvanian winter further compounded 
Dickinson’s woes.43  Dickinson explained to his brother that their first season outside the 
West Indies was ‘an extream[ly] hard winter.’44  In another letter to a West Indian Friend, 
Dickinson suggested that the ‘cold would violently seaze yee that thou cold hardly live;’ 
he continued, ‘it is certainly the most terrible thing to those have liv’d in ye West 
Indies.’45  Writing to his father, Dickinson revealed the larger implications of the harsh 
                                                           
40 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 11 May 1698. 
41 Mary must have endured quite a difficult struggle during her journey from 
Jamaica to Philadelphia.  The experiences of a new mother, unable to nurse and care for 
her child, probably left considerable marks on her as a mother and wife. Having to leave 
her family behind in Jamaica may have also provided many anxious moments.  Whatever 
physical hardships she endured during the journey must have subsided shortly after her 
arrival in Philadelphia because three months after their arrival, Dickinson and Mary 
conceived their second child, Joseph, who was born the 3 April 1698. 
42 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 11 May 1698.  
43 Both Dickinson (1663) and Mary (1673) were born in Jamaica and the majority 
of both the Dickinson and Gale families resided in Jamaica.  Neither visited England and 
there is no evidence that either traveled extensively in regions beyond the Caribbean.  
44 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Price, 16 April 1698. 
45 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to James Pinnick, 21 April 1698. Writing to another 
friend he suggested that the ‘extreamity of cold is hard to be bourne.’  Dickinson noted 
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winter.  That first winter Dickinson’s slaves were ‘all…sickly & very chargable;’ he 
further lamented that ‘I have but three left & one of them (Hagar) taken ill with distemper 
two or three days past the two that are well is London & Bell (Beu).’46  Furthermore, 
those enslaved individuals still alive proved to be problematic for Dickinson because 
‘they have been a great charge unto this winter being not able to earn their bread.’47  He 
continued, ‘hav[ing] been sick…Negroe Beu dyed which is a great loss and her help 
much missed amongst our children.’48  The harshness of the winter, however, was a 
fleeting problem as Dickinson concerned himself with figuring out how to make a living 
in Pennsylvania.  Dickinson had very little money and his only tangible asset, his three 
remaining enslaved Africans, proved to be a financial burden.   
Deciding between planting and trading occupied Dickinson’s mind for several 
months after his arrival.  He wrote to his brother, Caleb, expressing his view that despite 
Pennsylvania being a ‘pleasant thriving country…West Indian planters are at a loss when 
here’ suggesting that they were ‘not accustomed to ye labour & toyle that is required.’  
The change, Dickinson suggested, ‘[in] the manner of living & providing for their 
Famalies meets with such a change at which maketh it seem hard to be bourne.’49  It is 
uncertain why this transition proved so difficult for Dickinson.  Cleary, he engaged in 
trade while in Jamaica and mixed with many West-Indian associates who also traded 
across the Atlantic Ocean.  During the period from 1686 to 1692, probate records suggest 
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46 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 21 April 1698; HSP, JDLB, 
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47 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 25 April 1698. 
48 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 18 October 1698 and 28 
November 1698. 
49 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Wilson, 11 May 1698. 
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that half of all men who died in Jamaica were merchants.50  For Philadelphia, Nash 
provided evidence that suggests that ‘at least fifty-six merchants took up residence’ 
during the 1680s and at least another twelve merchants ‘cast their lot with Penn’s colony’ 
between 1690 and 1695.  Many of these first merchants, however, died before the turn of 
the eighteenth century.51  The size of the infant merchant community provided a great 
opportunity for Dickinson to carve a niche in the commerce of the bourgeoning colony.  
During the last two decades of the seventeenth century, very few Philadelphia merchants 
had consolidated or solidified permanent trade patterns.  Pennsylvania’s shortcomings 
proved to be Dickinson’s opportunities and finding the right markets and securing a 
reciprocal exchange allowed Dickinson to set the economic curve.  Theoretically, 
Dickinson could turn large profits in both the Caribbean and the mid-Atlantic colonies by 
establishing the first connections between Pennsylvania and Jamaica.52  
This difficult transition from Jamaica, an emerging plantation colony with a 
comparatively stable labor force, to Pennsylvania with very few plantations and an 
unstable labor force, convinced Dickinson that he was ‘inclined to Trade’ because he 
found himself ‘less capeable in body then formerly to be concerned in any other Imploy.’  
Nevertheless, Dickinson did not forsake his planting interests in Jamaica.  In fact, his 
Caribbean connections provided a major source of capital throughout the first two 
decades of the eighteenth century.  Similarly, through the inter-colonial slave trade, 
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Dickinson’s interests in the Caribbean provided a steady supply of labor for the under-
manned mid-Atlantic colony (a topic to be explored further in the next chapter).   
Therefore the term merchant should not be taken to imply simply trader because 
there was no single counterpart for the eighteenth century merchant.  He was, at various 
times, exporter, importer, wholesaler, retailer, purchasing agent, banker, insurance 
underwriter, and attorney.  Yet anyone who possessed sufficient capital could, of course, 
set-up in business as an importing and exporting merchant.53  Dickinson, however, lacked 
enough capital to establish himself independently and he was forced to take on what 
goods he could from merchants in Jamaica on credit.54  
Goods that were popular in Jamaica, however, proved to be problematic in 
Philadelphia.  Dickinson attempted to sell a ‘pipe of lime juice’ he received from Jamaica 
in April 1698.  He thought it was a ‘mean commodity’ because ‘little or no punch [was] 
used’ in Philadelphia.55  By the summer of 1698 he was forced into ‘selling lime juice per 
gallon;’ but he still held some limejuice nearly nine months later.56  At the same time 
Dickinson also found it difficult to sell ‘three cask[s] of Bottles of Brandy.’  He made 
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54 Obtaining capital in a frontier society was difficult but necessary for rising 
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55 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Alexander Parris, 16 April 1698. 
56 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Alexander Parris, 5 July 1698 and Dickinson to 
Alexander Parris, 24 November 1698. 
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offers to ‘most of [the] ordinary keeps’ in Philadelphia but many had as much ‘as they 
know what to doe with.’  He asserted that rum was ‘better esteemed of by ye 
generality.’57  A month later the brandy remained unsold because ‘this place 
[Philadelphia] will not vend it.’  He attempted to get rid of a cask with Joseph Kirle who 
was heading to Virginia ‘to find a market’ and sent another cask to New York.58 
Eventually, Dickinson, forced by the market, attempted to sell the ‘rest of the leaked 
bottles into a cask and by the gallon’ but he was ‘still trying to sell the last 6 or 7 gallons’ 
in November 1698.59  Limejuice and brandy both apparently did not suit the desires of the 
Philadelphia consumer in the late 1690s.60  Similarly, Isaac Norris found the New York 
market to be as unforgiving as his homeport when he loaded a ship at Madeira with ‘as 
much wine as it could stow’.  He directed the ship to New York, where Rip Van Dam 
was to sell ten pipes but Norris’s wine did not sell there because ‘the tastes of the place 
differ[ed] from those of Philadelphia’.61  The traffic between Philadelphia and New York 
was always active and as coastwise connections advanced during the eighteenth century 
port-to-port assistance occurred further afield.62  The difficulties experienced by 
Dickinson and Norris, however, suggest that inter-colonial trade at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century was far from integrated. Further complicating matters, merchants had 
to predict what goods consumers desired and at what time of year they might fetch the 
best prices.    
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Negotiating Circumstances  
Despite all his efforts, Dickinson’s first few business ventures in Philadelphia were 
complete failures.  Dickinson wrote to his brother, Caleb, ‘my first interprize failes 
having gon on credit for £400 worth of goods to furnish sloop…I am about £300 in 
debt.’63  Bad markets, the wrong goods, and the quality of goods he received all 
hampered Dickinson’s efforts to build reliable trading ventures.  Despite complications, 
the cargoes trading in an out of Philadelphia were exceedingly diverse.  This diversity 
allowed for some maneuvering during glutted or thin markets but also complicated the 
process of sorting out what goods would provide reliable returns and at what time of year.  
Hancock suggests that ‘glutted markets were among the most persistent vexations’ for 
colonial merchants.64  Dickinson, therefore, did not discriminate in which goods he dealt 
with from England, the West Indies, and further afield.  While it appears that, as Harrold 
Gillingham suggests, ‘merchants of those days dealt in everything salable’, Dickinson’s 
experiences support Frederick Tolles’s suggestion that ‘a good deal of experimentation 
was required before Philadelphia’s trade settled into paths yielding steady profits.’65  
Dickinson’s focus on establishing trade in Jamaica mirror the general sentiment that the 
‘West Indies market was eventually found to be the most satisfactory’.66  
Within a year of his arrival in Philadelphia, Dickinson realised that he needed 
more money, a ship, and better control over the trading process if he was to make his way 
in trans-Atlantic trade.  Dickinson actively attempted to create new markets in both 
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Philadelphia and Jamaica and within a few years, Dickinson was dealing typical mid-
Atlantic and West Indian goods including flour, bread, and beer from Pennsylvania and 
rum, molasses, and sugar from Jamaica.  The fundamental problem was that there was 
not a market in Great Britain for the natural products of the Philadelphia region; 
therefore, Dickinson worked out schemes of triangular or polygonal trade whereby local 
exports could be exchanged for commodities marketable in England.67  So, as Norris 
suggested in 1699, North Americans, especially beginners and small traders, liked to 
have West Indian partners for ‘disptach sake’ to buy produce at the best season and 
advance part of the ship’s return cargo from North America before the outward cargo 
sold.68  Ultimately, Philadelphia’s direct trade with England was ‘remarkably slight’ 
during the period from 1681 to the 1740s.  Steele contends that during the last five years 
of the seventeenth century, English outports received only one recorded cargo from 
Philadelphia.69  In the end, the nature of trans-Atlantic trade led Dickinson to focus on 
developing trading to and from the West Indies while relying on his West Indian produce 
to generate profits in England. 
For all the problems Dickinson faced trying to rebuild his career after the 
shipwreck in 1696, the lack of trade between Jamaica and Philadelphia presented a real 
opportunity for Dickinson to carve a niche into Philadelphia’s emerging trans-Atlantic 
economy.  At the most elementary level, Dickinson, along with several other Jamaican 
transplants, was largely responsible for initiating trade between Philadelphia and Jamaica 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  Other West-Indian counterparts, who 
relocated to the North American mainland, were also largely responsible for establishing 
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connections between the mid-Atlantic and the Caribbean.70  In 1678 Thomas Norris of 
London traveled to Port Royal, Jamaica, and established a profitable trading enterprise 
with England and the American colonies.  In March 1692 Norris’s son Isaac was sent to 
Philadelphia, presumably to establish trading connections with the Quaker colony.71  
These types of family networks existed beyond Philadelphia and Jamaica.  Ship owning 
by Virginia merchants and captains, for example, encouraged mariners and shipwrights to 
make the Chesapeake their primary residence.  Brothers John and James Bowdoin, 
Boston mariners, traded with Eastern Shore colonists and found the area appealing 
enough as a base for their maritime activities to purchase land in Northampton County, 
Virginia.  In 1707 James sold his share of the land to John and returned to Massachusetts 
while John stayed in Virginia.  Their decision to live in two different colonies allowed 
them to continue their inter-colonial trade without the risks involved in trusting non-
family members.72  Hatfield explains how such connections in Virginia and Barbados 
attempted to integrate a developing Atlantic market as she successfully explores the role 
several Barbadian families played in the development of Virginia during the late 
seventeenth century.73 
Convincing non-family members to alter their established trading routes proved to 
be only the first challenge that Dickinson faced.  In 1701, Dickinson wrote to Major 
Charles Hobby that he had ‘some trouble to perswade some of the owners to let her [a 
ship] goe this voyage they being mostly used to the Barbados trade.’74  He often 
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commented prior to 1700 about not being able to get freight.75  Dickinson was also 
familiar with perils of entrusting goods with unscrupulous captains.  During December 
1698, Dickinson granted power of attorney ‘at sundry places to pursu and apprehend an 
offender,’ Daniel Johnson from ‘ye island of burmudas…for those money and goods 
which he hath carried to a contrary port & there illegally disposed of and taken to his.’  
Johnson was supposed to go to Port Royal but instead went to Curacao and then on to 
Barbados ‘to furnish himself with a cargoe suitable for ye coast of gainy for a load of 
negroes.’  Johnson originally sailed out of St. Thomas and Dickinson suspected that he 
might return there.  Dickinson sent power of attorney to both Barbados and South 
Carolina but it is unclear if Daniel Johnson ever answered for his crimes.76 
Jensen argues that this West-Indian trade emerged as a response to the fact that 
the ‘dream of finding export staples suitable from the English market…never turned into 
reality.’77  West Indies produce proved to be another matter.  Dunn suggests that ‘the 
provision of food and drink posed a major problem for seventeenth-century Englishmen 
in the West Indies.’  The food crops they were used to in England could not be grown in 
the Caribbean, for the most part, and those food crops that flourished in the Caribbean 
were generally unappealing to the English palate.  After 1650 or 1660 the Barbadians and 
Leeward Islanders imported most of their food from England, Ireland, and North 
America.  In Jamaica, however, there was plenty of land for provision crops.  
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Nevertheless, the monied planters in this colony imported a great deal of their food from 
abroad.78 
Jamaica’s trade with English North America thus developed a healthy reciprocity.  
Colonial ships brought timber, naval stores, horses, and provisions for molasses, rum, and 
sugar.  The islanders bought vast quantities of imported flour, especially when the 
Pennsylvania flour and bread trade opened up at the end of the seventeenth century.  In a 
six month period in 1699, Dickinson sold eighty-three casks, 174 half barrels, sixty-six 
quarter barrels, and nine barrels of flour to some one hundred customers in Port Royal.  
This was enough to bake bread for the entire population of the island.  He also supplied 
Jamaica with forty-seven barrels of bread, thirty-three hogsheads, five barrels, and three 
tuns of Pennsylvania beer.79 
The Philadelphia market, however, was not always kind to neophyte merchants.  
Initially, Dickinson struggled to establish a firm position in the Philadelphia marketplace.  
The Philadelphian market was notoriously fickle, poorly positioned, and at some times of 
the year unreachable to both local farmers and trans-Atlantic merchants.80  Jensen 
contends that ‘despite William Penn’s reported care in choosing its location, the 
geographical situation of Philadelphia did not help its eventual rise to prominence.’ 
Jensen further suggests that:  
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observers generally agreed that the natural situation of Philadelphia for trade was 
somewhat inferior to that of many of its neighbors. On coming into port, ships had 
to travel more than one hundred miles up the Delaware River, a journey that 
involved a long and expensive pilotage.81   
The harbor itself was not as commodious as those of some other American ports.  
During winter, moreover, ice normally blocked up the river for three or four more weeks 
a year.  The merchants complained that this seasonal stoppage of their trade came at a 
time when roads to the city were most passable and when famers had the leisure to bring 
their produce to market.82  Dickinson lamented to one of his business associates during a 
particularly cold season that ‘we are likely to be shut up with ice’ this winter.83  Hancock 
suggests that ‘ice on the Delaware and East Rivers…could bring shipping to a halt in the 
winter months, causing a “general stagnation of business”, and leave “the price of 
everything…unsettled”’.84  Steele argues that ‘Philadelphia had much more trouble with 
winter ice than other major port’.85  
After sorting out the local market in Philadelphia and surviving some initial 
failures in his early trading career, Dickinson embarked, during the stagnant winter 
months, on a number of short trips back to the Caribbean to take more control of his 
trading ventures.  In May 1699, Dickinson returned to Jamaica, arriving on 4 June 1699. 
He quickly established himself in Port Royal as a merchant, commencing his trade with 
Philadelphia.  More importantly he borrowed £400 from his father to purchase the sloop, 
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Hopewell.86  Norris, Dickinson’s friend and a West Indian transplant acted as his factor in 
his absence further solidifying their West Indian and Quaker connections in both the mid-
Atlantic and the West Indies.87   
More Problems with Trade 
With more direct control over his merchandising, Dickinson began to prosper in trading 
to various places around the Atlantic including Madeira, the West Indies, and England.88  
Around this same time, Dickinson began dealing in logwood from the Bay of 
Campeche.89 Although technically illegal, Dickinson actively pursued inter-imperial trade 
very early in his trans-Atlantic trade.  During the first years of the eighteenth century the 
Philadelphia marketplace, like that of Port Royal, underwent considerable changes; 
Dickinson adjusted accordingly.  Hancock suggests that ‘from the Seven Year’s War 
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onward, American merchants grew more aggressive in “managing” their suppliers.’90  
Evidently, Dickinson was a half-century ahead of the curve.  Dickinson wrote to Anthony 
Major in the summer of 1700 that ‘the trade of this place [Philadelphia] increases much 
and great numbers of people come yearly upwards of 500 is come since last winter and 
several ships expected from Bristol and London with more they are chiefly families.’  
Therefore, Dickinson requested goods that he thought would do well in Philadelphia.  In 
the summer of 1698, Dickinson asked both his father and his brother for cocoa.91  More 
importantly he had to come up with a steady supply of money or credit and a steady 
supply of goods that would be ‘vendable in Philadelphia.’ Dickinson wrote to his 
family’s factors in London, Thomas Lloyd and William Parrott asking for the ‘proceeds 
of the sale’ of sugar to come to Philadelphia directly and in the future he requested the 
what his father remits to England ‘on [Dickinson’s] account unto thee.’92  As to the goods 
‘vendable’ in Philadelphia, Dickinson requested ‘Browne osinbrigs dowlas Cambrick and 
the kearseys large shallones hose & silk and as much drabdebury as will make a large 
coat.’93 
Many times, especially during his first few years in Philadelphia, Dickinson 
remained at the mercy of the market.  John Reynell, Dickinson’s contemporary put the 
matter generally:  
Sometimes our goods fetch 20 [i.e. twenty per cent above cost] sometimes 15 
sometimes 10 sometimes 5 sometimes the same [and] sometimes less then it cost 
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here I mean clear of all charges therefore the advantage of that trade very much 
depends on the timeing and remittances.94  
European goods often all came to market at the same time therefore causing 
problems in selling of certain goods.  Dickinson complained that ‘European goods are 
fallen’ and as a result he struggled to get rid of four ‘gownes & petticotes…all which he 
could not sell.’95  He wrote to several of his associates that their goods remained ‘mostly 
unsold’ because many of them were ‘soe over plenty.’  He hoped that the fall and winter 
would present a ‘better opportunity to sell.’96  The market for textiles tended to be the 
worst in the summer.  Dickinson suggested that ‘linnen hat & that is much wanted in this 
place’ but other heavier fabrics were going to ‘come to a dull market’ because 
Philadelphia was ‘full of coarse goods.’97  At other times Dickinson lamented that heavier 
broad cloth was ‘out of fashions…[and] under valued.’98  The summer seemed to be a 
bad time for other goods coming from Europe as well. Dickinson suggested that 
Philadelphia was ‘fully supplied with European goods’ and advised not to send any 
more.99  He continued to advise against the importing of European goods in 1701 because 
they were ‘expected to be plenty.’100  
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Other times Dickinson could not get the requested goods or the quality of goods 
that he received rendered them impossible to market.  He wrote that he had not sold ‘one 
penny’s worth’ of Isaac Gale’s goods especially the hats because they were ‘extream big 
in the head.’101  He received complaints about ‘ill fitting habdasherey and hats’ that some 
shopkeepers suggested to be ‘second hand.’102  But when Dickinson received quality 
‘pantaloons, flannels, and drugetts’ and other wollens they were ‘sold off readily.’103   
At other times he received damaged goods including a ‘rusty and tarnished’ 
clock.104  As a result, Dickinson could be harsh in his criticisms of goods coming from 
Europe.  In October 1716 he complained to John Askew that ‘those leather chairs that 
came per Richmond [were] such that all man kind [would] condemn.’  These 
complications suggest that perhaps trans-Atlantic merchants viewed Philadelphia’s young 
market as an afterthought or that the centre of trade was further south, probably in the 
West Indies. 
In 1698, Dickinson complained to Manuel Bruno that goods were coming to ‘an 
ordinary market’ and that the bread he received was ‘very fowle and full of weavell.’105 
Several days later Dickinson wrote to William Smith that he was unable to procure the 
beer he requested.106  Well into the 1710s, Dickinson continued to receive goods that did 
not demand a premium in Philadelphia.  He complained of rum that ‘ceader or mahogany 
did culler it to that degree it looked more like claret then rum & a tast of ye wood very 
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unpleasant.’  Nevertheless, Dickinson was able to sell it at a cut rate because ‘such a great 
quantity of rum come…in from Barbados.’107  Dickinson also received wine that ‘doth 
not prove well.’108  He wrote to his wine merchant in Madeira, Richard Miles, that ‘its 
appears to me that some wines from your Island have been from some years past 
suspected to have been corrupted with other wine not approved & now more freely made 
mention of & as such are rejected.’109  Later in the month he requested that ‘four pipes of 
the best wine’ be sent ‘directly to’ Philadelphia.110  A year later in July 1719, Dickinson 
received his ‘4 pipes of wine, all good.’111  Dickinson probably preferred wines from the 
‘Wine Islands’ because they were not considered European by the Navigation Acts and, 
therefore, could be exported directly to the American colonies whereas Iberian sherries 
and ports had to go through England.112  
For Dickinson, good wine was more than a personal preference; he thought it 
directly impacted his health, because when he ‘lost to pypes of my faune’  it ‘occasioned 
[him] last winter to drink poor wine which [he] have suffred for since by ye gout 
believing as “many of friends conjecture to be ye occasion”’ of his aliments.113  
Eventually Dickinson began to advise his West-Indian counterparts to stop sending rum 
in ‘casks of Mohogany or Ceader’ and ‘put it in good madera pipes of Bristoll Beers 
h[og]h[ea]ds…ye smaller casks ye better’ the ‘bitterish tast’ makes it unvendable.114   
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Dickinson also expressed disappointment in goods he received for personal use.  
Apparently, longing for Jamaican comfort foods, Dickinson’s wife, Mary, ordered 
cassava bread from her brother Isaac Gale but it did not satisfy her.  Dickinson suggested 
that she was ‘dissapointed in her cassava bread which [was] no small loss to her.’115  
Ultimately, Dickinson had to learn the hard way what would sell in Philadelphia and at 
what time a year he could get the best price for particular goods.  This steep learning 
curve created many anxious moments for Dickinson.  The next generation of trans-
Atlantic traders undoubtedly benefited from Dickinson and his contemporaries’ early 
experiences.  
A number of goods fared well in the Philadelphia market, especially ‘rum, sugar, 
and mellasses’ which ‘hath been a good commodity here [Philadelphia] since 
midsummer.’116  He also speculated to his West Indian partners that rum, molasses, and 
sugar would continue to sell well in the fall.117  Yet, even West Indian staples were 
subject to unfavorable markets.  Barbadian merchants particularly concerned Dickinson.  
He wrote to his brother-in-law, Ezekiell Gomersall, that the ‘sugar that came last fall that 
unsold wee had a great quantity from Barbados which glutted our market.’118   In 1715, 
Dickinson complained to John Lewis that Philadelphia had a ‘miserable market…for 
rum, sugar & mellasses.’119  The ‘dull market’ was occasioned by the large influx of 
foreign goods.  Dickinson wrote to inform his brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, that ‘most of 
the Mellasos we have is from Sarenam & High Spainola & next Antigua, Nevis, and St. 
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Christophers.’120 He also complained that ‘ships from Barbados [were] driving down 
sugar and rum prices in the Spring and Summer.’121  Many of these goods prior to 
Dickinson arrival did not come from Jamaica but from Barbados. Subsequently, 
merchants and traders were reluctant to alter traditional modes of operation.  Dickinson 
quickly realised he could take advantage of the fact that ‘barbadoes goods are at a great 
sale here and have risen since the arrival of three vessels from thence.’122  Slow markets 
often continued for months at a time.  As late as 1716, Dickinson continued to complain 
that ‘trade [was] slow and money [was] scarce.’123  The ability of Pennsylvanians to take 
advantage of the West Indian market, however, indicates the growing interdependence of 
England’s American colonies.124 
Expanding Trade to Foreign Ports 
 
Dickinson continually dealt with ‘dull trading,’ ‘bad markets’ and money being 
‘extreamly scarce’ in Philadelphia.125  By the mid-1710s, however, Dickinson was no 
longer a neophyte merchant battered and broken from months of captivity in Florida.  
Although Dickinson expanded his trading connections considerably by the late 1710s, he 
continued to struggle with the uncertainties of international markets, proper supply, and 
the issues with productivity of his sugar estates.  Yet, Dickinson in the proceeding decade 
had learned how to negotiate these uncertainties. 
As Nash suggests the ‘economic fortune’ of Philadelphia was at a nadir around 
the turn of the eighteenth century.  He contends that it was not until 1710, after a virtual 
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end of the hostilities between England and France restored foreign markets and reopened 
trade routes to southern Europe and the West Indies’ that economic stability returned to 
Philadelphia.126  Conversely, Marcus Rediker suggests that ‘war created tangible benefits 
for many.’ He contends that ‘they [wars] were, after all, often undertaken to capture new 
territory and markets’.127  War, however, disrupted communication and transportation 
and increased the cost of maritime insurance and shipping.  Nevertheless, as early as the 
spring of 1700, Dickinson, despite the complications of trade during wartime, began 
exploring the possibility of trading with a number of other European colonies.  He wrote 
to his brother-in-law, Ezekiell Gomersall, to inform him that he was ‘willing to runn the 
risque in a trading venture amongst the Spaniards…if a quick market [does not] present at 
your port [Port Royal.]’128  Dickinson ‘hoping barrels of flour arrived well in Jamaica’ 
reiterated to his brother that he may ‘so adventure some of [his] flour amongst the 
Spaniards’ but he would leave it to Gomersall to do as he saw fit.129  Apparently uneasy 
about missing the opportunities of foreign markets Dickinson asked Gomersall to inform 
him ‘if a trade amongst ye French would be lawfull and safe with advantage.’  He asked 
Gomersall to ‘procure a Letter of Credit or advice of [a] noted merchant in who [he] 
might confide.’  He figured that the French islands would probably ‘want such supplies 
as this place [Philadelphia] plentifully affords.’130   
Although European travelers frequently commented on the ubiquity of contraband 
trade throughout the Atlantic world, few historians have examined inter-imperial 
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smuggling in depth.  In 1917, Frank Wesley Pitman argued that ‘illegal trade was a 
permanent feature of colonial commerce during the whole period of restricted trade down 
to the American Revolution’.131  More recently, Wim Klooster argues that ‘illicit trade 
was big business in many parts of the New World.’  He goes on to suggest that ‘illicit 
trade…in many parts of the New World…contraband trade…overshadowed legal 
trade.’132  As he suggests it ‘takes two to smuggle’.  Dickinson actively sought several 
foreign partners during the early eighteenth century.  It is important to remember that 
Dickinson grew up in Jamaica during a period that Nuala Zahedieh characterises as one 
with a ‘thriving contraband trade.’133  Jamaica’s clandestine trade with the Spanish 
colonies got well underway in the first years of English settlement.  Essentially, 
merchants in England began to use Jamaica as their Caribbean entrepôt during the 
1680s.134  Zahedieh’s close examination of contraband trade in Jamaica during the 1680s 
suggests that nearly half of all ship entering Port Royal proceeded to Spanish colonial 
markets.135  Ultimately, Jamaican governors followed a policy of toleration, and so the 
island attracted merchants of foreign origin or from religious minorities already engaged 
in clandestine commerce.136  Therefore, Dickinson, having cut his cloth in this 
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environment, probably felt little concern for imperial regulations if foreign markets 
offered considerable profits.   
In 1696, Dickinson left Jamaica aboard the Reformation carrying with him 1,500 
pieces of eight.  While most colonies used commodities as currency, Anglo-Jamaicans 
used coins.  Since almost all trade with Spanish colonies was illegal, these coins 
undoubtedly came to Jamaica illegally.137  Whether or not Dickinson was engaged in 
illegal trade beyond his logwood interests in the Bay of Campeche before 1715 is 
unclear.  Nevertheless, Dickinson learned, at a very early age, about the profitability of 
trade beyond the bounds of the English colonies.138    
West Indians, particularly Anglo-Jamaican merchants, were particularly interested 
in trading beyond the bounds of the English colonies.  Klooster suggests that illicit trade 
was ubiquitous during the eighteenth century but he contends that before 1700 ‘very few 
contacts were established between French and English islands in the West Indies’.139  By 
1715, however, Dickinson had created active trade partnerships in foreign colonies, 
particularly in Saint Domingue.  Following an extended seven-year stay in Jamaica after 
his father’s death in 1704, Dickinson, his youngest son, John, his first daughter, Mary, 
and his pregnant wife, left Jamaica for the last time on 27 June 1709 aboard his ironically 
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named sloop, Happy Return.  Blown off course near Cuba, a French privateer lurking 
along the south side of Long Island, Bahamas captured Dickinson’s ship.140   
The French privateer escorted Dickinson and company to Port-au-Paix in northern 
Saint Domingue, where a Judge, a King’s Attorney and a secretary boarded the Happy 
Return and ‘seal’d down the Hatches, lest any of the goods should be embezzled, and so 
the Admiral of France be defrauded of his right.’  After a convoluted legal proceeding, 
during which time Dickinson refused to swear an oath, officials deemed the ship and all 
its contents a legal prize to be confiscated.  After the proceeding, ‘they [the French] were 
kind beyond common Friendship’ to Dickinson and his family.  The Dickinsons stayed 
with Judge Danzell and ‘were kindly entertained.’  Thomas Story, a Philadelphian who 
accompanied Dickinson on the voyage, spent some time with Colonel Lawrens, who was 
the Governor of the Fort in Cape Francois, during which time the governor related their 
condition on this island and the impact of the recent war: 
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that Port, with the Fort and Precincts, had been taken by the English and 
Spaniards, under the Conduct of Admiral Benbom[w]…they had never recovered 
it, but most People lived very poor: That tho[ugh] they made a little Sugar and 
Molosses, it was so mean it would hardly sell; and, being altogether confined to 
the French Merchants, they had very little for it, only a little Cloathing, &c. and 
that at very dear Rates, and had nothing to make Money, which was very scarce.  
He continued: 
But their Indico, which was very good, did them some more Help; yet, confined 
to France in that also, from whom they had some Flour, but generally musty, and 
now and then a Prize with Flour, Beef, Pork, &c. but that most of their fresh 
Provisions were wild Hogs, and Beef from the Island of Tortuga (or Turtles) 
about three leagues from that Port. 
While in Saint Domingue, Dickinson enjoyed the ‘Liberty to go where [he] 
pleased.’  During this time Dickinson undoubtedly took notice of the poorly supplied 
island and in turn may have recognised the considerable opportunities for trade.  
Dickinson and company remained in Saint Domingue ‘about 45 days’ because ‘it was 
rare to find any Occasion of Pasage, or Correspondence, to any other place, save Old 
France, or Martinico’.  The absence of competing vessels further encouraged Dickinson 
to engage trade with the island.  Eventually, they departed Saint Domingue on a ship 
bound for Martinique.  Upon their departure, Mary Dickinson, who had just given birth to 
her fifth child, Hannah, ‘was taken ill of a violent Flux, sometimes bloody.’  Dickinson 
and company eventually found passage to Antigua arriving on 29 September 1709 where 
they found accommodation with fellow Quaker James [Jonas] Langford.  Dickinson, his 
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children, and his recovering wife eventually arrived back in Philadelphia of 28 March 
1710.  This was his last voyage on the Atlantic.141 
By 1715, less than five years later, Dickinson had developed trade relationships 
with French merchants on Saint Domingue.  During the first two decades of the 
eighteenth ‘smuggling made a qualitative leap’ and Dickinson clearly played a part in this 
shift.  He shipped one hundred casks of flour to ‘Monsieur Gabett’ before he sent his ship 
on to Jamaica.142  The British government, however, held different opinions about illicit 
trade.  In 1686, England and France agreed upon a treaty of neutrality promising to 
abstain from commerce with each other’s possessions in America.  But in the years 
immediately after the War of Spanish Succession, Pitman suggests that ‘northerners had 
come to regard French markets in the south no longer as mere fields for speculative 
adventure, but as natural outlets for Northern produce.143  Dickinson voiced his concerns 
about legislation restricting intra-imperial trade in a letter to a relative in Kingston, 
Joshua Crosby:  
wee have lately come & order from ye Lord Justices to prohibit all trade with ye 
French grounded on a complaint from merchants…of Jamaica under ye penalties 
of the Treaty of Commerce…made in 1686…which will barr ye Trade with ye 
French Islands unless ye point can be gained a new the board of trade being 
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already & all new hands therein which cannot well be expected until a commerce 
with france is agreed upon.144   
Dickinson, concerned over the Lord Justices putting the Treaty into force, was 
forced ‘alter [his] vessels proceeding to Leoganna though to [his] cost…directly to 
Jamaica.’145  Dickinson did not give up his hopes to trade to the French at Saint 
Domingue.  A month later, in May 1715, Dickinson asked his brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, 
if ‘it might be safe and warrantable to send the sloop up to Leogan.’   
Dickinson, however, continued to inquire about the bounds of this new movement 
to enforce the Treaty of Commerce of 1686.  He suspected that that law was directed ‘on 
the Newfound Land Trade’ and that it had not ‘extended on a generall trade with the 
Islands in ye West Indies.’  Dickinson clearly expressed his frustration with the new 
policies especially in light of Philadelphia’s trade with Surinam.  With ‘an air of injured 
surprise,’ he exclaimed, ‘we have the trade with Suranam for mellossos why not with the 
other?’146  Here again, Dickinson attempted to maneuver around larger forces hampering 
his trading ventures. 
Dickinson continually lobbied his West Indian counterparts to engage in trade 
with the French because the French West Indian islands, particularly, Saint Domingue, 
were in ‘a position to purchase English supplies on terms far more attractive than 
Barbados or Jamaica could offer’.147  He suggested to his brother-in-law, Ezekiel 
Gomersall, that of all the foreign trades that carry out trade in the ‘american plantacions’ 
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the French were ‘industrious enough to all such opportunities.’148  And despite the 
increasing regulations on trade with foreign colonies, he continued to ‘order his sloop[s] 
to Leogane.’149 At other times he complained about ‘musty and rotten cacao and 
suggested if ‘good cacao’ was cheaper at Leogane to get it there.150 
Dickinson hoped that after the death of the French king, Louis XIV, the 
subsequent ‘alteracions in france may change the face of affaires greatly.’151  He did not, 
however, wait for such alterations.  In December 1715, he sent advice to his trading 
partner at Leogane: 
if ever thy godson shall take his progress this way [to Philadelphia] I shall receive 
him with all ye tender regards to a son.  My daughter make herself on the subject 
and will endeavour to learn the language of her country laing some claim to the 
Place of her birth which was when we stayed at Cape Francis. 
He continued with directions for his sloop: ‘there is on aboard a parcel of Flour…and 
lumber with some Empty cask for Mallasses….if  the vessel not be admitted to land them 
through any prohibicon in Trade give thy orders for thy vessel to make the best of her 
way to Jamaica.’152  Dickinson, however, was keenly aware that what his was doing was 
illegal and used his correspondence as cover.  He instructed his captain, John King, that 
‘when then come to Leogan with the Endeavour to Speak with this Gentleman should any 
boat come off to enquire thy Bussiness declare thou hast no other business but to deliver 
thy packet herein contained & have an answer.’153 
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Dickinson thought he had little choice but to trade with the French or other 
colonies when their traders presented better offers.  He lamented to Joshua Crosby that: 
Sugars are fallen & Sugar planters must take their chance with their neighbors & 
come down as others rise.  The French have not sold much cheaper then their 
neighbors but when a commodity is like to be cheap they assign a cause for it as I 
remember that ye Dutch bought such quantities from India that ye Sugar Interest 
in our plantations, were like to despaire.154 
Dickinson continued trading at Leogane regularly perhaps choosing it for its isolation and 
to avoid regulations at the much larger port, Le Cap.  Klooster suggests that being 
‘careful to protect their valuable good, the initiators of informal trade often chose to land 
their merchandise far from the watchful eyes of local officials’.155  Dickinson was 
probably also aware that many Jamaican merchants exchanged slaves for sugar and 
indigo along the isolated southern coast of Saint Domingue.156  In August 1717, 
Dickinson shipped 37,000 staves to Jamaica and requested his brother-in-law to provide 
him with 2,000 gallons of rum and a cask for 4,000 gallons of molasses to be carried ‘up 
to Leogan’ to be filled.157  He advised the ship’s captain to ‘take on Sugar & mellases 
with Indico.’158  He also requested that ‘some yams and oranges from Leogan[e] [if] one 
or both may be had.’159  Over the course next fifteen years, the practice of inter-imperial 
trade must have grown considerably.  In 1733, The Marquis de Fayet, governor of Saint-
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Domingue ‘fretted that he had tried everything to destroy foreign contraband trade but in 
vain: “I am alone against the whole country”’.160 
The following year old fears about restrictions from the home government 
returned.  Dickinson suggested to Lewis Galdy that:  
Wee have heard that the Trade between us & ye subjects of France in the West 
Indies are like to be disturbed by our Governments in North America upon 
instructions from home the government of Virginia we have heard hath made 
some seizures & proceeded to law but the determination we have not.161   
Ultimately new restrictions and the old burdens of the Navigation Acts ‘felt like a 
straightjacket’ to many Anglo-Atlantic traders.162  Smuggling and illicit trade, as Klooster 
suggests ‘came naturally to settlers seeking affordable products and easy outlets.’  
Dickinson’s opportunism illustrates ‘a new spirit of enterprise that manifested itself in 
Pennsylvania’ during the early eighteenth century.163  Similarly, Dickinson’s close 
friends and occasionally business partners, James Logan and Isaac Norris also 
concentrated on pursuing new mercantile connections.  For example, in 1710 Norris 
moved quickly to take advantage of a grain shortage in Lisbon.  For a year every bushel 
of wheat he procured was shipped to the Iberian Peninsula.  They attempted to trade rum 
in Newfoundland for fish to be shipped to Spain and Portugal.  In 1714, Logan shipped 
lumber to Leghorn in effort to open up Mediterranean trade routes.164 
Nevertheless, Dickinson and his Philadelphia counterparts still had to contend 
with local government’s regulations: 
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our country assembly have pusht hard in the merchant Traders especially on non 
residents laying duties on wines 50/per pipe from place of growth & double from 
other ports, 12 per tun on all vessalls, 2 per gallon of Rum & Brandy, five pounds 
per head on Negroes.165 
Upset about this tax, Dickinson complained to John Askew, ‘our country gentry 
are for levying taxes upon everyone save themselves not spareing trade in ye Least so 
that no part of the burden come on their shoulders.’166  Dickinson further lamented that 
these laws because he thought they would ‘discourage trade & and we shall be scantly 
supplied until our laws our repealed.’167  He suggested the new laws were enacted to 
‘mulet the trading men placing ye who support of the government there on & the planting 
interest of this country doth not pay one penny.’168 
Subsequently, Dickinson grew tired of contending with all the problems 
associated with trading.  He wrote to Joshua Crosby in April 1717: ‘I must confess my 
interest in vessels & ye success therein in very discourgeing.  If she comes here safe I 
shall not give myself much more Trouble with her in those new coarses taken.’ He 
continued, ‘I could have desired an explanation of them butt planters and trading men 
will stand oppose each other even against a common good.’169  He further lamented his 
association with one sloop in particular, Mary, to his brother-in-law: 
Upon their coming away to have had an account of her being sold would have 
been more satisfactory ye to have returned. She hath been an untoward vessel and 
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Emblem of Mistakes to me which had I foreseen would not have given occasion.  
I shall be more cautious for ye future.170 
Ultimately he concluded ‘as to me sloop if she return’d I am ready to think to sell her 
here and I shall not concern myself further in vessels then a part leaving the husbandry to 
those ye can better tend it.’171  When the ship arrived in Philadelphia he decided to ‘sell 
or burn the old unhappy sloop or Machine of mischief from first Cast shee shall not 
deceive me more.’172  Eventually, Dickinson destroyed Mary because ‘she was not 
thought to be worth Repairs.’173 
Dickinson’s ambitious political career also affected his trading.  He wrote to his 
brother-in-law, Jonathan Gale, that he ‘sought to have had time more particularly on trade 
but [had] had been much taken up with publick affairs.174 Neither trade nor politics 
seemed to satisfy Dickinson in his later years.  He wrote to John Askew expressing his 
discontent: 
all ye drudergy in a publick station my temper hath made me pray unto ye Publick 
and yet is unhappy enough not getting an thing there by but I shall if it pleaseth 
God to spare me retire some distance from the town having boughs about a year 
since.175 
Leaving behind Philadelphia and his lifestyle as a merchantman, however, proved to be a 
considerably difficult task. 
Conclusion 
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The purpose of this chapter was to unpack the idea that ‘the reality of decentralisation 
and the power of agency complicate the traditional understanding of states and empires’.  
By abandoning the idea of the centrality of the mother countries, their rulers, and their 
institutions, I presented a slightly grittier but more organic Atlantic world.  Rather than an 
Atlantic world engineered from above the heads of its constitute parts, this Atlantic world 
was constructed from the strands of individual lives and the repercussions of their 
actions.176   
Dickinson did not intentionally set out to create an inter-imperial Atlantic 
marketplace nor did he plan to develop Atlantic-wide institutions or networks.  In the 
face of constant uncertainty, Dickinson actively exhausted every viable opportunity to 
advance his personal ventures.  Pennsylvania colonists, as did their Anglo-Jamaican 
counterparts, struggled to find their place with the emerging Atlantic world during the 
beginning of eighteenth century.  The international significance of places like Barbados, 
Boston, and New York waned and Philadelphia and Jamaica rose to prominence.  
Through this process, people living in theses colonies shaped the patterns of the Atlantic 
world in significant ways.  
Pares argues that ‘ West Indian business made and original and independent 
contribution to the formation of American capital’.  He suggests that these traders were 
‘jacks of all trades’ and that nearly ‘every North American merchant had something to do 
with’ trade in the West Indies.177  Dickinson’s experiences illustrate that entrepreneurship 
was risky and uncertain.  Nevertheless, Dickinson was, for better or worse, willing to 
shoulder those risks.  Dickinson’s creative opportunism and his ability to manage 
                                                           
176 Hancock, Oceans of Wine, pp. xiii-xxix. 
177 Pares, Yankees and Creoles, p. 163. 
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business that involved four continents, hundreds of business partners and customers, and 
all the uncertainties of both trading and planting is what makes him useful to 
understanding the development of the early eighteenth century.   
First and foremost, Dickinson was a businessman, a real early-Atlantic 
entrepreneur.  He spent countless hours drafting letters, recounting prices, prospecting 
markets, managing his customers, his debits and credits, by informing, importuning, 
flattering, cajoling, demanding, and all the time selling.  Dickinson does not necessarily 
provide a perfect model for how early eighteenth century commerce transpired.  
Nevertheless, Dickinson was embedded in the institutions of trade of the turn of the 
eighteenth century Atlantic world.  He was created by it but he also helped create it.   
Contingency played a vital role in the everyday lives of the Atlantic peoples in the 
early-eighteenth century.  Their ability to deal with the many uncertainties of this period 
provide the context for understanding how subsequent generations of Anglo-Atlantic 
peoples thrived.  Illegal trade was merely one facet of Dickinson’s complex trans-
Atlantic commercial web but his experiences illustrate that merchants from ‘different 
empires’ created long-lasting economic and cultural ties that defied metropolitan designs.  
Mercantilists, unable or unwilling to appreciate what Klooster calls the ‘artificiality of 
organizing trade’ demanded that the profits of trade be channeled to England. Dickinson 
and his counterparts routinely ignored ‘imperial blue prints’ generation after generation 
as they sought to promote their own individual fortunes.178  By shouldering the burdens 
of unstable markets, inconsistent production and supply, threats of piracy, war, weather, 
and increased regulatory legislation, Dickinson and his contemporaries created a new 
Atlantic world. In the process they delivered the nascent connective strands of the early-
                                                           
178 Klooster, ‘Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas’, pp. 179-80. 
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eighteenth trans-Atlantic marketplace to the many planters and merchants who wove 
together those strands into the gilded fabric of late-eighteenth century Anglo-Atlantic 
commercial empire.  
Despite all these forces working against him, Dickinson became one of early-
Philadelphia’s wealthiest merchants. By extension of his commercial success he became 
one of the colonies most influential political figures.  Nash suggests that Dickinson 
‘might stand as an example of the crystallisation of a colonial elite’.179  For a quarter of a 
century his name in Philadelphia was synonymous with mercantile success and perhaps 
‘no one in the colony had enjoyed such a standard of living in the first three decades of 
settlement’.180  The stress of maintaining his family’s lifestyle however, took a 
recognisable toll on Dickinson.  His ambition, which propelled him through the so many 
uncertainties, ultimately brought about his demise.  During the eighteenth century, 
however, Dickinson lived the Atlantic world and for us his experiences illustrate the 
essence of the Atlantic world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
179 Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 324. 
180 Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 324. 
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CHAPTER 5: NEGOTIATING AN UNCERTAIN ATLANTIC SLAVE MARKET 
 
During the first two decades of the eighteenth century Jonathan Dickinson was 
Philadelphia’s largest single slaveholder and one of the most active slave-traders in 
Pennsylvania.1  Dickinson was not alone in the extent of his involvement with slavery nor 
was he singular as a Quaker who owned slaves in Philadelphia.  In fact, Quaker slave 
ownership in Philadelphia peaked during the first two decades of the eighteenth century.2  
During Dickinson’s lifetime almost every substantial merchant, Quaker and non-Quaker, 
in the city owned slaves.3  Enslaved Africans were ubiquitous in early Philadelphia.  As 
Ira Berlin contends, ‘as urban slavery expanded, slave-ownership became nearly 
universal among the urban elite and commonplace among the middling sort as well, 
especially in great port cities’.4  For early Philadelphians, slavery was a fundamental 
necessity for labor demands and the construction of a colonial elite identity.  
Enslaved Africans in Philadelphia, however, were much more than just status 
symbols for the Quaker elite.  Merchants, urban craftsmen, and farmers who owned mills 
or carried on large operations had the year-round-long-term demand for additional labor 
that black bondage could satisfy.5  Therefore, enslaved Africans engaged in trans-
Atlantic, urban, and agricultural servitude based out of Philadelphia and the surrounding 
                                                           
1 Dickinson traded enslaved Africans in Pennsylvania from 1697 to 1722.  At his 
height, Dickinson owned thirty enslaved Africans who comprised at least five percent 
and maybe as much as ten percent of the total enslaved population of Philadelphia. 
Dickinson may have been the largest single slaveholder in the history of colonial 
Pennsylvania.    
2 Jean Soderlund, Quakers and Slavery. A Divided Spirit (Princeton, 1985), pp. 
55-56. 
3 Gary Nash, Quakers and Politics. Pennsylvania, 1681-1726 (Princeton, 1968), 
pp. 323-34. 
4 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone. The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North 
America (Cambridge, 1998), p. 179. 
5 Soderlund, Quakers and Slavery, p. 55. 
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agricultural hinterland.  As the century progressed, the concentration of slavery in 
Pennsylvania moved out of Philadelphia into the surrounding hinterland.  Thus, enslaved 
Africans were everywhere throughout the Delaware River Valley, as well as Philadelphia 
during the first decades of the eighteenth century.  Overall, the workforce remained 
mainly white and the pattern of wholesale changeover from white European servants to 
enslaved Africans found in the West Indies was not replicated in Pennsylvania. Yet, by 
altering the nature of labor in Pennsylvania enslaved Africans contributed greatly to the 
economic development of the colony.6   More importantly, an increasing African 
presence in the colony engendered the autochthonous colonial debate about the morality 
of slavery. 
As early as the late-1680s, a fringe anti-slavery dialogue began within Quaker 
ranks.  Reconciling slave holding with their religious sensibilities proved to be a difficult 
task for some early eighteenth-century Quakers.  Therefore, historians typically associate 
Pennsylvanian Quakers with the anti-slavery movement.  At the turn of the eighteenth 
century, however, Quakers and non-Quakers alike in Pennsylvania were generally 
unopposed to the institution of slavery.7   Ultimately the Quaker anti-slavery movement 
was not serious movement until well into the mid-eighteenth century.  Nevertheless, the 
interplay between a small contingent of anti-slavery Quakers, a group of prominent 
Quaker slave-traders, and a considerable number of Quaker slave-owners at the turn of 
eighteenth century inadvertently set the course for not only slaveholding and the laws that 
                                                           
6 The definitive study of Quakers and slavery in Pennsylvania is: Soderlund, 
Quakers and Slavery. 
7 Jean Soderlund suggests that until the 1750s ‘most Friends probably had about 
the same attitudes on slavery as other colonists: they either owned slaves or saw nothing 
wrong with their behavior as long as they treated their chattels well’. Soderlund, Quakers 
and Slavery, p. 4. 
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regulated the institution but also for the growth of an anti-slavery movement in 
Pennsylvania.  
 If Quakers, as illustrated below, had not been so heavily invested in owning and 
trading slaves at the turn of eighteenth century, the campaign against the institution might 
have developed differently.  It was the influx of a considerable number of enslaved 
Africans that exposed white men and women, who were previously oblivious, to the 
plight of enslaved Africans.8  While increasing Quaker involvement in slavery stimulated 
a small contingent of Friends to lobby more adamantly against the practice of African 
slavery at the turn of the eighteenth century, most Quakers in Pennsylvania were far more 
concerned with developing their mercantile and agricultural interests rather than tearing 
down one of their business’s fundamental building blocks, the institution of slavery.9    
Therefore this chapter argues that Quakers’ considerable involvement in African 
slavery throughout Pennsylvania and the Lower Counties spurred a growing interest in 
the institution and the Society of Friends’ stance on the matter but did very little to deter 
Quakers from utilising enslaved Africans in their development of Pennsylvania 
agriculture and commerce.  Dickinson’s particular involvement with the institution of 
slavery reveals another element of his pragmatic negotiation of the uncertainties of the 
early-eighteenth-century Atlantic world.  In the process of reconciling and unraveling this 
significant component of his character, the following analysis examines the complexities 
of slave trading and slave owning within the Quaker community in Pennsylvania to 
                                                           
8 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 183. 
9 See Soderlund, Quakers and Slavery.    
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illustrate its importance in the development of Philadelphia and its agricultural 
hinterland.10   
Dickinson, along with a small cohort of West-Indian Quaker merchants including 
Samuel Carpenter from Barbados and Isaac Norris from Jamaica, advanced the institution 
of slavery, set the parameters for the trade, influenced legislation regulating enslaved 
Africans, and contended with the uncertain labor market in the Delaware River Valley.  
As a West Indian by birth, Dickinson held few qualms about the institution of slavery; 
owning and trading enslaved Africans was simply a matter of business for Dickinson.11  
The market for enslaved Africans was relatively small compared to the market it 
Dickinson and his West Indian counterparts’ homeports in the West Indies.  Therefore 
Philadelphia did not require more than the occasional shipload of enslaved Africans.  
When those shiploads arrived, however, they did not come from Africa directly.  The 
ships almost always came from the West Indies because these men and their extensive 
                                                           
10 As Edward Turner suggests, during the first few decades after the founding of 
Philadelphia, ‘it is probable that the Friends owned more slaves than any other class in 
the colony.’  Wax further suggests that ‘Quakers were most active in the Pennsylvania 
slave trade during the period prior to 1730, when Friends made up a larger proportion of 
the population than they did later and before Quaker attitudes regarding slavery had 
become fully developed.’ Edward Raymond Turner, ‘Slavery in Colonial Pennsylvania’, 
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 35:2 (1911), p. 142; Wax, 
‘Quakers Merchants and the Slave Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania’, The Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, 86:2 (1962), p, 145. 
11 Dickinson engaged his slaves in agricultural development, artisanal crafts, 
domestic service and rented slaves as contract laborers. His many letters discussing the 
role of his enslaved Africans throughout his life evidence this.  In many letters he 
comments on his need for enslaved Africans, the economic viability, and his desire to 
expand his holdings in both Jamaica and Philadelphia through the use of slave labor.  
See. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Maria Dickinson Logan Family Papers, Jonathan 
Dickinson Letterbook, 1698-1701; HSP, MDLP, Caleb Dickinson Correspondence, 
Francis Dickinson Correspondence, Jonathan Dickinson Miscellaneous Correspondence, 
Isaac Norris Correspondence, Samuel Preston Correspondence; HSP, Loudoun Papers, 
Jonathan Dickinson Miscellaneous Incoming correspondence; Library Company of 
Philadelphia, Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, 1715-1721 for many examples of 
Dickinson’s enslaved Africans. 
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mercantile contacts in the sugar islands ensured that enslaved Africans would be 
delivered to Philadelphia whenever the local market demanded them.12  Considering the 
economic importance of enslaved Africans in Pennsylvania, I am arguing that the 
marketability, supply, quality, and profitability of trading enslaved laborers was more 
important to Dickinson than any nascent and marginal anti-slavery sentiments expressed 
by fellow Quakers.  Dickinson, as he did with his many other business ventures, simply 
had to adjust to the uncertainties of the labor market in the Delaware River Valley.  
Dickinson and his West Indian cohort grappled with four obstacles in their slave-
trading endeavors.  First, Dickinson contended with the marginal but growing moral 
objections of several Quakers toward the institution of slavery.  Second, the quality of 
enslaved Africans shipped from the West Indies was questionable. The poor quality of 
many of the arriving Africans created a series of issues Dickinson and his fellow slave-
traders had to contend with in their business of trading slaves.  Third, Dickinson, as in his 
other endeavors, had to constantly negotiate the unpredictable Philadelphia marketplace.  
Finally, as an extension of the moral objections, the Quakers, who were largely in control 
over the government, half-heartedly attempted to enact restrictive legislation that 
imposed heavy duties on importing enslaved Africans which was apparently more of an 
annoyance to Dickinson rather than a genuine concern.13  Despite these issues Dickinson 
actively imported enslaved Africans in Pennsylvania along with this cornucopia of trans-
Atlantic goods. 
                                                           
12 Nash contends that the arrival of black laborers in Philadelphia ebbed and 
flowed in rhythm with a number of factors, including fear or revolts, taxation, and the 
accessibility of white indentured servants from Europe.  Nash, Forging Freedom. The 
Formation of Philadelphia’s Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 9. 
13 These factors, while important, did not seriously threaten to challenge the 
institution of slavery in Pennsylvania during the first half of the eighteenth century.   
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Extent of Slavery in Pennsylvania 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, as Gary Nash suggests ‘one in fifteen Philadelphia 
families owned slaves.’14  Moreover, nearly half of all Philadelphians who died before 
1750 owned enslaved Africans.  Of slave-owners from within the wealthiest echelon of 
Pennsylvania, which was comprised mostly of Quakers, nearly six out of ten held 
enslaved Africans at the time of their death.15  In proportion to the total population, slave 
importations into Pennsylvania reached a height during the period before 1720.16  
Quakers were both the largest importers and consumers of enslaved Africans in 
Pennsylvania.  
A lack of reliable statistical data, however, has handicapped our understanding of 
slavery in Pennsylvania during the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.  As 
Nash suggests, ‘the inquiring student finds only the most impressionistic information 
regarding the number of slaves in the city, the pattern of slave ownership, the use of 
slaves, and the interplay of demand for black and white bound labor.’17  Despite this lack 
of scholarly attention, the institution of slavery was not incidental to the development of 
                                                           
14 Nash, Quakers and Politics, 278; Nash, ‘Slaves and Slaveowners in 
Philadelphia’, William and Mary Quarterly, 30:2 (1973), p. 226. 
15 Nash, Forging Freedom, p. 9. 
16 Soderlund, ‘Black Importation and Migration into Southeastern Pennsylvania, 
1682-1810’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 133:2 (1989), p. 144. 
17 Nash, ‘Slaves and Slaveholders in Philadelphia,’ 224. In general, historians of 
colonial Philadelphia have had to rely on the widely varying comments of residents and 
visitors to estimate the slave population in Philadelphia.  In 1722, Governor William 
Keith suggested that Pennsylvania had few slaves ‘except for a few Household Servants 
in the City of Philadelphia.’  Twenty years earlier, however, there was cause for concern 
over the ‘great abuse & Ill Consiquence of the great multitude of Negroes who commonly 
meete togeither in a Riott & Tumultios manner on the first days of the week.’  These 
contradictory statements, for which many other examples exist, have complicated the 
scholarly attempts to come to a consensus regarding the size of Philadelphia’s and greater 
Pennsylvania’s slave population.  William Keith to Board of Trade, 18 December 1722 
quoted in Nash, ‘Slave and Slaveowners in Philadelphia,’ p. 224; Grand Jury 
Presentment, 18 September 1702, quoted in Nash, Quakers and Politics, pp. 278-79. 
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Philadelphia as an Atlantic port city and slaveholding in Pennsylvania was far more 
extensive than has generally been believed.18    
The first student of slavery in Pennsylvania, Edward Turner, suggested in 1911, 
that ‘it is almost impossible to obtain satisfactory information as the number of negroes in 
colonial Pennsylvania.’  He did, however, make ‘conjectures’ about the enslaved 
population: 1,000 in 1700, 2,500 in 1725, and 6,000 in 1750.19  More recently, Jean 
Soderlund, utilising probate inventories, mortality statistics, and tax lists, produced the 
only empirical study of the enslaved population in Philadelphia.  Soderlund illustrates 
that between 1691 and 1730 fewer than 630 slaves lived in the city.20  During the last 
decade of the seventeenth century, when Dickinson first arrived in Philadelphia, a scant 
213 enslaved Africans comprised ten per cent of the total population of the city.   
The first two decades of the eighteenth century, the time when Dickinson was 
most active in the slave trade, saw a substantial increase in the enslaved population.  The 
increase was in all probability related to the growing need for labor in the surrounding 
agricultural areas and the influence of newly-arrived merchants with connections to the 
West Indies, the major area from which enslaved Africans were drawn.21  Increasing 
                                                           
18 Nash, ‘Slaves and Slaveholders in Philadelphia’, p. 225; Berlin, Many 
Thousands Gone, p. 54.  
19 Turner, ‘Slavery in Colonial Pennsylvania’, p. 143.  Turner based his estimates 
on a reminiscent report published by John Watson that suggested, at the mid-eighteenth 
century ‘when fairs were held in Philadelphia as many as a thousand negroes sometimes 
gathered together for carousal and barbaric rejoicing.  Tuner, ‘Slavery in Colonial 
Pennsylvania’, p. 149; Nash, ‘Slaves and Slaveowners in Colonial Philadelphia’, p. 224; 
Soderlund, ‘Black Importation and Migration’, p. 146. 
20 Over the same period, Gregory O’Malley has estimated that 1,695 enslaved 
Africans were important into Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey from the 
Caribbean.  Gregory O’ Malley, ‘Beyond the Middle Passage: Slave Migrations from the 
Caribbean to North America’, William and Mary Quarterly, 66:1 (2009), p. 161. 
21 West Indian planters arriving prior to 1730, brought along their ideas regarding 
slavery along with enslaved Africans to help support their families, agriculture, and trade.  
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nearly 200 percent in the first twenty years of the eighteenth century, the slave population 
by 1720 had reached at least 620 individuals who comprised more than fifteen per cent of 
the total population.22    
While these numbers are substantially lower than Turner’s estimates or other 
contemporary observations that suggested a much higher number of enslaved Africans in 
Pennsylvania, they do reveal that slaveholding increased during the first two decades of 
the eighteenth century despite a number of obstacles working against the importation of 
enslaved Africans into Pennsylvania.23   
Early Opposition 
Much of the scholarship on slavery in colonial Pennsylvania emphasises the Quaker 
influence on the development of an anti-slavery movement that reached its peak during 
the years surrounding the American War of Independence.24  Thomas Drake’s, Quakers 
and Slavery in America, published in 1950, was, for many years, the standard text 
                                                           
They also came with ready-made contacts with family, friends, and Friends in the West 
Indies who were all involved in the institution of slavery.  Pennsylvania businessmen 
quickly saw the economic advantage of obtaining enslaved Africans over white servants, 
which they employed side by side. Wax, ‘Negro Resistance to the Early American Slave 
Trade’, The Journal of Negro History, 51:1 (1966), p. 12. 
22 Soderlund, ‘Black Importation and Migration’, p. 147; Nash, Forging Freedom, 
p. 9. Berlin also suggests that by the 1740s fifteen per cent of all workingmen in 
Philadelphia were enslaved Africans. Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 179. 
23 Contemporary visitors regularly overstated the size of black populations in the 
colonies. South Carolina was commonly thought to be ninety per cent black, rather than 
sixty per cent, partly because of the high visibility of black workers and their 
concentration in certain areas.  Nash suggests that ‘living in hundreds of different 
households rather than segregated quarters, Philadelphia’s slaves resorted to the city’s 
public spaces for social interaction after the day’s labor was done.  These ‘tumultuous 
gatherings’ probably contributed to the overestimation of the number of enslaved 
Africans living in Philadelphia.  Nash, Forging Freedom, p. 14.  
24 For a historiographical review covering scholarship from 1901 to 1974, see J. 
William Frost, ‘The Origins of the Quaker Crusade Against Slavery: A Review of Recent 
Literature’, Quaker History, 67:1 (1978), pp. 42-58. 
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accounting American Quakers’ attitudes toward slavery.25  In 1963, Sydney James argued 
in A People Among Peoples: Quaker Benevolence in Eighteenth-Century America, that 
the Quaker movement against slavery could not be divorced from other charitable 
impulses and reforms.   
Later in the 1960s, Darold Wax complicated the exploration of Quakers and anti-
slavery by illustrating that Quaker merchants in early Pennsylvania had few qualms about 
participating in the slave trade and would have imported more enslaved Africans if it had 
proved to be profitable.26  Wax further suggested that Quaker thought on slavery was a 
slowly developing process that passed through several stages.  At first, the Society of 
Friends ‘cautioned its members against importing’ enslaved Africans into Pennsylvania.  
Second, and sometime later, Quakers were ‘encouraged not to purchase’ enslaved 
Africans imported by others.  Third, the Society of Friends ‘sought to end slaveholding’ 
amongst members.  Finally, the Society of Friends began advocating for the ending of 
slavery as an institution.27  Kristen Block, in a recent article, suggests ‘the debt that 
Pennsylvania’s development owed to Quakers who were enmeshed in slave economy and 
could not—despite their faith’s insistence on spiritual equality—escape the immutable 
realities of their world.’  She further suggests that Quaker’s ‘economic status…[did not 
make] them amenable to radical experiments in social leveling.’28  Moreover, Manning 
                                                           
25 Thomas Drake, Quakers and Slavery in America, (New Haven, 1950.) 
26 Wax suggests, however, that ‘Quaker attitudes regarding slavery…were formed 
and crystallized at a time when the Pennsylvania Negro trade was possessed of somewhat 
peculiar characteristics’. Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade in Colonial 
Pennsylvania,’, p. 144. 
27 Wax, ‘Quakers Merchants and the Slave Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania’, p. 
144. 
28 Kristen Block, ‘Cultivating Inner and Outer Plantations: Property, Industry, and 
Slavery in Early Quaker Migration to the New World’, Early American Studies, 8:3 
(2010), p. 542. 
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Marable argues that ‘early Quaker anti-slavery protestors did not generally attack racism 
or the institution of slavery itself, but condemned the trade of blacks, as a blatant 
violation of traditional business ethics.’29  These more nuanced arguments that highlight 
an evolution of Quaker thought and the economic arguments of slavery stand up firmly 
against scholarship that suggests moral objections to slavery were fundamental in 
hampering Quaker involvement in slavery. 
It is, therefore, instructive to examine the origins of anti-slavery among 
Pennsylvania Quakers to illustrate how the initial anti-slavery positions had little impact 
on Quaker involvement in slavery.  First, Quaker anti-slavery was a minority opinion 
during the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century that garnered very little 
attention from either the Monthly or Yearly Meeting and its members.  Second, the 
minority opinion, for the most part, did not suggest much beyond a blanket statement 
against slavery and rarely offered alternatives to African slavery.  Third, in response to 
sentiments against slavery, the Meeting did very little beyond making suggestions against 
slavery and generally deflected responsibility for regulating slavery or the slave trade.  
Fourth, and most importantly, the following examples illustrate that many men who 
either voiced an opinion against slavery or supported an opinion against slavery were 
slave-holders themselves and made no effort to free their slaves and therefore should not 
be considered as adamantly anti-slavery.  In effect, slavery, as it was for Dickinson, was 
simply a matter of business for many Quakers, even those Quakers who voiced a tacit 
objection to it. 
                                                           
29 Manning Marable, ‘Death of the Quaker Slave Trade,’ Quaker History, 63:1 
(1974), p. 17. 
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  As early as 1688, however, some members of the Society of Friends began to 
express their ideas against slavery.30  In the first known protest against slavery by a 
religious body in the English colonies, four members of the Germantown Meeting drafted 
an antislavery tract to be presented at their Monthly Meeting.  ‘The Germantown Protest,’ 
drafted by Francis Daniels Pastorius, and signed by Garret Hendericks, Derick Op den 
Graeff, and Abraham Op den Graeff, is now regarded as an important document in the 
beginning of American anti-slavery.  At the time, however, these four men had taken an 
unpopular stance.  ‘The Germantown Protest’ circulated within the Quaker community as 
a manuscript but garnered little interest and was never published.  Christian Quakers, a 
splinter group founded by the schismatic Quaker George Keith, wrote a similar protest.  
Keith has been largely credited with writing the piece.  Katherine Gerbner suggests that 
the Exhortation and Caution to Friends concerning Buying or Keeping of Negroes, was 
both ‘unpopular and lost credibility within the orthodox Philadelphia Quaker community 
because it became part of a polemical print war that George Keith was waging against the 
orthodox Quakers.’31  Both of these documents attacked slavery on moral and practical 
grounds and argued that Quakers should forbid slavery.   
The Germantowners submitted their protest to the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, 
where the plan was rejected for having ‘so General a Relation to many other P[a]rts.’ The 
Exhortation, on the other hand, was not even honored with a dismissal in the Yearly 
                                                           
30 For a review of Quaker publishing against slavery see, J. William Frost, 
‘Quaker Antislavery: From Dissidence to Sense of the Meeting’, Quaker History, 101:1 
(2012), pp. 13-33. 
31 Katherine Gerbner, ‘Antislavery in Print: The Germantown Protest, the 
“Exhortation”, and the Seventeenth-Century Quaker Debate on Slavery’, Early American 
Studies, 9:2 (2011), p. 552. 
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Meeting.32  That same year, however, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting advised Friends 
not to buy slaves except for the purpose of freeing them.  No penalty for violation of this 
provision was provided. 33  Also in 1696, the Yearly meeting, prompted by knowledge 
that Quakers were participating in the slave trade, advised ‘that Friends be Careful not to 
Encourage the bringing in of any more Negroes’ after William Southeby and Cadwalder 
Morgan demanded that Friends ban the importation of slaves and the promotion of 
Quakerism among slaves already living in Pennsylvania.34   
In 1698 two Quakers, Pentecost Teague and Robert Pile, both wrote separate anti-
slavery tracts.  Pile urged that quarterly meetings should have authority to free slaves if 
they embraced the ‘true faith.’  Pile, therefore, suggested that Quakers instruct enslaved 
individuals to read and to educate them in Quakers principles.35  Essentially, Pile 
expressed the same notions of the nature of the slave trade to the Concord, Pennsylvania 
Monthly Meeting as the Germantown Quakers.  Pile argued that slavery was an evil 
because it violated the Golden Rule.  More importantly, he declared that the trade of 
slaves was an evil because it was based on stealing men.36  Pile’s objections evidently did 
not garner much attention nor was he able to impart his anti-slavery sentiments to his 
                                                           
32 Gerbner, ‘Antislavery in Print,’ p. 553.  
33 Herbert Aptheker, ‘The Quaker and Negro Slavery’, The Journal of Negro 
History, 25:3 (1940), p. 337. 
34 Craig W. Horle ‘William Southeby’, in Craig W. Horle, Marianne S. 
Wowokeck (eds), Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania. A Biographical 
Dictionary, 1682-1709,  (Philadelphia, 1991), p. 684. 
35 Henry J. Cadbury, ‘An Early Quaker Anti-Slavery Statement’, Journal of 
Negro History, 22:4 (1937), pp. 488-93. 
36 Marable, ‘Death of the Quaker Slave Trade’, p. 26. 
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immediately family.  When Pile’s son, William, died in 1734 he left as part of his estate 
‘A negro Woman & boy’ valued at £50.37   
In 1698 Teague presented a paper to the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting:  
relating to the selling of Negroes at the publick Markett place & Outcry, and it is 
the sense of this meeting, that friends ought not to sell them after that manner, and 
it is further agreed that friends…write to friends of the monthly meeting in 
Barbados to desire them to acquaint friends that they forbear sending any negroes 
to this place, because they are too numerous here.38   
Two months later a group of Friends sent a letter to the Barbados meeting suggesting at 
the ‘request of our said meetings that no more negroes may bee sent to this River to 
friends or others.’39  Nine Friends signed this letter but only one, William Southeby, was 
vehemently anti-slavery.  In fact, four of the nine, Thomas Masters, Anthony Morris, 
Samuel Carpenter, and James Fox, collectively owned at least seventeen slaves.  Another 
signer, John Jones, had lived in Barbados and probably at one point in his life also owned 
slaves.  Pentecost Teague, the Friend who suggested sending the letter to Barbados, also 
owned at least one slave.  The Barbadians were unlikely to receive the letter with much 
enthusiasm as large slave owners themselves.40   
                                                           
37 Horle, ‘Clement Plumsted’, in Craig W. Horle, Joseph S. Foster, and Jeffrey L. 
Scheib (eds), Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania. A Biographical Dictionary, 
1710-1756, (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 851. 
38 Minutes of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting and Minutes of Philadelphia Monthly 
Meeting quoted in Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 147; Minutes of the 
Philadelphia Monthly Meeting quoted in Cadbury, ‘Another Early Quaker Anti-Slavery 
Document’, The Journal of Negro History, 27:2 (1942), p.211. 
39 Cadbury, ‘Early Quaker Anti-Slavery Document, p. 212. 
40 Richard Dunn identified fifty-eight Quakers who were living in Barbados in 
1680. These people came from many strata of white society and all but four were 
slaveholders collectively owing more than 1,600 enslaved Africans.  Six owned more 
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  Years later, in 1711, after the persistence of William Southeby, the Yearly 
Meeting renewed its advice of 1696 that Friends should be careful not to encourage the 
bringing of any more enslaved Africans into the colony but again provided no restrictions 
against the practice.41  The Meeting, however, directed all merchants and factors to ‘write 
to their correspondents to discourage them from sending any more’ enslaved Africans.42  
Southeby’s passion on the issue, however, was not generally shared by the Philadelphia 
Yearly Meeting, which consistently opposed his efforts to end Quaker slave-owning.  
Southeby was undoubtedly a singular radical during a time when many Quakers saw 
nothing wrong with African slavery.   
In 1712 when the Yearly Meeting, under pressure from Chester Quakers, 
proposed asking advice of the London Yearly Meeting on the slavery question. Southeby 
strongly protested, believing that the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting should resolve the 
issue itself.  When the London Yearly Meeting failed in 1714 to take a firm stance 
against slavery, Southeby, unconcerned about the ‘frowns or displeasure of any’ that 
opposed him, issued a paper calling upon the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting to set an 
example.  The Meeting did in fact set an example when in April 1716 they called on 
Southeby to condemn himself for publishing and dispersing a paper censuring Friends of 
the Yearly Meeting for their refusal to support him.  Although Sotheby issued an 
                                                           
than one hundred slaves apiece.  Richard Dunn, Sugar and Slaves. The Rise of the Planter 
Class in the English West Indies, (Chapel Hill, 1972), pp. 102-06. 
41 William Southeby almost singularly carried the anti-slavery torch for much of 
the first two decades of the eighteenth century.  Southeby often stressed that Friends 
maintain their spiritual and moral priorities.   
42 Minutes of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting quoted in Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants 
and the Slave Trade,’ p. 156; Cadbury, ‘Early Quaker Anti-Slavery Document’, pp. 212-
13. 
 219 
unsatisfactory paper of self-condemnation, he remained in good standing until November 
1717, when he again was ordered to condemn his behavior.43   
Other Quakers, especially those who attended the Chester Meeting were 
concerned about slavery also.  In 1715, John Blunston, Caleb Pusey, John Wright, and 
Nicholas Fairlamb addressed the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting requesting that all Friends 
cease importing, buying, and selling slaves.44  Ironically, like Pile, Blunston’s anti-
slavery sentiments did not carry over to his descendents.  His son, Samuel Blunston, a 
planter in Lancaster County, was one of Pennsylvania’s largest slave owners.  At his 
death, Blunston owned at least fifteen slaves.45  Another Chester County Quaker, Caleb 
Cowpland, who served on a committee to review and amend the epistle against the 
‘purchasing of Negroes,’ which already advised those Quakers who already owned them, 
at his untimely death owned ‘A young Negroe Girl about 7 or 8 years of age.’46  The 
purpose of this preceding anti-slavery discussion was to illustrate that even Quakers who 
expressed an aversion to slavery participated in slavery at one point or another.  Those 
who did not express anti-slavery sentiments, as well as those who did may have very well 
purchased a portion of their enslaved Africans from fellow Quakers like Samuel 
Carpenter, Isaac Norris, James Claypool or Dickinson. 
Trading Slaves 
Ultimately, these minority opinions grew out of the fact that Quakers were involved in 
the slave trade from the very beginning of English settlement in the Delaware River 
                                                           
43 Horle, ‘William Southeby’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1682-1709, p. 685 
44 Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Minutes quoted in Joseph s. Foster, ‘John 
Blunston’, in Legislator and Lawmakers, 1682-1709, p. 224. 
45 Horle, ‘Samuel Blunston’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 230. 
46Horle, ‘Caleb Cowpland’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, pp. 290-
92. 
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Valley.47  In late November 1684, just three years after the first Quakers arrived in 
Pennsylvania, a Bristol ship, Isabella, arrived with 150 enslaved Africans.  William 
Frampton, a Quaker, negotiated the sale of the enslaved Africans, which took him ‘only a 
few days.’  Nash suggests that Quaker settlers, many of whom were eager for laborers to 
clear land and erect houses, so eagerly snapped up the newly arrived Africans that ‘most 
of the specie they brought to Philadelphia from England departed with the Isabella’ the 
next spring.48   
Large importations of enslaved Africans, directly from Africa, however, were not 
the norm during the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.  Almost all of the 
enslaved Africans, who arrived in Pennsylvania before 1730 arrived with their owners or 
were shipped from the West Indies in small lots of two or three.49  They were sent 
                                                           
47 Friend William Frampton, a merchant and operator of a ‘Brew house and Bake 
house’ in Philadelphia, was involved in the slave trade as early as 1684.  Wax, “Quakers 
Merchants and the Slave Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania’, p. 147. 
48 Gary Nash, Forging Freedom, p. 8.  The more significant importance of this 
shipment, as Jean Soderlund points out, is that the introduction of these 150 enslaved 
Africans greatly altered the demographic landscape of the colony.  Soderlund suggests 
that the enslaved Africans represented three percent of the colony’s total population of 
5,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, if Philadelphians purchased the enslaved Africans 
exclusively they would have comprised thirteen percent of the city’s population of 1,150 
inhabitants in 1684.  Soderlund, ‘Black Importation and Migration into Southern 
Pennsylvania’, pp. 144-45. 
49 Dickinson brought ten enslaved Africans with him when he departed Jamaica in 
1696: five women, four men, and a boy. The enslaved individuals included, Peter, 
London, Jack, Cesar, Cajoe, Hagar, Sarah, Bella, Susanna, and Quensa.  He also brought 
along an enslaved Indian girl, named Venus, who died en route from Jamaica to Florida.  
Exactly how many slaves the entire Dickinson family owned prior to 1700 is unknown. 
Considering Dickinson left with ten individuals, his father and brother were left to 
manage two sizable sugar plantations in Jamaica, and evidence from the 1710s 
demonstrates that Dickinson bought enslaved Africans in lots of thirty or so, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that they collectively held at least one hundred slaves.  It seems 
likely that Dickinson intended for his ten slaves to serve his family and the development 
of a plantation in Philadelphia.  Dickinson, however, did not arrive in Philadelphia with 
ten slaves.  Four of the ten, Jack, Ceasar, Quensa, and Cajoe all died in Florida from 
exposure on the final approach into St. Augustine.  Dickinson reported in the spring after 
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northward at the direct request of Pennsylvania residents for their own personal use, or on 
consignment to Philadelphia merchants for the purposes of sale. By and large, Dickinson, 
along with several other West Indian merchants dominated the slave trade in colonial 
Pennsylvania.50  Along with Dickinson prominent Quakers like Samuel Carpenter from 
Barbados, Isaac Norris from Jamaica, James Claypoole from London, but with 
connections to Barbados, and several others utilised their extensive mercantile 
connections in the Caribbean to supply the Philadelphia market with enslaved Africans 
whenever the market demanded labor.   
Gregory O’Malley contends that historians have underestimated how many slaves 
came into North America via the Caribbean especially in undersupplied colonies.51  
Philadelphia was certainly an undersupplied market.  O’ Malley further suggests that 
Jamaica and Barbados were the chief suppliers of enslaved Africans for the inter-colonial 
                                                           
his first winter that he had lost ‘some of [his] Negroes by sickness.’ He suggested to his 
father that they ‘have all been sickly & very chargable this winter & some dead, I have 
but three left & one of them taken ill with distemper two or three days past the 2 that are 
well is London & Bell.’ Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Maria Logan Family Papers, 
Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, Dickinson to Cozen Price, 16 April 1698; HSP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to James Pinnick 21 April 1698; HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 
21 April 1698.   
50  Berlin has suggested that for the neighboring colony of New York, that during 
the first three decades of the eighteenth century for every one slave that arrived directly 
from Africans, three arrive from the West Indian slaves in the colony.  Pennsylvania, 
with potentially more connections to the West Indies and fewer total slaves, may have 
had a higher percentage of former West-Indian slaves. Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 
p. 49.    
51 The relative significance of Caribbean sources for North American slaves vary.  
Some historians—especially those working prior to the rigorous quantification of the 
transatlantic trade and relying largely on anecdotal accounts from the early years of the 
forced migration—argue that Caribbean markets became important suppliers of slaves in 
North America.  In contrast many slave trade studies ignore intra-American slave 
movements altogether. O’Malley discusses, at length, the various strands of this 
historiography in O’Malley, ‘Beyond the Middle Passage’, pp. 125-172. 
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trade to North America52 Ultimately, inter-colonial slave trading occurred for a variety of 
reasons.  Most simply, trans-Atlantic traders did not supply African laborers to all ports 
with demand.  Overlooked by trans-Atlantic traders, places like Philadelphia relied more 
on inter-colonial trade for slave imports.53 
Inevitably there were problems associated with the Pennsylvania slave market in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  Despite problems with marketability, 
however, inter-colonial slave traders actively continued to import enslaved Africans 
because there was a high demand for slave labor in the developing colony.  The desire for 
labor in both town and countryside spurred the development of the slave trade despite 
some anti-slavery sentiments and the generally poor quality of slaves arriving in 
Philadelphia.  Dickinson and Isaac Norris sometimes expressed concerns over their 
involvement in the slave trade but, as this section illustrates, despite some economic 
disadvantages their involvement continued because of the considerable potential for 
profit. 
  Shortly after arriving in Philadelphia Dickinson began trading slaves.54 Almost 
immediately, Dickinson and Norris both learned that dealing in small groups of slaves, 
and permitting the prospective purchaser first-hand and careful scrutiny of individual 
slaves, carried with it distinct disadvantages for the slave trader.55 Dickinson and Norris 
                                                           
52 O’Malley, ‘Beyond the Middle Passage’, p. 130. 
53 O’Malley, ‘Beyond the Middle Passage’, pp. 133-34. 
54 Dickinson first documented slave trade occurred in the spring of 1698, when 
Dickinson traveled to New York and brought back an enslaved African.  Dickinson wrote 
to his brother, Caleb, that the ‘negro man [he] brought from New York either shall sell 
him ye full opportunity that present.’ Dickinson wrote to his mother a month later to 
inform her that a ‘negro man, Prince’ remained unsold at £40.54  HSP, JDLB, Dickinson 
to Caleb Dickinson, 29 July 1698; HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale 20 November 
1719; HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Mary Dickinson, 15 August 1698. 
55 Wax, ‘Negro Resistance to the Early American Slave Trade’, p. 13. 
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occasionally expressed reservations over the business of trading slaves.  Their 
reservations were not based on moral objections to slavery; rather, they complained about 
the marketability of the enslaved Africans.  Both Norris and Dickinson wrote to their 
West Indian counterparts complaining about the slave-market in Philadelphia.  Dickinson 
wrote to his brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, in the summer of 1700, expressing the common 
disagreement that existed between the West Indian shipper and the Philadelphia buyer: 
‘a[bou]t the Negroes…as to Jack both I and Isaac [Norris] have Endeavored to make Sale 
of him—but Cannot get the Money to answer thy Vallue of £45 here.  The boy Carro…is 
not Soe likely for a Market.’ 56  Norris expressed similar concerns to Richard Sleigh a 
year later: 
Ye Negro woman being bigg w[i]th child is not ready for sale—I have offer’d her 
to several & hitherto hold ye price £40 for I think her worth it—the boy I have not 
yet gott a Mastr. for—There is here Generally 5 or £10 Difference between 
offering to sell & wanting to buy a Negro.57  
The residents of Pennsylvania throughout the eighteenth century were confronted 
with an insufficient labor supply and were willing to purchase ‘good’, ‘high-quality,’ or 
‘likely’ enslaved Africans but the situation was not so critical as to force them to buy 
‘refuse’ slaves.  As Dickinson suggested slave purchasers harbored no illusions about the 
quality of enslaved Africans dispatched from the West Indies.  Norris summarised the 
matter with precision when reporting to his niece in Jamaica: ‘thou mentions thy 
                                                           
56 Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 25 June 1700 quoted in Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and 
the Slave Trade’, p. 149. 
57 Isaac Norris to Richard Sleigh, 20 May 1701, quoted in Wax, ‘Quaker 
Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 149. 
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Spouse’s purpose of Sending more Negroes, to Shew they are a Sort of Mdze Hazardous 
& rarely profitably to ye owner, and Seldom pleasing to factors.’58 
The quality of slaves that reached Dickinson in Philadelphia was the fundamental 
problem.  Wax suggests that there ‘could be little doubt that most of the slaves 
transported from the West Indies and consigned to the Philadelphia merchants were of 
poor quality.’  Extensive evidence suggests that many enslaved Africans coming into 
Philadelphia island planters termed as ‘refuse’ or ‘waste slaves’ and undesirable for 
plantation labor.  Many slaves sent to Dickinson and Norris suffered from yaws, stomach 
disorders, distemper, and the flux.  Oftentimes women were pregnant, and therefore 
difficult to sell, while others were in such poor health that they died shortly after their 
arrival in Pennsylvania.59 
  The poor quality of the enslaved Africans received in Philadelphia amplified and 
accentuated various other problems faced by the factor, many of which were related to 
the additional expenses associated with receiving and attempting to sell slaves in ill-
health.60  In the summer of 1700, Dickinson wrote his brother-in-law, Ezekiel Gomersall, 
one of the largest slave owners in Jamaica, about a ‘negro consigned on James Del 
Castello,’ who died shortly before arriving in Philadelphia for which Dickinson had to 
pay the fifteen-shilling burial costs.61  If slaves did not die shortly after arriving they were 
still oftentimes sickly.  Dickinson wrote to Enoch Stephenson about a group of ‘negro 
                                                           
58 Isaac Norris to Prudence Moore, 8 December 1731, quoted in Wax, ‘Quaker 
Merchants and the Slave Trade’ p. 153. 
59 Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade’, pp. 151-52. 
60 A recurring requirement was that individual slaves were given over to a 
doctor’s care.  Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 153. 
61 Del Castillo was the agent for the Spanish Crown and a lager purchaser of 
enslaved Africans in Jamaica.  HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiell Gomersall, 14 June 
1700; HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiell Gomersall, 25 June 1700. 
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women’ who ‘laine on [his] hand all winter’ that he ‘could not gett any person to offer 
anything’ because they ‘hath been sickly.’  To make matters worse, Dickinson 
complained that ‘whenever I had any to veine her she would make such faices & 
complaints as would prevent their proceeding further.’62  Any slave who failed to sell 
quickly was a financial burden on the merchant who was obliged to feed and care for 
them.63         
Dickinson continued to receive sick and lame enslaved Africans throughout the 
1710s.64  In 1719, he wrote to Francis Moore explaining that of the two enslaved Africans 
he received on consignment, one was ‘very sick and in some time dyed.’  The other ‘had 
a bad ulcerated leg…and after a he was gott well’ he was sold of the Lower County man 
for thirty pounds on bond.65  Dickinson continued to complain about losing slaves to 
disease.  He wrote to one relative in 1715 about losing slaves to a ‘malignant feavor’ and 
                                                           
62 Library Company of Philadelphia, Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, 1715-1721, 
Dickinson to Enoch Stephenson, 21 April 1714/15. 
63 Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 153.  While the women 
might have been actively trumping up their illnesses to avoid being sold, the longer 
enslaved Africans remained unsold the higher the cost of maintaining them would rise.  
The holding period could be quite long as in1715 when Dickinson referred to a parcel of 
enslaved Africans that were on his ‘hands a Yeare.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John 
Bessiwick, 26 April 1715. 
64 Susan E. Klepp, ‘Seasoning and Society: Racial Differences in Mortality in 
Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia’, William and Mary Quarterly, 51:3 (1994), p. 478. 
While quality was generally the number one concern, rapid sale was further hampered 
when slaves arrived in Philadelphia during winter. In 1715, Dickinson wrote to his 
brother informing him that the enslaved Africans he sent from Jamaica ‘have been on 
hand most of this winter.’ There was, to begin with, less demand for labor during the off-
season. Moreover, the danger of Philadelphia’s cold climate concerned prospective 
purchasers.  Both Norris and Dickinson periodically reminded their West Indian 
counterparts that enslaved Africans should not come to port in the months from October 
to March. Such warnings proved ineffective as newly arrived enslaved Africans 
continued to die from the extreme cold or remain unsold until the coming spring.  Wax, 
‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade’ p 153.  LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb 
Dickinson, 2 May 1715. 
65 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Moore, 18 November 1719. 
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to his brother-in-law, Jonathan Gale, that ‘most all our Negroes was taken with this 
distemper of which many of all sort were removed.’66  While time in the West Indies 
would provide an introduction to life in English colonies and time to adjust to the disease 
environment, many enslaved Africans were just as unprepared as their white West-Indian 
counterparts for the sharpness of a mid-Atlantic winter.  
While most historians suggest that Africans and Europeans faced similar risks to 
life and health in Philadelphia, Susan Klepp argues that enslaved Africans ‘faced 
substantially higher risk of death in Philadelphia than did free or dependent whites.’67  
Klepp suggests that even though most slaves from the West Indies had ‘partial previous 
exposure to New World diseases…none were accustomed to the cold winter and diseases 
in Philadelphia.’68  Norris wrote to Dickinson in 1703 about slaves consigned to him: 
‘they’re so chilly they can hardly stir from the fire and wee have early beginning for a 
hard wintr.’69  Dickinson complained to his brother, Caleb, that during the winter his 
slaves had ‘been a great charge unto this winter being not able to earn their bread.’70 
Despite these concerns, a number of his slaves appear to have been shipped from 
his Jamaican plantation once they were no longer viable workers. Contrary to O’Malley’s 
claim that ‘North Americans rarely imported season slaves from the islands, in 1703, 
Dickinson, from Jamaica, sent Norris three enslaved Africans only because they were no 
longer capable of satisfactorily performing their plantation duties.71  Harry was described 
                                                           
66 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Mother Griffits, 20 April 1715; LCP, JDLB,  
Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 20 April 1715. 
67 Klepp, ‘Seasoning and Society’, pp. 473-74. 
68 Klepp, ‘Seasoning and Society’, p. 475 
69 Isaac Norris to Dickinson, 1703, quoted in Turner, ‘Slavery in Colonial 
Pennsylvania’, p. 143.  
70 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 25 April 1698. 
71 O’ Malley, ‘Beyond the Middle Passage’, p. 135. 
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as a ‘choice boiler,’ (a useless skill in Pennsylvania), who also served as a carpenter and 
wheelwright both of which were in high demand in Philadelphia.  As far as Dickinson 
was concerned he was of ‘good disposition’ but ‘hee hath highly Suspected to have given 
Poison to Some of the negroes.’72  In any event, he was no longer fit for life on the 
plantation.  When Harry, along with Quajo and Sampson, arrived in Philadelphia they 
proved to be problematic for Norris.  Harry was especially rebellious; explaining why he 
could not get a new master for him, Norris remarked: ‘the fellow Grows so Subtill [that] 
w[he]n any body Comes to Look on him he Limps heartily tells [them] hi is old and 
Cannot Work.’73  Norris was apparently unable to sell Harry who remained with 
Dickinson for the next sixteen years.  Harry, as a skilled laborer, may have been one of 
the many slaves Dickinson rented out.  As a skilled laborer, Harry was also able to earn 
an income.74 
Thirteen years later in 1715, Dickinson wrote to his brother-in-law Isaac Gale 
about ‘an old negroe man…Harry that came from peper plantacion’ who was ‘under ye 
distempter…[and had] been downed for twelve days.’75  Harry survived his aliments and 
during the preceding fifteen years he must have provided Dickinson with some useful 
                                                           
72 Dickinson to Isaac Norris, 10 April 1703, quoted in Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants 
and the Slave Trade’, p. 152. 
73 HSP, Maria Dickinson Logan Papers, Jonathan Dickinson Correspondence, 
Isaac Norris to Dickinson, 12 November 1703. 
74 Many enslaved Africans in Philadelphia, like Harry, lived in intimate contact 
with white families, most of whom only owned one or two slaves.  Even though 
Dickinson was Philadelphia’s single-largest slave owner during the first decades of the 
eighteenth century, he generally hired out many of his slaves, keeping only a small 
number for household service and common labor in his warehouses and store.   
Throughout out the colonial era about two-fifths of Philadelphia’s slaves worked for 
mariners, artisans, and proprietors of small manufactories.  Hence, nearly am many slaves 
acquired artisan skills as performed domestic service. Nash, Forging Freedom, p.11; 
Nash, ‘Slaves and Slaveowners’, p. 241. 
75 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale 11 August 1716. 
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income.  With his letter to his brother-in-law, Dickinson included a letter from Harry to 
his son, Jack, still living in Jamaica.  With that letter Harry sent his son a ‘box of 
bread…also two dogs & a bitch all which ye old man [was] very earnest may go safe to 
his son.’76  Several years later in 1719, Dickinson related a status report of ‘black 
servants...left that come from Jamaica’ the list included Jamme, Bassa, Jon, & ajoe 
Peppers Son & Daughter she left which is called parthannah…and Harry.’77 
Other times enslaved Africans actively resisted being sold.  Norris, for example, 
informed a Jamaican correspondent in 1702 of the sale of an enslaved African sent to 
Pennsylvania.  His new master, Norris wrote, ‘thinks him a Sullen Lazy Fellow—w[he]n 
I sold him pretended he could not work S[ai]d his hand was broke and he was good for 
Nothing I was for it to be Rough w[i]th him to gett him From my Fire side.’78  Another 
woman Norris sold the following year was equally as unruly, first disrupting Norris’ 
household and then escaping after her sale to a Marylander.  Norris said that she was 
‘very averse to going & Just as the Boat was to put off she gave us the Slip.’79   
Dickinson received an enslaved woman, Sarah, who some ‘knoweth her to be a 
valuable negore’ but she ‘exercised her tounge’ to ‘occasion uneasseynes.’80  Most 
problematic for Dickinson was Jenny who arrived from Jamaica in 1709.  She was lame 
                                                           
76 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Joshua Gale, 7 September 1717. 
77 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Harriott, 2 June 1719. 
78 Norris to Richard Sleigh, 21 December 1702 quoted in Wax ‘Negro Resistance 
to the Early American Slave Trade’, p. 13 
79 Isaac Norris to Rogers and Mills, 17 June 1703, quoted in Wax, ‘Negro 
Resistance to The Early American Slave Trade’, p. 13 
80 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Moses Cardose, 7 December 1719; LCP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to Moses Cardose 25 April 1720; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Moses Cardose, 1 
July 1720.  By the spring, Dickinson had received offers of £35 and £37 but would not 
‘take less the 40.’   By the summer of 1720 Dickinson remitted thirty-seven casks of flour 
amounting to £29.1.6 to Mosses Cardose taking the women into account ‘allowing for 
£42 [to] charge for warme clothing, shoes, and stockings.’   
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and in poor health, which, coupled with her attitude, made it almost impossible to find a 
buyer.  Norris said it was doubtful he could dispose of her ‘at any tolerable price, none 
Yett Will bid any thin for her & ye Negro Says She will not do any thing if She’s sold & 
is Very angry, w[hi]ch is also Discouraging to any buyer.’81  In 1715, Dickinson wrote to 
Enoch Stephenson suggesting that: 
the Nergo Woman Capt Jonath[an] Barnett Left hath Laine on my hands all 
winter could not gett any p[er]son to offer anything for her She hath been Sickly 
& now I fare Shee will Dye Wh[e]n Ever I have any to View her She would make 
Such faices & Complaints as would prevent their proceeding further.82 
West Indian slaves arriving Philadelphia often arrived with the stigma of being 
problematic.  In 1701 Norris complained that potential buyers suspected that only slaves 
who were ‘Criminalls or Otherwise of Little worth’ were shipped to Pennsylvania. 
O’Malley suggest this is why North American slave purchasers preferred newly arrived 
Africans rather than seasoned slaves.83   After two slaves, one a highly skilled and 
valuable plantation worker, robbed his strongbox of more money than was ‘common for 
Pilferers,’ Norris shipped off the miscreants, telling one correspondent that this had a 
salutary effect of frightening his other ‘servants’ into better behavior.84  This was 
certainly the case in 1719, when Dickinson sent two enslaved Africans to Richard Miles.  
Samboe, an enslaved African Dickinson consigned to Miles, was ‘a brisk man at work’ 
but was deemed to be ‘disposed for’ because he ‘hath give occasion of offence by taking 
                                                           
81 Isaac Norris to Edith Lott, 25 July 1709, quoted in Wax, ‘Negro Resistance to 
the Early American Slave Trade’, p. 13. 
82 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Enoch Stephenson, 21 April 1715. 
83 O’Malley, ‘Beyond the Middle Passage’, p. 136. 
84 Smith, ‘Isaac Norris’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 764. 
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too great a latitude amongst ye female so oblidgeth to me.’  Dickinson was probably 
trying to avoid further issues or legal ramifications for his slave’s actions.    
 Despite their reputation for being sickly, lame, and recalcitrant, enslaved 
Africans from the West Indies sold in Pennsylvania but not necessarily on good terms.  
Credit was universally employed when disposing of slaves, a procedure which sometimes 
kept Norris and Dickinson from reimbursement for as long as twelve months following a 
sale.  Farmers were prosperous and needed a supply of labor, but almost universally had 
no specie.  Notes of credit rather than cash were successfully used in debt losses and the 
scarcity of specie within the West Indies forced the slave planters to demand high price, 
in cash, for their slaves.85  It was not always easy to collect from one’s debtors, 
particularly when the slaves were sold to inhabitants of the three Lower Counties.  Travel 
was slow and to call on a defaulter required time and money.86  Dickinson informed a 
West Indian planter, Jacob Gutterius, of one such sale and promissory note.87  The same 
day Dickinson wrote to Robert Ridous informing him that ‘a negro named Quao’ was 
sold to a Philadelphia lawyer for thirty pounds.’88  Dickinson also reported to Thomas 
Fearon the sale of a ‘negro woman’ to Francis Davenport of West New Jersey.89  In all 
three instances Dickinson did not collect ready money for the enslaved Africans.  
Conceivably, difficulties arising from the sale of slaves, including the money advances 
                                                           
85 Usually their West Indian trade was the means by which Pennsylvanians could 
obtain money.  Oftentimes, however, West Indians received very little currency from 
England and depended upon their American colonial trading partners to provide them 
with more money.  A strong deterrent to Pennsylvania slave purchasing was a lack of 
cash: oats and wheat could not easily be bartered away for black laborers. Marable, 
‘Death of the Quaker Slave Trade’, pp. 27-28 
86 Wax, ‘Quaker Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 154. 
87 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jacob Gutterius, 26 April 1715 
88 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Robert Redous, 26 April 1715 
89 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Fearon, April 1715. 
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made by the factor, would have been treated more lightly had ample profits ensued, but 
the reward to the factor, in the form of a commission, was little compensation for his 
time, effort, and expense.  Isaac Norris suggested that ‘it is a little accotable that People 
Should send abrod. Such Infirm Creatures, to fix a Charge & Trouble w[he]n there can be 
no Reasonable Proffit.’90   
Dickinson not only traded enslaved Africans, he also traded Indian slaves. The 
Philadelphia market for Indian slaves, like that of the African market, was not 
particularly inviting.  Dickinson wrote William Smith informing him that ‘many people’ 
were against the sale of imported Indians for fear that the Pennsylvania tribes, sensing 
they would soon be enslaved as well, would react with hostility.  Dickinson believed that 
Pennsylvanians had ‘but small tryal of them,’ and that the ‘greatest Objection’ was their 
running away; consequently, buyers offered ‘but Litell for them.’91  Pennsylvanians were 
so opposed to the importation of Indian slaves that a law was passed in 1706 that forbade 
the importation of Indians for sale.92   
                                                           
90 Isaac Norris to Joseph Curtis, 8 November 1709 quoted in Wax ‘Quaker 
Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 155. 
91 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to William Smith, 13 April 1698. 
92 ‘The Assembly, the Pennsylvania Economy, and the Growth of the Province, 
1710-1756’ in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 35.  Even so, there is evidence 
that several prominent Pennsylvania Assemblymen owned Indian slaves at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. William Markham, the lieutenant governor under both proprietary 
and royal rule stipulated in his will that his entire estate was given to his wife Joanna, 
except and Indian boy, born in the household, whom he ordered to be emancipated at age 
24.  Peter Groenendyke a Dutch immigrant from New York, and Kent County 
Assemblymen was, in 1688, living in Murderkill Hundred with his wife and son, a 
freeman, a Spanish-Indian slave and his English wife, and a Negro couple.  When Robert 
Wade, one of earliest English Quaker settlers on the west side of the Delaware River, 
died he left behind a Chester County plantation valued at £600 that included four 
servants: three enslaved Africans and one Indian valued together at £140.  William Trent, 
a Scottish Anglican merchant who was one of Philadelphia most prominent merchants 
trading and who rented Dickinson’s warehouse and wharf between Walnut and Spruce 
Streets for three years, owned at his death eleven slaves including two Indians.  Scheib, 
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Nevertheless, Dickinson bought Indian slaves for his own use well into the 1710s.  
In 1715, Dickinson wrote to inform his brother-in-law Isaac Gale, to request a ‘younge 
negroe girle’ in return of an ‘Indian man Named Pompy’ he was sending to Jamaica for 
his ‘use & with kind treatments he will bee of Vallue in [his] interest.’  John Fisher sold 
Pompy to Dickinson in Philadelphia.  Fisher bought Pompy in South Carolina as a boy 
and ‘brought him up to his trade’ as a blacksmith.  Pompy was also ‘accustomed to 
husbandry’ as well.93  Later in the year Dickinson wrote Isaac Gale inquiring as to ‘how 
the Indian man proves.’94  In the summer of 1719, Dickinson wrote again to his brother-
in-law, Isaac Gale about the death and an ‘Indian boy that was used to doing [his] 
service.’  Dickinson further lamented that ‘the miss of him at this time is Great.’95 
Dickinson’s involvement with Indian slaves provides further evidence to support Alan 
Gallay’s claim that the South Carolina Indian slave trade reached many places around the 
Atlantic world.96 
Legal Restrictions   
The following section examines the legal status of slaves but it is primarily concerned 
with why legislators were disinterested in regulating slavery in Pennsylvania.  By 
exploring some of Pennsylvania’s more prominent slave-owners who were both 
legislators and prominent Quakers, this section illustrates that slave-owning was far more 
                                                           
‘William Markham’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1682-1709, p. 531; Rosalind J. 
Beiler, ‘Peter Groenendyke’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1682-1709, p. 380; Smith 
‘Robert Wade’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1682-1709, pp. 723-24; Carolyn M. 
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John Lewis 2 May 1715. 
94 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale 7 November 1715. 
95 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale 1 June 1719. 
96 Alan Gallay, Indian Slave Trade. The Rise of the English Empire in the 
American South, 1670-1717 (Hew Haven, 2002) pp. 200-01, 300-01 
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pervasive and had an impact upon both the development of the port and the agricultural 
countryside. Furthermore, the following exploration illustrates that very few legislators 
even considered eliminating slavery in a colony starved for laborers. 
The Pennsylvania Assembly primarily concerned itself with regulating the 
importation of slaves in order to derive an income for the government through the 
imposition of a tax on imported slaves.  The Assembly also took into consideration the 
regulation of the behavior of slaves resident in the colony.  The Pennsylvania legislature 
first imposed taxes on imported slaves in the autumn Assembly of 1700, with duties 
between six and twenty shillings, dependent on age, on every slave imported.  This action 
was the first time any laws regarding slavery were sanctioned in Pennsylvania.  In 
January 1706 the Assembly raised the duty to forty shillings on all slaves, but in June 
1712, in the wake of a serious revolt in New York, and in response to a petition ‘sign’d 
by many Hands’ that urged the House to discourage the further importation of slaves, the 
Assembly raised the tax on imported slaves to £20.  Authorities in London repealed the 
prohibitive law in 1714; forcing the Assembly to cut it to a more modest duty of £5 in 
May 1715.  The rate was continued at the level through several renewals, until a statute of 
10 May 1729 reduced it to £2.97  
The government also found itself concerned with issues relating to the behavior of 
both enslaved Africans and free people of color in the province.  As early as 1693 the 
inhabitants of Philadelphia complained to the county court about ‘tumultuous gatherings’ 
of slaves ‘gadding abroad’ on Sundays.98  Nevertheless, the colonial Pennsylvania 
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Assembly was unimpressed by any arguments in favor of the abolition of slavery.  Just a 
year after Dickinson’s death, the Assembly’s committee of grievances actually 
denounced the practice of manumitting slaves as ‘pernicious,’ although the remark was 
made in the context of concern over the manumission of elderly slaves who then became 
a charge on the community as a whole, rather than an expense to their former master.99   
This attitude is not surprising, considering that fully one third (108 out of 324) of 
the representatives elected to the Assembly between 1703 and 1756, are known to have 
owned at least one slave at some point during their lives.100  If the period is expanded to 
include the last two decades of the seventeenth century, at least 131 assemblymen owned 
at least one slave during their lifetime.  In total the Pennsylvania Assemblymen held at 
least 477 enslaved Africans.101  During the 1710s, when Quakers were the dominant slave 
                                                           
99 Evidently, elderly slaves were a considerable burden to planters.  When Edward 
Farmar’s estate was inventoried in 1745, an ‘An old Nigroe Man & Woman’ were 
considered to have not value at all. In 1730 Joseph Growdon’s enslaved African, ‘one 
aged Negro’ was valued at £2 6s.  When Septimus Robinson’s estate was inventoried the 
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and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 360; Joseph S. Foster, ‘Joseph Growdon, Legislators and 
Lawmakers, 1682-1709, p. 388; Scheib, ‘Septimus Robinson’, in Legislators and 
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purchased or inherited and whether the representatives owned a slave at the time he 
served in the Assembly. 
101 For members from Philadelphia City the percentage was more than two-thirds 
and for the Philadelphia County it was nearly fifty per cent. See ‘Selected Characteristics 
of the Assembly and Its Representative’ in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, pp. 
149-50. 
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owners, the percentage of total Assemblymen who held slaves averaged around fifty 
percent.102   
Ultimately, these numbers suggest that large slave holdings in Pennsylvania may 
have been more widely dispersed than previously suggested by historians who have 
focused on urban dimensions slavery in Philadelphia.  The most prominent slave-owners 
included both merchants and planters in both Philadelphia and the countryside.103   The 
largest single slave holders include: Pieter Alrichs (sixteen), Thomas Sharp (sixteen), 
Samuel Blunston (fifteen), William Biles (fourteen), Sir William Keith (fourteen), 
Thomas Stevenson (fourteen), William Trent (eleven), Samuel Preston (twelve), Clement 
Plumsted (ten), and William Moore (ten).  Dickinson and Norris spearheaded this slave-
holding contingent.104  The general impression of Pennsylvanian slaveholding suggesting 
that the norm was for a slaveholder to rarely hold more than one or two slaves minimizes 
the importance of slavery to the development to Pennsylvania.105  Dickinson, for several 
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Legislators  and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 149.  Slaveholders represented nine counties 
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104 ‘The Assembly, the Economy, and The Growth of the Province’, in Legislators 
and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 55. 
105 Even though most slaveholders only owned one, two, or three slaves, that does 
not mean that slavery in Pennsylvania was inconsequential. In fact, enslaved Africans 
impacted many developments in Pennsylvania.  For example, Peter Worrall, a 
wheelwright and farmer, was probably a more typical slave-owner in Bucks County.  
Before he drowned in the Delaware River in a ferry accident 1705, he owned a 116 acre 
property on Slatepit Hill near the falls of the Delaware River where he worked along with 
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scholars, has therefore been the exception that proved the rule. Yet if one considers that 
twenty-five per cent of assemblymen-slaveholders (33 of 129) held more than five slaves 
and a third (11 of 33) of those slaveholders held more than ten slaves it appears that 
Dickinson was not alone in his large slave holdings.  Of the thirty-three assemblymen 
who owned five or more slaves, more than two-thirds were (twenty-three) Quakers.106  Of 
the eleven assemblymen who owned more than ten slaves all but three were Quakers.     
Utilising Enslaved Africans  
A brief exploration of several of the most prominent slave-owners listed in Pennsylvania 
provides insights into how large slave-owners utilised their slaves.  The year Dickinson 
arrived in Philadelphia at least one man owned more than ten slaves. Pieter Alrichs, a 
prominent member of the Provincial Council during the 1680s, was not only a large 
slave-owner but also possibly one of Pennsylvania’s earliest slave-traders.107 Alrichs was 
integral in organizing inter-imperial and inter-colonial trade during the first decades of 
                                                           
his two enslaved Africans where they managed to leave behind £23 in tools, £62 in 
produce, and £74 in livestock.  Similarly, before Samuel Burges, a carpenter and yeoman 
farmer who resided of a 103-acre plantation in Bucks County, died in 1716, he and his 
single enslaved worked his land leaving behind 22 head of livestock and 12 acres of 
planted grain.  In Chester County, John Evans, a Delawarean-born, mill-owner owned ‘1 
Negro Ladd & I Negro woman & 2 Smal Children.’ Along with two ‘white servant’ 
Evans and his enslaved Africans worked his wheat fields, gristmill, fulling mill on White 
Clay Creek in London Britain Township in Chester County until his death in 1738.  Small 
time slave-owners also resided in the city.  David Giffing, a blacksmith, who arrived in 
Philadelphia from Barbados in 1697 made a modest living as a blacksmith.  While not a 
rich man, Giffing resided in an eight-room house with a cellar with his wife, three 
children and three enslaved Africans: two men and a pregnant woman. David Haugaard, 
‘Peter Worrall’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1683-1709, pp.771-72; Haugaard, 
‘Samuel Burges’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, pp. 238-39; Foster, ‘John 
Evans’, in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, pp. 348-39; Schieb, ‘David Giffing’, 
in Legislators and Lawmakers, 1710-1756, pp. 393-94 
106 Seven Anglicans, two members of the Dutch Reform Church, and a Scotsman, 
whose religion is unknown, round out the list.   
107 Alrichs immigrated to New Amsterdam about 1656 as a commissary for the 
Dutch West India Company. 
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European settlement in the Delaware River Valley.  In the early 1660s, Alrichs promoted 
a trade agreement between the Dutch, the Maryland authorities, and a group of Delaware 
Indians.  The Dutch were to send beer and slaves to Maryland in exchange for tobacco 
and furs.  Slowly Alrichs consolidated his interests in the area by carefully negotiating 
inter-colonial trends.  Larger forces, however, were well underway.  During the English 
conquest of New Amsterdam in 1664, English authorities confiscated Alrichs’ land and 
his eleven enslaved Africans.  Clearly aware that new opportunities might emerge with 
the English presence, Alrichs travelled to New York and swore an allegiance to the king 
of England. With the arrival of William Penn, Alrichs’ political career continued to 
blossom.  He was appointed as a representative from New Castle County to the 
Provincial Council.    
By the time of his death, in 1697, Alrichs had accumulated at least four 
plantations and sixteen slaves.  His slaves were all employed on his estates. One estate 
near New Castle, which was given to his son Sigfridus, contained seven enslaved 
Africans who were in charge of running a gristmill, a bolting mill, and a tobacco engine.  
A second estate, at Reed Island, which held three enslaved Africans, who looked after 
both cattle and hogs, was given to his son, Hermanus.  Two other estates, with three 
enslaved Africans each, were allocated to his two youngest sons, Jacobus and Wessel.  
While a trader at heart Alrichs utilised his slaves for agricultural development more so 
than domestic service.108  Before his arrival in Philadelphia, Dickinson might have 
imagined his existence in a similar fashion.  Alrichs provides us with an instructive 
example for examining how different Europeans interacted with the various peoples who 
comprised the Anglo-Atlantic. Alrichs, a large slave owner, traded across the Atlantic 
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and throughout the Delaware River Valley with Native Americans and Europeans alike.  
Carefully managing his relationships across imperial lines, Alrichs successfully 
accumulated a vast estate similar to Dickinson’s Pennsylvania estate.   
Another instructive example is William Biles, who was a wealthy Bucks County 
Quaker gentleman and farmer who was raised in one of the most prominent households in 
Bucks County.  Biles immigrated to the Delaware River Valley as a boy in 1679.  Biles 
trained as a cooper before he inherited his father’s vast landed estate.  In the 1720s Biles 
began a lengthy political career.  Biles was the type of man who Dickinson often 
complained about: farmers who attempted to levy restrictions on Philadelphia’s merchant 
class.  In 1721, voters in the city and county of Philadelphia, evidently anxious about the 
significant down turn of trade (discussed in chapter four), turned out prominent 
Philadelphia merchants who dominated the Assembly.  At the time of his death Biles 
managed two thriving farms along with at least fourteen slaves that produced ‘bountiful 
crops’ and managed at least 187 head of livestock.  After his death, the estate was turned 
over to his wife Sarah, who was then probably the largest single female slave owner in 
Bucks County if not the Delaware Valley.109    
Sir William Keith and Lady Keith employed at least fourteen enslaved Africans at 
their country estate in Horsham Township in Philadelphia County during the early 1720s.  
In 1721, Keith established a settlement as ‘a small Retreat & nourishment to old age,’ and 
was building ‘a small Distillery & Brewery.’  By early 1726 Keith converted his 
settlement into a plantation giving up the liquor business and building a ‘very large 
handsome lofty house.’  The fourteen slaves not only attended to the Keith’s lavish 
entertaining but also worked a large farm managing at least 100 head of livestock and 
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seventy-five acres under cultivation.  Beyond his estate, Keith also utilised slaves in at 
least one failed business endeavor.  In 1719, Norris reported that Keith’s fishing venture, 
‘in which he employed slaves’ had failed.  Slaves were evidently a fundamental part of 
Keith’s business ventures and the management of his country-life.110  Keith’s 
employment of enslaved Africans suggests that at all levels of government, officials 
actively maintained interest in slavery.  
Yet another contemporary of Dickinson, Thomas Stevenson, was a farmer, 
merchant, gentleman, and a prominent assemblyman from Bucks County who served 
nine terms.  Stevenson, during his lifetime purchased more than 10,000 acres including at 
least eleven plantations and a cornmill.  Stevenson’s holdings stretched across the 
Delaware River Valley from Pennsylvania and New Jersey to Maryland and at the time of 
his death his personal estate totaled £1,600.  Fourteen slaves valued at £380 comprised a 
significant portion of his estate. While it is unclear exactly where the slaves resided, it 
may be suggested that that had something to do with at least one of his plantations that 
produced, at the time of his death, £237 worth of farm produce as well as 200 head of 
livestock valued at £307.111 
Philadelphia merchants also owned large numbers of slaves.  Clement Plumsted 
arrived in Philadelphia as a teenager from London and was employed by Samuel 
Carpenter in the late 1690s before he married Sarah Biddle Righton.  His training with 
Samuel Carpenter undoubtedly exposed him to the prospects and peril of trans-Atlantic 
trade.  Carpenter, a Barbadian transplant, actively engaged in trade with the West Indies 
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and at various times imported slaves into Philadelphia.  Like many Philadelphia 
merchants Plumsted, through real estate speculation, expanded his holdings considerably 
during the first several decades of the eighteenth century.  Acquiring an estate, Plumsted 
employed his ten slaves in various ways.  Plumsted probably hoped to emulate his 
wealthy Quakers counterparts.  Upon his death in 1745, of Plumsted’s ten slaves, five 
were bequeathed to his wife and son.  Another was manumitted with the provision that 
she received £5 per annum until she could ‘shift not longer’ and then be maintained by 
the state.  A seventh slave was to remain on the plantation in the Northern Liberties ‘to 
weed and to…garden and be kept in warm Cloathing and have his Diet.’ An eighth slave 
was to be given away to any friend of Plumsted’s that would ‘use him well.’  The ninth 
slave was to be taken care of by Mary Plumsted, who was also to provide for her in her 
will, and the last slave was to be apprenticed to learn a trade at the expense of the estate, 
and after serving out his time, was ‘then to be set free.’112 Plumsted’s provisions for his 
enslaved Africans marks a slight change in Quaker attitudes toward the institution of 
slavery and plight of enslaved Africans. 
Our final example, Jeremiah Langhorne, is a special case.  Langhorne, a Bucks 
County gentleman, officeholder, and farmer, was one of the principal leaders in the 
House and Bucks County preeminent politician during most of his thirty-four terms in the 
Assembly.  Langhorne died in 1742 having never been married and without any children.  
Among the various things he left behind to his sister, his nieces, nephews, grandnieces 
and grandnephews, Langhorne bequeathed his then 800-acre plantation, Langhorne Park, 
to his twelve-year-old grandnephew, Thomas Biles, grandson of William Biles.  The 
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most unusual feature of Langhorne’s will was the elaborate and generous provision he 
made for the manumission and future of his slaves.  Eight out of his nine adult slaves 
were to be freed immediately, with all but one of their children to remain under their care 
of their parents until reaching the age of twenty-four, when all were to be set free with a 
£10 legacy.  Until 25 March 1751, when Thomas Biles came of age, they were to reside 
at Langhorne’s ‘mansion house,’ having free use of the property, expect for his best 
parlor and his bedchamber, receiving all the profits of his plantation in return for payment 
of a £30 annual rent and continuation of the system of crop rotation.  A ‘resonable part’ 
of his household goods were to be left to them by the executors.  After that time, each of 
the four black families would receive a house and property totaling 410 acres. 
Langhorne’s ‘instruments of husbandry’ as well as twenty-four cows, eighteen horses, 
and sixty sheep were divided among them.  A lifelong bachelor, Langhorne’s confidence 
in his ‘negro servants’ evidently was borne in part from having left his farm to their 
charge during his frequent absences.  Langhorne’s provision more than likely made these 
four free-black families the wealthiest in Bucks County.113  Langhorne’s provisions for 
his slaves may seem extraordinary.  Langhorne, however, had no one who could utilise 
his slave laborers; therefore, he probably had little issue providing these favorable 
conditions to his former enslaved Africans.   
A few merchants, like Dickinson, owned more than ten slaves—many of who 
were hired out.114  A prominent Welsh gentleman, physician, influential Quaker politician 
and Norris’s father-in-law, Thomas Lloyd, stipulated in his 1694 will that his five slaves 
and their offspring should be hired out to provide a steady source of income for his wife 
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and children.115  In 1739, William Hudson, a Philadelphia politician, bequeathed a female 
slave and a rent charge on a male slave to his wife.116  Dickinson, at least in 1715, hired 
out his slaves at 18d. to 2s. 6d. per day depending on the job.117  
Slave-owners in Philadelphia, however, found it more difficult to hire-out their 
blacks as white indentured servants and white freedmen formed coalitions against black 
slave laborers.  In February 1707, ‘several Freemen’ petitioned the Pennsylvania 
legislature, urging them to discourage the numbers of blacks allowed with the colony that 
‘take away the Employment.’  Poor white urban workers again petitioned the legislature 
in 1723, requesting that the hiring out of blacks be ‘discouraged or wholly prevented,’ 
since ‘the Keeping of Negroes’ deprived them from earning a living.118  
Dickinson had other ideas about the possibilities for the Philadelphia labor 
market.  When the Jamaica Assembly enacted several laws aimed at increasing the white 
population Dickinson, as a large slaveholder and an employer of about forty ‘hired men 
& Servants,’ devised a plan he apparently regarded as strengthening his plantation while 
reducing his liability to fines, particularly because his skilled servants had fulfilled their 
time and new servants were difficult to obtain.119  He suggested to Norris in November 
1705 a scheme whereby he might send to Pennsylvania ‘some likely Negroe Ladds to be 
put out to Trades for five years’ to be trained as carpenters, wheelwrights, bricklayers, 
blacksmiths, and coopers, to become, in effect, a replacement force for his servants and 
hired workers in Jamaica. While in Pennsylvania, of course, they would not be subject to 
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fines by Jamaica.120  Like many of Dickinson’s grandiose schemes, there is no evidence 
he enacted his plan. This episode, however, illustrates that Dickinson continually devised 
contingency plans when unfavorable circumstance emerged. 
On several occasions both Dickinson and Norris reconsider their business in 
trading slaves.  Dickinson’s and Norris’ aversion to the slave trade was fundamentally 
grounded in the economics associated with acting as a slave factor. While much of the 
two merchants’ correspondence stresses the bother and expense associated with handling 
sickly and recalcitrant slaves, they continued to sell slaves for many years after making 
known their dislike of the trade.121   
Isaac Norris quite early on made it clear that he would prefer not to be involved in 
slave traffic but continued to trade slaves.  Writing to Dickinson in 1703, he said: 
‘Jonat[h]a[n] Send me no more nor Recommend me no more Negroes for Sale I Don’t 
like that Sort of Business any thing Else Least Considerable is much more Expectable.’122  
Norris asked Thomas Swan, after receiving two enslaved Africans, to ‘excuse at my 
Friends hands from Concerning mee w[i]th those kind of Creatures.’123  A few years later 
Norris wrote to Joseph Curtis, after receiving ‘a Lame Negro and Sickly,’ suggesting that 
he ‘knew not w[ha]t to Do w[i]th I have no Inclination to be Concern[e]d is Selling 
                                                           
120 Dickinson to Norris quoted in Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’ in Legislators and 
Lawmakers, 1710-1756, p. 314. 
121 They received not only enslaved Africans from the West Indies but many other 
commodities as well and depended on the island colonies as markets for their goods from 
Philadelphia.  Therefore a clear refusal to deal in enslaved Africans might have interfered 
with the other business activities and so they continued to sell slaves in spite of small 
returns and much inconvenience, and in the face of increasingly firm stand against the 
traffic taken by the Society of Friends.  Wax, ‘Quakers Merchants and the Slave Trade’, 
p. 156. 
122 Isaac Norris to Dickinson, 12 November 1703, quoted in Wax ‘Quaker 
Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 150. 
123 Isaac Norris to Thomas Swan, 13 March 1704, quoted in Wax ‘Quaker 
Merchants and the Slave Trade’, p. 150. 
 244 
Nergo’s at all & desire to avoid it as much as Possible—but Especially crazy one’s are a 
Charge & won’t go off—Thou or thy Friends may comand me in any other business, but 
I Desire to be Excus’d from Negroes.’124  
Dickinson also expressed a desire to limit his involvement in the slave trade but 
never actually stopped dealing in slaves.   Some Quakers regarded him as ‘an Encourager 
to Import them.’125  Dickinson was offended by the accusation stating that he only 
‘imported slaves for his own use.’126  Dickinson’s expressions against trading slaves were 
far more infrequent than Norris and tended be less adamant.  The criticism he received 
from Friends seems justifiable in the end.  Dickinson dropped a subtle hint to Friend 
Jacob Gutteres in April 1715, stating that the slave trade did not answer him well: ‘One 
of thy Negroes I sold I have Yett by mee a promissory note for the payment of which I 
Expect w[i]ll be made good. I am Very Unfitt for Comission business being taken up in 
other wayes.’127  The unsecured debt seemed to be the most concerning for Dickinson, 
when he made a similar comment to Thomas Fearon after a purchaser was reluctant to 
pay his creditors: ‘If thou Doubt or Mislikes It thou please appoint any other [per]son thy 
atty I Shall render to thy ord[e]r therein.’128  He also wrote to his brother-in-law, Jonathan 
Gale, ‘I must intreat ye not to send any more to mee for our people do not care to by 
except of boys and girles and ye generlait of our people are against any comeing into the 
country.’129  A letter from 1715 expresses Dickinson’s position. He wrote to his brother 
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that ‘I must desire [you] to send no more for they are no small trouble.’ In the same letter, 
however, Dickinson requested that his brother send several ‘negro girls’ to him from 
Jamaica.130  The vituperations of these two Quakers against the trade, lacking any 
vigorous moral or religious indignation, must be viewed in light of the factors mentioned 
above including the quality of slaves and the difficulties of the market.131 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, Dickinson only traded and owned slaves in Pennsylvania for two decades.  
Yet the time in which he was involved in the slave trade was foundational in setting the 
precedent for slave-holding in Pennsylvania.  It was also a critical period in the 
development of the Quaker anti-slavery movement.  Slavery and the anti-slavery 
movement continued long after Dickinson’s death in 1722 but as Herbert Aptheker 
suggests, the ‘prevailing general impression that the Quakers represented, as a body, 
throughout their history a solid phalanx aligned against human enslavement…is 
fallacious.’132  The height of slavery in Pennsylvania did not come until several decades 
after Dickinson’s death and it was not until 1750 that Quakers came together against 
slavery.  In many ways, Dickinson’s and other Quakers’ involvement in slave-holding 
and slave-trading provided the impetus for the Quaker movement to end slavery.  Yet in 
other ways, both slave-owning and anti-slavery sentiment in Pennsylvania were just 
getting underway.  Once again, we find Dickinson in a place where fundamental changes 
throughout the Anglo-Atlantic world were well underway.   
Darold Wax suggested that the Pennsylvania slave trade ‘was a slowly developing 
process.’  The period before 1730 mentioned above was followed by a period when 
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Philadelphia merchants actively began importing enslaved Africans from the West Indies 
and selling them in the local market; that is to say, merchant owners of vessels not only 
purchased the slaves in the islands but also sold them in Pennsylvania (containing 
perhaps as many as thirty or forty slaves) thereby eliminating middlemen like Dickinson.  
The growth of Philadelphia and greater Pennsylvania undoubtedly engendered a greater 
need for labor. Wax continued by suggesting that this method changed with the outbreak 
of the Seven Years’ War when the demand for slaves rose exponentially.  Thus the period 
from 1755 to 1765, when white laborers were relatively sparse in the Delaware River 
Valley represented the summit of the Pennsylvania slave trade.  This period was 
characterised by mainly large cargoes of slaves entering the Delaware River directly from 
the west coast of Africa.133 
 Without Dickinson and other prominent Quakers involvement in slavery there 
might have been less cause for Quakers to take a stance against the institution.  The shift 
to direct importations may have occurred earlier and Quaker involvement in the trade 
may have been muted.   The involvement of Quakers in African slavery, however, was a 
subject broached at many Monthly and Yearly Meetings thereby constantly stoking the 
fiery conversation regarding the nature of slavery and proper Quakerism.  At many times 
the Society of Friends constantly had to negotiate between their twin goals of spiritual 
reflection and economic subsistence.  Kristen Block argues that early in the 1660s 
prominent Friends in Britain and the colonies critiqued the ostentation, greed, and lack of 
concern for others that they believed were on the rise in their times.  Throughout the 
latter part of the century, Friends grappled with the factionalism and the ethics of wealth 
and capitalism.  Since slavery was the foundation for the prosperity of nearly all West 
                                                           
133 Wax, “Quakers and the Slave Trade’, pp. 144-45. 
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Indian Quakers and many other Quakers in the American colonies, the matter also 
became a subject of moral concern.134 The general concern of many Pennsylvanian 
Quakers during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, however, was how to 
acquire better, cheaper, and healthier enslaved Africans who could continue to help 
Philadelphia commerce and the surrounding agricultural lands become Atlantic.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
134 Block, ‘Cultivating Inner and Outer Plantations’, pp. 518-19. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE DECLINE OF DICKINSON’S TRANS-ATLANTIC ESTATE 
Only if I could find Language to Express ye load of trouble that lies on me with 
the rest of us I should indulge myself in bewailing our misfortune in engaging 
when under no previous obligation to it, in the most perplexing affair that any of 
us have ever been concerned in which in return to sincere friendship is like to 
produce no other fruit than that of the basest ingratitude…the Testator Died in my 
Debt by his own books as he generally had been more or less for Ten Years 
before and so is like to continue for I have not to this day had the Value of one 
Shilling from what he left. Nay we had not so much as one Bottle of Wine or 
other Liquor out of the cellar when wee met in the house on business except 
Joseph who claimed that to himself thought fit at any time to offer a glass so 
scrupulous we have ever been in touching what was not our own.1 
Against the wishes of Dickinson’s children, Isaac Norris, James Logan, and 
George Claypool reluctantly took on the convoluted task of settling Dickinson’s trans-
Atlantic estate in 1722.  As the executors familiarised themselves with Dickinson’s many 
North American, Caribbean, African, and English accounts, they quickly recognised the 
immense task ahead.  Less than a year after Dickinson’s death, James Logan expressed 
his frustrations (above) with the many problems he encountered while attempting to settle 
Dickinson’s affairs.  Norris ranked the ‘perplexing affair’ among the most ‘unhappy & 
                                                           
1 Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Logan Family Papers, 1638-1964, Series 1, 
Box 45, Letters of Jonathan Dickinson’s Estate from Isaac Norris, James Logan, and 
George Claypool, 1722-1728, James Logan to Isaac Gale, 23 September 1723.  
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troublesome accidents’ of his life.2  Despite the initial problems, neither Logan nor Norris 
could have expected the affair to be as complicated and lengthy as it proved to be. 
 For nearly four decades, trans-Atlantic lawsuits, false allegations of theft, 
manipulation, bitter name-calling, threats of violence, physical assaults, property 
destruction, and constant infighting between Dickinson’s children, relatives, and closest 
friends characterised the wind up of his estate.  The conflict outlasted nearly all the 
combatants involved, ruined long-standing relationships, witnessed the end of an 
impressive early-Atlantic business model, and destroyed the reputation of one of early-
Philadelphia’s most economically prominent and politically influential families.  For 
historians, this episode provides further evidence regarding the precarious nature of trans-
Atlantic trade during the early eighteenth century and provides interesting insights into 
the nature trans-Atlantic debt settlement.  This episode further illustrates the emergence 
of a colonial elite in Pennsylvania. It also reveals the fragility of this small but influential 
group.  These tribulations represent Dickinson’s final, albeit posthumous, struggle to 
contend with the uncertainties of the Atlantic world.   
More a dénouement than a climax, this ordeal reveals several themes about 
Dickinson’s life and the nature of early-eighteenth century Anglo-Atlantic world.  First, 
while contingency and resolve characterised much of Dickinson’s life, his ambition, in 
many ways, brought about the collapse of all he struggled to keep together.  During 
Dickinson’s life the Anglo-Atlantic underwent fundamental changes, which I have 
attempted to illustrate in the proceeding chapters and will further articulate below.  
Despite an inability to control larger forces at work, Dickinson, almost invariably, 
                                                           
2 HSP, Norris Family Papers, collection 454, vol. 18, Isaac Norris Letter Book, 
1716-1730, Isaac Norris to Thomas Hyam, 4 (no month) 1727, p. 500. 
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adjusted accordingly to the uncertain circumstances of the trans-Atlantic trade.  
Nevertheless, during the years immediately before his death the uncertainty of the 
previous two decades converged on a physically, financially, and emotionally exhausted 
man who could no longer contend with his personal and professional circumstances. 
In 1721, after years of poor health, the death of his wife, the misadventures of his 
children, a number of bad trading ventures, poor crop production in the Caribbean, and a 
household robbery, Dickinson was all but defeated.  Yet, Dickinson worked vigorously at 
managing his plantations in Jamaica, expanding his real estate in Pennsylvania, setting a 
course for his children, and continuing his trans-Atlantic mercantile ventures in effort to 
maintain his family’s relatively extravagant lifestyle.  Ironically, toward the end of his 
life, sugar planting in Jamaica and Pennsylvanian trans-Atlantic trade began to turn 
unprecedented profits.3  Dickinson, however, had violated the Society of Friends 
unwritten rule against conducting business beyond one’s abilities and therefore neither he 
nor his children saw lasting benefits of this shift in production and trade in the Anglo-
Atlantic colonies.4   
                                                           
3 The rise of large plantation system and the rise of creole elites made this period 
from the 1720s very profitable.  See John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy 
of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, 1985); Trevor Burnard, Creole Gentlemen. 
The Maryland Elite, 1691-1776 (New York, 2002). 
4 Frederick Tolles suggested that ‘the virtues of industry and frugality were, of 
course, held in high repute among Friends…[while] prudence, honesty, and a strong 
sense of order, were the other virtues that contributed to Quaker business success.’ While 
most Friends were known for extreme caution in their business undertakings and their 
book of discipline contained standing advice against buying, bargaining, or contracting 
beyond one’s abilities, Dickinson clearly overextending himself in the late 1710s and 
created a multitude of problems for his family, friends, and business associates.  His 
overextension and ambition brought about the demise of his trans-Atlantic estate.  In their 
meetings for discipline Friends were constantly warned against imprudent ventures by the 
query: “are Friends careful to live within the Bounds of their Circumstances, and to avoid 
launching into Trade or Business beyond their ability to manage?’ Tolles, Quakers and 
the Atlantic Culture (New York, 1960), pp. 62-64. 
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By examining Dickinson’s personal and professional hardships during the final 
years of his life, the 40-year legal battle surrounding his estate, and the estate’s eventual 
disintegration, this chapter seeks to personalise a largely impersonal Atlantic-world 
narrative.  The following exploration of the intensely personal situation surrounding 
Dickinson’s death and the settlement of his trans-Atlantic estate is organised into three 
sections. The first explores Dickinson’s tumultuous personal life at the end of the 1710s 
arguing that his personal woes affected his ability to effectively manage his trans-Atlantic 
business.  Second, this chapter argues that the extension of Dickinson’s estate in 
Pennsylvania, the maintenance of his family, and poor production on his Jamaican estates 
created cash-flow problems leaving Dickinson, his children, and the executors of his will 
in a precarious financial situation.  The final section of this chapter explores the multi-
generational struggle to settle Dickinson’s debts and the subsequent collapse of his estate.  
In the end, this chapter serves to close our story of Dickinson’s Atlantic world. 
Probate records of Dickinson’s estate, which one might assume provide the bulk 
of the evidence for this chapter, are relatively sparse.5  While probate records, as Gloria 
Main suggests, ‘provide quantitative outlines of colonial economic development, furnish 
profiles of evolving social structure, and sketch the contours of cultural change,’ they 
                                                           
5 Historians have discussed at some length the problems associated with probate 
records. See Gloria Main, ‘Personal Wealth in Colonial America: Explorations in the Use 
of Probate Records from Maryland and Massachusetts, 1650 to 1720’ The Journal of 
Economic History, 34:1 (1974), pp. 289-94; Main, ‘Probate Records as a Source for Early 
American History’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 32:1 (1975), pp. 89-99; Main, ‘The 
Standard of Living in Colonial Massachusetts’, The Journal of Economic History 43:1 
(1983), pp. 101-08; Carole Shammas, ‘Constructing a Wealth Distribution from Probate 
Records’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 9:2 (1978), pp. 297-307; Holly Izard, 
‘Random or Systematic: An Evaluation of the Probate Process’, Winterthur Portfolio, 
32:2/3 (1997), pp. 147-67; John Bedell, ‘Archaeology and Probate Inventories in the 
Study of Eighteenth-Century Life’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 31:2 (2000), 
pp. 223-45.  
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provide little insight into the lived reality of estate settlement.6  Undoubtedly, wills, 
inventories, and accounts of administration ‘can reveal the ways in which men disposed 
of their property among their spouses, children, relatives, and friends’ and can shed light 
‘on family life, the status of women, and the treatment of servants and slaves,’ but these 
typical documents could be supported by more personal documents.7  In this case, a 
detailed letter-book from Dickinson’s executors reveals strong insights into the 
complications of estate settlement.  This letter-book provides much more than evidence 
of the Dickinson’s standard of living.  It reveals intimate details regarding Dickinson’s 
relationships with his children, extended family, friends, and business associations. It, 
along with Dickinson’s letters before his death, is the preferred source for the following 
examination. 
Dickinson’s Woes 
Philadelphia was certainly healthier than Jamaica at the turn of the eighteenth century.8  
Yet Dickinson consistently complained about various distempers, fevers, bouts of small 
pox, and other ailments that plagued his family, his enslaved Africans, and greater 
Philadelphia.9  Moreover, from the mid-1710s, Dickinson increasingly complained about 
                                                           
6 Main, ‘Probate Records as a Source for Early American History’, pp. 89-99. 
7 Ibid, p. 90. 
8 Susan E. Kleep, ‘Seasoning and Society: Racial Differences in Mortality in 
Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia, The William and Mary Quarterly, 51:3 (1994), pp. 473-
506; Trevor Burnard, ‘A Failed Settler Society: Marriage Demographic Failure in Early 
Jamaica,’ Journal of Social History, 28:1 (1994), pp. 63-82; Burnard, ‘The Countrie 
Continues Sicklie: White Mortality in Jamaica, 1655-1780, Social History of Medicine, 
12:1 (1999), pp. 45-72.  
9 Dickinson reported the death of an Indian man after a ‘long sickness,’ loosing a 
number of his enslaved Africans to illness, and Joseph Kirle being ‘nigh Death’ in 1698.  
HPS, JDLB, Dickinson to James Stanyame, 13 April 1698; Dickinson to Cozen Price, 16 
April 1698; Dickinson to James Pinnick, 21 April 1698; Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 
21 April 1698; Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 25 April 1698.  Dickinson reported a 
‘sickness in North America…many dead in Virginia and Maryland in 1698. HSP, JDLB, 
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his ailing health, particularly tremendous bouts of gout sometimes lasting as long as five 
weeks.10  Dickinson’s ailments, while not life-threatening, rendered him bedridden for 
weeks at a time, hindered his ability to keep his accounts current, and kept him from his 
correspondence.11    
                                                           
Dickinson to Abraham Wilson, 11 May 1698.  This sickness must have spread to 
Philadelphia because Dickinson reported to his father that ‘we had been sickly this winter 
and & some dead (enslaved Africans). HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 13 
May 1698.  Later in the year Dickinson once again to his father ‘my famaly hath been 
visited by sickness my son Jonathan was nigh unto death having given him up and 
(Joseph was ‘very ill) when his distemper was a ye height…Negro Beu was taken who 
after 8 day sickness dyed and since the other Negro woman Hagar goth sick.’ HSP, 
JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 18 October 1698; Dickinson to Francis 
Dickinson 28 November 1698.  In 1700 Dickinson reported that on a trip from Jamaica to 
Philadelphia that he had a ‘sharpe fitt of collick [that] almost took away ye use of my 
limbs.’ HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to James Mills, 17 July 1700.  In 1715 Dickinson last his 
infant son, Isaac to an unknown ailment. LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Elizabeth Gaffers, 26 
April 1715.  That same month he reported losing ‘his son and negros to malignant fevor.’ 
LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Mother Griffits, 30 April 1715; Dickinson to Mons Denzell, 23 
August 1716. In Dickinson’s family contracted small pox: ‘all my family have had ye 
small post tenn in slumber & throu mercy all recovered, they son John was ye seized 
thereby & had they very thick…son Jonathan’s wife has not yet had ye Small Pox.’ LCP, 
JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 28 November 1716.  Apparently this was Dickinson’s 
family’s second bout with small pox he reported that although a ‘few hundred dead from 
small pox’ that ‘my two daughters & my two cousins have got well hero my sons had it 
here in 1702.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Rich Champion, 12 October 1716; Dickinson to 
Thomas Maleigh, 18 October 1716.  He reported to his brother-in-law Jonathan Gale that 
‘small pox hath gone through our town few haveing escaped it.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson 
to Jonathan Gale, 28 November 1716.  In 1719, Dickinson reported of ‘sickness in 
Philadelphia.’  He continued that ‘my wife hath ye feavor and been very ill…my son 
John hat been sadly sett with Boyles.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 19 
November 1719. 
10LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Joshua Crosby, 17 November 1719 
11 In 1716, Dickinson informed John Lewis that he had been ‘laid up with Gout’ 
which ‘hath hindered my not writing’. LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Lewis, 13 April 
1716. He made the same complaint to Captain Barrnett, and to his brother Caleb from 
Flushing, New York shortly after his son’s marriage. LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Captain 
Barnett, 13 April 1716; Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 10 May 1716.  A year later he 
suggested to his brother-in-law, Ezekiel Gomersall, that ‘sometimes [he was] affected 
with ye gout.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiel Gomersall, 2 September 1717.  Two 
years later, however, Dickinson complained about bouts of ‘turbulent gout’ that lasted for 
several weeks; he suggested to his factor in London, John Askew several months later 
that he ‘was down with gouat and am not fully got over it as yet.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson 
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Dickinson’s tribulations emerged at a fundamental turning point in 
communications in the Anglo-Atlantic world.  Steele contends that ‘communications 
continued to improve with increased shipping, extended postal services, and the 
flourishing of newspapers’ in the generation after 1714.12  For Dickinson’s generation, 
however, personal correspondence provided the sole means of communication between 
the various parts of the Anglo-Atlantic world.  The early modern merchant, as Steele 
suggests, ‘sought prompt and private information…[which] began with some effort to 
predict markets.’13  Lags in communication presented a number of issues for merchants 
contending with the factors that affected local markets.  Zahedieh suggests that ‘the long 
turn-around times in transoceanic trade stimulated refinements in credit practices to 
smooth the long chains linking a network of domestic suppliers and distributors with 
overseas customers.’14  Kinks in the chain, such as interruptions in correspondence, put 
stress upon personal and professional relationships and undoubtedly upset the delicate 
                                                           
to Richard Miles, 30 July 1719; Dickinson to John Askew, 27 August 1719; Dickinson to 
Thomas Mayleigh, 29 August 1719; Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 29 August 1719. His 
understanding of his condition, however, was flawed.  Dickinson attributed his gout to 
drinking poor quality wine: ‘I lost t[w]o pypes of my faune which occasioned me last 
winter to drink poor wine which I have suff[e]red for since by ye gout which many of 
friends conjecture to be ye occasion.’  In 1721, Dickinson lamented his illness at length 
and asked for help in relieving his pain: ‘I was indisposed so much out of order as made 
me keep my chamber for some time past my infirmity brought me down by a flying gouty 
humour that gets up to my stomach and puts me under great distress I have been afflicted 
with it these three summers and nothing relieves me but a rich generous claret wine 
which drives it to ye extream parts.  This remeday I must provide myself with or I maybe 
in great danger on these afterpoints I expect thou will provide for thy old friend.’  LCP, 
JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 8 September 1719; Dickinson to John Askew, 28 
August 1721. 
12 Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 250. 
13 Steele, The English Atlantic, pp. 213-14. 
14 Nuala Zahedieh, ‘Overseas Expansion and Trade in the Seventeenth Century’ in 
Nicolas Canny (ed.) The Origins of Empire (Oxford, 1998), p. 419. 
 255 
balance between mercantile peril and prosperity.  Trans-Atlantic credit and debt will be 
discussed in more detail below.       
While Dickinson’s personal ailments impacted his ability to conduct business, 
family illnesses also kept him from his correspondence.  Just as Dickinson recovered 
from a bout of gout, his wife ‘having gott cold [was] much out of order having an ague & 
fevor.’15  A week later Dickinson explained the severity of her sickness to Richard 
Champion: ‘My wife bei[n]g sized…with a Violent feavor…is in a week and low 
condition which comes soe near me [that] I am unfit for any business.’16  Dickinson 
opined that ‘I am under much trouble my wife being dangerously ill;’ he further 
lamented, that he was ‘not fitt to put [his] pain to paper.’17  Dickinson suggested to 
Joshua Hyam that he was ‘strongly affict[ed]’ by his wife’s illness that he had ‘not a 
turne of thoughts to answer those just demands which is due.’18  To Thomas Hyam, he 
suggested that his concern for his wife had rendered unable ‘to compose it [his mind] for 
business.’19  While her family members expressed concern over his health, Dickinson’s 
business associates expressed more concern for their accounts.  Increasingly, at the end of 
the 1710s, Dickinson was apologising to his associates for his infrequent letters and 
overextended accounts.  Since frequent correspondence was necessary in ‘the struggle to 
plan economic advantage[s],’ Dickinson’s failure to ‘exploit the latest intelligence’ 
provided many uneasy moments for Dickinson’s business associates.20  Ultimately, this 
                                                           
15 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 18 November 1719. 
16 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Richard Champion, 27 November 1719. 
17 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 28 November 1719; LCP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 28 November 1719. 
18 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Joshua Hyam, 28 November 1719. 
19 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 29 November 1719. 
20 Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 218. 
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lag in communication brought about by the conditions of Dickinson personal life set in 
motion the many problems associated with the estate well before his death in 1722. 
Dickinson’s correspondence suffered further after 30 November 1719, when 
twelve days from her first fever, Mary Dickinson died.  Dickinson wrote in ‘deep 
mourning’ about the ‘great loss to me and my Dear Children having [to] part with my 
Deare Wife last night.’21 He further lamented that ‘our loss in her is more than I with 
words can express.’22  He called her death, ‘the greatest loss [that] could be fall mee and 
myne.’23  He also suggested that he had ‘parted with one of [his] most greatest comforts 
in this life [his] most valluble companion.’24  Mary’s death marked a personal turning 
point in Dickinson’s life.  Suddenly, Dickinson’s priorities shifted.  The man, who for 
most of his life seemed solely concerned with mercantile pursuits, was reined in by the 
growing uncertainty of his family’s future.  Evidently, Mary was a temperate voice of 
reason, a mediator between father and sons, a good household manager, and a loving 
mother and wife.  In her absence, extenuating circumstances forced Dickinson to 
reconcile his relationships with his children by determining the best course for their 
future, all while attempting to correct his own errant financial course.  
Immediately after Mary’s death, Dickinson’s concerned himself most with the 
future of his children.  In all, Dickinson and Mary had six children, four boys and two 
girls.  Mary gave birth to her first child, Jonathan, six months before the Dickinsons first 
departed from Jamaica in 1696.25  Dickinson’s second and third sons, Joseph and John, 
                                                           
21 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 1 December 1719. 
22 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Vassall, 4 December 1719, 1719. 
23 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 4 December 1719. 
24 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Eastwick and Gale, 7 December 1719. 
25 Many times during their trek through Florida, baby Jonathan was ‘nigh unto 
death’ but he survived and arrived in Philadelphia with the Dickinsons in 1697.   
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were born in Philadelphia in on 3 April 1698 and 29 March 1701 respectively.26  
Dickinson’s business and family commitments, however, continually pulled him away 
from Philadelphia and his young family.  When Dickinson’s father fell ill during the 
spring of 1701, he suggested to his brother-in-law, Ezekiel Gomersall, ‘as to my goeing 
to Jamaica…my wife cannot consent I should goe and leave her here and she cannot 
move having a child not two months old and to remove the other two would be a great 
risque.’27  Nevertheless, Dickinson decided to make a voyage to Jamaica bringing along 
his wife and their youngest son, John.28  Dickinson left the eldest boys, Jonathan, aged 6, 
and Joseph, aged 4, in the care of prominent Friends, Samuel and Rachel Preston.29  
                                                           
26 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Cozen Prince, 16 April 1698; Dickinson to Francis 
Dickinson, 21 April 1698; Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 13 May 1698; Dickinson to 
Isaac Gale, 31 March 1701; Dickinson to Ezekiell Gomersall, 31 March 1701. Although 
the Dickinsons were visited by sickness in the summer of 1698 both Jonathan, who was 
again ‘nigh unto death’ and Dickinson had ‘given him up’ and Joseph was ‘very ill’ both 
survived HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Francis Dickinson, 18 October 1698; Dickinson to 
Francis Dickinson, 28 November 1698. After a year Dickinson returned to Jamaica and 
was never again separated from his wife. Moreover, shortly after his return to 
Philadelphia, Dickinson and Mary conceived their third child, John. Upon the birth of 
their third child, Dickinson reported that his wife and newborn child like their two sons, 
Jonathan and Joseph, were all well. HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 31 March 
1701; Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 24 April 1701. 
27 HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiell Gomersall 20 May 1701. 
28 In the spring of 1702 Dickinson received a certificated of removal for himself, 
his wife, and his youngest son, John, to return to Jamaica. The Dickinson’s arrived in 
Jamaica by late September 1702 and moved onto Pepper plantation, about 12 miles from 
Francis Dickinson’s home at Barton, and about 100 miles from Kingston and Port Royal. 
Craig W. Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Craig W. Horle, Jeffery L. Scheib, and Joseph 
S. Foster (eds), Lawmaking and Legislators in Pennsylvania. A Biographical Dictionary, 
1710-1756 (Philadelphia, 1991), p. 311. 
29 What Dickinson intended to be a relatively brief trip to Jamaica evolved into an 
extended stay in the island after his father’s death in 1704.  For various reasons, 
particularly the fact that his legacy in Jamaica had been ‘in a declining state’ and 
therefore he had ‘to Launch out very Largly to Reinforce it,’ the Dickinsons remained in 
Jamaica until the June 1709. Most of Dickinson efforts while in Jamaica were focused on 
situating his the two sugar plantations, he now shared with his brother Caleb, in an effort 
to establish a permanent, sound source of income from himself and his heirs. HSP, 
MDLP, Dickinson to Samuel Carpenter, undated. 
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During the next seven years in Jamaica, Dickinson’s family continued to grow.  Mary 
gave birth to her first daughter, Mary, in 1704 or 1705.30  When the Dickinsons departed 
from Jamaica in 1709, Mary was once again pregnant with her fifth child, a second 
daughter, Hannah who was born in Saint Domingue after French privateers took 
Dickinson’ ship in the Bahamas.31      
During Dickinson’s time in Jamaica, the Prestons struggled with raising his two 
eldest sons.  The Prestons, along with Norris, Logan, and other prominent Philadelphia 
Quakers, continually updated Dickinson about the status of his boys.  From Jamaica, 
Dickinson paid for their education and upkeep and he occasionally sent them tokens of 
affection.32  Nevertheless, Dickinson and his wife, in the minds of Jonathan and Joseph, 
who were very young when their parents departed, were probably little more than names 
at the end of letters and gifts.  Their surrogate mother, Rachel Preston, who James Logan 
                                                           
30 HSP, MDLP, Dickinson to Samuel Carpenter, undated. 
31 Thomas Story, Sometime between 1710 and 1714, Dickinson and Mary had a 
sixth child, Isaac, who died after ‘a sickly season’ from ‘first ye Meassles w[hi]ch was 
followed w[i]th a  malignant feaver’ in the summer of 1714.  LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to 
Elizabeth Gaffers, 26 April 1715; Dickinson to Mother Griffits, 30 April 1715. 
32 Dickinson wrote to Isaac Norris: ‘I do further request of thee to know of thy 
brother & sister Preston what I shall give a year for the boarding on my children if twenty 
pounds per anno for each may suffice’ HSP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Norris, 10 April 
1703. In response, Norris suggested that that no matter what cost the boys ‘shall want no 
Assistance of money Clothing…or anything needful.’ Isaac Norris to Dickinson, quoted 
in Horle ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and Legislators, p. 325). Nevertheless, 
Richard Hill suggested to Dickinson that the boys were ‘Much taken w[ith] theire 
Mothers letter & your tokens sent them and have bin very Just in Distributeing the 
Orranges according to direction.’ Richard Hill to Dickinson, quoted in Horle, ‘Jonathan 
Dickinson’ in Lawmakers and Legislators, p. 325. Dickinson, in 1703, sent a box 
‘Containing Some Linnen & Cloathing w[i]th what Elce my wife hath put up for Our 
Sons, And a P[ar]cell of Doves in Cages, Two Gurney henns and two Kids of Corne for 
thy Subsitence.’ HSP, MDLP, Dickinson to Isaac Norris, 10 April 1703.    
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characterised as an indulgent and extremely loving mother, should be credited with 
raising the boys during their adolescence.33     
During Dickinson’s seven-year absence, however, Jonathan and Joseph proved to 
be quite a handful for the Prestons.  The two boys were fond of one another and were 
often characterised as extremely high-spirited, rugged, and relatively uninterested in 
school.34  Jonathan apparently matured while Joseph remained ‘wild.’35  In support of 
Jonathan, Samuel Hudson commented to Dickinson that he ‘sometimes observed 
Jonathan to reprove him [Joseph] from Some of his Little tricks.’  He further suggested 
that ‘it often proves that a naughty boy makes a good man.’36  A number of Friends 
believed that the Dickinsons needed to return to Philadelphia for the sake of their children 
                                                           
33 James Logan called her ‘too affectionate’ toward them, while in a later letter, he 
eulogized her care for younger Jonathan during a serious illness: ‘what Difference there 
may be between a Mother & her in the Heart itself is impossible for me to judge but this I 
can boldly Say, that I never Saw even the fondness of Mother Shew more tenderness and 
Concern than she did through the whole time…to a degree that I thought twas impossible 
for Nature to support it.’ James Logan quoted in Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in 
Lawmakers and Legislators, pp. 325-26.  
34 Rachel Preston called the boys ‘Children of the greatest Spirit that ever I meet 
with, thay Rain as admaralls amongst the boys and have them in as good subjection as 
many a master has his Shooters; they are of the most undau[n]ted Corage and Cary ther 
Resentments very high.’ HSP, MDLP, Rachel Preston to Dickinson, 13 August 1702. On 
another occasion, she referred to them as ‘harty and Cherfull, Brisk and Lively’ while her 
husband said they possessed a ‘well brisk and Chearefull Spirit to the highest degree.’ 
HSP, MDLP, Samuel Preston to Dickinson 13 August 1703. James Logan wrote to 
Dickinson in 1704: ‘I shall acquaint thee they thy two rugged boyes are very lusty, love 
the River much better this hot weather than their Masters Countenance and the field & 
boats far before School or books’ James Logan to Dickinson, June 1704, quoted in Horle, 
‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and Legislators, p. 325.  Rachel Preston, in the 
previous month, suggested that Jonathan ‘loves his school rather beter then his brother 
but Improves in his larning slowly.’  Two years later, Isaac and Mary Norris suggested to 
Mary Dickinson that they boys ‘come forward handsomely enough in their Learning, 
And Altho[ugh] they may Seem to have Somew[ha]t that appears Resolute and a Little 
Rough in their temper & Carriage Yet there is room for Polishing & they have A Ground 
to work on.’ HSP, MDLP, Isaac and Mary Norris to Mary Dickinson, 21 March 1705/06. 
35 Jonathan almost died in 1703 and again in 1706 from severe illness. He also 
broke his arm in 1705 ‘Jumping off a hay Stack.’  
36 HSP, MDLP, Samuel Hudson to Jonathan Dickinson, 1 June 1706. 
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and their friendships.  As early as June 1704, James Logan, while praising Rachel 
Preston, stressed that even she ‘most eagerly’ desired that ‘her care should be succeed by 
Her to whom Nature had given a nearer and stronger Right.’37  In October of 1705, Norris 
offered sharper criticism: ‘I…wish heartily thy coming as well on their Acco[un]t as for 
the Cause of Friendship.’  He stressed it was ‘high time’ for their parents, rather than a 
‘best fr[ien]d to oversee them, since their ‘temper & years’ demanded ‘Stricter discipline’ 
than was possible ‘under the present Circumstances.’38 
Dickinson acknowledged the immense responsibility he placed on his friends in 
Philadelphia.  In November 1706, he wrote to Rachel Preston expressing his concern that 
he had not appropriately acknowledged her ‘care & trouble’ in raising the boys, adding 
that nothing should be spared ‘to Improve them in their manners & morals.’39  The 
Philadelphia Friends certainly held the boys close to their hearts but the impetuousness of 
the boys in their youth only proved to be a prelude to the immense trouble Jonathan, and 
especially, Joseph gave both Isaac Norris and James Logan after their father’s death.   
Coming of Age 
Near the end of his life, and particularly after the death of his wife, Dickinson struggled 
with setting a course for his impetuous children.  Dickinson’s preoccupation with his 
children’s future further disrupted his trans-Atlantic business affairs and upset his balance 
sheet.  Settling his sons on a plantation outside Philadelphia not only required large 
outlays of capital but it also required that Dickinson remain in Pennsylvania to help 
established crops, labor, and supplies.  Both took him away from his own trans-Atlantic 
                                                           
37 James Logan quoted in Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and 
Legislators, p. 315.  
38 Isaac Norris quoted in Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and 
Legislators, p. 315. 
39 HSP, MDLP, Dickinson to Rachel Preston, 21 November 1705. 
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business affairs.  By the late 1710s, Dickinson was keenly aware of the problems his 
friends experienced raising his two eldest boys.  Dickinson wrote to his sister, Mary, in 
Jamaica: ‘My son Jos[eph] is full of notion[s] of things afar of but…[I] shall keep him 
nere mee until hee hath a more solid Capacity to think Rightly for himself.’  Dickinson 
youngest son, John, apparently took after Joseph: ‘my son John I am asending him to a 
Country Schoole to ween him of from his towne companions being so taken up w[i]th 
Play that hee neglects his Learning.’  In an effort to level-out the impetuous Joseph, 
Dickinson sent him with George Claypool on a relatively short and safe trip to the 1715 
the Society of Friends Yearly Meeting in Long Island.  Dickinson’s eldest son, Jonathan, 
accompanied him on the trip as a chaperone.40  While at Long Island, Jonathan met his 
future wife, Hannah Rodman, the sixteen-year-old daughter of Dr. John Rodman, a 
Quaker from Barbados.41  This marriage undoubtedly served to further the development 
Dickinson’s business connections in both the mid-Atlantic and the Caribbean.   
After the wedding, Dickinson took a more active role in his three sons’ lives.  
Dickinson planned to apprentice his youngest son John, aged 15 in 1716, for six years to 
Walter Newberry, a Boston merchant.42  While Dickinson was still uncertain about 
John’s future, he conveyed to his brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, ‘wee have great hopes for 
                                                           
40 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Walter Newberry, 14 June 1715. 
41 For background of Dr. John Roadman see, Charles Henry Jones, Genealogy of 
the Rodman Family, 1620 to 1886 (Philadelphia, 1886).  The two were married in May of 
1716 in Flushing, Long Island. LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Richard Champion, 9 May 
1716; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 10 May 1716; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to 
Caleb Dickinson, 10 May 1716.  Mary, Joseph, and John accompanied Dickson to the 
weeding celebration in Flushing, Long Island, New York while Mary and Hannah 
remained in Philadelphia LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 10 May 1716. 
42 Walter Newberry also married one of Dr. John Rodman’s daughters. Anne 
Rodman was Hannah elder sister born in 1689. Anne died in 1715.   
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his good temper and Character.’43  Under the supervision of Newberry, John was 
supposed to travel to both England and Holland.44  After the wedding, Hannah moved 
with Jonathan ‘about six miles out of town [Philadelphia] upon a plantation to which 
[they] seem to take heartily to.’45  Dickinson suggested that Jonathan ‘contents himself at 
his country seat…taking pleasure in agriculture & husbandry.’46  Dickinson’s heavy 
expenditure of capital and mortgaged assets on real-estate purchases, which he probably 
could not afford, represents a significant change in how Dickinson, and Quakers in 
general, typically operated during the eighteenth century.  While Dickinson had 
occasionally overextended himself in the past, his real estate purchases during the 1710s 
clearly caused significant financial strain. Quakers generally had the reputation for 
operating modestly in business always being careful not to overextend themselves.47 
While John, Dickinson’s youngest son, was apprenticed to Walter Newberry, 
Joseph was recommended to Thomas Mayleigh ‘which hee promised to observe’.  
Joseph, however, continued to pose problems in regard to his boisterous behaviour.  
Nevertheless, Dickinson eventually allowed Joseph to leave Pennsylvania in fall 1717, at 
age 22, to join his brother, John, in England.48  Dickinson hoped that Joseph would take 
                                                           
43 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 11 August 1716. 
44 He departed Philadelphia on 20 July 1716 but got stuck in Boston for the winter 
and did not arrive in London until the fall of 1717. LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jonathan 
Gale, 21 August 1716; Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 28 November 1715; Dickinson to 
Walter Newberry, 26 September 1717.  
45 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 11 August 1716. 
46 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 7 September 1717. 
47 See Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House; Tolles, Quakers in Atlantic 
Culture; Nash, Quakers and Politics. 
48 Dickinson may have still been against his leaving because he did not 
accompany on his departure instead, ‘my wife went out of this town to accompany our 
son Joseph unto Chester where we parted with him ye 28th outward bound for London.’ 
LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Joseph Gale, 8 October 1717; Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 
23 November 1717. 
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‘Regular Courses to Improve his time Dureing his stay in great Brittaine.’  He further 
suggested that the best course for Joseph ‘must be by Reading of men of this Age.’49  
Dickinson also implored John to acquaint himself with ‘as much mathematicks as he can 
attain.’50  By the spring of 1718, Dickinson supposed John ‘seem[ed] inclinable to fix in 
London’ because he was ‘entreating’ Dickinson ‘to lett him to be apprentice with [their] 
kinsman Thomas Hyam at his counting house for 3 or 4 years’.51  While in England, 
Dickinson’s closest factors, particularly John Askew in London and Richard Champion in 
Bristol, took care looking after the young men.52  Dickinson suggested to Askew ‘should 
my sons have ye advantage of seeing some part of Holland under thy conduct will be to 
their great advantage & our great satisfaction.’53  Dickinson clearly saw the advantage his 
sons might gain from traveling to various Atlantic-world ports but Dickinson denied 
Joseph’s many requests to travel to Jamaica.  Dickinson advised his kin in England that ‘I 
am not for him going to Jamaica until he hath return to me [because] he hath not very 
well thought of the Clymate nor the Consequences that all ends.’54  Steele suggests that it 
was ‘customary to send a kinsmen, apprentice, or junior partner…to become acquainted 
with customers of worth and local conditions in the market.’55  Dickinson, however, 
clearly did not think Joseph fit to look after the family’s most profitable business of sugar 
                                                           
49 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 23 November 1717. 
50 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 2 May 1718; Dickinson to John 
Askew, 30 May 1718. 
51 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 30 May 1718, LCP; Dickinson to 
Joshua Gale, 11 June 1718, LCP; Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 2 May 1718. 
52 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 24 March 1717; Dickinson to Richard 
Champion, 20 May 1718. 
53 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 30 May 1718. 
54 Dickinson suggested that he ‘had rather he should take some time in England 
provided his Conduct be but agreeable & then return to us here.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson 
to Thomas Maleigh, 2 June 1718; Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 2 June 1718. 
55 Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 215. 
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planting in Jamaica.  Moreover, the boys’ misbehavior while abroad placed further stress 
on their father’s relationships with his business associates in England, many of whom he 
was indebted to.  
The boys’ grandiose plans for traveling Europe and the Caribbean quickly fell 
through.  Less than a year after departing Philadelphia, Joseph returned home after a brief 
trip to Holland.56  John also returned to Philadelphia because Thomas Hyam refused to 
take on John as an apprentice.  Thereafter, John decided to ‘come home & take an 
American, tryall of pricticall experiments.’57  John’s actions in England clearly upset 
Dickinson.  He admitted to Thomas Mayleigh, ‘my son John he has Mispent his time, his 
weekness, had manifest to mee which whenever he comes to think will be with strong 
Relections on what his has misspent In time & money to Noe prospect.’58  By 1720, 
however, John’s experiences had satiated his desire to see the world.  After his return he 
intended ‘to be a planter’ and take to the plantation Dickinson bought ‘from the 
Commishoners of the Manor of springgittsbury.’59  Dickinson wrote to his brother Caleb 
informing him of his youngest and oldest sons falling into line: ‘boath [John and 
Jonathan] incline to a country living they have to each settlement about a thousand acres 
with a large quantity of cripple or meadow land which will in time be very profitable if 
they can improve ye same.’60  This second large real estate purchase simply added to 
Dickinson’s growing list of debts.  Dickinson purchased the land for John’s plantation 
                                                           
56 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 27 August 1718; Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 
27 September 1718; Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 3 November 1718; LCP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 1 December 1718. 
57 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 3 November 1718. 
58 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 29 August 1719. 
59 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 7 July 1720. 
60 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 5 December 1720. 
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from the Penn family for nearly £1,000. This debt would not be paid off until nearly a 
decade after Dickinson’s death.   
Joseph continued to lobby to go to Jamaica during the summer of 1719 but 
Dickinson refused to allow him to go.61  When Dickinson’s brother-in-law, Leonard 
Vassel arrived in Philadelphia in June 1719, Dickinson sent Joseph with Vassel who was 
making his way to Boston via New York and Rhode Island but continued to deny 
Joseph’s request for Jamaica.62  The actions of Dickinson’s sons abroad probably added 
to the concerns of many of Dickinson’s associates who were increasingly reluctant to 
deal with Dickinson considering his mercurial track record.  Nevertheless in 1720, 
several months after Mary’s death, Dickinson reluctantly accepted Joseph’s plea to go to 
Jamaica; yet, he still expressed little faith in his second son.63  He implored his brother-
in-law, Isaac Gale, that ‘should my son go [to Jamaica] he is not fitt to do anything but 
see the country and reconcile himself to itt & his Friends’ but he also requested that 
Joshua Crosby find out ‘what station for settlement may suite him best.’64  Dickinson 
allowed Joseph six months in Jamaica ‘to view ye country and inspect our interest and 
                                                           
61 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Harriott, 2 June 1719. 
62 Jamaica remained out of the question. Joseph did make another trip along this 
same route in the spring 1720 to escort Vassel’s youngest son, William, to New York.  
LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Dear Brother, 30 June 1719; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to 
Jonathan Gale, 21 April 1720. 
63 Dickinson suggested that ‘my son Joseph intends to go to Jamaica with his 
cousin Jonathan [Gale] I shall leave him to his liberty therin.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to 
Richard Champion, 28 August 1721. 
64 Dickinson wrote to his brother-in-law, Ezekiel Gomersall, hoping that Joseph 
would ‘obtain thy favor in advice & council.’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 6 
July 1720; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiel Gomersall, 24 September 1720; LCP, 
JDLB,  Dickinson to Joshua Crosby, 23 December 1720. 
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visit our friends and relations and return next summer.’65  Joseph remained in Jamaica for 
more than a year, returning shortly before his father’s death in 1722.   
In one of his final extant letters, Dickinson wrote to Joseph about life in Jamaica.  
He informed Joseph on how to ‘save commissions’ by loading directly at the Black 
River; how his father, Francis, came to own the family’s property in St. Elizabeth Parish; 
and of the best lands on their estates and potential prospects for planting.  He also offered 
advice on sugar boiling and regulating his enslaved Africans.  Dickinson revealed at least 
one family issue: 
I have observed what thy mentions concerning EG I am apt to think that he hath 
an Evill Design against us for by all I can observe by is an envious spirit hath 
taken deep root in both of them and if Barton could be ruined he would consent 
there too.  What should occasion this I know not But wee must guard against such 
designes. 
He continued:  
As to EG complaining the injustice of one half of fattening pasture The injustice 
hat been done to mee from ye yeare 1696.  My brother Caleb hath had the benifitt 
of all untill 1702…they have not spared my timber nor grass on that 200 acres soe 
called in my patent.66      
It appears that, Joseph, aged 23, was finally coming of age and in some ways was 
able to gain approval from his father.  Dickinson’s family members, particularly those in 
Jamaica, however, seemed to be increasingly dissatisfied with Dickinson’s actions.  
Joseph’s nascent sense of independence and entitlement set the stage for his opposition to 
                                                           
65 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 5 December 1720. 
66 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Joseph Dickinson, 7 November 1721. 
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Dickinson’s appointed executers and Dickinson’s Jamaican family members.  Joseph’s 
trip to Jamaica probably exposed him to the value and extent of Dickinson’s estate for the 
first time.  Running plantations, as Burnard suggests, ‘was hard work and required a hard 
man;’ but Joseph had no experience running a plantation and from his actions and the 
tone of Dickinson’s letters it is clear that he was certainly not a ‘hard man’.67  These 
shortcomings, however, did not deter Joseph laying claim to Dickinson’s vast holdings in 
Jamaica after his father’s death.     
Joseph’s correspondence from Jamaica, however, revealed much larger and more 
immediate concerns for Dickinson.  Dickinson became aware of the necessity in visiting 
Jamaica to sort out a number of issues that had arisen during his decade-long absence.  
Dickinson, however, could not in good conscience, leave Philadelphia before he secured 
his two daughters and his three sons.  While Jonathan and John had settled onto 
plantations outside Philadelphia, they were clearly not self-sufficient.68  The young men 
could not provide for themselves and their plantations were several years away from 
becoming self-sustaining.  Profitability, Dickinson admitted, remained uncertain.  This 
lack of sustainability would haunt the executors of Dickinson’s will for years.  Moreover, 
Dickinson was either unwilling or incapable of dealing with his daughters as well.  By the 
summer of 1720, Mary and Hannah were living with Jonathan and Hannah on their 
                                                           
67 Trevor Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire. Thomas Thistlewood and his 
Slaves in the Anglo-Atlantic World (Chapel Hill, 2004). p. 183. 
68 At one point Dickinson requested Samuell Bayard to advance his son £5 to buy 
a horse.  Dickinson also bought his son 100 sheep valued ‘forty pounds New York 
currency’ for his plantation. In 1720, he requested Richard Champion to secure ‘husband 
men for Jonathan.’  Dickinson continued to support both Jonathan and John. LCP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to Samuell Bayard, 10 September 1719; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Samuell 
Bayard, 23 September, 1719; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Hendrick Hedrickson, 4 
December 1719; LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Samuell Bayard, 22 December 1710; LCP, 
JDLB, Dickinson to Richard Champion, 29 July 1720; Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 5 
July 1720. 
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plantation.69  He could not, however, situate his daughters to his satisfaction: ‘ I would 
soone make up to go [to Jamaica] but thare semes some difacalty to have them well 
secured in my absence.’70  He further lamented his troubles to his brother-in-law, Ezekiell 
Gomersall, ‘My two daughters for want of a guide to Instruct them at this their age Is a 
great part of my Daily thought with care and trouble.’71  His daughters were deeply hurt 
by their mother’s passing, which only added to Dickinson’s troubles.  He suggested to 
Mary’s brother, Jonathan Gale, ‘to my daughter mary the loss of her mother…hat sunk 
here into malancoly disposishons which adds to mine.’  He wrote to his brother-in-law, 
Isaac Gale, ‘I am settling a Plantation which my son Jonathan that made his choice to 
settle…all which chains me heare until I can wind up & settle my Family.’72  Dickinson’s 
preoccupation with his children and his inability to maintain consistent correspondence 
with his business associate greatly contributed to his demise.  Nevertheless, Dickinson 
suffered more from larger trans-Atlantic forces at work during the first decades of the 
eighteenth century.   
Mercantile Reverses 
As a result of these particular personal difficulties during the fall and spring of 1719-20, 
Dickinson’s professional career and mercantile relationships suffered.  Dickinson could 
not keep up with his correspondence, he could not maintain his accounts, and most 
importantly he could not visit Jamaica to set the course of his plantations straight.  
Dickinson was clearly distracted but the problems of 1719 did not spring upon him 
suddenly.  Dickinson suffered a number of mercantile reverses, in part because of a poor 
                                                           
69 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 7 July 1720. 
70 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezkiel Gomersall, 8 July 1720. 
71 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiel Gomersall, 17 December 1720; LCP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to Jonathan Gale, 5 July 1720. 
72 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 6 July 1720. 
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sugar market and the mismanagement of his plantations, in part because of the impact of 
the South Sea Company Stock collapse in England, and in part because he had 
dramatically overreached himself in real estate purchases.   
The declining state of his sugar plantations in Jamaica concerned Dickinson the 
most.73  Sugar cultivation in Jamaica during the 1710s was still in its adolescence.74  
Many of the problems planter experienced in the late-eighteenth century were far worse 
at the beginning of the century.  In general, as Burnard suggests ‘the cost of entering the 
sugar trade were formidable.’  Sugar planting required substantial capital outlay but had 
the potential to generate enormous profits.75  Dickinson’s experiences further suggest that 
maintaining the profitability of sugar planting required constant, disciplined attention.  
Extended absences or unreliable plantation managers could send a sugar plantation into 
economic ruin.  Further compounding the problems in the early-eighteenth century, 
markets were unreliable and production was uncertain; Dickinson’s absence and his 
inconsistent contact with his Jamaican counterparts only further compounded these 
problems.76  Nevertheless, much of Dickinson’s prosperity hinged on the productivity of 
                                                           
73 He further lamented to another brother-in-law, Ezekiell Gomersall, ‘My 
circumstances to my vew are very dull could I settle my affairs & family here I should 
readily make my visit to Jamaica but my eldest & youngest son both inclining to planting 
intrust here I am engag’d to establish them therein’ LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiell 
Gomersall, 8 July 1720. He suggested to John Harriott, his plantation manager that ‘I am 
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Dickinson to John Harriott, 9 July 1720. 
74 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 149-187. 
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76 In the summer of 1717 he received reports of ‘great produce from Barton and 
not so good at pepper.’  LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Joshua Gale, 7 September 1717.  John 
Harriott was responsible for the production but Isaac Gale and Ezekiel Gomersall were 
responsible for shipping.  Apparently Dickinson did not fully trust his brothers-in-law, 
because he asked Harriott to insure that they ‘take care in transporting it.’ LCP, JDLB, 
Dickinson to John Harriott, 7 September 1717. 
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his sugar estates; he borrowed against their returns and often carried a considerable debt.  
Adam Smith contended that the colonists contracted debt ‘not by borrowing upon the 
bond of the rich people of the mother country…but by running as much in arrear to 
correspondents will allow them’.77  Richard Pares further argued that ‘the profits of 
plantations were the source which fed the indebtedness charged upon the plantations’.78  
Burnard suggests that debt was endemic in Jamaica and became a major problem from 
extravagant or unlucky planters during the late-eighteenth century; Dickinson happened 
to be both extravagant and unlucky.79  Dunn suggests that ‘Jamaicans lived on credit to a 
great extent, and the assets of an apparently wealthy colonists might be entirely offset by 
his debts.’80  Dunn characterised Jamaican planters by suggesting that they ‘mortgaged 
next year’s sugar crop on imported furniture, clothing, and plate and left an estate 
hopelessly entangled in debts.’81  Dickinson perfectly illustrates Dunn’s Jamaican planter.     
 In bad years Dickinson could balance poor production and weak returns in 
Jamaica with his other mercantile pursuits.  Having overextended himself in 
Pennsylvanian real estate and improvements, however, he was in considerable debt at the 
end of the 1710s and was increasingly dependent on the returns from his sugar estates.  
He noted, to his brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, that ‘I shall have most need of what money I 
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can raise of this years produce in London & little to Bristol if any.’82  The Jamaican 
estates, however, were not yielding what they had in the past. Dickinson explained to 
John Askew, that his:  
Brother gave [him] full expectation & this year peper plantation made hardly two 
thirds of what last year…[his] part of Barton which had a very large cropp this 
yeare however to enlgard the strength…with Repairs have laid me under this 
straight.83 
Eventually Dickinson reconciled his position: ‘what this years cropp would have 
put into a Capacty of doeing with; I must leave undon but I am not a stranger to 
Disappointment and must exercise temper with Patience.’84  Recognising the problems 
with his plantations, when his wife fell ill, Dickinson requested that his brother-in-law, 
Isaac Gale ask Caleb to ‘to lett me have out of Records of ye island the coppy of my 
fathers conveyance to him which I have not yet seen of what Nature it is yet I may if it 
pleases God to permit me to putt things in ye best order for my famaly.’85  Later he 
expressed that he was ‘ sensible of…the declining state of peper plantation’ and 
entertained the idea of turning it ‘into pasture & stock.’86  Dickinson further advised his 
plantation manager at Barton, John Harriott, that ‘pepper plantation these dry years 
sheweth its meane produce.’ He asked Harriott to ‘give me thy opinion of settling a 
Plantation’ on land he held along the ‘Grasy River.’87 
                                                           
82 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 26 February 1717. 
83 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 6 November 1717. 
84 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John Askew, 29 April 1719. 
85 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 20 November 1719. 
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Dickinson’s plans for balancing his interests in Jamaica by reorganising his 
plantations stalled with the death of his long-time plantation manager, John Harriott.  
After the death of his plantation manager, Dickinson urgently needed to visit Jamaica but 
he could not in good confidence leave his daughters to the care of Jonathan’s young 
wife.88  He suggested to his London factor, John Askew:  
could I settle my affaires here in some manner to Leave it I would accordingly to 
my Inclination take my coarse to London and Carry with me my daughters and 
their I would leave them to visit Jamaica and make a settlement of my affairs 
there.89 
Thereafter, the future of Dickinson sugar estates in Jamaican remained uncertain.  Joseph, 
however, saw Harriott’s death as an opportunity to insert himself into a significant 
position of family power. 
Dickinson’s concerns about the returns from his sugar estates were further 
compounded by a household robbery on 24 November 1719 when James Moore ‘took 
away about five or six hundred pounds in cash.’90  To make matters worse the returns he 
expected from the sugar estates never came.  Of the 159 hogsheads of sugar shipped from 
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Jamaica to London, seventy-seven valued at £1388.19 sold for £607.07.08 in London 
with Thomas Mayleigh and the remaining sixty-two valued at £1136.8.3 in Jamaica sold 
in London with John Askew for £473.03.8.  The falling market left Dickinson in debt to 
Thomas Mayleigh by £170.15.10.  Dickinson had previously sold thirty-one hogsheads of 
sugar to a sugar refiner in London valued at £743.01.01 but a ‘week after an extent came 
against him & all he had was seized & at length compounded at 5/3 per pound.’  After 
which, Dickinson was in John Askew’s debt nearly £1000.91  Dickinson was ‘schoked by 
[the] terrible sale of sugar.’92  In 1721 Dickinson wrote to Richard Champion, to whom 
he was also in debt, ‘should sugars rise with you it may give me hopes of getting out of 
debt where from I am painfully concern’d to extricate myself one trouble with another 
had press me much under.’ Dickinson continued, ‘As to thy Enquiry after husbandmen 
till times mend & trade flourish we have little encourgment.’93  
The stock bubble created by rampant speculation in the South Seas Company 
further exacerbated the financial burden created by the robbery and his losses ‘at land and 
sea’.  He thought that ‘its thought suger may rise if Stock jobbing would fall…ye rise of 
ye South Sea Stock is a misery to us here.’94  Dickinson rightly perceived the impending 
doom of the South Sea stock crash:  
I hope their will not be occasion to race out of Brittaine and putt a Bethlem ye 
fittest plac for many that are running into stocks and Bubles which to us seems ye 
Disstruction must upon many with you and prove fatall to us in all ye plantacions 
form when this devouring stock fatall to us in all ye Bubbles then wee may expect 
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to feele ye force yet power yet will have all abroade and at home under their 
check who will governe trade in all its Branches is greatly feared.95   
In October 1720, Dickinson wrote to his brother implying that ‘stock and 
jobbing…is said to advance some mens fortunes and sink others.’  Ironically, his brother, 
Caleb, made a vast amount of money trading South Seas Company stock.96  Dickinson 
wrote to Richard Champion about his brother: ‘I have ye report yet he hath greatly 
profited by a purchase in South Sea Stock which is said he sold of ye value of £35000.’  
Dickinson inquired, ‘if he would lend me a sum to support my losses that I have 
sustained in a little above a year past which I may compute to be about two thousand 
pounds.’  He further lamented that he had ‘experience[d] this before as to be acquainted 
with such losses’97  Dickinson could do little to change this larger force working against 
the price of sugar.  Therefore, his main source of income, as it had been many previous 
times, was at the mercy of uncertain markets in England.  Larger Atlantic forces created 
detours that upset traditional avenues for prosperity; therefore Dickinson, under 
seemingly insurmountable debt, was forced to find new opportunities.  
 As illustrated in previous chapters, Dickinson consistently dealt with the 
uncertainty of the Atlantic marketplace.  Three years, however, clearly stood out over the 
rest.  The shipwreck in Florida in 1696 (chapter three), being captured by French 
privateers in 1709 (chapter four), and the multiplicity of problems he faced in 1719, 
Dickinson admitted, were the worst times of his life.98  He expressed his concern to 
Thomas Mayleigh:  
                                                           
95 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 29 September 1720. 
96 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 22 October 1720. 
97 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Richard Champion, 30 November 1720. 
98 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 23 December 1720. 
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But there seems soe great yet a desidence is dangerously insuing in ye year 1696 
1709 & 1719 during those years I have had Large experimented Tryall and in ye 
strength of hope I may gett forward without turning my mind to ye wright left of 
backward.99 
Six months later he continued:  
am straightened as was at such another pinch when I came last from Jamaica 
being taken by ye French who accounted for me aboute sixteen thousand besides 
what plundering their was & my expencies that follwed before I goot to writes 
with my famaly this was in 1709 and I must say 1719 hath made a deeper 
impression on my mind.100   
In December 1720 he wrote to Caleb, ‘this leads me to a thought off asking thee 
the question of lending me a sum of two or three thousand pounds in being said thou hast 
successfully improved ye sum thou putt into South Sea Stock.’101  He lobbied with Caleb 
for the loan ‘to promote my interest here & save my credit with my friends.’102  Caleb did 
not agree to his request.  Evidently, Dickinson and Caleb did not have a good relationship 
and Caleb’s refusal to support Dickinson in this predicament only made matters worse.  
Dickinson did not write very often to his brother and in the last years of his life the letters 
became even more infrequent.  Dickinson was clearly hurt by this and wrote to Isaac Gale 
in the spring of 1721 explaining ‘the deplorable calamity that has happened by South Sea 
Stock [which] ruin’d trade [and] sunk ye currency of many…the destruction of familys 
                                                           
99 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 28 July 1720. 
100 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Mayleigh, 6 December 1720. 
101 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Caleb Dickinson, 5 December 1720. 
102 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Thomas Hyam, 6 December 1720. 
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by that bubble of stock is surprising.’103  In August 1721, Dickinson lamented the fact 
that ‘South Sea and Mississippi have ruined trade in America.’104  He further lamented to 
Richard Champion, ‘The turne of times at hoe with you wee are like to be made deeply 
sencible whereof in North America friends money and credit are vanishe….we our much 
over balanced in our Trade and those that pursue at will be sencible thereof.’105  In the 
end, he abhorred the ‘Destruction of Familys by that bubble of Stock.’ Dickinson was 
clearly upset by his brother’s unwillingness to support him in his time of greatest need.  
The personal and professional hardships Dickinson experienced at the end of the 1710s 
hindered him from successfully completing many of his tasks.  He wrote to his brother-
in-law, Ezekiel Gomersal, that ‘I am growing heavey and dull to everything thee losses 
yet I have lately had, bary mee down yet I am hardly fitt for business.’106   
The problems Dickinson experienced in the final years of his life further illustrate 
the difficulties of conducting trans-Atlantic business.  Dickinson simply could not be in 
multiple places at once and his personal and professional relationships suffered as a 
result.  During his absences, both physical and psychological, his affairs suffered.  His 
insatiable desire to expand his holdings created multiple occasions during which time 
greatly overextended his accounts.  Real estate purchases in Pennsylvania and poor 
returns from Jamaica compounded his problems and left his estate in almost 
insurmountable debt.  On the exterior, Dickinson maintained the appearance of a wealthy 
merchant but this façade rested uneasily on the precipice of a mountain of debt, which the 
executors of his will were forced to scale in the years following his death.   
                                                           
103 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Isaac Gale, 10 May 1721. 
104 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to John May, 21 August 1721. 
105 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Richard Champion, 7 November 1721. 
106 LCP, JDLB, Dickinson to Ezekiel Gomersall, 17 December 1720. 
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Settling Dickinson’s Estate 
During this unfortunate string of events, Dickinson fell ill in the winter of 1721.  He died 
the following summer on 16 June 1722.  James Logan wrote to Isaac Gale: ‘it is with real 
grief that we are to inform thee of ye decease of our good friend…after an inward waste 
and looseness for some months.’107  Five children survived Dickinson: Jonathan, Joseph, 
John, Mary, and Hannah.  Despite his sons being of legal age, Dickinson, clearly 
understanding the chaotic state of his affairs and with the best intentions for his children’s 
welfare, appointed his three closest friends and business associates, Isaac Norris, James 
Logan, and George Claypool, as the executers of his will and guardians of his youngest 
daughter Hannah.  Norris, Logan, Claypool, collectively possessed decades of trans-
Atlantic business experience and were certainly capable, albeit reluctant, to settle 
Dickinson’s estate.108  He appointed his brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, as his executor in 
Jamaica. 
Norris, anticipating problems, initially refused to become an executor ‘but had not 
Resolution enough to resist, when a Languishing Fr[ien]d took [his] hand in his and 
w[i]th a Mournfull Sinking Voice said “will my friend forsake me at last.”109  When 
                                                           
107 HPS, Logan Family Papers, James Logan Letter Book, 1717-28, James Logan 
to Isaac Gale, 26 June 1722. 
108 The executors suggested to Isaac Gale that Dickinson ‘who had his childrens 
interest deeply at heart could not think ym fit to undertake that charge (for he would by 
no means hear of it) it would not be just in us to devolve that trust upon them after we 
had by forebearing a flat and peremptory refusal given him an expectation of our 
discharging it and had suffered him to continue in it till his last moments the young men 
if we ye may name more than one had false and with evil counselors some of whom it 
was thought had a design of then the estate would before ye younger children defrauded 
and their fathers reputation in all probability deeply suffer.’ HSP, Logan Family Papers, 
Letters of Jonathan Dickinson Estate, Box 45, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 6 
August 1722. 
109 Isaac Norris quoted in Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and 
Legislators, p. 327. 
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Norris called on him to appoint his sons instead, Dickinson retorted: ‘then all will be torn 
to pieces.’110  Logan suggested that ‘it was extremely unhappy that his circumstances 
here obliged him to think of any other executors and that his estate would not 
immediately be distributed among his children.  Logan continued ‘his debts…would be 
so uneasie that we would not accept of it without reluctancy.’111  Evidently, Dickinson 
thought his sons were incapable of managing the settlement of his complicated business 
affairs.  While his sons, particularly Joseph, thought otherwise, they had almost no 
business experience and what little experience they had was neither particularly 
successful nor encouraging to Dickinson.   
Therefore, the convoluted task of settling Dickinson’s estate passed to Norris, 
Logan, and Claypool. The complications were threefold.  First, Dickinson’s estate held 
heavy encumbrances that needed to be settled before his children could receive their 
inheritances.  In all Dickinson was indebted to various parties for at least £4,000.  
Furthermore, the debts were widely dispersed and difficult to settle according to 
provisions outlined in Dickinson’s will.  He owed around £1,000 to three separate parties, 
John Askew, his main factor in London, Archibald Hope in Rotterdam, both for goods 
unpaid, and William Penn’s family for unpaid land sales in Pennsylvania.  Dickinson 
owed the remaining £1,000, in relatively small increments, to various parties around the 
                                                           
110 Norris was more straightforward with Caleb Dickinson suggested that 
Dickinson ‘foresaw ye confusion which would ensue his leaving all or any of his sons 
executors and would not hear of it when noticed to him by some of us both in our own 
excuse & considering they were all of age, how odd it would look as well as ye trouble 
we conceived would arise to us in being concern’d for such grown & heady Infants—
Joseph was newly arrived from Jamaica being full or his own abilities & merit. I presume 
expected ye trust but when he found his fathers averse & our refusal for some week 
seem’d to endanger his dying without a will.’ HSP, Norris Family Papers, Norris 
Letterbook, Isaac Norris to Caleb Dickinson, 21 September 1723. 
111 HSP, LFP, JLLB, James Logan to Isaac Gale, 26 June 1722. 
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Atlantic world including debts in England, Madeira, Jamaica, Pennsylvania, and several 
North American colonies.  
The main complication regarded how and in what order the debts were to be paid.  
The laws of Pennsylvania called for his debt to the Penn family to be paid first but 
Dickinson clearly wanted the executors to leave selling his real estate in Pennsylvania to 
the last.  Therefore, Dickinson planned to pay his debts by using the profits from the 
sugar estates in Jamaica.  This posed two problems. First, the estates were yielding 
comparatively light profits, while the plantations were also in need of considerable 
maintenance.  Second, the sugar would have to be sold in London via a factor.  
Unfortunately, Dickinson was heavily indebted to his main factor in London, John 
Askew, for nearly £1,000 and any sugar he received he would clearly put toward settling 
his own accounts rather than forwarding it on the executors in Pennsylvania.  Therefore 
the executors had to decline using:  
John Askew at ye present…[because] he has a demand by account upon the estate 
not yet fully settled and it was reasonable to think he would have apply all the 
first effects to the discharge of it.  We hope in one time he will be fully paid but as 
we are obliged boath by law and prudence first to discharge those two debts of 
Archibold Hopes and the trustees of our proprietor.112 
The Hopes of Rotterdam appeared to be the most demanding of Dickinson’s 
creditors but the laws of Pennsylvania restricted the executors in their ability to settle 
their account.  Oddly enough several months before Dickinson’s death the Hopes began 
the legal process of securing a judgment against Dickinson.  Evidently, the Hopes paid 
                                                           
112 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Jonathan Gale, 20 July 1724. 
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the cost for Dickinson’s mercantile neglect in the last years of his life.  James Logan 
thought:  
of all these parts of this troublesome business there is nothing more perplexing to 
us than the Debt to the Hopes of Rotterdam who before they could know anything 
abut thy Brothers decease gave such very angry order to their attorney whom they 
choose only as wee suppose for his reputation and Eminence in the Law that is 
have exceedingly Embarrac’d us for had he followed his directions he would have 
spar’d nothing113 
Therefore, coming up with money to settle Dickinson’s debts with the Hopes was 
difficult and apparently took too long:  
In that imperfect list of Debts…wee call that to the Hopes of Rotterdam about 
£800 of their Money but their attorney having their order sued us for it…settled at 
it £1057:12:10 for which they have now obtained a judgement. As these men (the 
Hopes) are exceedingly angry about this affair and are for allowing no favour wee 
shall be very much situated how to gett their demand answered the debt is now 
about £ 800 sterling114   
Second, Dickinson’s sons, particularly Joseph, actively resisted the executors’ 
attempts to settle his father’s affairs because they thought Alexander Hamilton and the 
executors were bamboozling them out of their inheritances. They cited the sloppy nature 
of their father’s will and the executors attempting to mortgage or sell property in 
Pennsylvania to settle debts.  Since this property comprised the bulk of their inheritance, 
Dickinson’s sons collectively attempted to keep the executors from getting a true sense of 
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114 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 1 July 1723. 
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the value of the land, the buildings, and their contents.115  Dickinson drafted his will on 8 
June 1722, just a week before his death.  Dickinson’s eldest son, Jonathan, was the main 
beneficiary of his estate.  Dickinson bequeathed the more profitable sugar estate in 
Jamaica, Barton, which he held in common with his brother, Caleb to Jonathan. From the 
profits of the plantation, Jonathan was to pay his younger brother, John, £750.  He was 
also to pay £750 to Mary, and £500 to Norris, Logan, and Claypool for Hannah out of the 
profits.  These relatively large sums of money to be taken out of the profits from Barton 
seem unreasonable considering the debts Dickinson already owed.  Joseph was to receive 
two-thirds of Pepper plantation, which Dickinson openly admitted was in decline and 
perhaps better suited for pasture; the other third was given to John who was to pay £750 
to Hannah and £500 for Mary out of the profits.  Evidently, Dickinson felt his sugar 
planting could not only settle his outstanding debts but they could also provide 
considerable sums of money for the maintenance of his children.   It does not seem that 
Dickinson intended for his children to relocate to Jamaica; he simply envisioned them 
excising the wealth from the plantations while remaining in Pennsylvania. Dickinson’s 
intention for his children to be absentee planters suggests that his family had come a long 
way since his father’s arrival in Jamaica during the conquest.  Nevertheless, many 
problems plagued the sugar estates as Dickinson’s nephews came to find out nearly 
twenty years later when they inherited all of the Dickinson family holdings in Jamaica.    
As for his property in Pennsylvania, Dickinson gave Jonathan and his wife 
Hannah, ‘all his plantation land near Frankford on both sides of the Creek with all the 
stock Negroes thereon.’  After all his debts were paid, Dickinson gave Joseph the  ‘Bank 
                                                           
115 Further complicating the matter, during the last years of Dickinson’s life he 
turned over his bookkeeping to a second party, which added complications to the 
convoluted estate. 
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Water Lot, Store & Warves with his lots lying opposite of Westside Front Street & 
several Negroes.’ John was to receive ‘the Vineyard Plantation (still unpaid for) & Land 
bought of Commissers of Property…with several Negroes.’  Hannah was to receive the 
‘general House in Chestnut Street…and some Negroes.’  Dickinson requested that Isaac 
Norris, James Logan, & George Claypool & his Heirs ‘for ever his messuage & Lot in 
Front Street in possession of William Dellworth, & the £1000 order’d to be paid him by 
his sons Jonathan, Joseph, & John out of Jamaica Estate In Trust for separate use of Mary 
(who he say marry’d without his consent) during her husbands Life, & then to her & her 
Heirs of her Body remander to Hannah.’116  
Dickinson drafted an earlier will but the death of his wife rendered it 
ineffectual.117  As a consequence his legal will, completed several days before 
Dickinson’s death by Alexander Hamilton, was extraordinarily sloppy with filled-in 
blanks, mistaken pronouns, and erroneous amounts to be held in trust for his daughter 
Mary, all of which prompted Dickinson’s eldest’s sons, Jonathan and Joseph, to enter a 
caveat with Register General, Peter Evans, to prevent probate until their objections were 
heard ‘against the Validity of the Said Will.’  On 26 June 1722, Hamilton deposed that 
the apparent sloppiness of the will was caused by last minute decisions on the 
appointment of trustees and executors and by simple oversights, rather than by any 
sinister motives.  Ultimately, the will was declared valid and the task of executing it was 
                                                           
116 HSP, LFP, Abstract of Jonathan Dickinson’s Will. 
117 James Logan suggested that ‘while living the last summer of her [Mary] life 
she was extremely solicitous to have her husbands affairs…She was then anxious to have 
hime which in health to make his will…The will was nearly complete but her decease 
rendered all that had been done ineffectual…About 12 months after her death I began 
again to putt thy Brother in Law in mind of his good will…but he delayed it from time to 
time till his prevailing weakness convinced him of the necessity.’ HSP, LFP, JLLB, 
James Logan to Isaac Gale, 4 September 1722. 
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passed, to the dismay of the elder Dickinson brothers, on to Norris, Logan, and 
Claypool.118  Therefore, Dickinson’s wishes and Joseph’s actions when combined with 
the uncertainties of the Philadelphia market place and unreliable returns from the 
Jamaican sugar estates coalesced into a convoluted mess of problems for the executors 
that dragged on for nearly four decades.      
Despite his personal hardships, Dickinson added greatly to his possessions in 
Jamaica and Pennsylvania during the first two decades of the eighteenth century.  By 
virtue of his ability to negotiate the uncertainties of the early-eighteenth century Atlantic 
world, Dickinson participated in the formative processes that engendered a class of 
colonial aristocrats in Pennsylvania.  Nash suggests that ‘overseas trade [and] land 
speculation…were the main sources of wealth which helped create these Quaker 
grandees’.119  Dickinson, of course, actively participated in both.       
Expanding his estate in Pennsylvania property was evidently far more important 
to him than expanding his property in Jamaica, which he shared jointly with his brother, 
Caleb.  By 1720, Dickinson had invested nearly £5,000 in real estate and improvements 
in Pennsylvania purchasing more than twenty-five properties.120  Dickinson’s desire to 
                                                           
118 Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and Legislators, p. 323 
119 Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 322. 
120 In all, he purchased within the city of Philadelphia at least 3 properties on the 
Delaware River bank, as well as twenty lots and seven houses, primarily between High 
Street and Cedar Street, east of Third Street.  These properties were added to his original 
purchases from 1702 which included a partially built wharf between Walnut and Spruce 
Streets, and across from it on the west side of Front Street, a house and large lot which 
extended to Dock Creek.  He also purchased at least 300 acres in Gloucester Township, 
West New Jersey; twenty-one acres (with Isaac Norris) near Ridley Creek and 216 acres 
near Chester Mills, both in Chester county; and the Vineyard and 1,084 acres in 
Springettsbury Manor, 500 acres in Limerick Township, 133 acres in Passyunk 
Township, 727 acres and two house along Tacony Creek, primarily in Frankford, 206 
acres on Mill Creek, and 214 acres in Wicaco and Moyamensing, all in Philadelphia 
County.  Moreover, he owned almost one-half of the Chester Mills, along with twenty-
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expand in holding in Philadelphia may have resulted from relatively cheap and available 
land in Pennsylvania.  In comparison, land in Jamaica was far more expensive and 
perhaps he and his brother were more interested there in purchasing enslaved Africans to 
improve the land they already possessed.  Clearly aware of the nature of his large debt to 
the Penn family, Dickinson, on his deathbed, implored the executors to ‘have his debts 
paid as speedily as possible to save from Tearing to pieces such parts of his estates in this 
country [Pennsylvania] which have been procured and so farr improved.’121  Tolles 
suggests that real estate produced smaller returns, but ‘its safety and the fact that if 
required relatively little attention recommended it to those Quaker merchants who wished 
to retire devote themselves to religious, philanthropic, and political pursuits.’122  
Dickinson’s speculation in real estate may have been spurred on by his close friend 
Norris’ impressive real-estate portfolio in Philadelphia and the surrounding hinterland.123 
Dickinson’s household effects totaled just over £1,000 and the contents of his 
store and yard around £950.  In the final inventory Dickinson’s personal property totaled 
£1,978.17¾.124  Many of the goods in his possession could not be utilised to satisfy his 
creditors because they carried debts with them as well as for shipments ordered.  The 
most tangible asset the estate possessed was £203 worth of silver plate (594 ounces) but 
the executors worked tirelessly to preserve that for Dickinson’s children.  The 
merchandise in the store consisted of hardware, dry-goods, notions, cabinet hardware, 
skins, rum, wine, lumber, timber, and seaman’s goods.   
                                                           
seven acres on which they stood. Horle, ‘Jonathan Dickinson’, in Lawmakers and 
Legislators, p. 316. 
121 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, and Claypool to Isaac Gale, 25 June 1722. 
122 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, p.95. 
123 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, p. 95. 
124 HSP, MDLP, Dickinson Estate Inventory; Gillingham, ‘The Estate of Jonathan 
Dickinson’, p. 421 
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The inventory of his household goods provides insight into the Dickinson’s 
standard of living.  Almost every room of his ‘handsome city house’ contained mahogany 
furniture of the finest quality. Tea-tables, satin-cushioned easy chairs, caned elbowchairs, 
expensive clocks, looking glasses, and occasional pieces graced his parlors.  It is worth 
mentioning that exotic woods were not common in the colonies during the early 
eighteenth century.125  As early as 1699, Dickinson began importing logwood from the 
circum-Caribbean, which he no doubt had his furniture made.126  In the bedrooms were 
featherbeds with ‘Inside and outside Curtains, Vailings, head & Tester Clothes’.  His 
table displayed elaborate settings of china and silver, Oznabrigg napkins, and expensive 
glassware.  The kitchens contained leather chairs, brass candlesticks, and dozens of 
culinary apparatuses.  Dickinson’s library, perhaps one of the largest in early-eighteenth 
century Philadelphia, was not itemized but it was valued at just over £28.127  In the stable 
stood horses and one of the first four-wheeled carriages in Philadelphia.128   
This list of assets does much more than reveal Dickinson’s standard of living. 
More importantly, it illustrates an emblematic change in the way wealthy Quakers self-
identified.  As their wealth and influence grew, Quakers embraced more fashionable 
apparel and paid careful attention to the furnishing of houses in the style of upper-class 
Englishmen.129  Despite all these opulent assets, Dickinson’s estate was in shambles.  
                                                           
125 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, p. 128 
126 Dickinson also sold mahogany planks to John Johns and Abraham Hopper, 
both local cabinet-makers. Gillingham, ‘The Estate of Jonathan Dickinson’, p. 422. 
127 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, p. 158. 
128 Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 324. 
129 Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 323. 
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Several years earlier in 1711 after a long period of bad markets in Philadelphia, Norris 
suggested that ‘few if any here can pretend’ to the status of ‘Rich Quakers.’130   
Successfully collecting profits from sugar sales, collecting debts owed to 
Dickinson, finding markets for goods remaining in the store and yard, and soliciting 
buyers for the real estate proved to be an enormous task.  The executors suggested to 
Dickinson’s brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, that ‘we are able to discharge ye debt but very 
slowly through the general backwardness of people pay here and ye many discounts 
brought by shopkeepers against the estate.’131  A year after Dickinson’s death, the 
executors, unable to come up with the money to settle his debts, advertised some of 
Dickinson’s property for sale in American Weekly Mercury.132  They ran the 
advertisement for several weeks during the summer of 1723 and again in February and 
March of 1724.133  Much to the dismay of Dickinson’s sons, the executors were 
theoretically going against Dickinson’s final wishes by selling off his property in 
Pennsylvania. The executors quickly suggested that Dickinson:  
lived and died with the reputation of a great estate, which in effect is true, yet he 
had by means of some concurring accidents unhappily to far involv’d himself 
                                                           
130 HSP Norris Family Papers, Norris Letter Book, 1709-1716, Norris to Joseph 
Pike, 29 November 1711 quoted in Nash, Quakers and Politics, p. 325.  
131 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 1 July 1723. 
132 The following Lands and Tenements, being part of the Estate of Jonathan 
Dickinson Deceased; are to be Sold by Isaac Norris, James Logan, and George Claypool, 
Executors of the Last Will of said Jonathan Dickinson, viz. Five hundred Acres of Land 
in the County of Philadelphia.  One hundred and Thirty three Acres lying on the Road 
from Philadelphia to S. Blunston’s Ferry commonly called Duckers Land.  A house on 
Society-Hill where John Berrison now Dwells.  With Eleven Lots. A House in Chestnut 
Street where Charles Brockdon lives.  A Lot Running on the back thereof; an of several 
other Adjoyning Tenements.  Fifteen Two and thirtieth Parts of the Grist-Mills and Saw-
Mill on Chester Creek commonly called Chester-Mills. And one Moiety of the Plantation 
adjoining, which was formerly Caleb Pusey’s. As also Sundry valuable Household, and 
other Goods.’ LCP, American Weekly Mercury, 6 June 1723, no. 182 
133 See American Weekly Mercury editions: 185,188, 220, and 223. 
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before his decease that a frugal management is now become necessary until the 
incumbrances are cleared.134 
Writing to Dickinson’s brother-in-law, Isaac Gale, several weeks after his death 
the executors advised that ‘It is not possible for us as yet to give thee any certainty or 
hardly an estimate of his debts in the state of his affairs his books…[are in] no clear order 
and are behind [with] many accounts open and unsettled.’135  They further lamented 
Dickinson’s condition at the time of his death suggesting that:  
at no time these many years had our deceased Friend less of effects or Mercandize 
than at this of his decease…Money which will go but little way in the immediate 
occasions.  The stores are generally empty and…goods brought in by Joseph he 
claims as his own though at length he promis’d to submit what he has left unsold 
to the service.136 
The executors alluded here that the biggest problem came from Dickinson’s 
children.  From the outset the children posed several problems. First, none of them were 
self-sufficient.  Furthermore, they complained that ‘Jonathan’s (Sr.) family also having 
been always accustomed to an expensive way gives them and us an uneasiness.’137  
Without Dickinson doling out funds to his children, they were forced to quell their 
extravagant lifestyle.  The executors suggested that Jonathan, ‘tho[ugh] married and 
settled hath hitherto so much depended on his Father for support that he tells us he wants 
an immediate supply,’ and continued: ‘Jonathan and his family who are in no way of 
getting anything of value form their plantation will be exceedingly strained this next 
                                                           
134 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Logan and Claypool to Thomas Rodman, 7 September 1722. 
135 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 25 June 1722. 
136 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 25 June 1722. 
137 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 1 July 1723. 
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winter unless some such supplies come before the fall.’138  As for the Dickinson 
daughters, the executors informed Isaac Gale that, ‘Hannah is to be placed at a school out 
of her former acquaintance who were a disadvantage to her…Mary will want much more 
than the rent of the house allotted for her.’139  The children collectively were not 
accustomed to worrying about financial matters, which were now a major source of 
concern.   
Second, some children, particularly Joseph, actively resisted the efforts of the 
executors to settle Dickinson’s estate.  During the very first stage of settling the estate, 
Joseph blocked the executors from taking a proper inventory of Dickinson’s estate 
because the will indicated certain goods were to be given to Joseph as part of his 
inheritance.  They related to Isaac Gale that ‘we began amicably…to proceed in taking 
the inventory but it lasted not for he [Joseph] quickly renew’d his opposition and kept 
possession of the house and all the goods in it.’140  Joseph apparently laid claim to a large 
part of Dickinson’s estate that he did not have a legal right to. The executors suggested 
that ‘Joseph Dickinson maid some claim to halfe of it but he has already got a great deal 
                                                           
138 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 25 June 1722. 
139 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 6 August 1722; 
Hannah was sent to live with Jonathan’s wife’s father, Thomas Rodman in Rhode Island.  
Upon her departure the executors wrote to Rodman: ‘to pursue her father’s resolutions in 
his lifetime which were to place her out at some distance from the acquaintance she had 
contacted after her mother’s decease for which purpose above all other places he 
proposed Rhode Island encouraged we suppose by some hopes he might have conceived 
from some of this and thy relations that the child might find a reception with thee and be 
under they wife’s immediate care or at least by your means be recommend to that of 
some other friend with whom she might be conveniently and advantageously placed. 
HSP, LFP, LJDE, Logan and Claypool to Thomas Rodman, 7 September 1722. 
140 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 6 August 1722. On 
17 July 1722, the executors wrote to Joseph Dickinson to request the key of the house 
and store house: ‘to inventorying the Estate and gett the books possed up that wee may be 
able to as soone as possible know the Debts and Credit but finding the doors lock’d up 
and understanding the key are in thy possession we desire thee to bring or send them to 
us.’  HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool, to Joseph Dickinson 17 July 1722. 
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of the estate into his hands which appears not to belong to him.’141  More specifically 
Joseph claimed ownership of a ship from Boston:  
to which he produces a letter from his father to him when in Jamaica informing 
him of the cost of the ship that he held a quarter and that Joseph if he pleases 
might hold a part with him which claim he things he strengthens by saying he has 
the bill of sale in his hands.142 
Just as Joseph laid claim to assets in Dickinson’s storehouse, several other 
children refused to relinquish assets they believed to be their own.143  For example:   
the Negroes left to ye Children when the debt are paid for they account them 
theirs…while others (of more skill perhaps) affirm they are assets in our hands for 
which wee must be accountable and that they are liable (as undoubtedly they are) 
to be taken in Execution yet none of the children will agree to have the respective 
shares questioned.144 
Nevertheless, the executors were caught in two minds about what to do. They explained 
to Isaac Gale they thought ‘there would be sufficient [money] to answer all the debts and 
                                                           
141 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 20 November 1722. 
142 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool, to Isaac Gale, 8 November 1722. 
143 The children persisted in their leaving Philadelphia charging their travel to the 
estate. John was eager to go to Jamaica during Dickinson’s life but his father resisted.  
Shortly after his death, however, John departed for Jamaica while Joseph offered the 
most opposition to the executors.  George Claypool apparently had a soft spot for Hannah 
whom he wrote to offering advice to ‘keep good company and be modest.’ HSP, LFP, 
LJDE, George Claypool to Hannah Dickinson, 19 March 1722/23. Claypool sold 25 
casks for flour for her provision while under the care of Thomas Rodman.  Claypool also 
requested that ‘if it pleased’ Rodman that ‘it would be to her advantage to try another 
summer with you.’ HSP, LFP, LJDE, George Claypool to Thomas Rodman, 6 September 
1723. A year later ‘We have already mentioned thy cousin Jonathan and his Family his 
sister Hannah is at present very well placed with his wife’s uncle Thomas Rodman in 
Rhode Island from whom wee have a pretty good account of her.’ HSP, LFP, LJDE, 
Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 1 July 1723. 
144 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 1 July 1723. 
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leave a hand some provisions from the children under almost any management.’  Yet, the 
executors lamented that they struggled ‘against the opposition given us by those very 
children and labour against their will for their good at ye expence of our own quite and 
ease.’145  Nevertheless, their commitment to Dickinson and his family remained strong; 
they remarked that: 
It is an unpleasant task to speak to the disadvantage of any part of the family we 
think ourselves obliged to serve…but wee cannot avoid saying that Joseph’s 
resolution to pursue his own particular interest by all the means in his power 
without regard with any other is so apparent and his measures so unjustifiable that 
wee see no prospect of limiting him by any means but those of legal force which 
must be both to the loss of the estate and the dishonour of the family.146  
Joseph, in the minds of the executors, was an impetuous and selfish young man and his 
actions were the reason for a large portion of the complications.147  They suggested to 
Isaac Gale that Joseph:  
has of late told us that he has taken such measures as that he is sure thou will not 
pay any of the debts nor contribute towards it the laws of this Country submits all 
                                                           
145 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 6 August 1722. 
146 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 6 August 1722. 
147 The fundamental problem was that Joseph was a lair.  The executors suggested 
to Isaac Gale that ‘Great part of Joseph’s discourse before he went from hence relating to 
ye Estate was of finding Means in England or Jamaica to pay off all the debts at once in 
which wee were ever for encouraging him if he contribute to effecting of it and by his 
language one would judge he had an assurance from his uncle Caleb that he would 
advance a thousand pounds for that purpose.  Two of us have letters severally from Caleb 
by Captain Annis in which we can discover no such intention at present.’ HSP, LFP, 
LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 1 July 1723.  George Claypool suggested 
to Joseph that his promises ‘but now finds (as heretofore) they are as often broken as 
maide and that it is harde nay impossible to kill a weed the soile hath so naturally a 
disposition to produce.’ HSP, LFP, LJDE, George Claypool to Joseph Dickinson, 31 
August 1723. 
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estates whatsoever to the payment of debt and he knows that the mansion house 
being granted to him by the will must be last taken in the execution of the same 
laws and if the other estates given the children prove sufficient to discharge the 
debts he will then be safe in his part here as well as in Jamaica lett them fair as 
they can.148 
The executors reminded Joseph that he ‘often promised to give [them] no further 
trouble’ but he ‘always as certainly broke those promises.’  They hoped that he would see 
the error of his ways but they continued to receive ‘only abuses in return for our patience 
and insults for our friendly endeavors.’149  Eventually, they became more forceful. They 
reminded Joseph that ‘money thou calls thy own and thou further keeps form us what the 
law certainly makes assets in our hands for which we are accountable by law.’  They 
continued, ‘in short, instead of being a Friend to thee interest or shewing the least respect 
to thy Father’s memory thou acts as an enemy with regard to conscience, justice, honour, 
or anything else but what appears thy own present interest.’  They argued that ‘the other 
children suffer…wee are abused and all this is owing to thee rashness and folly to which 
thy inexperienced and undisciplined youth with an overweening opinion of thyself 
unhappily subjects thee.’150  Then at the cost of their reputation they threatened Joseph:  
through our tenderness for the whole family forbore taking more rigourous 
measures till our own reputation suffer by our lenity wee shall now without delay 
proceed to use such as are necessary to compel thee to the justice that is due…to 
use for what is wanting to our satisfaction and that we have better assurance of 
                                                           
148 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 6 August 1722. 
149 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Joseph Dickinson, 10 August 
1722. 
150 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Joseph Dickinson, 10 August 
1722. 
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thy behaviour to us as executors for the future in which thou has most shamefully 
and dishonourably failed.151 
Beyond blocking their efforts in Philadelphia, Joseph created problems for the 
executors by misrepresenting his father’s wishes in Jamaica. They informed Isaac Gale 
that they:  
could not without uneasiness observe the great difference (if we understood 
right)…of the impressions we had reason to believe thy Nephew Joseph’s false 
representations after his arrival there…thou fell into the opinion that the debts 
should be discharged by the estate here and the Legacy’s only be paid by that in 
Jamaica.152 
But the executors clearly laid out their plan for settling the estate and informed Isaac Gale 
of those plans.  Nevertheless they had: 
great reason to believe that the whole estate here taking in all that is given to the 
children will not be sufficient upon legal execution to pay the debts. The three 
principle parts of thy Brother estate here were, Frankford Plantation granted to 
Jonathan, his dwelling house allotted to Joseph, and the Vineyard to john, the first 
of these is an absolute grant wholly out of the executors power and within these 3 
days were are told that Jonathan has found means from it being granted in that 
manner to put it also out of the creditor reach which we assure your was without 
our privity or consent. There are also due from the estate two Debts more 
considerable than the rest, viz: one to the proprietor for above a thousand pounds 
sterling to be paid by and agreement in London which Our laws require to be first 
                                                           
151 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Joseph Dickinson, 10 August 
1722. 
152 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 21 September 1723. 
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discharged, and the other for about £1,057 of this money to the Hopes from which 
a judgment is recovered…we have secured the Vineyard Land for the payment of 
the debts to the proprietor at two annual payments with interest at 6%. As we also 
hinted formerly and are now securing the dwelling house viz joseph for the 
payment of the Hopes debt in the like manner in London in two years to come 
with interest at 6%. As to the other debts wee discharge them as fast as effects or 
money can be gott.153 
But the plan did not go off as planned because John, influenced by his brother, blocked 
the executors from taking the Pennsylvania property.  Claypool wrote to Norris that ‘John 
Dickinson was at the vineyard and locked up the barn…and had taken away the keys…he 
told me he had taken possession and would keep it.’154 
To further complicate matters, Dickinson’s brother-in-law and his Jamaica 
executor, Isaac Gale, died during the winter of 1723.  His responsibilities as executor 
were passed to his brother Jonathan Gale, who was evidently unfamiliar with preceding 
two years of complications.155 Therefore, the executors informed Jonathan Gale of the 
situation as it stood in 1723: 
 which give full account of the condition of the estate here and the unreasonable 
and as we think unjust interposition of the children especially Joseph to embarrass 
all our proceeding in pursuit of the true intent of the will to gett ye debts paid off 
and so save the estate for the children upon reading the will it will be perceiv’d 
that the testator knowing his engagement and that his estate here brings in little or 
no annual income directed and had his dependance that his estate in Jamaica (as it 
                                                           
153 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Isaac Gale, 21 September 1723. 
154 HSP, LFP, LJDE, George Claypool to Isaac Norris, 26 November 1723. 
155 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Claypool to Jonathan Gale, 9 February 1723/24. 
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was his fund and support in his lifetime) should be continued to raise a fund in 
Brittain until his debts were discharged as this was the place of residence so of 
course demand would be made here wee endeavor’d to keep of the creditors…The 
plantation here call’d the Vineyard purchase of our proprietory was never paid 
from and stands mortgaged for ye payment of about eleven hundred pounds 
sterling. This by will is given when the debts are paid to John but unless that 
money be paid in Brittain he can never enjoy it. There is also a debt of about 
seven hundred pounds sterling with interest accruing due to Archibold and Henry 
Hope of Rotterdam There are two other sterling debts due to Richard Champion 
and John Askew all this wee gave full account of to Isaac Gale but his Death 
succeeding that bad year for crops in Jamaica has hitherto postpon’d all 
undoubtedly.156 
The settlement remained unchanged for the next several years but by 1726 Joseph 
Dickinson had taken possession of the Jamaican estates and left the executors in the dark 
about their production.  They informed Jonathan Gale that ‘Joseph and Jon…carry 
themselves as such distance or behave in such manner that we are much in the dark as to 
what value hath been ship’d to London or which or how much of the debts there are 
discharged.’  They continued, ‘we hope Joseph’s ungrateful usage of thy lenity will be a 
caution against throwing more into their hands than is really necessary.’157   
In the winter of 1726, Joseph returned to Philadelphia and the executors hoped 
they might resolve their issues and find relief from their duties.  The matter, however, 
only got worse.  Joseph, with a new sense of his father’s possessions in Jamaica, was 
                                                           
156 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Claypool to Jonathan Gale, 19 June 1724. 
157 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Jonathan Gale, 18 July 1726. 
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more steadfast and convinced his siblings of the justice of his cause.  The executors 
suggested that ‘on Joseph’s arrival all the children being then together here [we] had 
reason…to expect some measures would be taken or proposed at least the terminate all 
the depending affairs of ye estate to which their own interest should have so strongly 
obliged them.’  Conversely, however, ‘the effect of this meeting proved no other than…to 
demonstrate to ye world how much their father had been in ye right in judging their as his 
did in making his will.’  They concluded that they ‘would either choose to cast a veil over 
their conduct for their parents sake than to expose it, and therefore shall say nothing 
further of it.’158 
 In 1727 Norris summed-up his feelings about the whole ordeal: ‘among ye 
unhappy & troublesome accidents of my life I do justly rank my being named one of the 
executors in ye will of my late friend Jonathan Dickinson.’159  He further related the 
proceeding five years to Thomas Hyam, ‘we have no asset left but some plate & lands 
which we have been desirous to save & devide among the children.  Notwithstanding ye 
scandalous & ungratefull usage we have met with from some of them…seiz[ing] upon 
everything they cold especially a cargo from Jamaica which arrived just before their 
father’s death.’ He lamented that ‘the Estate in Jamaica was appointed to pay all ye debts 
which with any tolerable degree of good management might have been done long before 
this, besides affording a hand some support to the children.’  He continued, ‘after the 
death of Isaac Gale the young men taking possession & leaving Joseph manager there 
appears little or no care to pay ye Debts but a scramble among them each to seize or 
                                                           
158 HSP, LFP, LJDE, Norris, Logan, Claypool to Jonathan Gale, 3 December 
1726. 
159 HSP, Norris Family Papers, Norris Letterbook, Isaac Norris to Thomas Hyam, 
4 (no month) 1727. 
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obtain as much as he can to support ye will of ye present day.’ In the end, Norris noted 
that ‘their uncommon & most indecent behavior towards us would shut us from any 
regard to them or their, were not ye discharge of a good conscience in view.’ Despite all 
the trouble Norris concluded by saying, ‘I have never touched a penny nor do expect 
compensation for ye Trouble.’160 
After Dickinson’s eldest son, Jonathan, died in October 1727 while visiting 
family in Long Island, the executors wrote to Joseph in London acknowledging that they 
intended to ‘discharge [his] fathers debts that thou hadst told the Penn’s if they would 
give security that ye bonds Mortgages and Deeds for Springetsbury Mannor…thou 
wouldst pay the money there…[but] that thou wouldst pay what is due to Arch[ibald 
Hope].’161  They argued that ‘it is indeed full time these debts with all others due from 
your father’s estate were discharged, being now above six years since his decease but the 
requiring security from those to whom ye money is due is what we doe not very well 
comprehend.’  They contended that ‘the intention in both was that the money should be 
paid, and when that is done to ye persons who have ye right to receive it there in no 
further occasion for scruples.’162 
Evidently, Joseph remained reluctant to give up all he had finagled from his 
father’s estate over the preceding six years.  His cause was further aided by the death of 
his younger brother, John, in 1729, at which point Joseph effectively owned all of what 
remained of his father’s estate.  Eager to protect his ‘possessions’ he drafted a will 
disposing all his interests in Jamaica to his daughter Mary and his sisters Mary and 
                                                           
160 HSP, NFP, NLB, Isaac Norris to Thomas Hyam, 4 (no month) 1727. 
161 HSP, NFP, NLB, Isaac Norris to Caleb Dickinson, 23 October 1727. 
162 HSP, LFP, LJDE,  Norris, Logan, and Claypool to Joseph Dickinson, 4 
November 1728. 
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Hannah.163  Less then a decade later, however, nearly every one involved in the dispute 
was dead including Jonathan, Joseph, John, Mary, and Hannah.  Two of the three 
executors George Claypool and Isaac Norris died in the early 1730s and James Logan 
was the sole executor of Dickinson’s will.  The will remained unsettled for more than two 
decades.164   
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the 1740s, an elderly James Logan was still trying to settle 
Dickinson’s accounts.  In August 1743 he wrote to the surviving trustee of the Hopes of 
Rotterdam, who had also died, about a ‘notice to sell property to settle debts of 
Dickinson’s estate to Archibold and Henry Hope.’165  Five years later, Logan ‘by an 
incurable lament reduced to crutches & otherwise infirm in Body, having grown tired of 
the ordeal…committed the whole business to a Draughtmen’ thereby washing his hands 
of the ordeal more than two decades later.166  While Logan was finished, the estate 
remained unsettled until the 1760s when Dickinson’s nephew began to manage their 
family estates in Jamaica.   
Eventually Dickinson’s possessions in Pennsylvania were sold piecemeal or 
moved outside the Dickinson family.  The property Dickinson held dear, ‘the Vineyard’ 
he bequeathed to his son, John, who at his death in 1729, passed to his sister, Mary, and 
her husband, Francis Jones, and thereby out of the Dickinson family.167  A seemingly 
fitting legacy of Dickinson estate, however, did remain.  Dickinson’s main dwelling, his 
                                                           
163 HSP, Society Collection, Will of Joseph Dickinson, 14 August 1730. 
164 HSP, Peter Papers, Opinion of Dudley Ryder on Dickinson Estate, 23 February 
1742/43. 
165 HSP, LFP, LLB, James Logan to C. Plumsted, 27 August 1743. 
166 HSP, LFP, James Logan’s Comments of Estate of Jonathan Dickinson, 1748. 
167 Philadelphia City Archives, Box A, 967, Fairmount Park Commission Land 
Titles for Flat Iron Park. 
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‘grand and handsome’ house on the Bank side on Front Street below Walnut Street was 
destroyed by fire in 1730 and was for many years suffered to remain in ruins.  It was 
known by the citizens of that day as ‘Dickinson’s Burnt Buildings.’168   
Dickinson’s possessions in Jamaica eventually passed to his nephews, Caleb’s 
three sons, residing in England.  Dickinson’s nephews would benefit greatly from the 
disintegration of his estate because they inherited the properties just as sugar-planting in 
Jamaica was turning the corner. As absentee planters, Dickinson’s nephews parlayed 
their inherited lands in Jamaica into a vast landed estate in England.   
This long episode illustrates just how uncertain fortunes were at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century.  In the matter of a decade, one of early Pennsylvania’s wealthiest 
and most prominent families was torn asunder by the struggles to keep their estate 
together.  Ultimately, Jonathan Dickinson and his family paid some of the cost for 
English colonies becoming Atlantic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
168 A fire broke out in a store near Mr. Fishbourne’s wharf, and consumed all the 
stores there, damaged several houses on that side of the street, and crossing the way 
seized the fine house of Jonathan Dickinson, whit two others toward Walnut Street, 
which were all ruined. The loss was £5,000.  After this fire, a subscription was forthwith 
set on foot ‘to supply the town’ with everything requisite to put out fire. John Fanning 
Watson, Annuals of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1881, p. 497; HSP, 
Penn Papers, Official Correspondence, Correspondence between William Penn and 
James Logan, 1, pp. 424. 
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CHAPTER 7: A NEW ATLANTIC. 
 
This dissertation has examined how Jonathan Dickinson made sense of the mercurial and 
uncertain Atlantic world around the turn of the eighteenth century.  The preceding 
chapters examined Dickinson’s interactions with an extremely diverse group of 
European, Native American, and African peoples who collectively comprised a formative 
generation of colonial society in North America and the West Indies.  By analysing 
Dickinson’s social and commercial maneuvers through the uncertainties of this period, 
this work has argued that contingency for unforeseen events was a fundamental 
organising principle of many early-Atlantic peoples.  I contend that individuals, driven by 
self-preservation and influenced by local circumstances, dictated the direction and the 
pace of many inter-colonial, inter-imperial, and trans-Atlantic developments familiar to 
the late-eighteenth-century Anglo-Atlantic world.  In short, new exigencies outweighed 
custom, and self-preservation, rather than directives from metropolitan governments, 
guided many Atlantic peoples’ actions.  
I have argued that the contentious conditions of local milieus heavily influenced 
the trends that guided the development of disparate colonies around the Anglo-Atlantic.  
Furthermore, as a result of various political and economic struggles, colonists developed 
localised colonial identities that did not necessarily coincide with directions from the 
mother country.  Moreover, this quasi-independence helped create a generation of 
ambitious Atlantic-world peoples, like Jonathan Dickinson, who were forced to negotiate 
the exigencies of their lives in the colonies by reacting and creating avenues for 
contingency for the seemingly endless problems, turned opportunities, they faced as a 
result of this imperial neglect.  These circumstances were particularly apparent during the 
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period from1655 to 1725, and in particular from the 1690s through the 1710s.  I have 
illustrated that during this period, trans-Atlantic relationships between England and the 
Anglo-Atlantic colonies were often ill defined and fluid.  Colonists, like Dickinson, either 
more willing or better suited to maneuver across imperial lines, developed relationships 
with a myriad of peoples who did not necessarily identify themselves as English.  The 
diversity of Atlantic world peoples is reflected in the diversity of their interactions.   
By abandoning the idea of the centrality of the mother countries, their rulers, and 
their institutions, I have presented a slightly grittier but more organic Atlantic world.  
Rather than an Atlantic world engineered from above the heads of its constitutive parts, 
this Atlantic world was constructed from the strands of individual lives and the from the 
repercussions of their actions.1  Contingency played a vital role in the everyday lives of 
the Atlantic peoples who Dickinson interacted with at the turn of the early-eighteenth 
century.  Their collective ability to deal with the many uncertainties of this period 
provides the context for understanding how subsequent generations of Anglo-Atlantic 
peoples thrived.   
Dickinson did not intentionally set out to create an inter-imperial Atlantic 
marketplace nor did he plan to develop Atlantic-wide institutions or networks.  In the 
face of constant uncertainty, Dickinson actively exhausted every viable opportunity to 
advance his personal ventures.  Pennsylvania colonists, as did their Anglo-Jamaican 
counterparts, struggled to find their place within the emerging Atlantic world during the 
beginning of eighteenth century.  Nevertheless, Philadelphia and Jamaica rose to 
prominence. Through this process, people living in theses colonies shaped the patterns of 
                                                           
1 David Hancock, Oceans of Wine. Madeira and the Emergence of American 
Trade and Taste (New Haven, 2009), pp. xiii-xxix. 
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the Atlantic world in significant ways.  Florida, on the other hand, remained a source of 
contention between competing European powers throughout this period.  In the end, 
Native Americans paid the ultimate price for the consolidation of European power in the 
American Southeast.  Undoubtedly, as Europeans established more and more settlements 
along the coast between South Carolina, New England, and the West Indians mainland 
colonies functioned less like islands separated by Native Americans.  Consolidation, 
however, forced colonists to define more precisely the political and socio-economic 
boundaries that separated them from one another.2   
Dickinson’s creative opportunism and his ability to manage commercial 
endeavors that involved four continents, hundreds of business partners and customers, 
amid all the uncertainties of both trading and planting is what makes him useful to 
understanding the developments of the early eighteenth century.  The interactions of 
Anglo-Atlantic colonists with other Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans along 
several European frontiers had profound effects on the development of the Atlantic world 
colonies and their subsequent convergence into or competition with the emerging British 
Empire.  Anglophone colonials did not exclusively guide the development of the Anglo-
Atlantic colonies.  By shouldering the burdens of unstable markets, inconsistent 
production and supply, threats of piracy, war, weather, and increased regulatory 
legislation, Dickinson and his contemporaries created a new Atlantic world.  In the 
process they delivered the nascent connective strands of the early-eighteenth-century 
trans-Atlantic marketplace to the many planters and merchants who wove together those 
                                                           
2 April Lee Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia. Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth 
Century (Philadelphia, 2004), p. 221. 
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strands into the gilded fabric of late-eighteenth century Anglo-Atlantic commercial 
empire.  
Revisiting Jamaica 
When Dickinson departed Jamaica in 1696, sugar planting was still in its infancy.  Anglo-
Jamaicans contended with a host of issues from international war and slave rebellions, to 
rampant disease and improper supply.  When Dickinson died in 1722, Jamaica was 
coming of age but the diminishing number of Anglo-Jamaicans continually struggled to 
find their place within the emerging Atlantic economy.  Eventually, enslaved Africans 
began to arrive in the island in greater numbers and Jamaican sugar production began to 
turn the corner toward unparalleled growth.  Wealthy planters eventually consolidated 
their possessions, as well as their power in the island.  From the very first days after the 
conquest, those who settled the island were left largely on their own to develop the 
island, secure its borders, and develop its social, economic, religious, and political 
infrastructure.  As suggested throughout this dissertation, problems also offered 
opportunities.  Jamaica’s isolation helped create a new generation of Anglo-Jamaicans 
ready to address the fundamental problems facing the island’s society.  In many cases, the 
generation after Dickinson did so successfully.  Having learned many valuable lessons 
from the first two generations of Anglo-Jamaicans, this new crop of planters increasingly 
left the island for the comfort of England after solidifying their interests in the island.  
From across the ocean, absentee planters left the island to an exponentially growing 
number of enslaved Africans and immigrant managers who consistently funneled the 
profits of their labor home.   
After Dickinson’s death, the face of Jamaica changed.  Jamaica was England’s 
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leading sugar exporter for most of the eighteenth century and in the 1770s production 
surpassed all the other English islands combined.  In 1700, the island’s worth measured 
in inventories and real estate estimates, totaled just over £2,000,000.  By 1750, Jamaica’s 
wealth amounted to nearly £10,000,000.  During the next twenty-five years Jamaica’s 
wealth nearly tripled again, totaling just over £28,000,000.  Jamaica was easily the 
wealthiest colony in the British Empire.  By extension, Anglo-Jamaicans were the richest 
people in the British Empire.3 Production more than quadrupled between the 1720s and 
the 1770s.  Richard Dunn suggests that ‘the sugar and slave system of plantation life 
matured quickly in the English islands under the tropical sun’.4  Trevor Burnard suggests 
that Jamaica during the mid-eighteenth century was the ‘powerhouse of the British 
Empire…the place par excellence where [British immigrants] could attain wealth and 
happiness’.5  This Jamaica was far different than the Jamaica Dickinson contended with 
at the turn of the eighteenth century.  This was the Jamaica Dickinson’s nephews 
inherited. 
  By the 1740s, Dickinson’s nephews, the sons of Caleb, Ezekiel, Caleb II, and 
Vickris, jointly owned their father’s landed property in Jamaica, as well as their uncle’s 
property.  The three brothers not only inherited the land, they also became the benefactors 
of their family’s hard work.  Dickinson and Caleb built the foundation for the success of 
the next generation.  They had literally built Jamaican society from the ground up.  The 
three brothers were absentee planters who residing in England.  As absentee planters, 
Dickinson’s nephews parlayed their inherited lands in Jamaica into vast landed estates in 
                                                           
3 Trevor Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire. Thomas Thistlewood and his 
Slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican World (Chapel Hill, 2004), p. 14. 
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England.  Through their acquisition of wealth, Dickinson’s nephew became influential 
players in the emerging English gentry.  Caleb II’s only son, William Dickinson, 
inherited all of the property in Jamaica in 1783 after his father’s death.  William did not 
follow his father’s mercantile concerns.  Having served in Parliament three times, he was 
more interested in politics.  His interests in Jamaica, however, provided him with 
considerable wealth.  The Jamaican estates were not the liabilities they were at the 
beginning of the century.  William continued his family’s interests with the West Indies, 
adding to his interests there through his wife’s family.  The Jamaican estates continued to 
provide profits for the England-based Dickinsons until the end of slavery.   
The lands first granted to Francis Dickinson in 1655, made profitable by Jonathan 
and Caleb, fought for by Joseph, and exploited by Ezekiel, Caleb II, and Vickris, and 
William, are now a part of the Appleton Estate, Jamaica Rum Distillery.  Appleton 
Estate, an award winning rum distillery, managed by J. Wray and Nephew Ltd., happily 
claim to be the ‘oldest sugar estate and distillery in Jamaica.’  The distillers claim 1749 as 
their inception date.  They might be better severed, as would historians, if they looked 
beyond the ‘glory days’ of the British Empire to consider the foundational and 
transitional period from 1655 to 1725 when Dickinson set their course.  Therefore, 
Dickinson’s legacy continues. 
Revisiting Florida 
Seventeenth-century Florida was a dynamic place where several autonomous Native 
American groups interacted with a number of different Europeans and their Native 
American allies living in mission towns around Saint Augustine.  Native Americans 
along the southeast coast were not mere dupes caught up in the events of the colonial 
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period.  They maintained their way of life, their socio-political organisation, and their 
religion.  They not only took an active role in the new world developing around them, 
they utilised the standing animosities of different Europeans to their advantage.6     
In the context of competing empires, it appears that for this brief period, the 
Native Americans were victorious in contending with the uncertainties of this period. 
While the ultimate demise of these three groups waited on the horizon, Dickinson’s 
journal presented a collection of highly sophisticated Native American groups who 
actively contended with the same issues Europeans faced at the turn of the eighteenth 
century.  Europeans and Native Americans sought to maintain traditional ways of life, 
adjust to new trade opportunities, and incorporate new peoples and their actions into their 
collective worldviews. The Jobé, the Santaluces, and the Ais all figured out how to work 
these shifting circumstances to their advantage.  In the end, these groups successfully 
maintained their autonomy and in some instances enhanced their position along this 
European frontier.   
Dickinson’s time in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, however, occurred on 
the eve of the most destructive period of the early colonial history of the American 
Southeast.  During the first decades of the eighteenth century, England and Spain 
engaged in a life and death struggle for control over the area’s resources.  During the 
struggles Europeans pitted Native American groups against one another.  The end result 
was catastrophic.  The English with their new Native American allies threatened to topple 
not just the mission system but also the entire Spanish presence in Florida.  What 
                                                           
6 Jerald Milanich, Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe (Gainesville, 
1995), p. 51. 
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weakened Spain even more—and at just the wrong time—was France’s reentry into the 
South at the beginning of the eighteenth century.7   
The English recognised the importance of the missions to the colony of La 
Florida.  Weakening the missions would weaken Spain’s hold on La Florida.  In the space 
of five years, 1702-1706 the American Southeast changed forever.  Disease and an 
alliance between the English and Native Americans decimated Florida’s aboriginal 
population.  The Apalachee mission system collapsed.8  Slave raiders drove the Timucua 
from their homes and enslaved many more. This time the Ais, the Santaluces, and the 
Jobe could not withstand larger forces at work.  The English confined the Spanish in 
northern Florida to the environs of Saint Augustine and Pensacola and their Native 
American allies raided for Native American captives as far south as the Florida Keys.     
After the swirl of invasion that began with the English failure to take Saint 
Augustine in 1702 and ended with the Franco-Spanish fiasco against Charlestown in 
1706, the Europeans scurried for alliances with Native Americans.  South Carolina’s 
phenomenal success in destroying Spanish missions raised English prestige and 
facilitated the recruitment of larger Native American forces for campaigns against their 
enemies.9  Within several years, however South Carolinians so alienated their allies that 
they banded together in a pan-Indian movement that ended the large-scale slaving of 
native peoples.  During their worst crisis of the early colonial period, South Carolinians 
faced not a single monolithic Indian enemy but a number of different Indian enemies who 
fought with different motives and different levels of intensity that were predicated by 
                                                           
7 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade. The Rise of the English Empire in the 
American South, 1670-1717 (New Haven, 2002), pp. 98-9. 
8 John Hann, Apalachee. The Land Between the Rivers (Gainesville, 1988); Hann 
and Bonnier McEwan, The Apalachee Indians the Mission San Luis (Gainesville, 1998).  
9 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, pp. 198. 
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varying degrees of interactions with the colonists.10  The Yamasee War devastated South 
Carolina and it took years for South Carolina to rebuild.  By 1730, however, the colony 
emerged in a dramatically new form.  A plantation-based economy revolved around rice 
while continuing to produce cattle, food, and wood products for West Indian markets.11   
The storms that swept Spanish Florida in the years after Dickinson escaped the 
peninsula destroyed its mission populations, rolled by its frontiers to the gates of St. 
Augustine, and converted the colony into a purely military outpost.12  These storms were 
not the same that left Dickinson stranded along the east coast.  These storms were much 
larger forces brought about by the competition of empires in the American Southeast.  By 
the early 1760s the indigenous population of Florida, once numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands, was reduced to almost nothing.13  Nevertheless, Great Britain, by 1763, 
achieved their goal of consolidating power along North America’s Atlantic coast at the 
Peace of Paris in 1763.  Yet their new colony or new colonies, East Florida and West 
Florida, proved to be problematic.  In essence, Anglo-Floridians now faced the same 
problems their Pennsylvania and Jamaican counterparts had faced at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century.  Comparatively feeble attempts to develop trade routes, find 
profitable crops, and import labor all proved to be in vain.  Ultimately, Great Britain gave 
up on Florida after the War of American Independence.  The brief twenty-year period of 
British rule in Florida represents an interesting counterpoint that suggests that despite the 
rising prominence of the British Atlantic colonial endeavor, local circumstances and 
trans-Atlantic forces often guided the development or in this case, lack of development, 
                                                           
10 Steve Oatis, A Colonial Complex. South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Ear of the 
Yamasee War, 1680-1730 (Lincoln, 2004), pp. 113-4. 
11 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, p. 341. 
12 Paul Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, (Bloomington, 2002), p. 174. 
13 Milanich, Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe, p. 230. 
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in various places around the Atlantic world.  By this time, Dickinson and his Native 
American counterparts had long been forgotten but through his journal the Native 
Americans of Florida’s east coast and Dickinson’s legacy continues. 
Revisiting Pennsylvania 
In 1721, Dickinson surveyed Pennsylvania’s grim situation: trade nearly stopped, money 
scarce, and imports depressed.  Dickinson further worried that unless people were given 
additional time to pay for their necessities, many of them would be ill prepared for the 
ensuing winter.  Dickinson died the next summer.  Other Pennsylvanians, however, 
continued to express similar sentiments as they faced, according to the provincial and 
proprietary secretary, James Logan, the worst economic depression the colony had ever 
experienced.14  While a variety of factors caused this economic failure, falling grain 
prices, the disruptions of the South Seas Company stock crash, a lack of a stable 
currency, want of laborers, and improper supply of Atlantic goods, all coalesced in the 
final years of Dickinson’s life.   
Despite these problems, during the period from 1710 to 1760, the province 
experienced phenomenal growth. The population expanded from 24,400 to almost 
184,000.  Perhaps the most significant component of this population expansion was its 
non-English component of nearly 40,000 Germans and 30,000 Scots-Irish.  Much of the 
growth can be attributed to Dickinson and his contemporaries’ ability to negotiate the 
uncertainties of the period.  They established consistent trade routes, found viable 
                                                           
14 Library Company of Philadelphia, Jonathan Dickinson Letterbook, 1715-1721, p. 385; 
‘The Assembly, the Economy, and the Growth of the Province,’ in Craig, W. Horle 
Jeffery L. Scheib and Joseph S. Foster (eds), Lawmaking and Legislators in 
Pennsylvania. A Biographical Dictionary, 1710-1756 (Philadelphia, 1997), pp. 42-3 
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markets, and established a consistent supply of labor. Their hard work created avenues by 
which wealth and immigrants funneled into the mid-Atlantic port.   
This new immigration, however, was cause for concern.  In 1717, Dickinson 
reported to a correspondent with some unease that 2,200 Germans alone had arrived in 
the matter of four months.  Despite his concerns, economic growth in Pennsylvania was 
strongest from the 1730s through the 1750s, as first the huge wave of German and Scots-
Irish immigrants and then the Seven Years’ War pumped new capital into the economy.15  
The Seven Years’ War also created an increased demand for enslaved Africans as the 
supply of white servants dwindled.  During the period from 1756 until 1765, slavery and 
slave-trading reached their height in colonial Philadelphia.16  Pennsylvania’s population, 
which had been comparatively homogenous during the first two generation of English 
settlement, began to take on an Atlantic characteristic. Various Europeans—English, 
Germans, Scots-Irish, some remaining Dutch and Swedish colonists—Native Americans, 
and various enslaved Africans, who increasingly arrived directly from Africa, were 
forced to redefine their positions within this expanding Atlantic colony. 
Ironically, the new Pennsylvania elite began to express the same sentiments their 
English counterparts expressed about them decades before.  Both Dickinson and Isaac 
Norris were part of the founding generation of Jamaica society, ‘the very scum of scums, 
and meer dregs of corruption.’17  Of their new German and Scots-Irish counterparts, 
Norris suggested that they were the ‘very Scum of Mankind.’  Samuel Blunston 
                                                           
15 Jean Soderlund, Quakers and Slavery. A Divided Spirit (Princeton, 1985), p. 57. 
16 Gary Nash, Slave and Slaveowners in Philadelphia’, William and Mary 
Quarterly 30:2 (1973), p. 229. 
17 A brief and perfect Journal of the late Proceedings and Success of the English 
Army in the West Indies, by I. S. an Eye-Witness. (London: 1655), p. 11. 
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dismissed them as ‘Idle trash.’18 Nevertheless, the nature of Pennsylvania was changing 
before their eyes.  No longer would Quakers dominate the socio-economic and political 
direction of the colony. Rather, Pennsylvania’s multicultural society comprised of 
European, Native American and Africans and relationships with the wider Atlantic world 
would come to define this ‘crossroad of empire’.19  
While this is the end of Dickinson’s Atlantic, it was only the beginning of a new 
British Atlantic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
18 Norris and Blunton quoted in ‘The Assembly, the Economy, and the Growth of 
the Province’ in Legislators and Lawmakers, pp. 49-50. 
19 Ned Landsmen, Crossroads of Empire. The Middle Colonies of British North 
America (Baltimore, 2010). 
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